

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dissertation

INDIVIDUAL TOTALITIES, IN ERNST TROELTSCH'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

by

Walter George Muelder

(B.S., Knox College, 1927; S.T.B., Boston University, 1930)


submitted in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

1933

482



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014

<https://archive.org/details/individualtotali00muel>

1933

m
copy 2

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter One: Introduction.....	1
I. Statement of the Problem.....	1
II. Brief Account of Troeltsch's Life.....	1
III. Summary of Research of Previous Investigators.....	8
IV. Materials and Methods of this Dissertation.....	14
V. General Plan of this Dissertation.....	15
Chapter Two: Troeltsch's Principles of Historiography.....	17
I. Historiography as a Search for Historical Causation... ..	17
A. Its Avowed Empirical Nature.....	18
B. Difficulties with Psychical Cause.....	18
C. Epistemological Problems Involved.....	19
II. Differences between Nature and History.....	19
A. Fleeting Nature of History.....	20
B. Closed System of Nature.....	20
C. Failure of Kant's Idealism.....	21
D. Solutions of the Dilemma.....	22
1. Metalogic.....	22
2. Psychology.....	23
3. Philosophy of Nature.....	24
E. Definitions of Historicism and Naturalism.....	25
1. Historical Development of these two Points of View.....	26
2. Significance of Rickert and the Neokant- ians.....	29
III. Definition of Historical Causation.....	30
IV. Contingency.....	33
V. Objects of the Historical Method.....	34
A. Individual Totalities.....	40
B. Conception of Development.....	41
C. Problem of Time.....	42
VI. Criticism of Troeltsch.....	45
A. Time.....	45
B. Causality.....	46
C. Transition to other Problems.....	49
Chapter Three: The Nature of Individual Totalities.....	51
I. Originality, <u>Ursprünglichkeit</u>	57
II. Representation, <u>Vertretung</u>	59
III. Unity of Meaning and Value, <u>Wert- oder Sinneinheit</u> ...	62
IV. Common-Spirit, <u>Gemeingeist</u>	72
V. Unconscious, <u>das Unbewusste</u>	80
VI. Creativity, <u>das Schöpferische</u>	81
VII. Indeterminism, <u>Freiheit im Willkürsinne</u>	82

Chapter Four: The Logic of Historical Development.....	86
I. Preliminary Definition of Development.....	86
A. Development and Evolution.....	89
B. Development and Progress.....	91
C. The Need of a Clear Definition of Development..	92
II. Troeltsch's Criticisms of Previous Positions.....	94
A. Hegel's Dialectic.....	94
B. Marx's Dialectic.....	104
C. The Historical Dynamic of Positivism.....	114
D. Troeltsch's Criticisms of Rickert.....	118
III. Troeltsch's Conception of Development.....	123
Chapter Five: The Cultural Synthesis.....	134
I. Development and the Cultural Synthesis.....	134
A. The Practical Nature of the Philosophy of History.....	135
B. Problems of a Cultural Synthesis.....	137
II. Philosophy and the Norms of History.....	137
A. The Significance of the Individual Totality..	139
B. Troeltsch's Platonism.....	141
C. Inner-historical Norms.....	148
1. Intuition.....	150
2. The A priori.....	153
D. The Problems of Ethics.....	162
1. The Morality of Conscience.....	162
2. The Ethics of Cultural Values.....	166
E. Religious Monadology.....	170
III. <u>Der Europäismus</u>	176
Chapter Six: Conclusions of the Dissertation.....	180
Summary.....	182
Bibliography.....	188
I. Troeltsch's Works.....	188
II. Works on Troeltsch.....	199
III. Other Works Consulted.....	204
Brief Autobiography.....	207

II. Brief Account of Troeltsch's Life.²

A brief account of Troeltsch's life will serve to show

1. All references to books in this dissertation will be to the abbreviations found on the right hand margin of the bibliography. Where no name is given the references are to Troeltsch; in all other cases the author's name will occur either in the footnote or in the context of the dissertation.

2. Based on GS, 5-18, and on Baron von Hügel's introduction to GS.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I. Statement of the Problem.

The fundamental category in Ernst Troeltsch's philosophy of history is the Individual Totality. Troeltsch holds that the Individual Totality is the real object of historical investigation and the touchstone of the validity of any philosophy of history. Hence, in his treatment of this principle are centered many of the basic issues of his philosophy. The problem of this dissertation is to investigate the nature of the Individual Totality, and this involves the following questions: 1) What are Troeltsch's principles and methods of historiography? 2) What are the structure and function of the Individual Totality? 3) How is development to be conceived of in the Individual Totality? 4) How are the norms of interpretation and value in the historical process to be validated in the light of the principle of the Individual Totality?¹

II. Brief Account of Troeltsch's Life.²

A brief account of Troeltsch's life will serve to show

1. All references to books in this dissertation will be to the abbreviations found on the right hand margin of the bibliography. Where no name is given the references are to Troeltsch; in all other cases the author's name will occur either in the footnote or in the context of the dissertation.

2. Based on GS, 3-16, and on Baron von Hügel's introduction to CT.

what place the problem under consideration had in his thinking. Ernst Troeltsch was descended from an old burgher family which had settled for centuries in the vicinity of Swabia and Bavaria. He was born in Augsburg in 1865, the eldest son of a physician in that city. From 1883 to 1888 he studied Protestant Theology at Erlangen, Göttingen, and Berlin.¹ His interest centered from early youth upon history,² and in 1884 he commenced the study of jurisprudence as a key to the understanding of that subject. He soon turned to theology, however, because it offered at that time access both to metaphysics and to history and because the science of religion was involved in the constant interaction between history and philosophy. Troeltsch speaks of his early preparation as follows:

Die Theologie war damals als historische Theologie eine der interessantesten, spannendsten, revolutionärsten Wissenschaften.² Wellhausen, Kuenen, Reuss, Weizsäcker, and also Bousset, Wrede, Hackmann, Gunkel, and Eichhorn served as means of instruction to lead him to the heart of the problem of the religious metaphysical consciousness. Albrecht Ritschl was one of the most influential of his earlier teachers. About this time he came in contact also with Lotze and with the works of Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher. He says of Lotze,

1. CT, xii.

2. GS, IV, 4.

what place the problem under consideration had in his thinking. Ernst Troeltsch was descended from an old burgher family which had settled for centuries in the vicinity of Sweden and Bavaria. He was born in Augsburg in 1865, the eldest son of a physician in that city. From 1883 to 1888 he studied Protestant Theology at Erlangen, Göttingen, and Berlin.¹ His interest centered from early youth upon history,² and in 1884 he commenced the study of jurisprudence as a key to the understanding of that subject. He soon turned to theology, however, because it offered at that time access both to metaphysics and to history and because the science of religion was involved in the constant interaction between history and philosophy. Troeltsch speaks of his early preparation as follows:

Die Theologie war damals als historische
Theologie eine der interessantesten, spannendsten,
neuesten, revolutionärsten Wissenschaften.³

Wellhausen, Kuhn, Harnack, Weizsäcker, and also Bonhoeffer, Troeltsch, Beckmann, Gunkel, and Eichhorn served as means of introduction to lead him to the heart of the problem of the religious metaphysical consciousness. Albrecht Ritschl was one of the most influential of his earlier teachers. About this time he came in contact also with Lotze and with the works of Kant, Fichte, and Schlegel. He says of Lotze,

1. CT, xii.

2. GS, IV, 4.

Lotze aber wurde zunächst der eigentliche bestimmende Geist. Ich sollte ihn persönlich nicht mehr kennen lernen, da er gerade, als ich nach Göttingen kam, nach Berlin uebersiedelte. Aber ich habe seine Bücher in jenen grundlegenden Jahren wieder und wieder gelesen.¹

Troeltsch served for some time as an Evangelical (Lutheran) curate in Munich. In 1891 he became a lecturer at Göttingen; in 1892 he became Extraordinary Professor in Bonn University, and in 1894 was made Ordinary (full) Professor of Systematic Theology at Heidelberg, where he stayed for twenty-one years and where he wrote many of his most important books, including his Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (1911). During this period he served for many years in the Baden Upper House.

In his formative years Troeltsch was influenced by Dilthey, whose new psychology attracted him especially because of its interest in the creative individual, an interest already awakened in Troeltsch by Lotze. His studies at that time were centered in psychological theory. He leaned toward the views which placed the essence of the spiritual life securely over against the physical world and which established the self-evident and independent rights of ideal Lebensgehalte against any ultimate dangers from Naturalism. The proof of this self-evidence lay, he thought, in the "Bewusstsein

1. GS, IV, 5.

Letzte aber wurde zunächst der eigentliche
bestimmende Geist. Ich sollte ihn persön-
lich nicht mehr kennen lernen, da er gerade
als ich nach Göttingen kam, nach Berlin
überabgegeben. Aber ich habe seine Bücher
in jenen prägnanten Jahren wieder und
wieder gelesen.

Trosch served for some time as an evangelist (in-

thron) in Munich. In 1881 he became a lecturer at

Göttingen; in 1882 he became extraordinary professor in Bonn

University, and in 1884 was made ordinary (full) professor

of Systematic Theology at Heidelberg, where he stayed for

twenty-one years and where he wrote many of his most impor-

tant books, including his Die christliche Religion

und Kirche (1891). During this period he served for

many years in the Baden Upper House.

In his formative years Trosch was influenced by Dil-

they, whose new psychology attracted him especially because

of its interest in the creative individual, an interest si-

mply awakened in Trosch by Lotze. His studies at that

time were centered in psychological theory. He leaned toward

the views which placed the essence of the spiritual life es-

pecially over against the physical world and which established

the self-evident and independent rights of ideal beings.

He held against any ultimate origins from Materialism. The

proof of this self-evidence lay, he thought, in the "Bewusstsein

der geisteswissenschaftlichen Methoden und in einer grundsätzlich idealistischen Deutung der Körperwelt, so wie sie Lotze und Leibniz vertraten."¹

In addition to these interests he also concentrated his attention on two closely related groups of problems, the science of religion and the systematic philosophy of the development of religion and of mind (Geist). He desired to work out "eine allgemeine Entwicklungsgeschichte des religiösen Geistes auf der Grundlage seiner Verwurzelung im allgemeinen Leben und die besondere Stellung und Beurteilung des Christentums in dieser universalen Entwicklung."² As the first fruit of this intent appeared his Melanchthon und Johann Gerhard, a treatise on the Reformation. With this a new problem emerged, viz., whether the modern era began with the Reformation or at some later date. He finally concluded that modern times first appeared in the Aufklärung. Troeltsch's work in this field brought him into close contact with Dilthey who influenced him profoundly.

Along with these historical investigations, he studied philosophy of religion, and the latter led him into more detailed research in psychology, epistemology, and philosophy of history. Now arose still another problem, that of the

1. GS, IV, 6.

2. Ibid., 6.

der geisteswissenschaftlichen Methoden und in einem grundsätzlichen ideologischen Bewusstsein der Körperwelt, so wie als
 Löwe und Leinwand vorstehen. 1

In addition to these interests he also concentrated his
 attention on two closely related groups of problems, the
 sciences of religion and the systematic philosophy of the de-
 velopment of religion and of mind (Geist). He devoted his
 work not only to the general history of the development of religion
 but also to the study of the development of the individual
 human being and the development of the individual human being
 in the history of the individual human being. 2

First fruit of this interest appeared his Religion und So-
zialismus, a treatise on the Reformation. With this a new
 problem emerged, viz., whether the modern era began with the
 Reformation or at some later date. He finally concluded that
 modern times first appeared in the Reformation. Treitschke's
 work in this field brought him into close contact with his
 they who influenced him profoundly.

Along with these historical investigations, he studied
 philosophy of religion, and the latter led him into more de-
 tailed research in psychology, epistemology, and philosophy
 of history. Now arose still another problem, that of the

1. GS, IV, 6.
2. Ibid., 6.

Uebergang von psychologischen Beschreibungen und Analysen zu kritischen Untersuchungen ueber Wert und Wahrheitsgehalt, damit auf die Probleme des Verhältnisses von psychologischer Analyse zu gültigkeitstheoretischer Anerkennung.¹

Here Dilthey could help but little, for his work seemed unsatisfactory on this point.² About this time he became acquainted with Windelband, Hensel, and Rickert. The effect of Rickert on his thought Troeltsch describes as follows: "Nun sah ich all diese Probleme neu."³ A lecture in St. Louis, "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft" (1905), and a monograph on Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie (1904), indicate the significance of this new influence. Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (1902) also reflects this point of view. This last work, he says, is the germ (Keim) of everything which followed.

Troeltsch was not completely satisfied, however, with the Neokantian standpoint.

Eine derartige Stellung aller Erkenntnis rein auf die Spitze des Subjects und die Verwandelung aller Realität in Productionen des Subjects ist dann ueberhaupt doch das reine Gegenteil aller natürlichen Realitäts-empfindung.⁴

1. GS, IV, 8.

2. Ibid., 8-9.

3. Ibid., 9.

4. Ibid., 10.

5. Ibid., 13.

Übergang von psychologischen Beschreibungen
 und Analysen zu kritischen Untersuchungen
 über Wert und Wertlosigkeit, damit zur
 die Probleme des Verhältnisses von psycho-
 logischer Analyse zu kulturanthropologischer
 Forschung.¹

Here Bittner could help but little, for his work seemed un-
 satisfactory on this point.² About this time he became ac-
 quainted with Immanuel Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The effect of
 Nietzsche on his thought is described as follows: "When
 ask for all these problems new."³ A lecture in St. Louis,
 "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissen-
 schaft" (1908), and a monograph on Das historische in Kant's
Religionsphilosophie (1904), indicated the significance of
 this new influence. Die Bedeutung des Christentums und die
Religionsgeschichte (1902) also reflects this point of view.
 This last work, he says, is the germ (Kern) of everything which
 followed.

Freud was not completely satisfied, however, with
 the Neokantian standpoint.

Ein drittes Stadium aller Erkenntnis
 rein auf die Frage des Subjekts und die
 Verhältnisse aller Realität in Produktionen
 des Subjekts hat demgegenüber doch das
 reine Gegenstand aller natürlichen Realitäts-
 empfindung.⁴

1. GS, IV, 8.
2. Ibid., 3-9.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. Ibid., 10.

Accordingly, he turned to the writings of Malebranche, Leibniz, and Hegel. These theoretical investigations were supplemented by practical researches in sociology prompted by Troeltsch's official political position. As a result his thought took still another turn, a shift from the ideological method of Hegel and Dilthey to a method and point of view like that of Max Weber and Marx. "Und von da her ergriff mich die Marxistische Unterbau-Ueberbaulehre mit der grössten Gewalt."¹ Troeltsch never became a confirmed Marxist, however. The product of these various influences and researches was the famous work published in 1911, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen. Written from the same standpoint was also his Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter (1915).

In the same year he transferred from the theological faculty in Heidelberg to the philosophical faculty in Berlin, where he remained until his death. During the war days in Berlin Troeltsch engaged in publicity work. The war made a tremendous impression on him.

Andrerseits gab der Umstand, dass ich die grossen historischen Ereignisse wenigstens teilweise sehr in der Nähe ihres Quellenortes beobachten konnte, einen tiefen und lebendigen Eindruck vom Wesen historischer Schicksale, Entwicklungen und Katastrophen, wie ihn kein Bücher- und kein Quellenstudium so gewähren kann.¹

1. GS, IV, 11.

2. Ibid., 13.

At the University of Berlin he lectured on Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Philosophy of General Civilization, Introduction to Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, and Philosophy of History. From 1919 to 1921 he was a member of the Prussian Landtag and Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Public Worship.¹

His main interest in Philosophy of Religion was concentrated in these years on the problem of the essence and norms of judgment involved in religionsgeschichtliche Entwicklung. This interest plunged him into the midst of the problems of ethics and of philosophy of history. Thus began a search for a positive systematic statement of his own position in philosophy of history. His starting-point, as the third volume of his Gesammelte Schriften shows, was a criticism of Rickert and Windelband, whose works, nevertheless, seemed to him to be the most profitable basis for such a philosophical system. Troeltsch's studies eventuated in the work called Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922), which forms the basis of our present investigation. In this volume the author tried to answer the question, "wie von dem Historisch-Relativen der Weg zu geltenden Kulturwerte zu finden sei."² A second volume was to have followed, but Troeltsch passed away before it was completed. However, in three lectures which he was to have delivered at the University of London in 1923, we have

1. CT, xiii. 2. GS, IV, 14.

3. *Ibid.*, 463.

At the University of Berlin he lectured on Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, Philosophy of General Civilization, Introduction to Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, and Philosophy of History. From 1919 to 1921 he was a member of the Prussian Landtag and Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Public Worship.¹

His main interest in Philosophy of Religion was concentrated in those years on the problem of the essence and norms of judgment involved in religious metaphysical statements. This interest plunged him into the midst of the problems of ethics and of philosophy of history. Thus began a search for a positive systematic statement of his own position in philosophy of history. His starting-point, as the third volume of his Gesammelte Schriften shows, was a criticism of Rickert and Windelband, whose works, nevertheless, seemed to him to be the most profitable basis for such a philosophical system. Troeltsch's studies overlaid in the work called Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922), which forms the basis of our present investigation. In this volume the author tried to answer the question, "Was von dem Historisch-Relativen der Welt an Relativem Aufzuheben zu finden sei."² A second volume was to have followed, but Troeltsch passed away before it was completed. However, in those lectures which he was to have delivered at the University of London in 1923, we have

a few anticipations of the central theme of the anticipated work. These lectures with two others were edited by Baron Friedrich von Hügel and appeared in English under the title, Christian Thought (1923); the German edition, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung appeared in 1924.

III. Summary of Research of Previous Investigators.

No great amount of attention has been given, as yet, to Troeltsch's philosophy of history. The problem which we have chosen to investigate appears, however, in most of the essays which have been written on the theme of our study. The first investigator to be considered is Lyman. Lyman's essay, "Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of History,"¹ is largely expository. His main criticism is that the concept of Individual Totalities lacks the validity which is required if it is to be made all-controlling and hence the determiner of norms. Moreover, says Lyman,

Troeltsch's faith that every culture has its metaphysical rights is something, but not enough, so long as he does nothing toward thinking these cultures together.²

What is commendable in Troeltsch is his

combination of historical realism with the task of a present synthesis of culture; his appeal to penetrative insight as supplementing factual knowledge; his recognition of the creative rôle which spiritual meanings and processes may play in history; his transcending of nationalism and his desire to avoid unconscious European arrogance in

1. Phil. Rev., 41 (1932), 443-465.

2. Ibid., 463.

a few anticipations of the central theme of the anticipated work. These lectures with two others were edited by Baron Friedrich von Hügel and appeared in English under the title Christian Thought (1923); the German edition, Der Christliche Glaube und seine Bedeutung appeared in 1924.

III. Summary of Hasegawa of Previous Investigations.
No great amount of attention has been given, as yet, to Troeltsch's philosophy of history. The problem which we have chosen to investigate appears, however, in most of the essays which have been written on the theme of our study. The first investigator to be considered is Lyman. Lyman's essay, "Hume's Philosophy of History," is largely expository. His main criticism is that the concept of individual Totality lacks the validity which is required if it is to be made all-controlling and hence the determinant of norms. However, says Lyman,

Troeltsch's faith that every culture has its metaphysical roots is so strong, but not enough, so long as he does nothing toward thinking these cultures together.

What is commendable in Troeltsch is his

combination of historical realism with the lack of a present cynicism of culture; his appeal to prescriptive insight as supplementing the factual knowledge; his recognition of the creative role which spiritual meanings and processes may play in history; his transcending of nationalism and his desire to avoid unconscious European arrogance in

1. Phil. Rev., 41 (1932), 443-462.
2. Ibid., 463.

historical thinking; and his own insistence on penetrating through historical empiricism and epistemology to a religious and metaphysical view.¹

Troeltsch, however, on the relation of the Christian ethic to Lyman's criticism omits a specific analysis of the principle of the Individual Totality and the discussion of points at which he finds Troeltsch's view inadequate.

Baron von Hügel, the second investigator to be considered, criticized Troeltsch in two essays, the first appearing in the March and December issues of the Constructive Quarterly (1914), and reprinted in Essays and Addresses under the title, "On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity." The second essay is the introduction to Troeltsch's Christian Thought, five essays prepared to be delivered in England in 1923. Troeltsch died before these essays were given, and Baron von Hügel edited them with an introduction. Most of the first essay lies outside the interest of the present investigation, for it does not deal with any specific problem in the philosophy of history. Indeed, at the time of its writing, Troeltsch had not formulated the principles of his philosophy of history in a systematic way. There is, however, a note on Troeltsch's conception of ethics which is relevant. Von Hügel agrees with Troeltsch that Ethics must begin with a general analysis of the Moral, and that thus we reach the conception of an end absolute, necessary, and valuable in itself.²

1. Phil. Rev., 41 (1932), 463-464.

2. EA, 153.

historical thinking; and his own insistence
on penetrating through historical empiricism
and epistemology to a religious and metaphysical
view.¹

Lyman's criticism omits a specific analysis of the principles
of the individual totality and the discussion of points at
which he finds Troeltsch's view inadequate.

Baron von Hügel, the second investigator to be consid-
ered, criticized Troeltsch in two essays, the first appearing
in the March and December issues of the Constitutional Quarterly
(1914), and reprinted in Essays and Addresses under the title
"On the Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity." The
second essay is the introduction to Troeltsch's Christian
Thought, five essays prepared to be delivered in England in
1923. Troeltsch died before these essays were given, and
Baron von Hügel edited them with an introduction. Most of the
first essay lies outside the interest of the present investi-
gation, for it does not deal with any specific problem in the
philosophy of history. Indeed, at the time of its writing,
Troeltsch had not formulated the principles of his philosophy
of history in a systematic way. There is, however, a note
on Troeltsch's conception of ethics which is relevant. Von
Hügel agrees with Troeltsch that ethics must begin with a
general analysis of the moral, and that thus we reach the con-
ception of an end, necessary, and valuable in itself.²

1. Phil. Rev., 41 (1932), 463-464.

2. EA, 123.

He also agreed with Troeltsch that the Kantian ethic cannot be identified with the Christian ethic.¹ He disagrees with Troeltsch, however, on the relation of the Christian ethic to redemption.² Finally, he agrees with Troeltsch that an objective as well as a subjective ethic is necessary if we are to solve the moral problem.³

Von Hügel points out in his "Introduction" to Christian Thought that Troeltsch's point of view on many problems changed considerably after the outbreak of the World War. He became more and more individualistic and, consequently, overemphasized the utter uniqueness of historical events. Von Hügel criticizes him for his doctrine of "polymorphous" truth and for finding so little in common among the Individual Totalities of history. Von Hügel firmly defends the view that "every comparison, of no matter what two things, involves some element common to these two things."⁴

Another critic is Fritz Heinemann.⁵ His appreciative essay defends Troeltsch's principle of historical wholes. Nevertheless, he rejects Troeltsch's limitation of the historical to mere Einmaligkeit,⁶ for this precludes any possible historical norm. Heinemann also rejects the historical a priori, though his reasons are not given in detail.⁷

1. EA, 156. 2. Ibid., 161-165. 3. Ibid., 165-169.

4. CT, xxiv. 5. NWP, 209-230. 6. Ibid., 223.

7. Ibid., 226.

He also agreed with Troeltsch that the Christian ethic cannot be identified with the Christian ethic.¹ He disagreed with Troeltsch, however, on the relation of the Christian ethic to redemption.² Finally, he agreed with Troeltsch that an objective as well as a subjective ethic is necessary if it is to solve the moral problem.³

Von Hügel points out in his "Introduction" to Christian Thought that Troeltsch's point of view on many problems changed considerably after the outbreak of the World War. He became more and more individualistic and, consequently, overemphasized the utter uniqueness of historical events. Von Hügel criticizes him for his doctrine of "polytypous" truth and for finding so little in common among the individual totalities of history. Von Hügel firmly defends the view that "every comparison, of no matter what things, involves some element common to these two things."⁴

Another critic is Fritz Heitmeyer.⁵ His representative essay defends Troeltsch's principle of historical wholeness. Nevertheless, he rejects Troeltsch's limitation of the historical to mere Wirklichkeit⁶ for this precludes any possible historical norm. Heitmeyer also rejects the historical a priori, though his reasons are not given in detail.⁷

1. *Id.*, 156. 2. *Id.*, 161-163. 3. *Id.*, 166-169.

4. *Id.*, xiv. 5. *Id.*, 202-203. 6. *Id.*, 203.

7. *Id.*, 203.

Then Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen has also criticized Troeltsch's philosophy of history.¹ He outlines Troeltsch's position and traces the inner development of his thought. Like others, he also holds that Troeltsch succumbs logically to the historical relativism which he strove to overcome. Von Rintelen outlines possible alternatives which he feels do not share the difficulties involved in Troeltsch's view.² He criticizes the reduction of the a priori to a mere Evidenzgefühl,³ his too individualistic conception of value, and his conception of that "polymorphous" truth.⁴

Otto Hintze has also devoted some attention to Troeltsch's philosophy of history.⁵ Hintze is a contentious critic, and we shall consider some of his views in detail later on.⁶ He charges Troeltsch with confusing historical science and philosophy of history, and he rejects much of Troeltsch's historical logic. Hintze would eliminate all considerations of value from the logic of history. Moreover, whereas Troeltsch recognizes the chief opponent of his own standpoint to be naturalism, Hintze rejects this putting of the problem and finds the conflict to be between Historicism and Pragmatism.⁷

1. "Der Versuch einer Ueberwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 8 (1930), 324-372.

2. Ibid., 348-349. 3. Ibid., 354. 4. Ibid., 368.

5. "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Historische Zeitschrift, 135 (1927), 188-239.

6. See below, Chapter III.

7. Ibid., 195-199.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of history.¹ He outlines Troeltsch's position and traces the inner development of his thought. Like others, he also holds that Troeltsch approaches logically to the historical relativism which he strives to overcome. Von Hinzelin outlines possible alternatives which he feels do not share the difficulties involved in Troeltsch's view.² He criticizes the revision of the a priori to a mere epistemological,³ his too individualistic conception of value, and his conception of "polyvalent" truth.⁴ Otto Hinze has also devoted some attention to Troeltsch's philosophy of history.⁵ Hinze is a conventional critic, and we shall consider some of his views in detail later on.⁶ He charges Troeltsch with confusing historical science and philosophy of history, and he rejects much of Troeltsch's historical logic. Hinze would eliminate all considerations of value from the logic of history. Moreover, whereas Troeltsch recognizes the chief opponent of his own standpoint to be naturalism, Hinze rejects the putting of the problem and finds the conflict to be between historicism and pragmatism.⁷

1. "Der Versuch einer Überwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 6 (1930), 322-372.
2. Ibid., 348-369. 3. Ibid., 354. 4. Ibid., 368.
5. "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Historische Zeitschrift, 125 (1927), 183-239.
6. See below, Chapter III.
7. Ibid., 193-199.

Then too, Hintze finds the conception of Individuality to be vague and the principle of historical development in Troeltsch to be ambiguous. The former insists on a more realistic formulation of the relationship between the individual person and the Common-Spirit of the Individual Totality.¹ Hintze rejects completely Troeltsch's attempt to find norms in history,² and holds that the latter's fear of relativism is unnecessarily exaggerated, for man is not as autonomous as Troeltsch conceives him to be.³ Finally, Hintze declares that the chief problems of Troeltsch's philosophy of history are anthropomorphic illusions.⁴ Ethical and valuational categories, he says, contrary to Troeltsch, do not apply to external reality. Historical life is hardly influenced by spiritual forces.⁵

Still another critic of Troeltsch is Paul Tillich.⁶ His point of view is summarized in the following statement:

Es ist die tiefe Tragik von Troeltschs Lebenswerk, dass er auch in der letzten gewaltigsten Anstrengungen, das Unbedingte im Bedingten zu finden, schliesslich versagte.⁷

Tillich does not go into a detailed analysis of this problem.

1. Hintze, *Op. cit.*, 221. 2. *Ibid.*, 229. 3. *Ibid.*, 231.

4. *Ibid.*, 233. 5. *Ibid.*, 234.

6. "Ernst Troeltsch," Kant-Studien, 29 (1924), 351-358.

7. *Ibid.*, 357.

Then too, Hirsch finds the conception of individuality to be
vague and the principle of historical development in Troeltsch
to be ambiguous. The former insists on a more realistic
formulation of the relationship between the individual and
society and the common-sense of the individual reality.¹ Hirsch
rejects completely Troeltsch's attempt to find norms in his-
tory,² and holds that the latter's fear of relativism is un-
necessarily exaggerated, for man is not as autonomous as
Troeltsch conceives him to be.³ Finally, Hirsch declares that
the chief problems of Troeltsch's philosophy of history are
anthropomorphic illusions.⁴ Ethical and rational cate-
gories, he says, contrary to Troeltsch, do not apply to ex-
ternal reality. Historical life is hardly influenced by
spiritual forces.⁵

Still another critic of Troeltsch is Paul Tillich. His
point of view is summarized in the following statements:
"Bei der tiefen Kritik von Troeltsch'scher
Denkweise, dass er auch in der letzten ge-
weitesten Ausdehnung, das Unbedingte
in Bedingtem zu finden, schliesslich ver-
sagt."⁶

Tillich does not go into a detailed analysis of this problem.

1. Hirsch, op. cit., 281. 2. Ibid., 282. 3. Ibid., 281.
4. Ibid., 282. 5. Ibid., 284.
6. "Kritik Troeltsch'scher Denkweise," Kant-Studien, 29 (1924), 251-258.
7. Ibid., 287.

As a final investigator and critic of Troeltsch's philosophy of history to be included here, we may mention Arthur Liebert. His essay¹ confined itself to a discussion of Troeltsch's posthumous work, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung. Liebert stresses the Kantian strain in Troeltsch's thought,² but also his emphasis on the necessity of compromise.³ What is insufficiently accented in Troeltsch is the belief

dass die Welt des Seins ihren Halt und ihren Sinn und die Stützen ihres Lebens nur in der Idealwelt des Sollens findet.⁴

Liebert concludes that Troeltsch stood at the threshold of a new metaphysics and that he prepared the way for this new philosophy, but that he was too predominantly an historian to effect the necessary and desired construction.⁵

Troeltsch's works on philosophy of religion and sociology have received much more universal attention than his philosophy of history. The critical works and essays on his philosophy of religion and sociology, however, are not relevant to the central problem of this dissertation. And yet, some of the articles and books on the religious a priori should be mentioned. Among these are discussions by Bornhausen, Diehl,

1. "Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung," Kant-Studien, 29 (1924), 359-364.

2. Ibid., 360. 3. Ibid., 362. 4. Ibid., 363.

5. Ibid., 363-364.

As a final investigator and critic of Troeltsch's philosophy of history to be included here, we may mention Arthur Liebert. His essay¹ confined itself to a discussion of Troeltsch's posthumous work, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung. Liebert stresses the Kantian strains in Troeltsch's thought,² but also his emphasis on the necessity of compromise.³ What is insufficiently accounted in Troeltsch is the belief

Das die Welt des Geistes ihren Platz hat und
ihren Sinn und die Stützen ihres Lebens
nur in der Idealswelt des Geistes findet.⁴

Liebert concludes that Troeltsch stood at the threshold of a new metaphysics and that he prepared the way for this new philosophy, but that he was too predominantly an historian to effect the necessary and desired connection.⁵

Troeltsch's works on philosophy of religion and sociology have received much more universal attention than his philosophy of history. The critical works and essays on his philosophy of religion and sociology, however, are not relevant to the central problem of this dissertation. And yet, some of the articles and books on the religious a priori should be mentioned. Among these are discussions by Bornemann, Diehl,

1. "Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung, Kant-Studien, 29 (1924), 252-304.

2. Ibid., 260. 3. Ibid., 262. 4. Ibid., 262.
5. Ibid., 263-264.

Fellner, Günther, Jelke, Kaftan, Knudson, Köhler, Leidretter, Macintosh, Mezger, Sleigh, Spiess, Wieneke, and Wobbermin.¹ We shall have occasion to discuss the essay by Knudson in some detail in Chapter Five.

IV. Materials and Method of this Investigation.

The materials which are basic in this dissertation are found primarily in Volume III of Troeltsch's Gesammelte Schriften and in his Christian Thought. We are also concerned with all other writings of his which deal with the fundamental principles here involved. Such are especially his articles on "Historiography" and "Contingency" in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, the method and philosophical conclusions of his Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, as well as essays and monographs which deal with the a priori and the absoluteness of Christianity.² Finally we are concerned with his systematic treatments of ethics and value.³

The method of this dissertation will be as follows:

- 1) Expository. We shall develop at some length Troeltsch's own answer to the four questions which we have placed in our statement of the problem.
- 2) Historical and comparative. We shall try to show how some of the basic principles in

1. For names of essays and books, see Bibliography.

2. PER, ACT, also GS, II, 754-768, 805-836.

3. See GS, II, 227-327, 364-385, 386-451, 525-672, 673-728.

Polmer, Günther, Jelinek, Katten, Kautson, Köhler, Leidegger,
Lautsch, Langner, Miesch, Selen, Wierske, and Wobbenin.¹
We shall have occasion to discuss the essay by Kautson in some
detail in Chapter Five.

IV. Materials and Method of this Investigation.
The materials which are basic in this dissertation are
found primarily in Volume III of Froelich's Gesamtheit
Schriften and in his Christliche Theologie. We are also concerned
with all other writings of his which deal with the fundamental
principles here involved. Such are especially his articles
on "Historiographie" and "Gegenwartigkeit" in the Neuzeitliche
Kultur und Ethik, the method and philosophical conclusions
of his Soziallehre der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, as
well as essays and monographs which deal with the a priori and
the actuality of Christianity.² Finally we are concerned
with his systematic treatments of ethics and values.³

The method of this dissertation will be as follows:

- 1) Expository. We shall devote at some length
Froelich's own answer to the four questions
which we have placed in our statement of the
problem.
- 2) Historical and comparative. We shall try to
show how some of the basic principles in

1. For names of essays and books, see bibliography.
2. P. 1, 101, also 11, 154-158, 201-202.
3. See 11, 127-128, 154-158, 201-202, 225-226,
273-278.

Troeltsch's philosophy underwent a change in the course of his research. Then we shall also indicate how Troeltsch's own standpoint arose out of his discussion of the works of others.

3) Critical and analytic. We shall analyze Troeltsch's answers to the four questions posited above and will inquire whether the principle of Individual Totalities achieves the validity to which it lays claim.

V. General Plan of the Dissertation.

In the Introduction we have tried to state clearly the problem of this investigation and its place in the developing thought of Troeltsch. We have also pointed to some of the criticisms which have been written about his philosophy of history.

Chapter Two will be devoted to an exposition of Troeltsch's principles of historiography. It is thus an answer to question one as stated in the problem. At the end of the chapter we shall indicate some criticism of Troeltsch's treatment of historiography. Chapter Three discusses the nature of Individual Totalities. It answers question two: What are the structure and function of the Individual Totality? This chapter is chiefly expository and compares Troeltsch's position on several points with that of Hegel, Hintze, and Hartmann. The next chapter attempts to answer question three: How is development to be conceived of in the Individual Totality? Here the positions of Hegel, Marx, the Positivists, and Rick-

...of his philosophy...
in the course of his research...
shall also indicate how Troeltsch's own
standpoint arose out of his discussion of
the work of others.
...critical and analytical...
Troeltsch's answers to the four questions
posed above and will indicate whether the
principles of individualistic criticism
the validity to which it lays claim.

V. General Plan of the Dissertation.

In the Introduction we have tried to state clearly the
problem of this investigation and its place in the developing
thought of Troeltsch. We have also pointed to some of the
criticisms which have been written about his philosophy of
history.

Chapter Two will be devoted to an exposition of Troeltsch's
principles of historiography. It is thus an answer to ques-
tion one as stated in the problem. At the end of the chapter
we shall indicate some criticism of Troeltsch's treatment of
historiography. Chapter Three discusses the nature of indi-
vidualistic criticism. It answers question two: What are the
structure and function of the individualistic criticism? This chap-
ter is chiefly expository and compares Troeltsch's position
on several points with that of Hegel, Hintze, and Hartmann.
The next chapter attempts to answer question three: How is
development to be conceived of in the individualistic
Here the positions of Hegel, Marx, the positivists, and Rick-

ert are made the background against which is portrayed Troeltsch's own view. At the end of this discussion the epistemological foundations of Troeltsch's position are analyzed and criticized. The concluding chapter deals with norms of interpretation and value in the Individual Totality. It tries to answer the question: How are the norms of interpretation and value in the historical process to be validated in the light of the Individual Totality? This is the crucial issue. After indicating the significance of the problem, the discussion develops Troeltsch's use of the principles of intuition, apriorism, and personality, analyzing and criticizing his presentation of these conceptions. The whole thesis is thus constructed about the exposition and criticism of Troeltsch's answer to the four questions involved in the fundamental problem of the nature of Individual Totalities.

The search for a purely scientific and theoretical point of view, any aesthetic or merely curious approach to history. Historiography is not interested in the ethical values of human actions in history, nor in history as a manual for politics or political education. Those who seek for sociological or economic principles as abstracted from particular developments in history, or who seek for principles which are to form the bases of society may be engaged in significant problems, but they are not historiographers. "History as pure theoretical science is different

are made the background against which is portrayed Troeltsch's
 own view. At the end of this discussion the epistemological
 foundations of Troeltsch's position are analyzed and criti-
 cized. The concluding chapter deals with norms of interpre-
 tation and value in the individual totality. It tries to
 answer the question: How are the norms of interpretation and
 value in the historical process to be validated in the light
 of the individual totality? This is the crucial issue. After
 indicating the significance of the problem, the discussion de-
 velops Troeltsch's use of the principles of induction, anal-
 ogy, and personality, explaining and criticizing his presenta-
 tion of these conceptions. The whole thesis is thus construct-
 ed about the exposition and criticism of Troeltsch's answer to
 the four questions involved in the fundamental problem of the
 nature of individual totality.

CHAPTER TWO

Troeltsch's Principles of Historiography

I. Historiography as a Search for Historical Causation.

Troeltsch's discussion of historiography constitutes an introduction to his philosophy of history. Taken strictly, historiography is an empirical science which has as its one great theoretical problem the determination of historical causation. Neither appraisal nor judgment of history as a whole is included in the conception. Troeltsch says:

The sole task of history in its specifically theoretical aspect is to explain every movement, process, state, and nexus of things by reference to the web of its causal relations. That is, in a word, the whole function of purely scientific investigation.¹

The search for causes rules out, from the purely scientific and theoretical point of view, any aesthetic or merely curious approach to history. Historiography is not interested in the ethical values of human actions in history, nor in history as a manual for politics or political education. Those who seek for sociological or economic principles as abstracted from particular developments in history, or who seek for principles which are to form the bases of society may be engaged in significant problems, but they are not historiographers. "History as pure theoretical science is different

1. "Historiography," ERE, VII, 718.

CHAPTER TWO

Troeltsch's Principles of Historiography

I. Historiography as a Search for Historical Causation.

Troeltsch's discussion of historiography constitutes an introduction to his philosophy of history. Taken strictly, historiography is an empirical science which has as its one great theoretical problem the determination of historical causation. Neither general nor judgment of history as a whole is included in the conception. Troeltsch says:

The sole task of history in its scientific-ly theoretical aspect is to explain every movement, process, state, and human of change by reference to the web of its causal relations. That is, in a word, the whole function of purely scientific investigation.

The search for causes runs out, from the purely scientific and theoretical point of view, any aesthetic or merely curi-ous approach to history. Historiography is not interested in the ethical values of human actions in history, nor in his-tory as a manual for politics or political education. Those who seek for aesthetic or economic principles as abstract-ed from particular developments in history, or who seek for principles which are to form the bases of society may be an-gaged in significant problems, but they are not historio-graphers. "History as pure theoretical science is different

from history as an element of belles lettres, politics, economics, and the like."¹

The problem of cause, however, is not a simple one. In the field of historiography a difficulty seems to arise as soon as the conception of psychic causation is introduced.

One may ask whether, in view of the peculiar nature of psychical causation, or motivation, the insight necessary to determine and appreciate it must not be drawn from personal experience and personal judgment. Such insight, it will be said, is always bound up with subjective estimates of what ought to be. Thus, e.g., only those who feel that certain ethical, political, and artistic excellences ought to exist will seek and discover them as real springs of action, while those who do not so regard them will seldom be able to regard them as motives, and the less so as historical causes do not lie on the surface or force themselves into notice, but are, as a matter of fact, always brought to light by the sympathetic imagination. Such a view is not wrong. Yet it does not subvert our fundamental principle, since the causes so discovered and realized are, in the sphere of historical study, taken account of as facts only, and not as grounds for the corrections and criticisms of the historian, whose subjective attitude to the facts must, accordingly, be once more discounted.²

The 'ought-to-be' must always be separated from what really is. Historical study is interested only in the latter, and all personal judgments must give way before the real facts. The fulness, depth, and range of personal experience always

1. "Historiography," ERE, VII, 718.

2. Ibid., 718-719.

from history as an element of politics, politics, eco-
nomics, and the like."

The problem of cause, however, is not a simple one. In
the field of historiography a difficulty seems to arise as
soon as the conception of psychic causation is introduced.

One may ask whether, in view of the essen-
tial nature of psychological causation, or mo-
tivation, the insight necessary to deter-
mine and appreciate it must not be drawn
from personal experience and personal judg-
ment. Such insight, it will be said, is
always bound up with subjective estimates
of what ought to be. Then, e.g., only
those who feel that certain ethical, po-
litical, and artistic excellences ought
to exist will seek and discover that as
real springs of action, while those who
do not so feel and whom will seldom be able
to regard them as motives, and the facts
as historical causes do not lie on the
surface or force themselves into notice,
but are, as a matter of fact, always brought
to light by the sympathetic imagination.
Such a view is not wrong. Yet it does not
admit our fundamental principle, since
the causes so discovered and realized are,
in the sphere of historical study, taken
account of as facts only, and not as grounds
for the corrections and criticisms of the
historian, whose subjective attitude to the
facts must, accordingly, be once more dis-
counted.

The 'ought-to-be' must always be separated from what really
is. Historical study is interested only in the latter, and
all personal judgments must give way before the real facts.
The fulness, depth, and range of personal experience always

subjectively condition the investigator. "But the purely scientific aim of historical reflexion is not thereby surrendered."¹

By the very nature of the problem causation thus carries us into the field of epistemology, and in so doing it has transcended the interests of empirical science. Before we have completed what we mean by historical causation we shall find that we have had to wrestle with the main problems of a philosophy of history. We cannot deal with the question adequately on the purely scientific plane. Otto Hintze points out that Troeltsch has not succeeded in differentiating clearly a purely theoretical empirical historiography from a philosophy of history.² This is also no doubt behind the remark of Fritz Heinemann: "Der Begriff des Historismus als historische Kategorie ist nicht eindeutig."³ Thus in the very beginning of our discussion we have begun to inquire into the logic and epistemology of history. The general epistemological problems must be presented, accordingly, so that we may the more clearly define and determine the problem of causation.

II. Differences between Nature and History.

One of the first things which impresses itself upon the

1. "Historiography," ERE, VII, 719.

2. "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Hist. Ztsch., 135 (1927), 189-190.

3. NWP, 220.

13
subjectively condition the investigator. But the purely
scientific aim of historicism is not thereby sur-
passed.¹

By the very nature of the problem causation thus carries
us into the field of epistemology, and in so doing it has
transcended the limits of empirical science. Before we
have completed what we mean by historical causation we shall
find that we have had to wrestle with the main problems of a
philosophy of history. We cannot deal with the question ade-
quately on the purely scientific plane. Otto Hintze points

out that Troeltsch has not succeeded in differentiating
clearly a purely theoretical empirical historiography from a
philosophy of history.² This is also no doubt behind the re-
mark of Fritz Heitsch: "Der Begriff des Historismus als
historische Kategorie ist nicht eindeutig."³ Thus in the
very beginning of our discussion we have been to inquire in-
to the logic and epistemology of history. The general episte-
mological problems must be presented, accordingly, so that we
may the more clearly define and determine the problem of

causation.

II. Differences between Nature and History.

One of the first things which impresses itself upon the

-
1. "Historiography," *ERS*, VII, 719.
 2. "Troeltsch and the Problem des Historismus," *Hist.*
Zeich., 133 (1927), 182-190.
 3. *ERV*, 220.

investigator is the minuteness and almost fleeting character of the historical world over against the immense expanses of nature in space and time. As Troeltsch remarks:

Die Geschichte samt ihrer biologischen Vorgeschichte erscheint demgegenueber doch immer wieder wie eine völlig fremdartige, verschwindende kleine Enklave, flüchtig wie der Hauch des Atems auf einer gefrorenen Glasscheibe.¹

There is a tendency among idealists, says Troeltsch, to solve this problem by showing the distinctive nature of history and drawing a sharp line between the methods of the natural sciences and that of historical investigation. In the natural sciences we observe exactness, clarity, necessity, predictability, extension, and size. History, on the other hand, deals with what is mobile, the creative, the responsible, the dramatic, the intuitive, and the ethical.² Any harmony between these two fields is then asserted to be only a practical question. Such was essentially the Kantian solution,³ but the Kantian distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason has difficulties of its own, as we shall see below.

A more profound study reveals the fact that the greatest difficulty of reconciliation lies in the thought of a "geschlossenen, allgemeintüftigen und gleichartigen Natur-

1. GS, III, 83.

2. Ibid., 84.

3. Ibid., 85.

investigator is the minuteness and almost lasting character of the historical world over against the immense expanse of nature in space and time. As Troeltsch remarks:

Die Geschichtswissenschaft hat ihren biologischen Vor-
zug nicht in der Beobachtung des Geschehens, sondern in
der Wiederherstellung der Vergangenheit, der Ver-
schönerung der Vergangenheit, der Klärung der
der Mensch das Atom und seine Gefühle
Glaubenshaftigkeit.¹

There is a tendency among idealists, says Troeltsch, to solve this problem by showing the distinctive nature of history and drawing a sharp line between the methods of the natural sciences and that of historical investigation. In the natural sciences we observe exactness, clarity, necessity, predictability, extension, and time. History, on the other hand, deals with what is mobile, the creative, the responsive, the dramatic, the intuitive, and the ethical.² Any harmony between these two fields is then asserted to be only a practical question. Such was essentially the Kantian solution,³ but the Kantian distinction between the theoretical and the practical reason has difficulties of its own, as we shall see below.

A more profound study reveals the fact that the greatest difficulty of reconciliation lies in the thought of a ges-
chlossenen, allgemeinen, allgemeinen und allgemeinen Natur-

1. Op. III, 82. 2. Ibid., 84.

3. Ibid., 85.

kausalität, dem Gedanken des geschlossenen Natursystems, wozu die Sätze von der Erhaltung der Energie und der Entropie hinzukommen."¹ The effect of the first of these concepts would be to rule out all interaction between mind and body. Moreover, everything psychical, historical, spiritual, and logical becomes an epiphenomenal puzzle. The second idea leads to indifference toward all value and meaning, for the universe, under that theory, is destined as a whole to a mere Wärmetod. If the conception of logic here implied is postulated as the only type of logic applicable to the world as a whole, then any unique logic of history would be ruled out completely from the outset.² Such a naturalistic position, however, is "ein Phantom eingebildeten logischen Zwangs, nicht ein Ergebnis des tatsächlichen Wirklichkeitsbefundes, der vielmehr rein von sich aus ganz anders besagt und darum für bloss subjektiv erklärt werden muss."³

Kant and especially the Neokantians are partly responsible for the conception of a transcendently deduced closed causal system of nature. This, however, is not really a deduction, but an assumption based on the principles of Newtonian physics. Both Kant and the Neokantians exaggerate the creative activity of the mind in the knowing process. Though each attempts to enhance the significance of the subject, Troeltsch believes that the appeal to the creation of the

1. GS, III, 87. 2. Ibid., 88. 3. Ibid., 89.

Kausalität, dem Gedanken des geschlossenen Mechanismus, won-
 die Sätze von der Erhaltung der Energie und der Entropie hin-
 zu kommen.¹ The effect of the first of these concepts would
 be to rule out all interaction between mind and body. More-
 over, everything physical, historical, spiritual, and insti-
 tutional becomes an epiphenomenal parasite. The second idea leads
 to indifference toward all value and meaning, for the uni-
 verse, under that theory, is destined as a whole to a mere
extinction. If the conception of logic here implied is postu-
 lated as the only type of logic applicable to the world as a
 whole, then any unique logic of history would be ruled out
 completely from the outset.² Such a naturalistic position,
 however, is "ein Phanton eingebildeten logischen Wunders,"
 nicht ein Ergebnis des tatsächlichen Wirklichkeitsbegriffes,
 der vielmehr stets von sich aus ganz anders besteht und daher
 für diese subjektiv erklärt werden muss.³
 Kant and especially the Mechanists are really responsi-
 ble for the conception of a transcendently deduced causal
 causal system of nature. This, however, is not really a de-
 duction, but an assumption based on the principles of New-
 tonian physics. Both Kant and the Mechanists exaggerate the
 creative activity of the mind in the knowing process. Though
 each attempts to enhance the significance of the subject,
 Troeltsch believes that the appeal to the creation of the

object through thought, especially in the form which gives to such construction a purely mathematical-causal organization, is really a denial of the Idealism which such attempts seek to establish. It denies every conception of cause which is less rigid and which would give unique historical events their proper place.¹

Troeltsch seeks to harmonize the fields of history and of nature in three ways. The first of these is what he calls "metallogic." By metallogic he means the general type of logic which Hegel employed, in which epistemology, metaphysics, and formal logic are united. We shall see that Troeltsch appeals to the metallogic of Leibniz, whose general position he accepts on many vital issues. What Troeltsch seeks especially to make clear is that the validity of judgment is not dependent on its psychological genesis, but that the norms of thought are latent in the psychological act itself. "Es handelt sich hier um Sollgesetze, nicht um faktische Seinsgesetze."²

Immer erwachsen die realwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse nicht aus einem System der Logik, sondern umgekehrt dieses aus den Setzungen, Hypothesen, und Wagnissen des sich selbst vertrauenden Realerkennens. Wie aber dem auch im einzelnen sei, an dem Grundcharakter der Logik und Wertwissenschaften, eine entscheidende Durchbrechung der kausalgenetischen Notwendigkeiten zu sein, wird damit nichts geändert; im Gegenteil. Diese Durchbrechung aber ist die

1. GS, III, 90. 2. GS, III, 91. GS, III, 94.

object through thought, especially in the form which gives to such construction a purely mathematical-logical organization, is really a denial of the idealism which such attempts seek to establish. It denies every conception of causes which is less rigid and which would give unique historical events their proper place.¹

Troeltsch seeks to harmonize the fields of history and of nature in three ways. The first of these is what he calls "metaphysics." By metaphysics he means the general type of logic which Hegel employed, in which epistemology, metaphysics, and formal logic are united. We shall see that Troeltsch appeals to the metaphysics of Leibniz, whose general position he accepts on many vital issues. What Troeltsch seeks especially to make clear is that the validity of judgment is not dependent on its psychological genesis, but that the norms of thought are latent in the psychological act itself. "Es handelt sich also hier um Gesetze, nicht um faktische Gesetze."²

Immer erwachsen die wissenschaftstheoretischen Erkenntnis nicht aus einem System der Logik, sondern umgekehrt dieses aus den Begriffen, Hypothesen, und Aussagen des sich selber vertretenden Erkenntnisses. Als aber dem auch im einzelnen Fall, an dem Grundcharakter der Logik und Wissenschaft, eine entscheidende Durchdringung der kausalen Notwendigkeiten an sein, wird damit nichts geändert; im Gegenteil. Diese Durchdringung aber ist die

cessity, erste und grundlegende Befreiung von der Ueber-
gewalt des Naturalismus.¹

Troeltsch is here emphasizing an important point. Behind all description of fact lie the norms of thought, the principles of logic. The latter has well been named "die Moral des Denkens." Ought is basic in all thinking. Accordingly, a realization of the fundamental rôle of ought in epistemology and in a theory of value transcends and breaks through a mere evolutionary naturalism. Thus, meaning and value are set free from the bondage of the natural sciences, for they are dependent on laws of ought, and not on mere laws of being.

There is a second point at which the method of the natural sciences is broken through, viz., in psychology. Hintze complains that Troeltsch does not give adequate attention to empirical psychology.² Nevertheless, from the point of view of the foundations of historical method he does give it an important function. It is a violation of psychical experience to seek to reduce psychology to a pure natural science. The mind is not an epiphenomenon but stands in the causal nexus. Interaction alone is an adequate solution of the mind-body problem. A recognition of interaction, however, at once sets free the historical process from the bonds of strict naturalistic necessity.³ Troeltsch carries the significance of psychic processes far beyond mere independence from ne-

1. GS, III, 92. 2. Op. cit., 190. 3. GS, III, 94.

of psychic processes far beyond mere independence from ne-
naturalistic necessity.² Troeltsch carries the significance
sets free the historical process from the bonds of strict
body problem. A recognition of intersection, however, at once
nexus. Intersection alone is an adequate solution of the mind-
The mind is not an epiphenomenon but stands in the causal
ence to seek to reduce psychology to a pure natural science.
important function. It is a violation of physical experi-
of the foundations of historical method he does give it an
empirical psychology.³ Nevertheless, from the point of view
complains that Troeltsch does not give adequate attention to
natural sciences is broken through, viz., in psychology. Hintze
There is a second point at which the method of the nat-
dependent on laws of ought, and not on mere laws of being.
free from the bondage of the natural sciences, for they are
evolutionary naturalism. Thus, meaning and value are set
in a theory of value transcends and breaks through a mere
ration of the fundamental rôle of ought in epistemology and
kenes." Ought is basic in all thinking. Accordingly, a reali-
of logic. The latter has well been named "die Moral des Den-
description of life the norms of thought, the principles
Troeltsch is here emphasizing an important point. Behind all
gewalt des Naturalismus.¹
erste und grundlegende Bedeutung von der Über-

cessity, however.

Freilich kommt man damit auf den Gedanken eines verborgenen psychischen Lebenshintergrundes, eines ununterbrochenen Stromes psychischen Lebens, der nur für das Bewusstsein unterbrochen erscheint und aus welchen sowohl Individuum als geistige Produktion der Individuen auf unbegreifliche Weise im Zusammenhang mit der leiblichen Individualisation und der psychischen Wechselwirkung hervorgehen. Aber auf solche metaphysische Hintergründe führt die Psychologie auch ohne dies, da sie ja dem Problem des Ich und des Unbewussten sowieso nicht aus dem Wege gehen kann. Mit alledem aber entfernen wir uns weit von allem, was den Naturwissenschaften von sich aus zugänglich ist und bekommen wir endgültig freien Raum für die relative Naturabhängigkeit der Historie, für das was man Schöpfung, Neuzeugung, Durchbruch und Aktualisierung geistiger Gehalte nennt.¹

More weighty still, however, are the considerations of a third kind, those of a philosophy of nature. It is the function of philosophy to investigate the logical presuppositions of the sciences and their relations to the rest of reality.² Such a study shows first of all that what appears to be a priori in science, as, e. g., the idea of cause, is not itself capable of being deduced a priori, but arises in the intercourse of thought with its object. Hence our appeal must be primarily to experience. To the precise nature of the a priori we shall turn later. In the second place, philosophy of nature reveals that some of the so-called laws of nature are not final.

1. GS, III, 94-95. 2. Ibid., 95. Ibid., 97.

cessary, however.

Freilich kommt man damit auf den Gedanken
einen vergangenen psychischen Lebens-
zustand, eines ununterbrochenen Stromes psy-
chischen Lebens, der nur für das Nachdenken
unterbrochen erscheint und aus welchen so-
wohl Individuum als gesamte Produktion der
Individuen auf unzerstörliche Weise in un-
trennbarer mit der lebendigen Individualität
sich und der psychischen Wechselwirkung
hervorgehen. Aber auf solche metaphysische
Hintergründe führt die Logik nicht aus und ohne
dies, da sie in dem Problem des Ich und des
Umweltzustandes nicht aus dem Welt ge-
hen kann. Mit alledem aber entstehen wir
uns weit von allem, was den Historischen-
schaffen von sich aus zugänglich ist und
bekommen wir endlich freier Raum für die
relative Naturgeschichte der Historie,
für das was man Schöpfung, Hervorbringung,
Darstellung und Aktualisierung nennen ge-
hen kann.

More widely still, however, are the considerations of a
third kind, those of a philosophy of nature. It is the func-
tion of philosophy to investigate the logical presuppositions
of the sciences and their relation to the rest of reality.
Such a study shows first of all that what appears to be a
priori in science, e.g., the laws of causality, is not it-
self capable of being deduced a priori, but arises in the
intercourse of thought with its object. Hence our appeal
must be primarily to experience. To the precise nature of the
a priori we shall turn later. In the second place, philosophy
of nature reveals that some of the so-called laws of nature
are not final.

Andrerseits sind die Energiesätze nichts
Denknotwendiges, sondern empirisch gefun-
dene and bestätigte Sätze, deren Verhält-
nisse zu etwaigen psychischen und geistigen
Kräften damit ganz unbestimmt bleibt.¹

The real a prioris of natural science are as follows:

Sie bestehen in Wahrheit in dem Erinnerungs-
vertrauen, in der viele Kombinationen und
Ergänzungen erlaubenden Umdeutbarkeit quali-
tativ-sinnlicher Eindrücke in quantitative
und räumliche Substrate, in dem Regelmässig-
keitsaxiom und in dem Kausalitätsprinzip,
das die Verknüpfung von Gleichem mit Gleichem
in der unmittelbaren zeitlichen Sukzession
der Einzelvorgänge bedeutet und daher mit
dem Regelmässigkeitsvertrauen nicht iden-
tisch ist.²

Out of none of these a prioris can one deduce the nec-
essarily closed system of nature; nor can the latter be dem-
onstrated as a deduction from the principle of causation.

These may be necessary for the practical success of scientif-
ic study, but they can in no way exclude other realms of law
modern thought, despite their antagonisms, go back to a com-
mon root, nor determine the nature of the world as a whole.

Das psychische Leben, die geistigen und
werthhaften Schöpfungen zu den Molekularbe-
wegungen des Gehirns als einem Bestandteil
des geschlossenen Naturzusammenhanges in
ein Verhältnis der Zuordnung oder der Epi-
phänomenalität zu bringen, ist ein nicht
bloss praktisch unlösbares, sondern ein
theoretisch falsch gestelltes Problem. Das
genügt für die Historie, um ihr Luft und
Möglichkeit zu geben, während sie im übrigen
ja eng genug an die Natur gebunden bleibt.³

At this point it is well to define the two seemingly ir-
reconcilable points of view which Troeltsch calls Naturalism

1. GS, III, 96. 2. Ibid., 96-97. 3. Ibid., 97.

Anderserseits sind die Untersuchungen nichts
Denknotwendiges, sondern empirisch gewonnen
denen eine beständige Fülle, deren Verhältnis
müsse zu gewissen psychischen und zeitlichen
Kräften damit ganz unbestimmt bleiben.

The rest a priori of natural science are as follows:

Sie bestehen in Wahrheit in dem Brinnerungs-
vermögen, in der viele Kombinationen und
Ergebnisse erzielenden Unendlichkeit der
tativ-empirischen Klärung in quantitative
und räumliche Substrate, in dem Gesetzmäßig-
keitssinn und in dem Kausalitätsprinzip,
das die Verknüpfung von Gleichem mit Gleichem
in der unmittelbar zeitlichen Kausalkette
der Einzelvorgänge bedeutet und daher mit
dem Gesetzmäßigkeitsvermögen nicht iden-
tisch ist.

Out of none of these a priori can one deduce the nec-
essarily closed system of nature; nor can the latter be dem-
onstrated as a deduction from the principle of causation.
There may be necessary for the practical success of scientific
study, but they can in no way exclude other realms of law
nor determine the nature of the world as a whole.

Das psychische Leben, die geistigen und
wertvollen Gehirnsorgane zu den Molekularpro-
zessen des Gehirns als einem Bestandteil
des geschlossenen Naturzusammenhangs in
ein Verhältnis der Ordnung oder der Un-
geordnetheit zu bringen, ist ein nicht
bloß praktisch unlösbares, sondern ein
theoretisch falsch gestelltes Problem. Das
Gesetz für die Natur, um das es geht
Möglichkeit zu geben, während alle im übrigen
in engem Zusammenhang bleiben.

At this point it is well to define the two seemingly ir-
reconcilable points of view which Trostsch calls Naturalism

and Historicism. By Historicism he means "die grundsätzliche Historisierung alles unseren Denkens ueber den Menschen, seine Kultur und seine Werte."¹ This does not mean historical relativism. Historical relativism is a skeptical attitude towards all norms in history. What Troeltsch means here is simply that no material values are absolute and that all norms must be inner-historical. By Naturalism he means

der die gesamte Wirklichkeit umfassende Zusammenhang einer von allem Qualitativen und aller unmittelbaren Erfahrung absehenden Vergesetzlichung.... Er ist die Unterbauung eines Systems von möglichst mathematisch ausdrückbaren, quantitativen Beziehungsgesetzen unter die Alltagserfahrung des gemeinen Bewusstseins, die Repräsentation der sinnlichen Erfahrungsbilder und ihres gegenseitigen Bezuges durch mathematische Formeln, die aus dem Wesen des blossen Raumes fließen.²

Troeltsch tries to show that these two great creations of modern thought, despite their antagonisms, go back to a common root, "der Bewusstseinsanalyse als Fundament der Philosophie."³ In Descartes' analytical philosophy both tendencies were already present, one pointing in the direction of the world of extension and universal law, the other pointing to the ego and the historical and genetic content of consciousness. Descartes and his followers concerned themselves chiefly with the first tendency, and yet he wrestled with the problem of interaction. Later Spinoza puzzled over psycho-

1. GS, III, 102. 2. Ibid., 103. 3. Ibid., 106.

and Historicism. By Historicism we mean "the fundamental
Historicism" which means that we are not to be
neither and none other." This does not mean historical
relativism. Historical relativism is a skeptical attitude
towards all norms in history. What Troeltsch means here is
simply that no material values are absolute and that all
norms must be inner-historical. By inner-historical he means

das die gesamte Wirklichkeit umfassen und
sich auf einen von allen objektiven und
aller menschlichen Erkenntnis-Verhältnisse
Vergangenheit... Er ist die Unterlage
eines Systems von möglichst mathematisch
ausdrückbaren, quantitativen Beziehungen
geordnet unter die Alltagswelt der ge-
meinen Bewusstseins, die Hauptbestimmung der
menschlichen Existenz bildet und ihnen gegen-
seitigen Bezügen durch mathematische Formeln
die Gesetze des menschlichen Lebens

Troeltsch tries to show that these two great questions of
modern thought, despite their antagonism, go back to a com-
mon root, "der Bewusstseinsanalyse als Fundament der Philo-
sophie." In Descartes' analytical philosophy both tendencies
were already present, one pointing in the direction of the
world of extension and universal law, the other pointing to
the ego and the historical and genetic content of conscious-
ness. Descartes and his followers concerned themselves
chiefly with the first tendency, and yet he wrestled with the
problem of extension. Later Spinoza wrestled over psycho-

physical parallelism, Leibniz over preestablished harmony, Pascal over the logic of the heart, and Malebranche over the paradoxical relation of salvation and revelation to universal law. All these seemed concerned to secure a place for the historical ethical world, though their attempts were only partially successful.¹

A more direct analysis of consciousness took place among the English empiricists. Locke and his successors were psychological and genetic in their enquiries and studied knowledge from the point of view of the historical process of experience. This method gleaned support from Leibniz's philosophy of continuity and from Goethe's "'lebendige' Naturschauung." In Schelling and Hegel the natural sciences themselves were aufgehoben in a logic which conceptualized history, but which tended to neutralize the physical sciences as developed by Descartes and Newton. Since then, says Troeltsch, "leben wir in einer mit ihren Erfolgen und den Zeitstimmungen wechselnden Rivalität von Naturalismus und Historismus. Seit der Soziologie und dem Darwinismus kann man beides oft nicht mehr recht unterscheiden."²

Genuine interest in historical processes and in the logic of history has come to self-consciousness only under the greatest handicaps. At the risk of repetition, it is

1. GS, III, 105.

2. Ibid., 106.

physical periplan, Leibniz over preestablished harmony,
 Pascal over the logic of the heart, and Kant over the
 paradoxical relation of salvation and revelation to universal
 law. All these seemed concerned to secure a place for the
 historical ethical world, though their attempts were only
 partially successful.

A more direct analysis of consciousness took place
 among the English empiricists. Locke and his successors were
 psychologists and genetic in their analysis and studied
 knowledge from the point of view of the historical process of
 experience. This method gained support from Leibniz's phi-
 losophy of continuity and from Goethe's "Ursprüngliche
 Wesenheit." In Schelling and Hegel the natural sciences them-
 selves were approached in a logic which conceptualized his-
 tory, but which tended to neutralize the physical sciences as
 developed by Descartes and Newton. Since then, says Troeltsch,
 "haben wir in einer mit ihren Ergebnissen und den Bestimmungen
 wachsenden Rivalität von Naturalismus und Historismus. Seit
 der Soziologie und der Historismus kann man behaupten oft nicht
 mehr recht unterscheiden."

Genuine interest in historical processes and in the
 logic of history has come to self-consciousness only under
 the greatest handicaps. At the risk of repetition, it is

important to make this clear. The two methods, natural science on the one hand and historiography on the other, root in epistemology. "The method," says Troeltsch, "is determined not by the subject matter, but by the epistemological end in view; for knowledge is never a mere reproduction of experience, but always an abstract selection of particular elements of experience for a definite intellectual end."¹ The method of natural science is determined "by the interest of selecting that aspect of experience in which it manifests itself as absolutely determined by universal laws, and, accordingly, the method in question abstracts from all that is qualitative and individual."² It is important to note that down to the time of Herder and Hegel modern philosophy either took no account of history at all (with the possible exception of Vico), or else brought historical occurrences under a causal conception, which was simply that of natural science philosophically generalized. "Descartes surrendered history to the theologians and to revelation; Hobbes and Spinoza treated it in a naturalistic fashion. The naturalistic view prevailed also in the case of Hume and Kant, notwithstanding the great diversity in their respective views of causality."³

1. ERE, VII, 720. However 2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., 719. Vico tries to understand the previous course of human history as the natural development of human nature. He sees the general natural law of development manifesting itself in the history of peoples as well as in that of individuals. Cf. Windelband, HOP, 526.

important to make this clear. The two methods, natural science on the one hand and history on the other, rest in epistemology. "The method," says Troeltsch, "is determined not by the subject matter, but by the epistemological end in view; for knowledge is never a mere reproduction of experience, but always an abstract selection of particular elements of experience for a definite intellectual end."¹ The method of natural science is determined by the interest of selecting that aspect of experience in which it manifests itself as absolutely determined by universal laws, and, accordingly, the method in question abstracts from all that is qualitative and individual.² It is important to note that down to the time of Herder and Hegel modern philosophy either took no account of history at all (with the possible exception of Vico), or else brought historical occurrences under a causal conception, which was simply that of natural science philosophically generalized. "Descartes transferred history to the theologians and to revelation; Hobbes and Spinoza treated it in a naturalistic fashion. The naturalistic view prevailed also in the case of Hume and Kant, notwithstanding the great diversity in their respective views of causality."³

1. *Enc. VII*, 730. 2. *Ibid.*, cit.

3. *Ibid.*, 719. Vico tries to understand the previous course of human history as the natural development of human nature. He sees the general natural law of development manifesting itself in the history of peoples as well as in that of individuals. Cf. Windelband, *ROP*, 526.

Within the Kantian school, especially in its development toward the Panlogism of Hegel, a different approach occurred.

The knowledge and aetiology of Nature were subjected to extreme violence by historical thought, in as much as the latter became simply the application of the law of dialectical movement to the cosmic process and the course of human affairs. But if this was a violation of natural science, it was no less a violation of historical thought itself, which by such procedure gained only a finer sense of order and continuity, but no clearer comprehension of its own fundamental conceptions.¹

It was not until the revival of Kant's philosophy later in the century under the guise of Neokantianism, together with the influence of Wundt and Dilthey, that the differences between historical causation and causality in natural science were carefully worked out and an adequate basis given to the logic and epistemology of history.

In an essay entitled "Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie"² Troeltsch reviews one of the significant books which came from the Neokantian School, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung: eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften, by Rickert. Troeltsch's extended review of this work forms the basis of his own epistemological analysis and construction. The latter's dependence on Rickert is obvious. On one point, however, there is radical disagreement, for even in Rickert the problem of Causality seems not to have

1. ERE, VII, 719.

2. GS, II, 673-728.

Within the Kantian school, especially in its development toward the Panlogism of Hegel, a different approach occurred.

The knowledge and methodology of Nature were subjected to extreme violence by historical thought, in as much as the latter became simply the application of the law of dialectical movement to the economic process and the course of human affairs. But if this was a violation of natural science, it was no less a violation of historical thought itself, which by such procedure gained only a false sense of order and continuity, but no clear or comprehensive of its own fundamental conceptions.

It was not until the revival of Kant's philosophy later in the century under the guise of Neokantianism, together with the influence of Wundt and Dilthey, that the differences between historical causation and causality in natural science were carefully worked out and an adequate basis given to the logic and epistemology of history.

In an essay entitled "Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie" Troeltsch reviews one of the significant books which came from the Neokantian school, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffswelt: eine historische Einleitung in die historische Wissenschaft, by Rickert. Troeltsch's extended review of this work forms the basis of his own epistemological analysis and construction. The latter's dependence on Rickert is obvious. On one point, however, there is radical disagreement. For even in Rickert the problem of causality seems not to have

been adequately treated.

Meines Erachtens erfordert das Buch ein weiteres spezielles Werk ueber den Kausalitätsbegriff, wenn es wirklich ueberzeugend und durchdringend wirken soll. Denn es wird sehr vielen gehen wie mir, dass sie an diesem Punkte--und es ist doch ein Hauptpunkt--die Rickertschen Andeutungen nicht ganz verstehen und durchschauen. Wie ist es möglich den Erfahrungsinhalt zugleich nomothetisch nach dem Prinzip der Kausalgleichung und der Erhaltung der Energie und dann doch wider ideographisch nach dem Prinzip der Individualkausalität oder der Kausal-Ungleichung zu verstehen? Sind das wirklich nur zweierlei Betrachtungsweisen desselben Objektes oder sind das nicht doch Teilungen innerhalb der Objekte, die zum einen Teil dem ersten und zum anderen dem zweiten Erklärungsprinzip unterliegen? Ich kann es mir schwer anders vorstellen.¹

III. Definition of Historical Causation.

The definition of historical causation thus becomes a central problem. Troeltsch, who believes that psycho-physical interaction is the only valid solution of the mind-body enigma, presents an essentially psychological view of this causation. In his article on "Historiography" he says that historical causation

is almost exclusively a matter of psychological motivation. In the historical sphere nearly everything passes through the medium of consciousness, and in the last analysis all turns upon the constant interaction of conscious efforts, into which even the un-

1. GS, II, 720; III, 228-229. The distinction between Troeltsch's position and that of Rickert and Kant is very clearly brought out in the quotation. We shall deal with it in more detail below; see Chapter IV.

1. CS, II, 750; III, 228-232. The distinction between Troeltsch's position and that of Rickert and Kant is very clearly brought out in the quotation. We shall deal with it in more detail below; see Chapter IV.

is almost exclusively a matter of psycho-logical motivation. In the historical sphere nearly everything passes through the medium of consciousness, and in the last analysis all turns upon the constant interaction of conscious efforts, into which even the un-

historical causation

tion. In his article on "Historiography" he says that his-

ma, presents an essentially psychological view of this cause-

interaction is the only valid solution of the mind-body enig-

central problem. Troeltsch, who believes that psycho-physical

The definition of historical causation thus becomes a

III. Definition of Historical Causation.

vorstellen. I
unterliegen? Ich kann es mir schwer anders
zum anderen dem zweiten Erklärungsprinzip
Objekte, die zum einen Teil dem ersten und
sind das nicht doch Teilungen innerhalb der
Betrachtungswesen derselben Objekte oder
versteht? Sind das wirklich nur zweierlei
Kausalität oder der Kausal-Unterschied zu
ideographisch nach dem Prinzip der Individual-
beutung der Energie und dann doch wider
dem Prinzip der Kausalgleichung und der Er-
klärungsansicht zugleich notwendig nach
und durchschauen. Wie ist es möglich das
Rückertischen Andeutungen nicht ganz verlassen
Tunkte--und es ist doch ein Hauptpunkt--die
vielen gehen wie mir, dass als es diesem
durchdringend wirken soll. Denn es wird sehr
bestätigt, wenn es wirklich notwendig und
voras spezielles Werk neben den Kausalitäts-
Kausalas Erklärungs erfordert das Buch ein wei-

been adequately treated.

conscious elements tend to resolve themselves. Thus the peculiar irrational quality and initiative of the individual consciousness make themselves felt in the ultimate result, alike in the individual life and in the life of the group. Here, therefore, it is not permissible to reduce events into non-qualitative forces, or to explain effects by causal equivalence.¹

Moreover, there emerges continually in the historical process the fact of the new. This is no mere transformation of existent forces, but an element of essentially free content, due to the convergence of historical causes.² What is novel and unique finds, thus, a significant place. It applies both to the individual and to the group, or Individual-Totality, to which he belongs.³ In the case of the former we see the creation of personality, and in the case of the group the creation of a new Common-Spirit,⁴ or even a new cultural synthesis.⁵ The whole conception of historical process is that of flux in the individual and in the group. The idea of personality is illustrative:

Now the end of moral action which first appears in an obvious manner is the attainment of a free personality, which has its foundations in itself and possesses a certain unity of its own....Out of the flux and confusion of the life of instincts, the unity and

1. GS, II, 719.

2. To be discussed more fully below under Contingency.

3. Defined below under Individuelle Totalität.

4. Defined below under Gemeingeist.

5. See Chapter Five, Section Two.

conscious elements tend to resolve themselves. Thus the peculiar transitional quality and initiative of the individual consciousness make themselves felt in the life and in the life of the group. Here, therefore, it is not impossible to reduce events into non-qualitative forces, or to explain effects by cause and effect.

Moreover, there emerges continually in the historical process the fact of the new. This is no mere transformation of existent forces, but an element of essentially free development, due to the convergence of historical forces.¹ What is novel and unique finds, thus, a significant place. It applies both to the individual and to the group, or individual-totality, to which he belongs.² In the case of the former we see the creation of personality, and in the case of the group the creation of a new common-spirit,³ or even a new cultural synthesis.⁴ The whole conception of historical process is that of flux in the individual and in the group. The idea of personality is illustrative:

How the end of moral action which first appears in an obvious manner is the attainment of a free personality, which has its freedom along its itself and possesses a certain unity of its own. . . . But of the flux and confusion of the life of manhood, the unity and

1. Cf. II, 119.
2. To be discussed more fully below under Common-spirit.
3. Defined below under Individual-totality.
4. Defined below under Common-spirit.
5. See Chapter Five, Section Two.

strives to compactness of personality has first to be created and acquired.... Freedom and creation constitute the secret of personality.¹

The factors of novelty, creation, and freedom form part of the whole contingent aspect of the world which features so largely in history. This does not mean, however, that historical events are wholly contingent. Furthermore, we are not to infer from the discussion of psychological motivation, that the science of history deals with this kind of cause alone. History frequently has recourse to natural causation as well. Factors like polar limitations, glacial periods, earthquakes, famines, destructive winters, uninhabitable regions, and the like, play frequently a great part in determining the facts of history. Their effects are often direct and not purely psychological.² Nevertheless, contingency is close to the heart of historical method.

The latter, as has been shown, centers about that which is individual and unique. Only in conscious experience are values formulated, and conscious values are validated and receive clarification only through historical orientation in historical development.³ Natural science, on the other hand,

1. Christian Thought, 51; the passage is quoted in English because the lectures were first delivered in English. The German reference is, DHSU, 9.

2. ERE, VII, 719.

3. GS, II, 694.

Later in German in GS, IV, 1210, with slight alterations. Reprinted in GS, II, 739-773.

...to consciousness of personality as a first to be
created and accepted... Freedom and creation
constitute the secret of personality.¹

The factors of novelty, creation, and freedom form part
of the whole contingent aspect of the world which features as
largely in history. This does not mean, however, that his-
torical events are wholly contingent. Furthermore, we are not
to infer from the discussion of psychological questions, that
the sciences of history deal with this kind of cause alone.
History frequently has recourse to natural causation as well.
Factors like polar limitations, glacial periods, earthquakes,
famines, destructive winters, uninhabitable regions, and the
like, play frequently a great part in determining the facts
of history. Their effects are often direct and not purely
psychological.² Nevertheless, contingency is also to the
heart of historical method. The latter, as has been shown, centers about that which
is individual and unique. Only in conscious experience are
values formulated, and conscious values are validated and re-
ceive clarification only through historical orientation in
historical development.³ Natural sciences, on the other hand,

1. Christian Thought, 51; the passage is quoted in Eng-
lish because the lecture was first delivered in English.
The German reference is, DSU, 2.

2. HR, VII, 719.

3. DS, II, 694.

strives to eliminate the unique and particular; this is its ideal. And yet, even in the most general sciences, e. g., mechanics, it is not entirely successful. Nevertheless, science grades its subdivisions into exact and less exact disciplines in proportion as they approximate the ideal of conformity to absolutely universal laws.

An adequate philosophy of history must take account of the wealth of contingent and unique data which empirical historical events present. Troeltsch appraises students of history in proportion as they account for unique events. Failure to do this is the chief fault of the Hegelian dialectic, in spite of its great merits. On the other hand, it was just his sober and realistic sense of the irrational in history which constituted the contribution of Ritschl to historical methodology. The greatness of Harnack lay in his acute awareness of what is living and individual in historical process.¹ This, in short, is the problem of contingency.

IV. Contingency.

When we examine the question of contingency, there are six forms in which it may be studied:

- 1) Der Unterschied der begrifflichen Gesetze und Notwendigkeiten von den Tatsachen, die in ihnen verknüpft, vereinheitlicht und

1. GS, II, 694.

2. "Contingency," ERE, IV, 773. . . Later in German in Z Th K, (1910), with slight alterations. Reprinted in GS, II, 769-778.

strives to eliminate the unique and particular; this is its ideal. And yet, even in the most general sciences, e. g., mechanics, it is not entirely successful. Nevertheless, science grades its subdivisions into exact and less exact disciplines in proportion as they approximate the ideal of conformity to absolutely universal laws.

An adequate philosophy of history must take account of the wealth of contingent and unique data which empirical historical events present. Historical sciences approximate the ideal of history in proportion as they account for unique events. Failure to do this is the chief fault of the Hegelian dialectic, in spite of its great merits. On the other hand, it was just this sober and realistic sense of the irrational in history which constituted the contribution of Hirsch to historical methodology. The greatness of Harnack lay in his acute awareness of what is living and individual in historical process.¹ This, in short, is the problem of contingency.

IV. Contingency.

When we examine the question of contingency, there are

six forms in which it may be studied:

- 1) Der Unterschied der begrifflichen Gesetze und Notwendigkeiten von den Tatsachen, die in ihnen verknüpft, vereinheitlicht und

1. *Op. cit.*, II, 694.

2. "Contingency," *MS. IV*, later in German in *Die Philosophie der Geschichte*, (1910), with slight alterations. Reprinted in *GS*, II, 754-756.

Even the beherrscht werden. Diese Tatsachen selbst sind irrational und zufällig.¹

The facts, as such, are irrational and contingent. Why this principle such as the theory of recurrence of cosmic cycles, or that should exist is incomprehensible. The truly incomprehensible thing, as D'Alembert puts it, is that anything should exist at all. This is why metaphysics reasons back to the will of God; witness Augustine, the Nominalists, Schelling, and even E. v. Hartmann.

- 2) Die Elemente der Kontingenz in den rationell-begrifflichen Notwendigkeiten selbst. Das Weltgesetz, der Weltbegriff, die Welteinheit sind immer nur Phantasien oder Postulate gewesen ohne wirkliche Aufweisbarkeit.²

Particulars are explained by the fact that a number of laws simultaneously apply to certain events. This plurality of laws makes them, in relation to one another and to the ideal of an absolute cosmic law, contingent. Furthermore, how is the real controlled by these laws? The contingent element persists even though we apply the idealistic method of Kant and Fichte to the production and ordering of phenomena.

- 3) Der Begriff der Individualität. Auch wenn man eine allgemeine rationelle Gesetzmässigkeit behaupten wollte, so ist doch jedes innerhalb dieses Netzwerkes sich bildende konkrete einzelne etwas Individuelles, d.h. etwas aus allgemeinen Gesetzen nicht restlos Verständliches, das immer noch etwas aus ihnen nicht resultierendes Besonderes und Unwiederholbares hat. Das gilt von den einfachsten Naturvorgängen bis zu den feinsten seelischen Lebenskomplexen.³

1. GS, II, 773. 2. Ibid., 773. 3. Ibid., 774.

besteht werden. Diese Tatsachen selbst sind irrational und zufällig.¹

The facts, as such, are irrational and contingent. Why this or that should exist is incomprehensible. The truly incomprehensible thing, as D'Alembert puts it, is that anything should exist at all. This is why metaphysical reasons back to the will of God; witness Augustine, the Nominalists, Schelling, and even E. v. Hartmann.

2) Die Elemente der Kontingenz in den rationalen-begrifflichen Notwendigkeiten selbst. Das Weltgesetz, der Weltbegriff, die Weltseinheit sind immer nur Phantasien oder Postulate gewesen ohne wirkliche Aufweisbarkeit.²

Particulars are explained by the fact that a number of laws simultaneously apply to certain events. This plurality of laws makes them, in relation to one another and to the ideal of an absolute cosmic law, contingent. Furthermore, how is the real controlled by these laws? The contingent element persists even though we apply the idealistic method of Kant and relate to the production and ordering of phenomena.

3) Der Begriff der Individualität. Auch wenn man eine allgemeine rationale Gesetzmäßigkeit behaupten wollte, so ist doch jedes innerhalb dieses Bereiches sich bildende konkrete einzelne etwas individuelles, d.h. Verändliches, das immer noch etwas aus etwas aus allgemeinen Gesetzen nicht festes Unveränderliches hat. Das gilt von den einfachsten Naturvorgängen bis zu den feinsten geistlichen Lebenskomplexen.³

Even the universe as a whole is unique and individual. If we take refuge from the contingency of the whole by an appeal to a principle such as the theory of recurrence of cosmic cycles, the latter itself becomes contingent. All radical rationalism, such as that of Spinoza, is wrecked on the fact of individuation.

4) Das Problem des Neuen. Nach den Prinzipien jedes reinen Rationalismus könnte es in der Wirklichkeit nie die Entstehung von etwas Neuem geben.¹

A strict rationalism would have to deny all movement and becoming, as did the Eleatics. Hegel's principle of negativity was, in reality, an attempt to rationalize the Irrational and Contingent. Expressed in metaphysical terms, this is the thought of creation and 'positing' (Setzung) applied to the particular.

Epistemologically expressed it is the idea of a causality of non-equivalence, as opposed to the causal equivalence with which alone a consistent rationalism can be satisfied. In the causality of equivalence the nexus signifies identity of essence, with a mere change of form. In causal non-equivalence the nexus provides a place for the new. The endeavor to reduce all our knowledge of causes to the former category is hopeless, and accordingly an element of contingency clings to the conception of causality itself.²

On the principles of a purely rational system, nothing new could ever emerge in the world of the real. This would lead

1. GS, II, 775.

2. ERE, IV, 89.

³Ibid., 777. This reference to Kant is not found in the article in ERE.

Even the universe as a whole is unique and individual. If we take refuge from the contingency of the whole by an appeal to a principle such as the theory of recurrence of cosmic cycles, the latter itself becomes contingent. All rationalism, in fact, such as that of Spinoza, is rooted on the fact of individualism.

4) Das Problem des Neuen. Nach den Prinzipien jedes rationalen Rationalismus könnte es in der Wirklichkeit nie die Entstehung von etwas Neuem geben.¹

A strict rationalism would have to deny all movement and becoming, as did the Eleatics. Hegel's principle of negativity was, in reality, an attempt to rationalize the irrational and contingent. Expressed in metaphysical terms, this is the thought of creation and 'positing' (Setzung) applied to the particular.

Epistemologically expressed it is the idea of a causality of non-equivalence, as opposed to the causal equivalence with which alone a constant rationalism can be satisfied. In the causality of equivalence the nexus signifies identity of essence, with a mere change of form. In causal non-equivalence the nexus provides a place for the new. The answer to the question of knowledge of causes to the former category is hopeless, and accordingly an element of contingency clings to the conception of causality itself.²

On the principles of a purely rational system, nothing new could ever emerge in the world of the real. This would lead

to the absurdest of materialisms. But novelty is a fact and must be accepted as such.

5) "Der Zusammenhang der Freiheit mit der Kontingenz."¹
The causal 'must' of the process of things, when judged by the absolute standard of ideal values, manifests itself as something contingent. "For if these values represent the true significance of the existent, it is impossible to see why they should demand for their realization this particular sphere of causality."² Furthermore, in relation to the ideal of universal necessity, interrupted or variable laws are contingent. Determinism, finally, is "immer nur ein aus dem Axiom der absoluten Rationalität sich ergebendes Folgeaxiom, aber niemals eine wissenschaftliche erwiesene Tatsache."³

- 6) Die Kontingenz in den Ideen der Freiheit.
Lieget in den Ideen der Freiheit, der absoluten Werte und Gültigkeiten, die letzte erlebbare Wurzel des Gesetzesgedankens und damit der unbedingten Notwendigkeit, so ist doch der Inhalt der ideellen Gesetzgebung selbst nicht als etwas in sich Notwendiges zu erkennen.⁴

Troeltsch appeals here to the exceedingly formal and contentless ethics of Kant as an illustration of his point. Kant's principles of ethics were divorced from concrete living. Another illustration is the old Scholastic quarrel whether the moral commands are good because God wills them, or

¹GS, II, 776.

²ERE, IV, 89.

³GS, II, 776.

⁴Ibid., 776-777.

⁵Ibid., 777. This reference to Kant is not found in the article in ERE.

to the abundance of materialism. But novelty is a fact and must be accepted as such. (5) "Der Zusammenhang der Freiheit mit der Kontinuität." The causal 'must' of the process of things, when judged by the absolute standard of ideal values, manifests itself as something contingent. "For if these values represent the true significance of the existent, it is impossible to see why they should demand for their realization this particular sphere of causality." Furthermore, in relation to the ideal of universal necessity, interrupted or variable laws are contingent. Determinism, finally, is simply nur ein aus sich selbst absoluter Rationalität sich ergebendes Folaxiom, aber nicht eine wissenschaftliche erwiesene Tatsache.³

(6) Die Kontinuität in den Ideen der Freiheit. Es liegt in den Ideen der Freiheit, der absoluten Werte und Gültigkeiten, die letzte Ursache aller Gesetzmäßigkeiten und damit der unbedingten Notwendigkeit, so ist doch der Inhalt der absoluten Gesetzmäßigkeit selbst nicht als etwas in sich Notwendiges zu erkennen.⁴

Freiheit erscheint hier in der expediently formal and contentless ethic of Kant as an illustration of his point. Kant's principles of ethics were divorced from concrete living. Another illustration is the old scholastic question whether the moral commands are good because God wills them, or

¹ibid., II, 776. ²ibid., IV, 89. ³ibid., II, 776. ⁴ibid., 776-777. This reference to Kant is not found in the article in ERE.

whether God wills them because they are good. Thus the question of contingency penetrates into the very deepest roots of the thought of necessity.

Like the problem of rationalism and many others, contingency is related to the whole field of philosophy. Its scope is as broad as human thought and its laws. Troeltsch summarizes it as follows:

Es ist die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Rationalen zum Irrationalen, des Tatsächlichen zum Begrifflichen, der Schöpfung zur Ewigkeit und Notwendigkeit der Welt. Die Ausgleiche sind unmöglich. Das wirkliche menschliche Denken besteht in der fortwährenden Verbindung beider. Ein absoluter Rationalismus mit der Konsequenz des Pantheismus ist ebenso unmöglich als ein absoluter Irrationalismus mit der Konsequenz der Zufälligkeit und Zusammenhangslosigkeit aller Dinge oder das Polytheismus. Hier stehen Spinoza und William James einander als Gegenpole gegenüber. Die Möglichkeit einer restlosen Ineinanderarbeitung beider ist nicht gegeben....Hier führt jeder Versuch in letztlich unheilbare Widersprüche, obwohl die Vereinigung immer wieder von neuem versucht werden muss.¹

In the conception of contingency it would thus seem as if the historical method were the contradictory of the purely scientific point of view, since the latter has as its ideal a closed system of nature and universal causality therein. But complete contingency and naturalism are only the two necessary poles between which thought moves. The nature of investiga-

1. GS, II, 777-778. The favorable mention here of William James is significant. Troeltsch was more and more impressed by the former's radical empiricism. See below, Chapter V.

whether God wills them because they are good. Thus the ques-
tion of contingency penetrates into the very deepest roots of
the thought of necessity.
Like the problem of rationalism and many others, contin-
gency is related to the whole field of philosophy. Its scope
is as broad as human thought and its laws. The following summary
is as follows:

Es ist die Frage nach dem Verhältnis des
Rationalismus zum Irrationalismus, des Tatsächlich-
en zum Begrifflichen, der Schöpfung zur
Zerlegung und Notwendigkeit der Welt. Die
Ausgangspunkte sind unauflöslich. Das Wirkliche
menschliche Denken besteht in der Fort-
währenden Verbindung beider. Ein absoluter
Rationalismus mit der Konsequenz des Pan-
theismus ist ebenso unmöglich als ein abso-
luter Irrationalismus mit der Konsequenz
der Unmöglichkeit und Zusammenhanglosigkeit
aller Dinge oder des Polytheismus. Hier
stehen Spinoza und William James einander
als Gegensätze gegenüber. Die Möglichkeit
einer reinen Ineinanderbeziehung beider
ist nicht gegeben... Hier tritt jeder Ver-
such in fastlich unheilbare Widersprüche,
obwohl die Vereinigung immer wieder von
neuem versucht werden muss.

In the conception of contingency it would seem as if the
historical method were the contradictory of the purely scien-
tific point of view, since the latter has as its ideal a
closed system of nature and universal causality therein. But
complete contingency and naturalism are only the two necessary
poles between which thought moves. The nature of investiga-

1. GS, II, 777-778. The favorable mention here of Wil-
liam James is significant. The fact was more and more im-
pressed by the former's radical empiricism. See below, Chap-
ter V.
The original is in:

tion requires it. Pure natural science and pure historical conceptions are only logical and not real extremes.¹ It is the genius of historical interpretation, however, that it recognizes the presence of contingent factors in the world and gives them their rightful place with regard to history. Without contingency the historical process would be impossible and would utterly lack meaning. Thus James's empiricism is more nearly right than Spinoza's monism which Troeltsch definitely rejects.

V. Objects of the Historical Method.

The historical method, then, is determined by the object of selecting from the flux of phenomena that which is qualitatively and uniquely individual, whether on a larger or on a smaller scale, and of making this intelligible in its concrete and specific relations.² In another place Troeltsch says:

Der Zweck, das Qualitativ-Mannigfaltige unter Gesichtspunkten individueller besonderer Zentren zu organisieren, bedingt die Methode des historischen Denkens.³

Or again,

Historical knowledge selects its materials as it may require - a national history, a state of civilization, a biography, an intellectual development, - and seeks, by means of the individual causality proper to history, to make it as intelligible as if it were part of our own experience. Even the history of

1. GS, II, 694. 2. ERE, VII, 720. 3. GS, II, 691.

5. GT, 118-119.

tion requires it. True natural science and pure historical
conceptions are only logical and not real extremes.¹ It is

the genius of historical interpretation, however, that it re-
cognizes the presence of contingent factors in the world and
gives them their rightful place with regard to history. With-
out contingency the historical process would be impossible and
would utterly lack meaning. Thus James's empiricism is more
nearly right than Spinoza's monism which Treitschke definitely
rejects.

V. Objects of the Historical Method.

The historical method, then, is determined by the object
of selecting from the flux of phenomena that which is quali-
tatively and uniquely individual, whether on a larger or on a
smaller scale, and of making this intelligible in its concrete
and specific relations.² In another place Treitschke says:

Der Zweck der qualitativ-individualisierenden
Geschichtswissenschaft ist es, das Einzelne
in seiner Eigenart zu verstehen, und es
in seinen Beziehungen zu den anderen
Einzeln zu erklären.³

Or again,

Historical knowledge selects its materials
as it may regard - a national history, a
state of civilization, a biography, an in-
tellectual development, - and seeks, by means
of the individual essentially proper to history,
to make it as intelligible as it is in the
of our own experience. Even the history of

1. GS, II, 694. 2. EHR, VII, 780. 3. GS, II, 691.

within a "kind," were it within our grasp, would be a freely selected and individually concrete subject matter, inasmuch as its development could be understood only as a particular concatenation, and in no sense as an instance of the operation of universal laws. Such purely objective causal explanation, based upon the widest possible experience and the most methodical application of experience, constitutes the distinctive character of history as a pure theoretical science.¹

The real objects of historical thought for Troeltsch are the historische Totalitäten² or individuelle Totalitäten.³ These concepts refer to objective wholes in the historical process, an examination of which constitutes the main problem of this dissertation. Examples of these are "a human life, a nation, a condition of affairs, the spirit of an age, a legal constitution, an economical condition, a school of art."⁴ Others listed in his Christian Thought are: the sphere of Western culture, the social class, the family, the free professional associations, the narrower circles based on sympathy or friendship, the communities of creed, church, and denomination, and the free intellectual communities or schools of thought.⁵ These totalities can be conceptually combined and recombined until we achieve the highest conception of historical totality, namely, humanity. But "this conception of mankind, as a whole, just because mankind cannot be brought place, the author himself admits that the recognition of the

1. ERE, VII, 720.

2. Ibid., 720.

3. GS, III, 32.

4. ERE, VII, 720.

5. CT, 118-119.

thinking, were it within our grasp, would be a truly selected and individually concrete subject matter, inasmuch as its development could be understood only as a particular concrete action, and in no sense as an instance of the operation of universal laws. Such purely objective causal explanation, based upon the widest possible experience and the most methodical application of experience, constitutes the distinctive character of history as a pure theoretical science.¹

The real objects of historical thought for Frobenius are the historische Totalitäten² or individuelle Totalitäten.³

These concepts refer to objective wholes in the historical process, an examination of which constitutes the main problem of this discipline. Examples of these are "a human life, a nation, a condition of affairs, the spirit of an age, a legal constitution, an economical condition, a school of art,"⁴ others listed in his Christian Thought are: the sphere of Western culture, the social class, the family, the free professional associations, the narrower circles based on sympathy or friendship, the communities of creed, church, and denomination, and the free intellectual communities or schools of thought.⁵ These totalities can be conceptually combined and recombined until we achieve the highest conception of human totality, namely, humanity. But "this conception of mankind, as a whole, just because mankind cannot be brought

-
- | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|
| 1. EHR., VII, 720. | 2. Ibid., 720. |
| 3. Op., III, 32. | 4. EHR., VII, 720. |
| 5. Cf. III-119. | |

within a single, simultaneous, and all-embracing view, can never be more than an incomplete work of the imagination."¹

The characteristic difference between these Individual Totalities and the conception of law in natural science lies in the fact that the former are individual wholes of value (individuelle Wertganzen).²

An Stelle der Gesetzesbegriffe der Naturwissenschaften treten die Begriffe von individuellen Wertganzen. Diese Wertganzen können ausgebreitete Kollektiv-Erscheinungen sein; sie können in einzelnen Persönlichkeiten kulminieren, sie können in ihrem weitesten Zusammenhang und ihrer Wechselwirkung geschildert werden; sie können auf die kausalen Zusammenhänge ihres Aufbaues hin untersucht werden. Alles das sind die Aufgaben der historischen Wissenschaft, wie sie wirklich tätig ist, wenn sie ihr Quellenmaterial kritisch gesichert hat und aus ihm die historische Wirklichkeit rekonstruiert. Immer aber bleibt dabei das organisierende Prinzip ihrer Tätigkeit die Auswahl der besonderen Tatsachen unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenschlusses zu individuellen einmaligen Wertganzen.

Troeltsch affirms that this is a completely objective, purely phenomenological teleology, which has nothing to do with metaphysics, but has the simple purpose of selecting out of the infinity of facts the true historical concept.³ How much this idea of historicism implies with regard to epistemology and metaphysics, we have already adequately indicated. At another place, the author himself admits that the recognition of the

1. ERE, VII, 720.

2. GS, II, 692.

3. Ibid., 692.

within a single, all-embracing view, can never be more than an incomplete work of the imagination.¹ The characteristic difference between these individual Totalities and the conception of law in natural science lies in the fact that the former are individual wholes of value

(Individualität) (S. 2).

An Stelle der Gesetzesbegriffe der Naturwissenschaften treten die Begriffe von individuellen Totalitäten. Diese Totalitäten können ausgedehnte Kollektiv-Beziehungen sein; sie können in einzelnen Personen, Kulturen, Völkern, als können in ihrem weitesten Zusammenhang und ihrer Wechselwirkung geschichtlich werden; sie können auf die kausalen Zusammenhänge ihres Aufbaus hin untersucht werden. Alles das sind die Aufgaben der historischen Wissenschaft, wie sie wirklich tätig ist, wenn sie ihr volles material kritisch geschicht hat und aus ihm die historische Wirklichkeit rekonstruiert. Immer aber bleibt dabei das organisierte Prinzip inner Tätigkeit die Achse der besonderen Tatsachen unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenhangs zu individuellen ein- maligen Ereignissen.

Freilich stimmt dies zu einem vollständig objektiven, rein phänomenologischen Teleologie, which has nothing to do with metaphysics, but has the simple purpose of selecting out of the infinity of facts the true historical concept.² How much this idea of historicism implies with regard to epistemology and metaphysics, we have already adequately indicated. At another place, the author himself admits that the recognition of the

2. ed., II, 223.

1. ed., VII, 720.

2. ed., 223.

fact that the objects of history are Individual Totalities shows that the problem of empirical historical research is interrelated with the problems of a system of values, including ethics.¹ He says:

Thus, e.g. Gegenueber dem naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffe der Kausalität steht nicht bloss die an Stelle der Kausalgleichung tretende Kausalungleichung oder individuelle Kausalität, sondern noch mehr die Aufhebung der Kausalität der Einzelbezüge in einer der Ganze überwaltenden Kontinuierlichkeit des Sinnes, des Wertes oder der Idee, wobei dann ja auch das Hervortreten der schöpferischen Originalität aus einem solchen ueberhaupt ganz unmechanischen Zusammenhang weniger auffallend ist.

The historical wholes just indicated above are "processes, and internally coherent congeries of phenomena," and hence the study of them requires a third principle of reflexion, viz., the principle of development (Entwicklung). Entwicklung must not be confounded either with development in natural science or in metaphysics. These distinctions must be made clear. Troeltsch conceives scientific development to signify "the explanation of becoming by the addition of infinitesimal mechanical changes."² "The metaphysical conception denotes the interpretation of reality as the expression of an absolute intelligence which realizes itself therein."² In contrast to these, the conception of historico-empirical development denotes the progress that issues from

1. GS, III, 55-56. It is with relation to this point that Troeltsch's chief affinity with Rickert must be recognized.

2. ERE, VII, 720.

fact that the objects of history are individual totalities shows that the problem of empirical historical research is interrelated with the problem of a system of values, including ethics.¹ He says:

Gegenüber dem naturwissenschaftlichen Begriff der Kausalität steht nicht bloß die Idee der Kausalität, sondern die Idee der Kausalität als einer individuellen Kausalität, sondern noch mehr die Auffassung der Kausalität als einer Kausalität in einer der Gattung überweltlichen Kontinuität des Sinnes, des Wertes oder der Idee, wobei dann ja auch das Hervorsetzen der abgeleiteten Ursächlichkeit aus einem solchen Verhältnis ganz unendlich vielen mannigfaltigen Verhältnissen entspricht.

The historical wholes just indicated above are "processes, and internally coherent series of phenomena," and hence the study of them requires a third principle of reflection, viz., the principle of development (*Entwicklung*). *Entwicklung* must not be confused either with development in natural science or in metaphysics. These distinctions must be made clear. Theoretically conceived scientific development is strictly "the explanation of becoming by the addition of infinitesimal mechanical changes."² The metaphysical conception denotes the interpretation of reality as the expansion of an absolute intelligence which realizes itself therein.³ In contrast to

these,

the conception of historical-empirical development denotes the progress that issues from

1. *Op. cit.*, III, 55-56. It is with relation to this point that Troeltsch's chief affinity with Rickert must be recognized. 2. *Op. cit.*, VII, 730.

time in the history, the essential element of certain psychical efforts, the working out of the consequences that are latent in the earliest beginnings, the dynamical element in psychical forces which are not exhausted in a single manifestation, but work out towards a tendency to a development akin to logical evolution.

Thus, e.g., there is development in religious, ethical, and philosophical ideas; likewise in the character of individuals and peoples, as also in forms of government and economic conditions. Wherever this tendency asserts itself, it constitutes a principle that organizes the aggregates, and moves them onward from within--a principle that absorbs and elaborates the various causes, and supplies them with a focus of attraction or repulsion.¹

Dieser Begriff der Entwicklung schliesst dabei vollkommen den kausalen Zusammenhang der Ereignisse ein, nur dass ihm der Aufweis des Kausalzusammenhangs bloss Mittel zur Herstellung historischer Ganzen und niemals Selbstzweck ist, und dass er den Kausalzusammenhang zwischen zwei individuellen Erfahrungstatsachen mit Rücksicht auf die Besonderheit ausschliessenden naturwissenschaftlichen Kausalbegriffes bilden wird.²

One of the main problems of this dissertation will be to clarify and criticize the principle of development. Having introduced it here, we leave it, to discuss it fully below.

In the problem of historical development the concept of time is important. As used in the study of historical events, it assumes quite a different form from its use in the natural sciences. A recognition of the tremendous disparity between

1. ERE, VII, 720. For an 2. GS, II, 693. discussion of the problem of time with a criticism of physical time, see E. S. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," *Jour. Rel.*, 12 (1932), 544-555.

the essential element of certain psychological forces, the working out of the consequences that are latent in the earliest beginnings, the dynamical element in psychological forces which are not exhausted in a single manifestation, but work out towards a tendency to a development akin to logical evolution.

Thus, e.g., there is development in religious, scientific, and philosophical ideas; likewise in the character of individuals and peoples, as also in forms of government and economic conditions. Wherever this tendency asserts itself, it constitutes a principle that organizes the aggregates, and moves them onward from within—a principle that absorbs and elaborates the various causes, and supplies them with a focus of attraction or repulsion.

Dieser Begriff der Entwicklung schließt das bei Vollkommen des kausalen Zusammenhangs der Ereignisse ein, nur dass ihm der Aufbau des Kausalzusammenhangs nicht fehlt, zur Darstellung historischer Gesetze und Prinzipien. Selbstverständlich ist, und dass es dem Kausalzusammenhang zwischen zwei individuellen Ereignissen zwischenzeitlich mit Rücksicht auf die Gesamtheit ausschließender Kausalzusammenhänge bilden wird.

One of the main problems of this dissertation will be to clarify and criticize the principle of development. Having introduced it here, we leave it, to discuss it fully below. In the problem of historical development the concept of time is important. As used in the study of historical events, it assumes quite a different form from its use in the natural sciences. A recognition of the tremendous disparity between

time in science, i.e., physical time, and concrete duration in history, shows again the deep cleft which exists between physical causation and historical causality. Troeltsch says:

In dem Unterschied der chronometrischen Zeit und der konkreten Dauer ist der tiefste Gegensatz gegen die mathematische-mechanische Naturwissenschaft erreicht.¹

On the question of time Troeltsch rejects the position of Kantian idealists. Rickert, for whom he holds high regard, seemed (as we have shown above on page 21) to have neglected this essential point, which invalidated much of his philosophy of history. Kant's view of time was that of physical time. This was a weakness. The result was mere formalism. The same can be charged of Rickert, who makes of history "ein blosses System logischer Geltungen."

Wir fallen in den völligen Vernunft-rationalismus und Anti-historismus Kants zurück und gewinnen nicht einmal mehr die etwas naiven Vermittelungen, die Kant zwischen historischen antagonistischer Entwicklung und Herausarbeitung der Vernunft aus ihr gefunden hatte.²

There are several important differences between the two conceptions of time.³ Physical time is dependent on space and motion in space and thus connected with physical cause, whereas historical or concrete time is the time of the inner sense (inneren Sinnes) and of memory, which controls spatial and unspatial events and places them in the service of the present or the future. "The present always carries past and future

1. GS, III, 61. 2. Ibid., 154.

3. Ibid., 56-57. For an illuminating discussion of the problem of time with a criticism of physical time, see E. S. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," Jour. Rel., 12 (1932), 544-555.

time in science, i.e., physical time, and concrete duration in history, shows again the deep effect which exists between physical causation and historical causality. Troeltsch says:

In dem Unterschied der chronometrischen Zeit und der konkreten Dauer ist der tiefste Gegensatz gegen die mathematische-mechanische Naturwissenschaft enthalten.

On the question of time Troeltsch rejects the position of Kantian idealists. Rieker, for whom he holds high regard, seemed (as we have shown above on page 21) to have neglected this essential point, which invalidated much of his philosophy of history. Kant's view of time was that of physical time. This was a weakness. The results were mere formalism. The same can be charged of Rieker, who makes of history "ein blosses System logischer Gegebenheiten."

Wir fallen in den völligen Vernunftirrtum, wenn wir die Zeit als ein historisches Faktum betrachten, das sich aus der Natur ergibt. Die Zeit ist ein a priori gesetztes Prinzip der Vernunft, das die Erscheinungen ordnet.

There are several important differences between the two conceptions of time.³ Physical time is dependent on space and motion in space and thus connected with physical cause, whereas historical or concrete time is the time of the inner sense (inneren Sinnes) and of memory, which controls spatial and temporal facts and places them in the service of the present or the future. "The present always carries past and future

1. Ibid., 111, 61. 2. Ibid., 154. 3. Ibid., 56-57. For an illuminating discussion of the problem of time with a criticism of physical time, see E. S. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," Jour. Rel., 12 (1932), 244-258.

within itself in productive fashion."¹ Secondly, physical time

zerlegt die Zeit in genau begrenzte Einzelabschnitte und in diesen Abschnitten stehende Einzelvorgänge, was nur durch Reduktion der Zeit auf räumliche Vorgänge in letzter Linie möglich ist.²

In contradistinction to this, historical time is like a river (Fluss) in which nothing is set off or cut up into units, but everything flows into everything else. Past and future are interpenetrating. Measurement of this time is impossible. We can have only

Zäsuren, die mehr oder minder willkürlich nach Sinneszusammenhängen und grossen Sinnwandlungen eingelegt werden.³

The chronological reduction of these processes to sun-time is only a very crude and external means of orientation, which has nothing to do with the inner division of itself, i.e., with its inner slowness or acceleration. We shall see later how significant this psychological conception of time is for the principle of historical development, for concrete duration distinguishes the latter from the idea of progress and from the idea of natural evolution.

Troeltsch considers concrete duration the most significant contribution of Bergson.

Das Wichtigste aber ist die mit dem Grundgedanken eng zusammenhängende, ja fast identische Entdeckung des Unterschiedes von Zeit und Dauer, von chronometrisch-mathematischer und historischer, erlebter, gewirkter und

1. Lyman, "Troeltsch's Philosophy of History," Phil. Rev. 41 (1932), 451. 2. GS, III, 56. 3. Ibid., 642-643.

within itself in productive fashion. Secondly, physical time

verläuft die Zeit in genau bestimmter Hinsicht
absolut und in diesen Abschnitten stehende
Einselvorgänge, was nur durch Reduktion der
Zeit auf räumliche Vorgänge in letzter Linie
möglich ist.

In contradistinction to this, historical time is like a river
(Fluss) in which nothing is set off or cut up into units, but
everything flows into everything else. Past and future are
interpenetrating. Measurement of this time is impossible. We
can have only

Erzählen, die mehr oder minder willkürlich
nach Sinnzusammenhängen und grossen Sinn-
wandelungen eingeteilt werden.

The chronological reduction of these processes to ann-time is
only a very crude and external means of orientation, which has
nothing to do with the inner division of itself, i.e., with
its inner slowness or acceleration. We shall see later how
significant this psychological conception of time is for the
principle of historical development, for concrete history
distinguishes the latter from the idea of progress and from
the idea of natural evolution.
Troeltsch considers concrete duration the most signifi-
cant contribution of Bergson.

Das Wichtigste aber ist die mit dem Grund-
gedanken eng zusammenhängende, je fest ihn-
liche Entdeckung des Unterschiedes von Zeit
und Dauer, von chronometrisch-mathematischer
und historischer, existenz, gewirkter und

gefühlter Zeit, von homogenem Medium zeitliche Lagenordnung und inhaltlich heterogener, frei verbindender und verschmelzender, schaffender und sinkender Kontinuität des Lebens.¹

With this consideration of time we have come to the close of our presentation of Troeltsch's principles of historiography. Troeltsch thought he presented some of these principles without any necessary reference to metaphysical discussions of the same. He did not, however, avoid the fundamental problems of epistemology, logic, and ethics. Historical causation as a purely empirical and theoretical science not only has implications of a philosophical nature, but the clarification of the idea of cause in history in contradistinction to physical cause involves philosophy.

VI. Criticism of Troeltsch.

Troeltsch's discussion of time is empirical and psychological. For the purposes of his work this may be adequate. However, he seems to regard his view of time as very similar to Bergson's, if not identical with it. Bergson's conception of time is not only psychological but metaphysical. The durée réelle of L'Évolution Créatrice is a metaphysical doctrine which rules out as an abstraction the view of time as developed in physical science. Troeltsch, on the other hand,² nowhere clearly makes so positive a statement, but allows the

1. GS, III, 642-643.

2. See above page 43.

geleiteter Zeit, von homöopathischen Mitteln
 lichte Lagerung und inaktiver Betoro-
 genen, frei verbindender und verschmelzender
 der, schallender und starker Kontinuität
 des Lebens.

With this consideration of time we have come to the close of
 our presentation of Troeltsch's principles of historiography.
 Troeltsch thought he presented some of these principles with-
 out any necessary reference to metaphysical discussions of
 the same. He did not, however, avoid the fundamental problems
 of epistemology, logic, and ethics. Historical causation as a
 purely empirical and theoretical science not only has implica-
 tions of a philosophical nature, but the clarification of the
 idea of cause in history in contradistinction to physical
 cause involves philosophy.

VI. Criticism of Troeltsch.

Troeltsch's discussion of time is empirical and psycho-
 logical. For the purposes of his work this may be adequate.
 However, he seems to regard his view of time as very different
 to Bergson's, it is not identical with it. Bergson's conception
 of time is not only psychological but metaphysical. The
durée réelle or l'évolution is a metaphysical doc-
 trine which rises out as an abstraction the view of time as
 developed in physical sciences. Troeltsch, on the other hand,
 nowhere clearly makes so positive a statement, but allows the

two conceptions of time to continue peaceably in separate realms. Though protesting against the application of physical or spatial time to history, he does not attack the former as an abstraction from the real nature of the world. Finally, Troeltsch's view of time has not adequately distinguished psychological from metaphysical time. If he wishes his historiography to be a purely empirical science, it is difficult to understand how he can so easily and innocently accept Bergson's metaphysical duration.

The same kind of criticism may be made of Troeltsch's whole treatment of causality. He uses the term physical cause in the Nineteenth Century meaning of universal necessary connection in a closed system of nature. He does not protest against its use in natural science. Here, apparently, it may be used without interference. The only objection is that one cannot apply it to the facts of history. As a result there is a sharp cleavage between science with its conception of law and history with its idea of development. Troeltsch tries to bridge this gap by an appeal to contingency. Lyman writes,

The necessity for compounding the idea of law with the idea of contingency makes room for individuality and creativeness in the historical process, for the rôle of will as underlying all the a prioris of the several sciences, for the accidental in history which is often introduced by physical causes, and for the polarity belonging to historical inquiry by reason of its joint quest for the factual and the meaningful.¹

1. Phil. Rev., 41 (1932), 453.

two conceptions of time to continue peacefully in separate realms. Though protesting against the application of physical or spatial time to history, he does not attack the former as an abstraction from the real nature of the world. Finally, Troelsch's view of time has not adequately distinguished between ontological from metaphysical time. If he wishes his historiography to be a purely empirical science, it is difficult to understand how he can so easily and innocently accept Bergson's metaphysical duration.

The same kind of criticism may be made of Troelsch's whole treatment of causality. He uses the term physical causes in the nineteenth century meaning of universal necessary connection in a closed system of nature. He does not protest against its use in natural science. Here, apparently, it may be used without interference. The only objection is that one cannot apply it to the facts of history. As a result there is a sharp cleavage between science with its conception of law and history with its idea of development. Troelsch tries to bridge this gap by an appeal to contingency. Lyman writes,

The necessity for compounding the idea of law with the idea of contingency makes room for individuality and creativeness in the historical process, for the rôle of will as underlying all the a priori of the several sciences, for the accident in history which is often introduced by physical causes, and for the polarity belonging to historical inquiry by reason of its joint quest for the factual and the meaningful.

Nevertheless, the two spheres are not encompassed adequately by a rational whole which unifies them. The breach between history and science is not closed again.

Had Troeltsch made use of the new conceptions of cause in the natural sciences, which even in his day were being taught, he might have had a less rigid conception of the sphere of science. Contingency would have been recognized as operating even in the field of physics. But Troeltsch's view of cause is still narrowly Kantian in this field and narrowly deterministic. The writings of current scientists are different in their points of view. Eddington says,

It is a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law. Determinism has dropped out altogether in the latest formulations of theoretical physics and it is at least open to doubt whether it will ever be brought back.¹

Further on he says:

The future is a combination of the causal influences of the past together with unpredictable elements - unpredictable not merely because it is impracticable to obtain the data of prediction, but because no data connected causally with our experience exist.Those who maintain a deterministic theory of mental activity must do so as the outcome of their study of the mind itself and not with the idea that they are thereby making it more conformable with our experimental knowledge of the laws of inorganic nature.²

In this connection it will not be out of place to develop two

1. The Nature of the Physical World, p. 294.

2. Ibid., 294-295.

Nevertheless, the two spheres are not encompassed separately by a rational whole which unifies them. The breach between history and science is not closed again.

Had Troeltsch made use of the new conceptions of science in the natural sciences, which even in his day were being taught, he might have had a less rigid conception of the sphere of science. Contingency would have been recognized as operating even in the field of physics. But Troeltsch's view of science is still narrowly Kantian in this field and narrowly deterministic. The writings of current scientists are different in their points of view. Millington says:

It is a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that physics is no longer regarded as a science of deterministic law. Determinism has dropped out altogether in the latest formulations of theoretical physics and it is at least open to doubt whether it will ever be brought back.

Further on he says:

The future is a combination of the causal influences of the past together with unpredictable elements - unpredictable not merely because it is impossible to obtain the data of prediction, but because no data connected causally with our experience exist. . . . Those who maintain a deterministic theory of mental activity must do so as the outcome of their study of the mind itself and not with the idea that they are thereby making it more conformable with our existing mental knowledge of the laws of inorganic nature.

In this connection it will not be out of place to develop two

1. The Nature of the Physical World, p. 224.
2. Ibid., 204-205.

further propositions regarding physical cause:

In recent times some of the greatest triumphs of physical prediction have been furnished by admittedly statistical laws which do not rest on a basis of causality. Moreover the great laws hitherto accepted as causal appear on minuter examination to be of statistical character.

Whether or not there is a causal scheme at the base of atomic phenomena, modern atomic theory is not now attempting to find it; and it is making rapid progress because it no longer sets this up as a practical aim. We are in the position of holding an epistemological theory of natural knowledge which does not correspond to the actual aim of current scientific investigation.¹

Add to this the positive principle of Indeterminacy,² and the epistemological views of classical physics are doomed. A contemporary philosopher like Whitehead rejects the whole Kantian approach, even to science, and presents a view which is thoroughly temporalistic.³ Such a metaphysics of science avoids the dualism inherent in Troeltsch's scheme. The fundamental problem is one of time. If Troeltsch had, like Alexander, considered the universe to be through and through history,⁴ the crude dualism of his treatment might have been avoided.

We can at least affirm that in modern scientific thought it is

1. The Nature of the Physical World, 298-299.

2. Ibid., 220.

3. Science and the Modern World, ch. IX. Cf. E. S. Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God," cited above.

4. Cf. J. Alexander Gunn, The Problem of Time, 257.

Further propositions regarding physical causality:
 In recent times some of the greatest triumphs
 of physical prediction have been furnished by
 admittedly statistical laws which do not rest
 on a basis of causality. Moreover the great
 laws hitherto accepted as causal appear on
 closer examination to be of statistical
 character.

Whether or not there is a causal scheme at
 the base of atomic phenomena, modern atomic
 theory is not now attempting to find it; and
 it is making rapid progress because it no
 longer sets this up as a practical aim. We
 are in the position of holding an epistemo-
 logical theory of natural knowledge which
 does not correspond to the actual aim of our
 present scientific investigation.¹

Add to this the positive principle of indeterminacy,² and the
 epistemological views of classical physics are doomed. A com-
 temporary philosopher like Whitehead rejects the whole Kantian
 approach, even to science, and presents a view which is thor-
 oughly temporalistic.³ Such a metaphysics of science avoids
 the dualism inherent in Troeltsch's scheme. The fundamental
 problem is one of time. If Troeltsch had, like Alexander,
 considered the universe to be through and through history,⁴
 the crude dualism of his treatment might have been avoided.
 We can at least affirm that in modern scientific thought it is

1. The Nature of the Physical World, 298-322.
2. Ibid., 320.
3. Science and the Modern World, ch. IX. Cf. A. S. Brichman, "A Temporalist View of God," cited above.
4. Cf. J. Alexander Gwyn, The Problem of Time, 237.

not necessary to draw the sharp lines of distinction which Troeltsch has drawn between physics and history. With the contingency of the physical world generally recognized by scientists, the facts of historical development are more at home than under the rigidity of the systems of the past century which Troeltsch was combatting. Troeltsch professed a temporalistic metaphysics, but he did not show how physical time was related to it.

At the beginning of this chapter we indicated that Troeltsch's historiography would serve to introduce his philosophy of history. He constantly merges his empirical historiography with its philosophical presuppositions. There is a significant passage in his essay on Ebnæck's Das Wesen des Christentums in which he says,

Geschichte und Geschichtsphilosophie lassen sich nur künstlich und methodisch scheiden; in Wahrheit steckt schon in der ersteren ein Stück des letzteren.¹

The chief problems of philosophy of history emerge in the determination of historical causation. The two concepts about which all the other problems revolve are Individual Totalities and the idea of development. Within the historical totality is constructed a system of values which must be judged by an ideal system of values. It is the function of ethics to construct such a system. This problem becomes extremely complicated because concrete ethical values are so largely dependent on history.²

1. GS, II, 451.

2. ERE, VII, 722.

not necessary to draw the sharp lines of distinction which Troeltsch has drawn between physics and history. With the contingency of the physical world generally recognized by scientists, the facts of historical development are more at home than under the rigidity of the systems of the past conformity which Troeltsch was combating. Troeltsch possessed a far-reaching metaphysics, but he did not know how physical time was related to it.

At the beginning of this chapter we indicated that Troeltsch's historiography would serve to introduce his philosophy of history. He constantly merges his empirical historiography with the philosophical presuppositions. There is a significant passage in his essay on Ernst Curtius in which he says,

Geschichte und Geschichtsphilosophie lassen sich nur künstlich und methodisch scheiden; in Wahrheit steckt schon in der ersten ein Stück der letzteren.¹

The chief problems of philosophy of history emerge in the determination of historical causation. The two concepts about which all the other problems revolve are individual totality and the idea of development. Within the historical totality is constructed a system of values which must be judged by an ideal system of values. It is the function of ethics to construct such a system. This problem becomes extremely complicated because concrete ethical values are so largely dependent on history.²

Another problem is that of metaphysical or ethical development.

This must be carefully distinguished from the conception of historical development in the empirical sense, and is not to be demonstrated in terms of the latter. The empirical conception of historical development shows only partial, or progressive and regressive developments, but not the advance of mankind as a whole towards a final and universal end. It certainly exhibits the formation of ethical aggregates, but not their synthesis in a uniform and progressive continuity....In reality, the conception of ethical development is a postulate of faith.¹

A third problem has to do with Individuation. This refers to the approximation which any group or any individual makes to the Ideal system of values. Individuation is closely related to the problem of a cultural synthesis which we shall discuss at length below, being but another form of the problem with which Troeltsch wrestled during his whole career, "das Verhältnis zwischen der endlosen Bewegtheit des geschichtlichen Lebensstromes und dem Bedürfnis des menschlichen Geistes, ihn durch feste Normen zu begrenzen und zu gestalten."² These problems form the general outline for the remainder of this dissertation: the nature of Individual-Totalities, the meaning of Development, and the problem of a Cultural Synthesis. To the first of these we now address ourselves.

1. ERE, VII, 722.

2. DHSU, 1.

Another problem is that of metaphysical or ethical de-

velopment.

This must be carefully distinguished from the conception of historical development in the empirical sense, and is not to be demonstrated in terms of the latter. The empirical conception of historical development shows only partial, or progressive and regressive developments, but not the advance of mankind as a whole towards a final and universal end. It certainly exhibits the formation of ethical aggregates, but not their synthesis in a uniform and progressive activity... In reality, the conception of ethical development is a postulate of ethics.

A third problem has to do with indivision. This refers

to the approximation which any group or any individual makes to the ideal system of values. Indivision is closely re-

lated to the problem of a cultural synthesis which we shall discuss at length below, being but another form of the problem with which Troeltsch wrestled during his whole career, "das

Verhältnis zwischen der endlichen Bewusstseins- und der unendlichen Lebenswirklichkeit und dem Bestreben des menschlichen Geistes, ihn durch feste Normen zu bestimmen und zu gestalten." These

problems form the general outline for the remainder of this discussion: the nature of individual-indivision, the meaning of development, and the problem of a cultural synthesis.

To the first of these we now address ourselves.

1. ETHICS, VII, 232.

2. ETHICS, I.

The logic of history is of this kind. It consists of definite logical assumptions, of principles of selection and construction, which are used at first unconsciously in the understanding and criticism of experience. These principles can be distinguished as the mind interacts with its object, and they require a logical formulation.¹

The fundamental category of the logic of history is, accordingly, "die Kategorie der individuellen Totalität."² To describe what is involved in this category is the task of this chapter. There is no simple element analogous to the atoms or centers of energy of natural science in the science of history.

On the contrary there are many wholes or "zusammengesetzte Grössen, in denen eine Fülle psychischer Elementarvorgänge samt gewissen Naturbedingungen schon jedesmal zusammengeballt ist zu einer Lebenseinheit oder Totalität."³

The forces operative in these totalities are thus, to a large extent, psychical; nevertheless, the totality is not simply a psychological concept, but also logical. These logical wholes are more than mere individuals or persons. A careful analysis of history shows that persons must be understood in the setting of larger units, like the family, the sex, the class, the folk, the conditions of the times, and the spiritual situa-

1. GS, III, 29.

2. Ibid., 32.

3. Ibid., 32-33. There is a close relationship here to Gestalt psychology. One might even call Troeltsch's principle of Individual Totalities, the principle of Historical Gestalten.

The logic of history is of this kind. It consists of definite logical assumptions, of principles of selection and construction, which are used at first unconsciously in the understanding and criticism of experience. These principles can be distinguished as the mind interacts with the object, and they require a logical formulation.¹

The fundamental category of the logic of history is, accordingly, "die Kategorie der individuellen Totalität."² To describe what is involved in this category is the task of this chapter. There is no simple element analogous to the atoms or centers of energy of natural science in the science of history. On the contrary there are many wholes or "Zusammengesetzte Größen, in denen eine Reihe psychischer Elementarvorgänge samt gewissen Naturbedingungen schon jedesmal zusammengefaßt ist zu einer Gesamtheit oder Totalität."³

The forces operative in these totalities are thus, to a large extent, psychological; nevertheless, the totality is not simply a psychological concept, but also logical. These logical wholes are more than mere individuals or persons. A careful analysis of history shows that persons must be understood in the setting of larger units, like the family, the sex, the class, the folk, the conditions of the times, and the spiritual atmosphere.

1. *ibid.*, III, 29.
 2. *ibid.*, 28.
 3. *ibid.*, 28-29. There is a close relationship here to Gestalt psychology. One might even call Troeltsch's principle of individual totalities, the principle of historical Gestalten.

tion of the period. Consequently, the real objects of research are:

CHAPTER THREE

The Nature of Individual Totalities

In the previous chapter we raised certain problems which we must now investigate. The chief burden of that chapter was to show the sharp differences existing between the assumptions and methods of natural science and those of historical science. On the one hand is the "mathematisch-mechanisch-physikalisch-chemische Theorie der reinen Naturwissenschaft," on the other "die reine Historie als Erforschung und Darstellung der seelischen Bewegungen, Schöpfungen, und Zusammenhänge des Menschentums."¹ Troeltsch holds that the presuppositions and method of historical science demand a type of logic which is different from that assumed in natural science. The former he calls metalogic.² Metalogic arises out of the necessity of thought to accommodate itself to the particular subject matter of the Realwissenschaften in which it engages. The characteristic feature of metalogic is:

die Lehre von der jedesmal auf den grossen Hauptgebieten verschiedenen Art der Abstraktion, die naturgemäss von dem Stoffe abhängt, auf den sich die Erkenntnis richtet, und von dem besonderen Erkenntniszweck, der sich mit der Art des Stoffes selbst instinktiv darbietet, mit dessen Gestaltung durch eine aus dem Stoff selber wirkende Notwendigkeit verbunden ist.¹

1. GS, III, 29.

2. The following is only a preliminary definition of metalogic. For a fuller discussion see below Ch. IV.

The initial act of judging is a logical intuition.¹ This
tion of the period. Consequently, the real objects of re-
act of intuition is an hypothesis which must be tested by the
search are:

sum total of causal relations which the objects manifest, both
internally die Kollektiv-Individualitäten, Völker,
Staaten, Klassen, Stände, Kulturzeitalter, as have
Kulturtendenzen, Religionsgemeinschaften,
Vorgangskomplexe aller Art wie Kriege,
Revolutionen usw.¹

The larger whole comes logically first, though the size of an
In thus ruling out mere individual persons as the objects of
Individual Totality is not its criterion.
his research he affirms his agreement on this point with
Harnack.²

The periphery, or limit, of such a totality is hard to
determine, and Troeltsch remains very vague in treating it.
He simply says that it is a matter of intuition and a matter
"des historischen Taktes."³

Sowohl die Abgrenzung bestimmter Zeit-
strecken oder Perioden wie die Umschrei-
bung eines gegenständlichen Keises sind
insofern 'subjektiv'.³

Nevertheless, says the author, the research student must be
certain that he has a totality which he has not superimposed
upon his material, but which grows out of the data of history
itself. How this whole obtains or possesses any objectivity
of its own is a problem we shall discuss below. It suffices
for the historian, "wenn er den von ihm herausgeschnittenen
Gegenstand als einen immer noch anschaulichen Zusammenhang zu
sehen vermag."⁴ Such an object must be definable, and assimi-
lable to or classified under other Individual Totalities.

1. GS, III, 33.

2. Ibid., 33 n. of intuition, see below Chapter V.

3. Ibid., 34.

4. Loc. cit.

tion of the period. Consequently, the real objects of re-

search are:

Revolutions usw.
Vorgangskomplexe aller Art wie Kriege,
Kulturkrisen, Religionsgemeinschaften,
Staat, Klassen, Stände, Kulturzeitalter,
die Kollektiv-Individualitäten, Völker.

In thus ruling out mere individual persons as the objects of
his research he affirms his agreement on this point with
Harnack.²

The periphery, or limits, of such a totality is hard to
determine, and Troeltsch remains very vague in treating it.
He simply says that it is a matter of intuition and a matter
"des historischen Faktors."³

Sowohl die Abgrenzung bestimmter Zeit-
strecken oder Perioden wie die Umschrei-
bung eines gegenständlichen Komplexes sind
inhärent 'subjektiv'.⁴
Nevertheless, says the author, the research student must be
certain that he has a totality which he has not superimposed
upon his material, out of which grows out of the data of history
itself. How this whole obtains or possesses any objectivity
of its own is a problem we shall discuss below. It suffices
for the historian, "wenn er den von ihm herausgeschalteten
Gegenstand als einen immer noch anschaulichen Zusammenhang zu
sehen vermag."⁴ Such an object must be definable, and assimi-
lable to or classified under other individual totalities.

1. GS. III, 33.
2. Ibid., 33 n.
3. Ibid., 34.
4. Loc. cit.

The initial act of judging is a logical intuition.¹ This act of intuition is an hypothesis which must be tested by the sum total of causal relations which the objects manifest, both internally and externally. After the larger totalities have been proved, the smaller units can be examined and explained.² The larger whole comes logically first, though the size of an Individual Totality is not its criterion.

That the representative and significant qualities of an epoch of history are not compounded from simple elements, be they atoms or human beings even, but consist in significant attributes of the whole whose bases are rooted in the sociological structure of the times, is a principle which we owe to

Hegel. In criticizing the philosophy of history before Hegel, Horkheimer, a contemporary German philosopher, writes:

Machiavellis Fehler besteht nicht schlechthin in der Behauptung von Gleichformigkeiten im Charakter der geschichtlich aufgetretenen Menschen, sondern in dem Absehen von den gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen für die Erhaltung oder Veränderung psychischer Eigenschaften. Mit Ausnahme von Hegel hat kaum ein Philosoph der neueren Zeit den Irrtum Machiavellis vermieden.³

Hegel's entire philosophy follows the pattern of understanding things by seeing their relations to, or their place in, the wholes to which they belong. We can know nothing absolutely unless we know the Absolute. The real is rational and rationality consists in complete relatedness. Hegel's philosophy of

1. For a criticism of intuition, see below Chapter V.

2. GS, III, 34.

3. ABG, 33.

The initial act of judging is a logical intuition.¹ This act of intuition is an hypothesis which must be tested by the sum total of causal relations which the objects manifest, both internally and externally. After the larger totalities have been proved, the smaller units can be examined and explained.² The larger whole comes logically first, though the size of an individual totality is not its criterion.

That the representative and significant qualities of an epoch of history are not compounded from simple elements, but they atoms or human beings even, but consist in significant attributes of the whole whose bases are rooted in the social- local structure of the times, is a principle which we owe to Hegel. In criticizing the philosophy of history before Hegel,

Horkheimer, a contemporary German philosopher, writes:
 Machiavelli's Fehler besteht nicht ausschließlich in der Behauptung von Gleichformigkeiten im Charakter der geschichtlich aufgetretenen Menschen, sondern in dem Absehen von den gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen für die Erhaltung oder Veränderung psychischer Eigenschaften.
 Mit Ausnahme von Hegel hat kaum ein Philosoph der neueren Zeit den Irrtum Machiavelli's vermieden.

Hegel's entire philosophy follows the pattern of understanding things by seeing their relations to, or their place in, the wholes to which they belong. We can know nothing absolutely unless we know the Absolute. The real is rational and rationality consists in complete relatedness. Hegel's philosophy of

1. For a criticism of intuition, see below Chapter V.
 2. GS, III, 34.
 3. ABG, 33.

ment.¹ Nicolai Hartmann says of Hegel: history repudiates every atomistic construction or interpretation of society. The principle of historical dialectic functions not among mere personal monads which are completely impervious to each other, but among nations and states and peoples, all of which are manifestations of the Objective Spirit.

By Objective Spirit Hegel meant, says Windelband, "the active and influential living body of individuals, which is not created by these, but rather forms the source from which they proceed as regards their spiritual life."¹ The same interpretation is given by Lasson.² Reason Hegel called substance.

Die Substanz ist sie, nämlich das, wodurch und worin alle Wirklichkeit ihr Sein und Bestehen hat.³

Hegel's grand place in the philosophy of history. In the Encyclopädie he says that the Objective Spirit is the Absolute Idea, but only as it has being an sich.⁴

Aside from abstract right and morality, the fundamental unity or totality within the Objective Spirit is the family.⁵ A more nearly concrete expression of this substance is civil society.⁶ Above both family and civil society is the state.⁷ Thus, not the individual person, but the state is the real. Above the state there is no higher form, no praetor, as Hegel expresses it,⁸ save the process of history and its development, subordinate to it, or including it and the people are

1. Windelband, HOP, 613.

2. "Einleitung," GPR, XVI.

3. VPG, 42.

4. #483.

5. Ibid., #518.

6. Ibid., #523.

7. #535.

8. GPR, #333.

history repudiates every atomistic construction or interpretation of society. The principle of historical dialectic functions not among mere personal monads which are completely impervious to each other, but among nations and states and peoples, all of which are manifestations of the Objective Spirit. By Objective Spirit Hegel meant, says Windelband, "the

active and influential living body of individuals, which is not created by these, but rather forms the source from which they proceed as regards their spiritual life."¹ The same interpretation is given by Jasson.² Reason Hegel called substance.

Die Substanz ist also, nämlich das, wodurch und worin alle Wirklichkeit ihr Sein und Bestehen hat.³

In the *Encyclopädie* he says that the Objective Spirit is the Absolute Idea, but only as it has being on earth.⁴

Aside from abstract right and morality, the fundamental unity or totality within the Objective Spirit is the family.⁵ A more nearly concrete expression of this substance is civil society.⁶ Above both family and civil society is the state.⁷ Thus, not the individual person, but the state is the real. Above the state there is no higher form, no presensor, as Hegel expresses it,⁸ save the process of history and its develop-

1. Windelband, *HOP*, 613.
2. "Einleitung," *GPR*, XVI.
3. *VPG*, 42.
4. 4483.
5. *Idid*, 4518.
6. *Idid*, 4523.
7. 4535.
8. *GPR*, 4533.

ment.¹ Nicolai Hartmann says of Hegel: historical sciences.¹

Today Man darf von Hegel sagen, dass er der Ent- nature of
social gro decker des objektiven Geistes ist. Gerade
presents den ueberindividuellen, geschichtlich le- up Mind
in The Fou benden Geist meinte er, und für ihn prägte
personalit er diesen Terminus. Auf ihn bezog er das Laski
them essen geschichtliche Geschehen, in ihm erblickte
goes. Dur er den eigentlichen Geschichtsträger, den
trary, den Schöpfer von Recht und Moral, Gemein-
ity, Bal schäftsorganisation und Staat, Bildung, He finds
wholes in Zivilisation und Kultur. Denn diese Ge-
bilde sind es, die Geschichte haben. Da- responsibility
mit hat er der Philosophie des Geistes die
Wege gewiesen. ists a person. But Perry, on the con-
Seine Entdeckung war, dass er den lebenden
Geist im grossen an seinen Grundphänomenen
auf allen Geistesgebieten erstmalig philo- personal-
sophisch fasste und sein Eigenleben neben ance of
dem lebenden Geist in kleinen, oder auch
ueber ihm aufzeigte.² Interest apparent on this sub-

Hegel's greatness lies partially at least in his giving wholes,
like states, a significant place in the philosophy of history.

Troeltsch concedes this contribution. What he criticizes in
Hegel, however, is the regimentation of all historical facts
into a rational system,³ wherein human beings appear as mere
marionettes under the overpowering might and progress of the
state.⁴ deduce or explain this principle logically, but it re-

Hegel's predominant interest in the state and in the peo-
ple (Volk) displays an Eighteenth Century influence in his
thought. But other Collective Totalities alongside of the
state, subordinate to it, or including it and the people are
necessary. Larger cultural unities than mere states assuredly
gebung und Bestimmung aller dieses werden
schon von Laski. Aber in allen steckt
schlechthin gegebene ursprüngliche

1. GPR, #340.

2. PGS, 170.

3. GS, III, 273.

4. Ibid., 275.

5. "In Society a Person," Jour. Phil., 21 (1924) 87-91.

ment. I. Nicolai Hartmann says of Hegel:

Man darf von Hegel sagen, dass er der Ent-
decker des objektiven Geistes ist. Gerade
den neoplatonischen, geschichtlich be-
stimmten Geist meinte er, und für ihn grünte
er diesen Terminus. Auf ihn bezog er das
geschichtliche Geschehen, in ihm erblickte
er den eigentlichen Geschichtsträger, den
Schöpfer von Recht und Moral, Gemein-
schaftsorganisation und Staat, Bildung,
Zivilisation und Kultur. Denn diese Ge-
bilde sind es, die Geschichte haben. Da-
mit hat er der Philosophie des Geistes die
Wege gewiesen.
Seine Entdeckung war, dass er den lebenden
Geist im Großen an seinen Grundphänomenen
auf allen Geistesgebieten erstmalig philo-
sophisch fasste und sein Eigenleben neben
dem lebenden Geist in kleinen, oder auch
über ihm aufzeigte.²

Hegel's greatness lies partially at least in his giving wholes,
like states, a significant place in the philosophy of history.
Troeltsch concedes this contribution. What he criticizes in
Hegel, however, is the regimentation of all historical facts
into a rational system,³ wherein human beings appear as mere
marionettes under the overpowering might and progress of the
state.⁴

Hegel's predominant interest in the state and in the peo-
ple (Volk) displays an eighteenth century influence in his
thought. But other collective totalities alongside of the
state, subordinate to it, or including it and the people are
necessary. Larger cultural units than mere states assuredly

1. GPR, 4340.
2. PGR, 170.
3. GPR, III, 273.
4. Ibid., 275.

also exist and must be recognized in historical science.¹

Today there is a great deal of interest in the nature of social groups taken as wholes. MacDougall's The Group Mind presents important psychological data on the problem. Laski in The Foundations of Sovereignty discusses the problem of the personality of such associations as corporations. He finds them essentially impersonal so far as a sense of responsibility goes. Durkheim calls society a person. But Perry, on the contrary, denies that society can be conceived of as a personality.² Baldwin and Royce also recognize the significance of wholes in society. With such interest apparent on this subject, Troeltsch's treatment assumes especial significance because of his positive contributions.

I. Originality, Ursprünglichkeit.

The intuitively grasped Individual Totalities display qualities which require further elucidation. The first of these Troeltsch calls Ursprünglichkeit und Einmaligkeit. One cannot deduce or explain this principle logically, but it refers to something which one understands with sympathetic intuition.

Das was man in der Historie ableiten und erklären nennt, ist nur ein Einfühlen in den Werdegang, bei dem man verstehen kann, wie, die Uranlage und Umstände einmal gesetzt, sich in der Wechselwirkung mit Umgebung und Bedingungen alles dieses Werden nachempfinden lässt. Aber in allem steckt doch eine schlechthin gegebene ursprüngliche

1. GS, III, 36.

2. "Is Society a Person," Jour. Phil., 21 (1924) 87-91.

also exist and must be recognized in historical science.¹

Today there is a great deal of interest in the nature of social groups taken as wholes. MacDougall's The Group Mind presents important psychological data on the problem. Laszli in The Foundations of Society discusses the problem of the personality of such associations as corporations. He finds them essentially impersonal so far as a sense of responsibility goes. Durkheim calls society a person. But Perry, on the contrary, denies that society can be conceived of as a personality.² Baldwin and Joyce also recognize the significance of wholes in society. With such interest apparent on this subject, Troeltsch's treatment assumes especial significance because of his positive contributions.

Originality, Ursprünglichkeit.

The intuitively grasped individual totalities display qualities which require further elucidation. The first of these Troeltsch calls Ursprünglichkeit und Einmaligkeit. One cannot deduce or explain this principle logically, but it refers to something which one understands with sympathetic intuition.

Das was man in der Historie erleben und erklären nennt, ist nur ein Einmaliges in den Weltgang, bei dem man verstehen kann, wie die Ursache und Umstände einmal gesetzt, sich in der Wechselwirkung mit den Bedingungen alles dieses Werden nachvollziehen lässt. Aber in allem steckt doch eine schlechthin gegebene ursprüngliche

1. Is Society a Person? Jour. Phil., XI (1924) 87-91.
 2. Is Society a Person? Jour. Phil., XI, 38.

Setzung, eine qualitative Einheitlichkeit und Besonderheit, die man als Schicksal, Prädestination, Schöpfung oder sonstwie bezeichnen kann, die aber bei alledem nur die logische Kategorie der nun einmal bestehenden tatsächlichen Gesetztheit be- deutet.¹

Under this concept come all those peculiar traits of nations

and epochs which cannot be deduced, and which the historian

must simply accept. The unique qualities of the Jewish people, e. g., of Hellenism, of German culture are of this nature. All of the religious, scientific, and artistic events and achievements of these peoples follow definite psychological laws, but the mere statement and relationships of these laws do not ex-

plain the matter in hand. Troeltsch says:

Alle jene Charaktere setzen sich aus aber-

tausend Einzelvorgängen zusammen, sind aber aus der Zusammensetzung nicht abzuleiten, da in jenen Einzelvorgängen selbst schon jenes Besondere steckt und aus dem, was in ihnen schon steckt, das Ganze erst zusammenrinnt.²

There is nothing mystical about this concept of originality, but it refers to something given. Instances from the history of religion illustrate what is meant. The whole of Troeltsch's Soziallehren shows, he says,

dass alles spezifisch Religiöse und vor allem die grossen Knotenpunkte religiöser Entwicklungen eine selbständige Aeusserung des religiösen Lebens sind. Jesus, Paulus, Origenes, Augustin, der hl. Thomas, der hl. Franz, der hl. Bonaventura, Luther, Calvin, sie können in ihrem Fühlen und Denken nicht

1. GS, III, 38.

2. Ibid., 38-39.

Setzung, eine qualitative Einseitigkeit
und Besonderheit, die nun als Schicksal,
Prädestination, Schöpfung oder sonstige
Berechnung kann, die aber bei alledem nur
die logische Kategorie der nun einmal be-
stehenden tatsächlichen Gesetzmäßigkeit be-
deutet.¹

Under this concept come all those peculiar traits of nations
and epochs which cannot be deduced, and which the historian
must simply accept. The unique qualities of the Jewish people,
e. g., of Hellenism, of German culture are of this nature. All
of the religious, scientific, and artistic events and achieve-
ments of these peoples follow definite psychological laws, but
the mere statement and relationships of these laws do not ex-
plain the matter in hand. Troeltsch says:

Alle jene Charaktere setzen sich aus ab-
tausehd Einzelvorgängen zusammen, sind
aber aus der Zusammenfassung nicht abzu-
leiten, da in jenen Einzelvorgängen selbst
schon jenes Besondere steckt und aus dem,
was in ihnen schon steckt, das Ganze erst
zusammenrückt.²

There is nothing mystical about this concept of originality,
but it refers to something given. Instances from the history
of religion illustrate what is meant. The whole of Troeltsch's
Soziallehren shows, he says,

daß alles apostolisch Religiöse und vor
allem die exakten Knotenpunkte religiöser
Entwicklungen eine selbständige Aneignung
des religiösen Lebens sind. Jesus, Paulus,
Origenes, Augustin, der hl. Thomas, der hl.
Bernard, der hl. Bonaventura, Luther, Calvin,
sie können in ihrem Wählen und Denken nicht

1. GS. III, 38.
2. Ibid., 38-39.

clear "aus Klassenkämpfen und oekonomischen Interessen hergeleitet werden."¹ Thus, historical They are einmalig and ursprünglich. The uniqueness of the movements in history to which they belonged and which they led must be recognized as something given.

II. Representation, Vertretung.

The second quality is that of Vertretung or representation. The characteristics which an historical whole possess are each a representation of an infinite number of particulars which are united in this one concept. Without such representation any science of historical events would be impossible.

Should one describe Caesar's politics as a democratically based military dictatorship which tends to be an oriental theocracy, then one is not using mere historical classifications nor concepts of law. What one is using are Vertretungsbegriffe which arouse thousands of details in the imagination and which have meaning only in these details.² The Vertretungsbegriffe select the essential characteristics of a whole and present them symbolically to the reader, who fills in the details himself. The symbolical and representative function of the conceptualized Individual Totalities cannot be overlooked. Moreover, these representations cannot be inaccurate summaries of causal relations, but must be grounded in the historical movement itself. The function of Vertretungsbegriffe is to make

1. GS, I, 975.

2. GS, III, 40.

and Klassifikation und systematischer Aufbau
rechen hergestellt werden.

They are original and historical. The uniqueness of the
movements in history to which they belong and which they led
must be recognized as something given.

II. Representation, Verstehen.

The second quality is that of Verstehen or representation.
The characteristics which an historical whole possesses are each
a representation of an infinite number of particularities which are
united in this one concept. Without such representation any
science of historical events would be impossible.

Should one describe Caesar's politics as a democratically
based military dictatorship which tends to be an oriental the-
ocracy, then one is not using mere historical classifications
nor concepts at law. What one is using are Verstehensbegriffe
which arouse thousands of details in the imagination and which
have meaning only in these details.² The Verstehensbegriffe

select the essential characteristics of a whole and present
them symbolically to the reader, who fills in the details him-
self. The symbolical and representative function of the con-
ceptualized individual Totalities cannot be overlooked. More-
over, these representations cannot be inanimate summaries of
causal relations, but must be grounded in the historical move-
ment itself. The function of Verstehensbegriffe is to make

clear "eine uebergreifende, ueberindividuelle Zusammenfassung und Triebkraft der historischen Tendenzen."¹ Thus, historical expositions are to a large extent symbolical, and hence do not merely copy the causal successions of events. To limit the exposition to causal connections would result in the most fantastic abstractions imaginable. It is for this reason that in addition to detailed Einzeldarstellungen there must be representative Zusammenfassungen.

On Accurate Vertretungsbegriffe are, accordingly, among the chief problems of a philosophy of history. Troeltsch says by way of illustration:

Die Gesamtgeschichte der Reformation und lokale und biographische Einzelforschung z. B. unterscheiden sich gerade durch Ueberwiegen des kausalen Elementes in den letzteren und des symbolischen in den ersteren. Berühmte Darstellungen wie Rankes Epochen und Guizots Considerations oder Harnack's Wesen des Christentums und Burkhardts Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen sind Verkettungen von Symbolen, sind das Extrakt unzähliger Einzeluntersuchungen und bedürfen der Prüfung an weiteren solchen.²

The principle of representation is not peculiarly Troeltsch's except insofar as it has historical application; for it is a function of all logic and of all thought. Every concept is a representative of the particular or groups of particulars to which it refers. The idea of wholeness is implicit in every logical concept whatever. Troeltsch has simply brought out its

1. GS, III, 41.

2. Ibid., 41-42.

significance for the logic of historical method.¹ It is a weakness of empiricists, like Hume and Mill, that they do not sufficiently recognize the representative function of logical conceptions. Mill's scientific ideal was an aggregation compounded out of inductive laws and a causal series constructed out of the transformations of the elements within this aggregate.² Mill's belief that inference could proceed without universals was based on an atomistic association-psychology. On his basis the really unique and creative qualities of history which emerge in Individual Totalities are unexplainable. However, all thinking whatsoever is dependent on representation and meaning.

In contradistinction to Mill we find in Hegel's philosophy of history a positive treatment of representation. For him, great men and all institutions are representatives of the Objective Spirit which works through them. Representation here is not only logical but also metaphysical. It is by virtue of universal reason operating in each individual person and in the customs and institutions of society that history proceeds. Hegel's treatment of great men demonstrates the point:

Dies Allgemeine ist ein Moment der produzierenden Idee, ein Moment der nach sich selbst strebenden und treibenden Wahrheit. Die geschichtlichen Menschen, die welt-historischen

1. Note that the essay which we are reviewing is called "Die formale Geschichtslogik."

2. GS, III, 419; cf. below Chapter IV on Positivism.

significance for the logic of historical method. It is a weakness of empiricists, like Hume and Mill, that they do not sufficiently recognize the representative function of logical conceptions. Mill's scientific ideal was an aggregation constructed out of inductive laws and a causal series constructed out of the transformations of the elements within this aggregate. Mill's belief that inference could proceed without universals was based on an atomistic association-psychology. On his basis the really unique and creative qualities of history which emerge in individual totalities are unexplainable. However, all thinking whatsoever is dependent on representation and meaning.

In contradistinction to Mill we find in Hegel's philosophy of history a positive treatment of representation. For him, great men and all institutions are representatives of the Objective Spirit which works through them. Representation here is not only logical but also metaphysical. It is by virtue of universal reason operating in each individual person and in the customs and institutions of society that history proceeds. Hegel's treatment of great men demonstrates the point:

Das Allgemeine ist ein Moment der Produktion, ein Moment der nach sich selbst strebenden und stehenden Wahrheit. Die geschichtlichen Menschen, die welt-historischen

1. Note that the essay which we are reviewing is called "Die formale Geschichtslogik."
2. 68, III, 419; cf. below Chapter IV on Positioning.

Individuen sind diejenigen, in deren Zwecken ein solches Allgemeine liegt.

Dies sind die grossen Menschen in der Geschichte, deren eigene partikuläre Zwecke das Substantielle enthalten, welches Wille des Weltgeistes ist.

Deshalb folgen die anderen diesen Seelenführern, denn sie fühlen die unwiderstehliche Gewalt ihres eignen inneren Geistes, der ihnen entgegentritt.¹

Troeltsch's conception of representation is not exactly Hegel's. The metaphysical aspect of reason is lacking in Troeltsch. The latter uses Vertretung simply in a logical sense and limits it to the internal structure of the totality. He does not attempt to transcend the epistemology of history. There is no absolute dialectic or Idee which the totality represents. We shall see that this failure to transcend the empirical historical totality constitutes one of the chief problems in Troeltsch's philosophy of history.²

III. Unity of Meaning and Value, Wert- oder Sinneinheit

The representative and symbolic function of an Individual Totality points to a Wert- oder Sinneinheit. The historical wholes are determined by an immanent value or meaning which inheres in the whole.

Wenn Völker, Staaten, Kulturkreise hauptsächlich sich als solche Totalitäten darstellen, so liegt die Einheit in dem relativ einheitlichen Sinn oder Wert, den sie für ihr eigenes Bewusstsein vor sich selber haben und den sie in immer neuen Anläufen

1. VFG, 66-67.

2. See below Chapter V.

2. Ibid., 72.

Individuen sind diejenigen, in deren Zwecke ein solches Allgemeines liegt. Dies sind die grossen Menschen in der Geschichte, deren eigene partikuläre Zwecke das Substantielle enthalten, welches Wille des Weltgeistes ist. Deshalb folgen die anderen diesen Seelenführern, denn sie fühlen die unwiderstehliche Gewalt ihres eignen inneren Geistes, der ihnen entgegentritt.¹

Troeltsch's conception of representation is not exactly

Hegel's. The metaphysical aspect of reason is lacking in

Troeltsch. The latter uses Vertretung simply in a logical

sense and limits it to the internal structure of the totality.

He does not attempt to transcend the epistemology of history.

There is no absolute dialectic or Idee which the totality

represents. We shall see that this failure to transcend the

empirical historical totality constitutes one of the chief

problems in Troeltsch's philosophy of history.²

III. Unity of Meaning and Value, Wert- oder Sinnhaftigkeit

The representative and symbolic function of an individual

totality points to a Wert- oder Sinnhaftigkeit. The historical

wholes are determined by an immanent value or meaning which

inheres in the whole.

Wenn Völker, Staaten, Kulturkreise hauptsächlich sich als solche Totalitäten darstellen, so liegt die Einheit in dem relativ einheitlichen Sinn oder Wert, den sie für ihr eigenes Bewusstsein vor sich haben und den sie in immer neuen Anleihen

1. Vgl. 68-69. 2. See below Chapter V.

This passage und Zusammenhängen instinktiv oder bewusst every darzustellen streben.¹

Moreover, the continuity which an Individual Totality exhibits in its development in time expresses itself in values. These unities of meaning and value are not rigid, however, and they do not exist in isolation. They exert constant influences on other wholes and out of such interactions proceed some of the most significant developments of nations and cultures. Such interactions took place between the Greek and oriental worlds, between the Germans and the Ancients, between the Middle Ages and Islam.

Within the larger totalities there are smaller units of value and meaning. When these are integrated into the whole, they give birth to a meaning of the larger unity which is more than a mere aggregate of its parts. We observe such a relationship when we study Christianity, as we shall see below. In order for the smaller units to retain their individual values in the whole, however, these single meanings must participate in the meaning of the whole. There must be a meaningful unity of development of mankind in order for individual value to be preserved.²

Die Einzelsinne können bei ihrer völligen Verflössung in das Ganze selber Sinn nur sein und bleiben, wenn es auch einen Sinn des Ganzen, eine sinnvolle Entwicklungseinheit der Menschen gibt.

1. GS, III, 71.

2. Ibid., 72.

und Zusammenhängen implizit oder bewusst
darzulegen streben.

Moreover, the continuity which an individual totally exhibits
in its development in time expresses itself in values. These
unities of meaning and value are not rigid, however, and they
do not exist in isolation. They exert constant influences on
other wholes and out of such interactions proceed some of the
most significant developments of nations and cultures. Such
interactions took place between the Greek and oriental worlds,
between the Germanic and the Latin, between the Middle Ages
and Islam.

Within the larger totality there are smaller units of
value and meaning. When these are integrated into the whole,
they give birth to a meaning of the larger unity which is
more than a mere aggregate of its parts. We observe such a
relationship when we study Christianity, as we shall see be-
low. In order for the smaller units to retain their individ-
ual values in the whole, however, these single meanings must
participate in the meaning of the whole. There must be a
meaningful unity of development or working in order for in-
dividual values to be preserved.

Die Einzelheiten können bei ihrer völligen
Verflüchtung in das Ganze selber Sinn nur
sein und bleiben, wenn es auch einen Sinn
des Ganzen, eine allgemeine Entwicklungs-
heit der Menschen gibt.

This passage is quite Hegelian. Troeltsch adds that every historical period must view the meaning of the whole of history as a whole even if one does not share Hegel's conviction of having perceived "den Geist der Menschheit als werdende Sinneinheit."¹ But Hegel's intellectualism is a constant source of disagreement for Troeltsch.

Hegel hatte recht, diese Vollendetheit zu behaupten, wenn er die Geschichte konstruieren wollte; aber er hatte freilich unrecht damit, dass er sie ueberhaupt konstruieren wollte.²

The Wert- oder Sinneinheit is thus not a construction of the philosopher, but must be found in the objects of historical inquiry. Finding these units depends "auf unserer ganz autonomen Fähigkeit zur Erfassung verschiedenster Sinn- und Wertmöglichkeiten."³ The word Sinn means not necessarily a conscious purposing, but may mean a "noch völlig unbewusster Trieb- und Bedeutungszusammenhang. Es (Sinn) ist zugleich rein formal verstanden und braucht nicht jedesmal einen positiven Sinn und Wert zu bedeuten."³ If, for example, we examine the Marxian economic interpretation of history, the unity of meaning in each stage of the dialectic is not necessarily an object of conscious purpose for the individuals involved. And yet, the Sinnzusammenhang must be recognized.⁴ Thus unity of meaning and value may be found in many places; in a period of

1. GS, III, 73.

2. Ibid., 74-75.

3. Ibid., 42.

4. Ibid., 43; cf. K. Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie (EP), S. 91.

This passage is quite Hegelian. Tractisch adds that every historical period must view the meaning of the whole of history as a whole even if one does not share Hegel's conviction of having perceived "den Geist der Menschheit als werdende Sinnlichkeit."¹ But Hegel's intellectualism is a constant source of disagreement for Tractisch.

Hegel hatte recht, diese Vollständigkeit zu behaupten, wenn er die Geschichte konstruieren wollte; aber er hatte freilich unrecht damit, dass er sie überhaupt konstruieren wollte.²

The Wert- oder Sinnlichkeit is thus not a construction of the philosopher, but must be found in the objects of historical inquiry. Finding these units depends "auf unserer ganz autonomen Fähigkeit zur Erfassung verschiedener Sinn- und Wertmöglichkeiten."³ The word Sinn means not necessarily a conscious purpose, but may mean a "noch völlig unbewusster Trieb- und Bedeutungszusammenhang. Es (Sinn) ist zugleich rein formal vorhanden und braucht nicht jedesmal einen positiven Sinn und Wert zu bedeuten."⁴ If, for example, we examine the Marxian economic interpretation of history, the unity of meaning in each stage of the dialectic is not necessarily an object of conscious purpose for the individuals involved. And yet, the Sinnzusammenhang must be recognized.⁵ Thus unity of meaning and value may be found in many places; in a period of

1. GS, III, 73.
2. Ibid., 74-75.
3. Ibid., 42.
4. Ibid., 43; cf. K. Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie (HP), 8. 91.

stagnation, in a society that is dancing on a volcano, or in a band of robbers.¹

The function of meaning and value, we noted in Chapter One, constitutes one of the chief differences between historical and scientific method. Thus it is significant, says Troeltsch, that Marx, e. g., used the dialectic rather than the purely causal principle in interpreting history. Meaning and value resist a merely mathematical and mechanical analysis. In its concreteness (konkrete Anschaulichkeit) the Individual Totality remains a unity of meaning in and for itself, which no mathematical analysis can destroy. This is all the more so because the unity of meaning and value is not dependent on any mere subjective interests.

In order to get a more concrete understanding of the problem involved here let us look at the history of Christianity from the standpoint of this conception. Christianity did not arise as a mere social function of particular class interests. On the contrary, its meaning must be understood against the background of the religious history of Jesus' time.² The Sinn-einheit of social institutions in that period does not explain Christianity. The latter must be understood in terms of itself. Jesus' preaching, says Troeltsch, was a purely religious message and proceeded from his conception of God and His will for man. The kernel of Jesus' message was as follows:

-
1. GS, III, 43; cf. K. Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie (EP), S. 91.
 2. GS, I, 25.

stagnation, in a society that is dancing on a volcano, or in a band of robbers.¹

The function of meaning and value, we noted in Chapter One, constitutes one of the chief differences between historical and scientific method. Thus it is significant, says Troeltsch, that Marx, e. g., used the dialectic rather than the purely causal principle in interpreting history. Meaning and value resist a merely mathematical and mechanical analysis. In its concreteness (*konkrete Anschaulichkeit*) the individual totality remains a unity of meaning in and for itself, which no mathematical analysis can destroy. This is all the more so because the unity of meaning and value is not dependent on any more subjective interests.

In order to get a more concrete understanding of the problem involved here let us look at the history of Christianity from the standpoint of this conception. Christianity did not arise as a mere social function of particular class interests. On the contrary, its meaning must be understood against the background of the religious history of Jesus' time.² The *Einheit* of social institutions in that period does not explain Christianity. The latter must be understood in terms of itself. Jesus' preaching, says Troeltsch, was a purely religious message and proceeded from his conception of God and His will for man. The kernel of Jesus' message was as follows:

1. *GS. III, 45; cf. K. Marx, Das Elend der Philosophie*
(MR), 8, 91.
2. *GS. I, 22.*

Aus allen Unsicherheiten der Ueberlieferung ist der Grundgedanke der Predigt Jesu doch einfach zu erkennen. Es handelt sich um die Ankündigung der grossen Entscheidung, des Kommens des Gottesreiches als des Inbegriffes der vollendeten Gottesherrschaft, wo der Wille Gottes auf Erden geschieht, wie jetzt im Himmel, ohne Sünde, ohne Leid und Schmerzen, und wo die wahren Werte der Gesinnung und des reinen Willens leuchten werden in der ihnen zukommenden Herrlichkeit.¹

Here then was a Sinneinheit associated with a great personality. The gospel did not remain isolated, however, but intermingled with contemporary life. In so doing it proceeded along a path of development by virtue of a dialectic all its own. Consequently, it acted upon and received influences from a myriad of other Sinneinheiten. Troeltsch's masterpiece, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, traces the development of the social conceptions within this great historical totality. The sociological effects of Jesus' gospel took three main forms, the church, the sects, and mysticism. Each of these may be regarded as smaller historical totalities within the Individual Totality known as Christianity. In all three forms there is a common immanent Christian Sinneinheit. Thus the church is an institution concerned chiefly with grace and salvation and in this way carries on Jesus' work of redemption. The church is able to receive the masses, and to adjust itself to the world because it can ignore the need for subjective holiness, to a certain extent, for the sake

1. GS, I, 34.

Aus allen Unsicherheiten der Überlieferung
 ist der Grundgedanke der Predigt Jesu doch
 einfach zu erkennen. Es handelt sich um die
 Ankündigung der grossen Entscheidung, des
 Kommens des Gottessohnes als des Inbegriff-
 tes der vollendeten Gottesreichheit, wo der
 Wille Gottes auf Erden geschieht, wie jetzt
 im Himmel, ohne Sünde, ohne Leid und Schmerzen,
 und wo die wahren Werte der Gestaltung und
 des reinen Willens leuchten werden in der
 ihnen zukommenden Herrlichkeit.

Here then was a Sinnlichkeit associated with a great personal-
 ity. The gospel did not remain isolated, however, but inter-
 mingled with contemporary life. In so doing it proceeded
 along a path of development by virtue of a dialectic all its
 own. Consequently, it acted upon and received influences
 from a myriad of other Sinnlichkeiten. Troeltsch's masterpiece,
Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, traces
 the development of the social conceptions within this great
 historical totality. The sociological effects of Jesus' gos-
 pel took three main forms, the sect, the church, and mysti-
 cism. Each of these may be regarded as smaller historical for-
 malities within the individual totality known as Christianity.
 In all three forms there is a common immanent Christian Sinn-
lichkeit. Thus the church is an institution concerned chiefly
 with grace and salvation and in this way carries on Jesus'
 work of redemption. The church is able to receive the masses,
 and to adjust itself to the world because it can ignore the
 need for subjective holiness, to a certain extent, for the sake

must be understood in and through itself, "aus seinem eigenen of the objective treasures of grace and redemption.¹

The sects were voluntary bodies, composed of strict and austere Christian believers who were bound to each other by the fact that all had experienced 'the new birth'. These believers are limited to small groups, they emphasize the law rather than grace, and live apart from the world. In varying degrees within their own circle they set up the Christian order, based on love. They live in preparation for and expectation of the coming Kingdom of God.¹

The mystics transformed the world of ideas which had hardened into formal worship and doctrine and stressed a purely inward and personal experience. The basis of mystical groups was purely personal, with no permanent form. Thus mysticism tended to weaken the significance of forms of worship, doctrine, and the historical element.¹

These three forms of the christliche Religiosität show how smaller units of meaning and value can participate in the meaning of a larger whole. The above discussion has also shown how important meaning and value are for the understanding of an Individual Totality. But the conception of immanent meaning and value within an historical object is significant from another standpoint, viz., in comparing different cultures and religions. Troeltsch holds that each religious development

1. GS, I, 967; cf. Eng. tr., II, 993.

of the objective treasures of grace and redemption.¹

The sects were voluntary bodies, composed of strict and austere Christian believers who were bound to each other by the fact that all had experienced 'the new birth'. These believers are limited to small groups, they emphasize the law rather than grace, and live apart from the world. In varying degrees within their own circle they set up the Christian order, based on love. They live in preparation for and expectation of the coming Kingdom of God.¹

The mystics transformed the world of ideas which had hardened into formal worship and doctrine and stressed a purely inward and personal experience. The basis of mystical groups was purely personal, with no permanent form. Thus mysticism tended to weaken the significance of forms of worship, doctrine, and the historical element.¹

These three forms of the Christian Religious show how smaller units of meaning and value can participate in the meaning of a larger whole. The above discussion has also shown how important meaning and value are for the understanding of an individual totality. But the conception of immanent meaning and value within an historical object is significant from another standpoint, viz., in comparing different cultures and religions. Troeltsch holds that each religious development

must be understood in and through itself, "aus seinem eigenen umfassenden schöpferischen und originalen Grundantrieb."¹ In general, however, this principle is not observed. Consequently students of comparative religion tend to fall into three great fallacies:

- (1) dass sich das absolute Wertsystem aus einzelnen Vernunftwerten von getrennt darstellbarer Entwicklungsgeschichte zusammensetze;
- (2) dass jeder einzelne Wert für die gesamte Menschheit gelte und daher in seiner menschlichen Gesamtentwicklung von Botokuden und Kamtschadalen bis zum Pariser oder Berliner durch verfolgt werden könne und müsse;
- (3) dass jede solche Gesamtentwicklung ein Gesetz ihrer Stufenfolge besitze, aus dem die für uns heute geltende Entwicklungstendenz der Gegenwart erst erschlossen und damit diese selber geleitet werden könne.²

The science of history is not a comparative discipline like comparative anatomy or zoology. Comparative historical analysis is only an aid to the better understanding of its object in its individual uniqueness. For in spite of all analogies and similarities the objects of history must be viewed from the standpoint of their own immanent meanings and values.

Otto Hintze criticizes Troeltsch's conception of Sinn- oder Werteinheit. Hintze holds that the general concept of Individual Totality has significance as an historical object without any consideration of meaning or value. For Sinneinheit he would substitute Lebenseinheit. He believes that the

1. GS, III, 191.

2. Ibid., 190.

4. Ibid., 206.

must be understood in and through itself, "aus seinem eigenen
umfassenden schöpferischen und originalen Grundantrieb." In
general, however, this principle is not observed. Consequent-
ly students of comparative religion tend to fall into three
great fallacies:

- (1) dass sich das absolute Wertsystem aus
einzelnen Vermittlungen von getrennt dar-
stellbarer Entwicklungsgeschichte zusammen-
zusetzen;
- (2) dass jeder einzelne Wert für die gesamte
Menschheit gelte und daher in seiner mensch-
lichen Gesamtentwicklung von Bodendenkmalen und
Kunstschätzen bis zum Pariser oder Berliner
durch verfolgt werden könne und müsse;
- (3) dass jede solche Gesamtentwicklung ein
Gesetz ihrer Stufenfolge besitze, aus dem
die für uns heute geltende Entwicklungsstadien
der Gegenwart erst erschlossen und damit diese
selber geleitet werden könne.

The science of history is not a comparative discipline like
comparative anatomy or zoology. Comparative historical analy-
sis is only an aid to the better understanding of its object
in its individual uniqueness. For in spite of all analogies
and similarities the objects of history must be viewed from
the standpoint of their own immanent meanings and values.
Otto Hintze criticizes Trevelyan's conception of Sinn-
oder Wertfreiheit. Hintze holds that the general concept of
Individual Totality has significance as an historical object
without any consideration of meaning or value. For Sinnfrei-
heit he would substitute Lebensfreiheit. He believes that the

constituting of an historical object is an act of intuitive and not of rational thought. Historians proceed not logically but analogically. The basic factor is the individual person who receives at the hand of Troeltsch inadequate attention. The individual person is the basis for all historical analogy.

In the second place Sinneinheit has a two-fold meaning; it can be used nominalistically and realistically. "Es kann sich um den Sinn eines Wortes handeln oder um den Sinn einer Sache."¹ Thus when Troeltsch seems to equate Sinn- with Wert-einheit the equation is arbitrary. The meaning is expressed already in the naming of an object, e. g., the culture of the Renaissance or the French Revolution. Though these concepts include certain values, the emphasis on value should be separated logically from meaning.² Especially ought one to keep meaning and moral value distinct.³ Thus Hintze says:

Die Kategorie der Individualität, die den historischen Gegenstand konstituiert, ist rein formal, ein blosser Akt der anschaulichen Abstraktion auf dem Gebiet des historischen Lebens; sie ist nicht inhaltlich durch individuelle Lebens- oder Kulturwerte bestimmt.⁴

What seems to lie behind these remarks of Hintze is the conviction that cultural values do not belong to the logic of history, but to its philosophy. Their presence in Troeltsch's logic of history is due to a carry-over of

1. Op. cit., 203.
 2. Ibid., 204.
 3. Ibid., 205.
 4. Ibid., 206.

constituting of an historical object is an act of intuitive and not of rational thought. Historians proceed not logically but analogically. The basic factor is the individual person who receives at the hand of Troeltsch inadequate attention.

The individual person is the basis for all historical analogy. In the second place Stannisch has a two-fold meaning; it can be used nominally and realistically. "He kann sich um den Sinn eines Wortes handeln oder um den Sinn einer Sache."¹ Then when Troeltsch seems to equate Sinn with Wert sinnlich the question is arbitrary. The meaning is expressed already in the naming of an object, e. g., the culture of the Renaissance or the French Revolution. Though these concepts include certain values, the emphasis on value should be separated logically from meaning.² Especially ought one to keep meaning and moral value distinct.³ Thus Hintze says:

Die Kategorie der Individualität, die den historischen Gegenstand konstituiert, ist rein formal, ein bloßer Akt der anschaulichen Abstraktion auf den Gebiet des historischen Lebens; sie ist nicht inhaltlich durch individuelle Lebens- oder Kulturwerte bestimmt.⁴

What seems to lie behind these remarks of Hintze is the conviction that cultural values do not belong to the logic of history, but to its philosophy. Their presence in Troeltsch's logic of history is due to a carry-over of

1. Op. cit., 203.
2. Ibid., 204.
3. Ibid., 203.
4. Ibid., 206.

Rickert's theory of value. If we base the study of history upon certain beliefs about values, we bind it to some particular Weltanschauung. Hintze thinks that the exclusion of Wert-einheiten from Geschichtslogik would allow, on the contrary, a categorical structure of history which does not assume any particular Weltanschauung, but which is assimilable to different philosophies. Troeltsch's view, he thinks, tends to be prejudiced in favor of a particular metaphysics.

Hintze has raised a significant and difficult problem. His objections, however, do not appear to be entirely cogent. Logic, to be sure, is not necessarily bound to any definite theory of values, and axiology can indeed be distinguished from the science of formal logic. And yet the two are not entirely disparate. Rickert's dictum, "Die Logik ist die Moral des Denkens," is more than figurative. The primacy of the practical reason reaches down into the roots of logical theory itself, and the nominalistic use of Sinneinheit, for which Hintze pleads, has already been provided for in Troeltsch's conception of Vertretung. The logic of history, if it is adequately to account for the distinctive qualities of historical events, like wholes of meaning and value, must be more than purely formal, i. e., Aristotelian. History requires a logic of wholes which deals as well with material as with formal truth. Since meanings and values are empirical facts of history, the philosophy of history cannot be divorced from all

70
Hobbes's theory of value. If we base the study of history upon certain beliefs about values, we bind it to some particular Weltanschauung. Hintze thinks that the exclusion of Werturteile from Geschichtswissenschaft would allow, on the contrary, a categorical structure of history which does not assume any particular Weltanschauung, but which is amenable to different philosophies. Troeltsch's view, he thinks, tends to be prejudiced in favor of a particular metaphysics. Hintze has raised a significant and difficult problem. His objections, however, do not appear to be entirely cogent. Logic, to be sure, is not necessarily bound to any definite theory of values, and axiology can indeed be distinguished from the science of formal logic. And yet the two are not entirely disparate. Rickert's dictum, "Die Logik ist die Moral des Denkens," is more than figurative. The primacy of the practical reason reaches down into the roots of logical theory itself, and the nominalistic use of Sinnhaftigkeit, for which Hintze pleads, has already been provided for in Troeltsch's conception of Verstehen. The logic of history, if it is adequate to account for the distinctive qualities of historical events, like wholes of meaning and value, must be more than purely formal, i. e., Aristotelian. History requires a logic of wholes which deals as well with material as with formal truth. Since meanings and values are empirical facts of history, the philosophy of history cannot be divorced from all

considerations of axiology and ethics; rather it must give a coherent account of them. Spirit, Gemeingeist

Hintze's position, that the logic and epistemology of historical science are distinguishable from metaphysics, is correct. Troeltsch does not keep these distinctions clearly before him. It is nevertheless true that some epistemologies have specific implications for metaphysics, e. g., neorealism and absolute idealism. A correct epistemological consideration of values may involve certain implications for metaphysics. The fear of metaphysics should not, however, obscure our recognition of the significance of values. To delete all investigations of values from a study of Individual Totalities would mean the exclusion of the most characteristic features of historical events. Teleology functions significantly in history. Many of the psychical aspects of historical causation are purposive. Motives cannot be ignored. One would violate the very data of history to abstract all value from the considerations of that data. Troeltsch's position, then, that Sinn- oder Werteinheiten are found not only in single individuals but are immanent principles in Individual Totalities, seems to be sound. As Troeltsch says in ACR, Die Kulturinhalte des Staates, der Gesellschaft, der Kunst, der Wissenschaft bedeutet freilich sämtlich objektive, an sich gültige Werte und Ideen, die nicht aus dem natürlichen subjektiven Begehren hervorgehen, sondern ihm eine neue höhere

Teleology functions significantly in history. Many of the psychical aspects of historical causation are purposive. Motives cannot be ignored. One would violate the very data of history to abstract all value from the considerations of that data. Troeltsch's position, then, that Sinn- oder Werteinheiten are found not only in single individuals but are immanent principles in Individual Totalities, seems to be sound.

As Troeltsch says in ACR, Die Kulturinhalte des Staates, der Gesellschaft, der Kunst, der Wissenschaft bedeutet freilich sämtlich objektive, an sich gültige Werte und Ideen, die nicht aus dem natürlichen subjektiven Begehren hervorgehen, sondern ihm eine neue höhere

Die Kulturinhalte des Staates, der Gesellschaft, der Kunst, der Wissenschaft bedeutet freilich sämtlich objektive, an sich gültige Werte und Ideen, die nicht aus dem natürlichen subjektiven Begehren hervorgehen, sondern ihm eine neue höhere

considerations of axiology and ethics; rather it must give a coherent account of them.

Mintze's position, that the logic and epistemology of historical science are distinguishable from metaphysics, is correct. Troeltsch does not keep these distinctions clearly before him. It is nevertheless true that some epistemologies have specific implications for metaphysics, e. g., neo-realism and absolute idealism. A correct epistemological consideration of values may involve certain implications for metaphysics. The fact of metaphysics should not, however, obscure our recognition of the significance of values. To delete all investigations of values from a study of individual totalities would mean the exclusion of the most characteristic features of historical events.

Teleology functions significantly in history. Many of the psychological aspects of historical causation are purposive. Motives cannot be ignored. One would violate the very data of history to abstract all value from the considerations of that data. Troeltsch's position, then, that Sinn- oder Wertsein heiten are found not only in single individuals but are inherent principles in individual totalities, seems to be sound.

As Troeltsch says in AGR,

Die Kulturinhalte des Staates, der Gesellschaft, der Kunst, der Wissenschaft bedeuten freilich sämtlich objektive, an sich gültige Werte und Ideen, die nicht aus dem natürlichen subjektiven Bewusstsein hervorgehen, sondern ihm eine neue höhere

Welt eröffnen.¹

is to explain the Gemeingeist as a mystical entity abstracted from all individual consciousnesses. To do so would mean "ein

IV. Common-Spirit, Gemeingeist

The next problem to confront us in an Individual Totality is the relation between society and the individual, between the objective and the subjective spirit, between the Gemeingeist and the individual persons. This, says Troeltsch, is the hardest problem of historical science. It has analogies in biology and psychology.

Wie im biologischen Organismus der Gesamtkörper und die einzelnen Zellen, wie im persönlichen Seelenleben die Persönlichkeit und die psychischen Einzelelemente ein spannungsreiches Verhältnis darbieten, so ist das erst recht in der historischen Totalität der Fall.²

This relation, says Troeltsch, presents an insoluble antinomy, but it is nevertheless a primary phenomenon of history (ein Urphänomen). It is universal in its application and presence.

Es beschränkt sich nicht auf Staaten, Völker und Nationen, sondern umfasst auch die losesten rein gedanklichen oder gefühlsmässigen Verbindung, genau so wie der Begriff der individuellen Totalität selbst, der damit nur in sein inneres Gefüge verfolgt wird.³

In considering this problem two fallacies must be avoided. The first is to explain the Gemeingeist as a collection or product of previously isolated individual consciousnesses which come into accidental intercourse with one another. The second

1. ACR, 74.

2. GS, III, 44.

3. Loc. cit.

IV. Common-Spirit, Gemeinheitsgeist

The next problem to confront us in an Individual Totality

is the relation between society and the individual, between

the objective and the subjective spirit, between the Gemein-

geist and the individual persons. This, says Troeltsch, is

the hardest problem of historical science. It has analogies

in biology and psychology.

Wie im biologischen Organismus der Gesamt-
körper und die einzelnen Zellen, wie im
persönlichen Seelenleben die Persönlichkeit
und die psychischen Einzelelemente ein
spannungsgeladenes Verhältnis darstellen, so
ist das erst recht in der historischen To-
talität der Fall.²

This relation, says Troeltsch, presents an insoluble antinomy,

but it is nevertheless a primary phenomenon of history (ein

Urphänomen). It is universal in its application and presence.

Es beschränkt sich nicht auf Staaten,
Völker und Nationen, sondern umfasst auch
die lossten rein gedanklichen oder ge-
istlichen Verbindungen, genau so wie
der Begriff der individuellen Totalität
selbst, der damit nur in sein inneres
Gefüge verfolgt wird.³

In considering this problem two fallacies must be avoided.

The first is to explain the Gemeinheitsgeist as a collection of

product of previously isolated individual consciousness which

come into accidental intercourse with one another. The second

1. AGR, 74.
2. GS, III, 44.
3. Loc. cit.

is to explain the Gemeingeist as a mystical entity abstracted from all individual consciousness. To do so would mean "ein nicht schon zugleich fremdes Bewusstsein in sich tragendes Einzelbewusstsein und ein nicht aus und in Individuen bestehendes und sich bildendes Gesamtbewusstsein."¹ Thus a Common Spirit is not a mystical entity which might exist independently of persons. And yet, the concept saves us from thinking of society as merely the accidental interaction of individuals. It teaches us that society is a real whole. The Gemeingeist is a primary phenomenon, ein Urphänomen. This phenomenon constituted an important problem for Hegel, whose treatment of the Objective Spirit may throw some light upon Troeltsch's discussion. In Hegel's philosophy the world of spiritual institutions is the realm of the Objective Spirit. The law, morality, and the state are such spiritual institutions. They are objective and are just as much outward objects as a stone or a star. However, they are also identical with the ego to which they are thus external. Stace says,

They are nothing but the objectification of my single self, of me as a peculiar individual with my personal eccentricities and caprices. But they are the objectification of my universal self, my reason, of what I have in common with all humanity, and of the universal spirit of man. For example, the laws of the state are not, or ought not to be, merely the embodiment of the whims, the prejudices,

1. GS, III, 45.
2. Ibid., 45.
3. Ibid., 45.
4. Ibid., 45.
5. Ibid., 45.
6. Ibid., 45.

is to explain the Gemeinschaft as a mystical entity abstracted from all individual consciousness. To do so would mean "ein nicht schon angesehener Bewusstsein in sich tragendes Einzelbewusstsein und ein nicht aus und in Individuen bestehendes und sich bildendes Gesamtbewusstsein." Thus a Gemeinschaft is not a mystical entity which might exist independently of persons. And yet, the concept saves us from thinking of society as merely the accidental intersection of individuals. It teaches us that society is a real whole. The Gemeinschaft is a primary phenomenon, ein Ursachmoment.

This phenomenon constituted an important problem for Hegel, whose treatment of the Objective Spirit may throw some light upon Troeltsch's discussion. In Hegel's philosophy the world of spiritual institutions is the realm of the Objective Spirit. The law, morality, and the state are such spiritual institutions. They are objective and are just as much outward objects as a stone or a star. However, they are also identical with the ego to which they are thus external. Stace says,

They are nothing but the objectification of my single self, of me as a peculiar individual with my personal eccentricities and caprices. But they are the objectification of my universal self, my reason, of what I have in common with all humanity, and of the universal spirit of man. For example, the laws of the state are not, or ought not to be, merely the embodiment of the whims, the prejudices,

This view may seem to be one-sided and extreme; and yet or the interests, of any individual or class. They embody the rational and universal life of the community. These institutions are thus, on the one hand, objective and outward, and, on the other hand, they are clearly spiritual, for they are the manifestation of mind, intelligence, purpose.¹

Hegel's treatment of Objective Spirit² includes ethics, politics and a philosophy of law. The highest expression of unity between the Objective Spirit and the individual person is in social ethics. Within the scope of social ethics there are three main forms; the family,³ civil society,⁴ and the state.⁵ Hegel gives a clear account of the objectivity of customs, laws, and institutions, but he does not deal adequately with the relationship between the individual and the objective whole to which he belongs.

In Hegel, as Hartmann says, the Objective Spirit is a being of a higher order than individual persons, a universal spiritual substance, possessing its own mode of being and life. The individual spirits are related to it as accidents. Not they, but it in them is the significant thing.

Die Individuen sind nur unvollständige Ausprägungen seines Wesens. Sie bestehen nie ausserhalb seiner, sind ganz getragen von ihm. Sie können sich wohl verblendet von ihm 'abscheiden', aber der 'abgeschiedene Geist' ist todgeweiht.⁶

1. The Philosophy of Hegel (POH), pp. 322-323.
2. EPW, #484ff.
3. Ibid., #518ff.
4. Ibid., #523ff.
5. Ibid., #535ff.
6. PGS, 6.

of the interests of any individual or class. They embody the rational and universal life of the community. These institutions are thus, on the one hand, objective and outward, and, on the other hand, they are clearly spiritual, for they are the manifestation of mind, intelligence, purpose.

Hegel's treatment of Objective Spirit includes ethics, politics and a philosophy of law. The highest expression of unity between the Objective Spirit and the individual person is in social ethics. Within the scope of social ethics there are three main forms; the family,³ civil society,⁴ and the state.⁵ Hegel gives a clear account of the objectivity of customs, laws, and institutions, but he does not deal adequately with the relationship between the individual and the objective whole to which he belongs. In Hegel, as Hartmann says, the Objective Spirit is a being of a higher order than individual persons, a universal spiritual substance, possessing its own mode of being and life. The individual spirits are related to it as accidents. Not they, but it in them is the significant thing.

Die Individuen sind nur unvollständige Ausprägungen seines Wesens. Sie können nicht unabhängig sein, sind ganz von ihm getragen. Sie können sich wohl verhalten, aber nicht unabhängig von ihm 'abscheiden', aber in der 'abgeschiedenen Gestalt' ist jeder Mensch ein Teil.

1.	The Philosophy of Hegel (1901), pp. 322-323.
2.	ibid., 443ff.
3.	ibid., 451ff.
4.	ibid., 453ff.
5.	ibid., 453ff.
6.	ibid., 453ff.

This view may seem to be one-sided and extreme; and yet Hegel's constant insistence that the essential truth of the individual is the state, and that the state is simply man's true self, i. e., his universality objectified, seems to bear this out.

Hartmann's own view is essentially different from Hegel's on the crucial point of the relation between the Common Spirit and the individual spirits. His view is similar to that of Troeltsch and can be set down in several propositions;

- (1) Geformter Gemeingeist ist nicht Inbegriff individueller Geister, obschon er auf deren Gemeinschaft beruht.
- (2) Die Bewegung des Gemeingeistes in der Geschichte ist nicht Gesamtheit privater geistiger Bewegtheit, obgleich sie diese als Elemente enthält.
- (3) Die Dynamik geschichtlichen Geisteslebens ist nicht einfach ein Getriebensein, weder durch Umstände allein noch durch individuelles Bedürfnis und Initiative allein, obgleich beides jederzeit wirksame Faktoren sind. Sondern, in jeder dieser Hinsichten ist das Ganze ebenso sehr vor wie nach dem Teile, ist Bedingendes und Bedingtes zugleich, besteht nie anders als in und mit den Teilmomenten. So gibt es den Gesamtgeist stets nur 'mit' der Person, das geschichtliche Schicksal nur 'mit' dem persönlichen Schicksal, die geschichtlich bewegende Macht nur 'mit' der individuellen Initiative.¹

In all of this, however, the Gemeingeist is an object of a different order and existence from that of the Hegelian Objective Spirit and from personal consciousness.

1. PGS, 258-259.

This view may seem to be one-sided and extreme; and yet Hegel's constant insistence that the essential truth of the individual is the state, and that the state is simply man's true self, i. e., his universality objectified, seems to bear this out.

Hartmann's own view is essentially different from Hegel's on the crucial point of the relation between the Common Spirit and the individual spirits. His view is similar to that of Troeltsch and can be set down in several propositions:

- (1) Geformter Gemeingeist ist nicht lebendig, er ist nur ein abstrakter Geist, dessen Leben in der Bewegung des Gemeingeistes in der Geschichte ist nicht Gemeingeist, sondern nur ein abstrakter Gemeingeist, dessen Leben in der Geschichte ist nicht Gemeingeist, sondern nur ein abstrakter Gemeingeist.
- (2) Die Dynamik geschichtlichen Geisteslebens ist nicht einfach ein Geschehen, sondern durch Umstände allein noch durch individuelle Bedürfnisse und Initiative allein, d. h. durch die Wirklichkeit der Faktoren sind. Sondern, in jeder dieser Hinsichten ist das Ganze ebensosehr vor wie nach dem Teile, ist Bedingendes und Bedingtes zugleich, besteht nie anders als in und mit den Teilnehmenden. So gibt es den Gemeingeist stets nur 'mit' der Person, das geschichtliche Schicksal nur 'mit' dem persönlichen Schicksal, die geschichtlich bewegende Macht nur 'mit' den individuellen Initiativen.

In all of this, however, the Gemeingeist is an object of a different order and existence from that of the Hegelian Objective Spirit and from personal consciousness.

tion of the (1) Es gibt wohl ein Bewusstsein des objektiven Geistes, aber es ist kein höheres Gemeinbewusstsein ueber dem der Individuen. in fact explanation (2) Das Bewusstsein des objektiven Geistes besteht nicht in ihm, sondern in uns, den Einzelpersonen. Der objektive Geist hat tures of (1) sein Selbstbewusstsein nicht in sich, sondern in uns. successive (3) Da das Bewusstsein des Individuums inhaltlich inadäquat ist, so hat er sein In the s. volles Selbstbewusstsein weder in sich, noch in uns. Es gibt kein adäquates Be- nical skill- wusstsein des objektiven Geistes. Es ist based on sein inneres Schicksal, weder direkt an conscious sich selber noch mittelbar in uns ein Bewusstsein seiner selbst haben zu können.

(3) Certain periods of history, like the Middle Ages, are Troeltsch's view is not unlike the general outline of not so instinctive and spontaneous as some believe. And yet Hartmann's thought which we have just presented. Nevertheless the epochs of maturity are rich in common moods, hypotheses, less, Troeltsch does not carefully define Common Spirit. He and conventions; filled with vague mass-impulses and tyrannical says, in fact, that it is a matter of comparative indifference, dogmas; little guided, on the whole, by rational purpose, but once how one defines and explains it conceptually. One may driven by passion and feeling. Conversely, a great leveling conceive of it somewhat mystically as certain German Romantists takes place through law, intercourse, and education. Troeltsch cists did, i. e., as a common spiritual substance pervading looked upon the United States as a paradise of public opinion. the individual. One may conceive it, again, as a resultant

(3) A Common Spirit is a superindividualism without which of typical fundamental impulses, the intellectual and the emotional strong and hardy ethical direction of the stream of life is tional. Schleiermacher traced it to an oscillation of reason possible. However, monistic conceptions of Common Spirit are between the impulse toward identity and that towards differentiation. Gabriel Tarde traced it to inter-individual adaptations. There never has been any Common Spirit but tions and imitations, to the realization of individual initiatives. Finally, we may explain it, with the aid of an analogy from biology, by a kind of organic vital unity and correla-

1. 114. cf. DHSU, 49-50.

1. PGS, 267. 115.

3. Ibid., 116-118.

(1) Es gibt wohl ein Bewusstsein des objektiven Geistes, aber es ist kein höheres Gemeinbewusstsein neben dem der Individuen. (2) Das Bewusstsein des objektiven Geistes besteht nicht in ihm, sondern in uns, den Einzelpersonen. Der objektive Geist hat sein Selbstbewusstsein nicht in sich, sondern in uns. (3) Da das Bewusstsein des Individuums ihm inhaltlich innewohnt, so hat er sein volles Selbstbewusstsein weder in sich noch in uns. Es gibt kein adäquates Bewusstsein des objektiven Geistes. Es ist sein inneres Schicksal, weder direkt an sich selber noch mittelbar in uns ein Bewusstsein seiner selbst haben zu können. Troeltsch's view is not unlike the general outline of Hartmann's thought which we have just presented. Nevertheless, Troeltsch does not carefully define Common Spirit. He says, in fact, that it is a matter of comparative indifference how one defines and explains it conceptually. One may conceive of it somewhat mystically as certain German Romantics did, i. e., as a common spiritual substance pervading the individual. One may conceive it, again, as a resultant of typical fundamental impulses, the intellectual and the emotional. Schlegel traced it to an oscillation of reason between the impulse toward identity and that towards differentiation. Gabriel Tarde traced it to inter-individual adaptations and imitations, to the realization of individual initiatives. Finally, we may explain it, with the aid of an analogy from biology, by a kind of organic vital unity and correlation.

tion of the group.¹ What interests Troeltsch most is not the explanation, but the fact of the Common Spirit. Certain features of it are clear, however.

(1) The variety of the sociological structures of the successive typical cultural periods must not be exaggerated. In the epochs of maturity population, intercourse, and technical skill increase, and groups are much more firmly based on conscious and purposive agreement.²

(2) Certain periods of history, like the Middle Ages, are not so instinctive and spontaneous as some believe. And yet the epochs of maturity are rich in common moods, hypotheses, and conventions; filled with vague mass-impulses and tyrannical dogmas; little guided, on the whole, by rational purpose, but driven by passion and feeling. Conversely, a great leveling takes place through law, intercourse, and education. Troeltsch looked upon the United States as a paradise of public opinion.³

(3) A Common Spirit is a superindividualism without which no strong and hardy ethical direction of the stream of life is possible. However, monistic conceptions of Common Spirit are a fantastic delusion.

There never has been any Common Spirit but that of a group, family, race, class, profession, school, or sect, and even the Church's attempt to comprehend all these under a single dome remained a work of force and diplomacy.

1. CT, 114; cf. DHSU, 49-50.

2. Ibid., 114-115.

3. Ibid., 115-116.

tion of the group.¹ What interests Troeltsch most is not the explanation, but the fact of the Common Spirit. Certain features of it are clear, however.

(1) The variety of the sociological structures of the

successive typical cultural periods must not be exaggerated. In the epochs of maturity population, intercourse, and technical skill increase, and groups are much more firmly based on conscious and purposive agreement.²

(2) Certain periods of history, like the Middle Ages, are not so instinctive and spontaneous as some believe. And yet the epochs of maturity are rich in common moods, hypotheses, and conventions; filled with vague mass-impulses and tyrannical dogmas; little guided, on the whole, by rational purpose, but driven by passion and feeling. Conversely, a great leveling

takes place through law, intercourse, and education. Troeltsch looked upon the United States as a paradise of public opinion.³

(3) A Common Spirit is a superindividualism without which no strong and hardy ethical direction of the stream of life is possible. However, monistic conceptions of Common Spirit are a fantastic delusion.

There never has been any Common Spirit but that of a group, family, race, class, profession, school, or sect, and even the Church's attempt to comprehend all these under a single dome remained a work of force and diplomacy.

1. GT, II, 4; cf. DHSU, 49-50.
2. Ibid., 114-115.
3. Ibid., 115-116.

a faith and a dream, contradicted in the actual life of the times by the eternal strife of ideas and interests.¹

(4) The present may have a universal spirit, which can only be seen, however, in complete detachment, by strangers and those who will come after us. Most of our lives, says Troeltsch, are lived not in a monistic, homogeneous circle, but in a number of concentric circles, each of which has its own ethical Common Spirit.²

(5) The Common Spirits have each a different intellectual content. This is like point three. "It is absolutely impossible to conceive of them all as one community, and then to credit this community ideally with a common intellectual content."³ Each Common Spirit is like concentric circles which touch other circles. One must not elevate any one of them monistically into a universal basis or an all-determining accent.

One can only demand for the most universal community, which is that of Humanity, a mutual understanding and tolerance, and a feeling of fundamental human obligation, without any definite content.⁴

It is always a matter of universal disvalue when one of the smaller and less important Common Spirits is elevated to a position of monistic control over men's lives. Thus Troeltsch viewed with alarm the contemporary spirit of nationalism. He

1. CT, 117-118.

2. Ibid., 118.

3. Ibid., 119.

4. Ibid., 121.

... a faith and a dream, contradicted in the actual life of the eternal strife of ideas and interests.¹

(4) The present may have a universal spirit, which can only be seen, however, in complete detachment, by strangers and those who will come after us. Most of our lives, says Troeltsch, are lived not in a monastic, homogeneous circle, but in a number of concentric circles, each of which has its own ethical Common Spirit.²

(5) The Common Spirits have each a different intellectual content. This is like point three. "It is absolutely impossible to conceive of them all as one community, and then to credit this community ideally with a common intellectual content." Each Common Spirit is like concentric circles which touch other circles. One must not elevate any one of them monastically into a universal basis or an all-determining content.

One can only demand for the most universal community, which is that of Humanity, a mutual understanding and tolerance, and a feeling of fundamental human obligation, without any definite content.³

It is always a matter of universal divisions when one of the smaller and less important Common Spirits is elevated to a position of monastic control over men's lives. Thus Troeltsch viewed with alarm the contemporary spirit of nationalism. He

1. Cf. 114-115.
2. Ibid., 118.
3. Ibid., 119.
4. Ibid., 121.

called it "the most dangerous monistic exaggeration of the idea of a Common Spirit."¹ A common dome under which to unite all Common Spirits is to be found only in some metaphysical and religious element. But this can today, says Troeltsch, not be done by the church. It must be accomplished in some other way.²

(7) The category of the Common Spirit becomes, in Troeltsch's hands, more than a descriptive concept of the inner nature of an Individual Totality. He makes it also a normative category.³ He relates it intimately to the problem of cultural syntheses which we shall discuss below, and to the whole field of metaphysics.⁴ Thus the Common Spirit has become not merely a logical and epistemological problem, but a metaphysical one and serves an ethical and practical function. The historian thus not only contemplates history, but makes it.

This whole discussion has given us a general idea of what is meant by Gemeingeist, but no solution has been given of the problem which Troeltsch raises concerning the relation between Gemeingeist and Einzelgeist. He seems to have taken this problem out of the field of the logic of history and placed it in the realm of ethics and of cultural values, in the discussion of which we shall meet it again.

1. CT, 122.

2. Ibid., 123-124. On religion and cultural values see below Chapter V.

3. Ibid., 124-125.

4. See below Chapter V.

called it "the most dangerous monistic exaggeration of the
 idea of a Common Spirit."¹ A common dome under which to
 unite all Common Spirits is to be found only in some meta-
 physical and religious element. But this can today, says
 Troeltsch, not be done by the church. It must be accomplished
 in some other way.²

(V) The category of the Common Spirit becomes, in
 Troeltsch's hands, more than a descriptive concept of the
 inner nature of an individual totality. He makes it also a
 normative category.³ He relates it intimately to the problem
 of cultural syntheses which we shall discuss below, and to
 the whole field of metaphysics.⁴ Thus the Common Spirit has
 become not merely a logical and epistemological problem, but
 a metaphysical one and serves an ethical and practical func-
 tion. The historian thus not only contemplates history, but
 makes it.

This whole discussion has given us a general idea of
 what is meant by Gemeinschaft, but no solution has been given
 of the problem which Troeltsch raises concerning the relation
 between Gemeinschaft and Kulturkreis. He seems to have taken
 this problem out of the field of the logic of history and
 placed it in the realm of ethics and of cultural values, in
 the discussion of which we shall meet it again.

1. Cf. p. 323.
2. Ibid., 123-124. On religion and cultural values see
 below Chapter V.
3. Ibid., 124-125.
4. See below Chapter V.

V. Unconscious, das Unbewusste

In order to grasp adequately the function of Gemeingeist Troeltsch introduces another concept, der Begriff des Unbewussten.¹ The Common Spirit presupposes an unconscious element or factor. Man is not conscious of the many thousand things that go to make up the Common Spirit. The individual himself has many presuppositions, instincts, and impulses of which he is unconscious or only half conscious. This mass of unconscious elements is so great that the fully conscious actions of man are really exceptional. An understanding of the unconscious factors in history differentiates the conception of the development of the Individual Totality from any mere pragmatic or reflective study. Moreover, the Unconscious as applied to history must not be confused with its use in psychology.

Denn es ist nicht der schwierige Begriff des psychologischen Unbewussten, sondern die tausendfach von der Historie bestätigte Tatsache, dass unsere Handlungen, Gefühle, Instinkte, Strebungen und Entschlüsse viel mehr Voraussetzungen in sich tragen als wir wissen und eine viel grössere oder ganz andere Bedeutung für das Ganze und die Dauer haben, als uns selbst bewusst war. Es ist nicht Bewusstlosigkeit, sondern Ueberschies- sen des Gehaltes ueber das aktuell Bewusste und Zurückgehen des Bewussten in unbekannte Tiefen, die sich erst dem die ganzen Auswirkungen ueberschauenden Historiker annähernd offenbaren und ihm immer neue Fragen stellen.²

1. GS, III, 46.

2. Ibid., 47.

V. Unconscious, das Unbewusste

In order to grasp adequately the function of the unconscious

Freud introduces another concept, the Begriff des Unbe-

wussten.¹ The Common Spirit presupposes an unconscious ele-

ment or factor. Man is not conscious of the many thousand

things that go to make up the Common Spirit. The individual

himself has many presuppositions, instincts, and impulses of

which he is unconscious or only half-conscious. This mass of

unconscious elements is so great that the truly conscious ac-

tions of man are really exceptional. An understanding of the

unconscious factors in history differentiates the conception

of the development of the individual totally from any mere

pragmatic or reflective study. Moreover, the Unconscious as

applied to history must not be confused with its use in psy-

chology.

Denn es ist nicht der schwierige Begriff
des psychologischen Unbewussten, sondern
die Auseinandersetzung von der Historie be-
trifft, dass unsere Handlungen, Gefühle,
Instinkte, Erhebungen und Entschlüsse viel
mehr Voraussetzungen in sich tragen als wir
wissen und eine viel größere oder ganz an-
dere Bedeutung für das Ganze und die Dauer
haben, als uns selbst bewusst war. Es ist
nicht Bewusstheit, sondern Unbewusstes-
sein das Gehalt des Bewusstes in unbekante
und zurückgebliebenen des Bewusstes in unbekante
Tiefen, die sich erst den die ganzen Aus-
wirkungen verarbeitenden Historiker an-
nähernd offenbaren und ihm immer neue Fragen
stellen.

Freud, S.

1. 1911, 11, 10.

2. 1911, 11, 10.

The unconscious operation of historical factors is significant just because it is unconscious. Only after the conclusion of a long period of history can one often detect the movement and development of certain processes and forces

which were previously hidden from view. The relationship of the individual to the Common-Spirit becomes clearer in many instances after some previously unknown connection has been carefully traced through the flow of historical events. Troeltsch has emphasized an important factor here. As illustrations of this point we may cite Marx's economic interpretation of history wherein significant social relationships are brought to light of which the participants had not the slightest consciousness. The significant work of Max Weber on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism also bears this out.

VI. Creativity, das Schöpferische

Another important aspect of the life of the Individual Totality is the spontaneity, originality, and creativity of the individual person within the whole. Creativity is located only in personality. All individuals are imbedded in a superindividual setting from which they draw their traditions, their social life, and other heritages. But after one has analyzed the social structure and the total environment of the individual there remains a Moment of Originality which is unexplainable. This personal Originality has a revolutionary and determinative effect upon the whole, which is creative. Thus novelty emerges.

The unconscious operation of historical factors is significant just because it is unconscious. Only after the conclusion of a long period of history can one often detect the movement and development of certain processes and forces which were previously hidden from view. The relationship of the individual to the Common-Spirit becomes clearer in many instances after some previously unknown connection has been carefully traced through the flow of historical events. Troeltsch has emphasized an important factor here. As illustrations of this point we may cite Marx's economic interpretation of history wherein significant social relationships are brought to light of which the participants had not the slightest consciousness. The significant work of Max Weber on the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism also bears this out.

VI. Creativity, das Schöpferische

Another important aspect of the life of the individual is the spontaneity, originality, and creativity of the individual person within the whole. Creativity is located only in personality. All individuals are imbedded in a super-individual setting from which they draw their traditions, their social life, and other heritages. But after one has analyzed the social structure and the total environment of the individual there remains a Moment of Originality which is unexplainable. This personal Originality has a revolutionary and determinative effect upon the whole, which is creative. Thus novelty emerges.

The decisive role of the New, however, is not purely individualistic. It constitutes a creative synthesis which expresses itself in spiritual powers such as the great men of history illustrate.

According to this conception history is unpredictable and any thought of universal law, be it naturalistic or dialectic, to the causal principle of equivalence in natural science, impossible. The primordial depths of character out of which Troeltsch holds that for historical enquiry the logical conceptions must be enlarged to include an apparently irrational factor. Bergson has done this by making the logic of creative evolution normative, and has considered the physical world as a benumbing of life which demands a corresponding benumbing of logic. In this contention Bergson goes too far, but his suggestion is significant.¹ Troeltsch is right in seeking the creative forces of history in the depths of individual personality. His position on this point is closely related to the theories of Leibniz, Lotze, and Rickert.

Here, then, is creative pulsating personality acting within a whole. Personality is fundamental in history.

Included in this conception of creativity is a further concept, Freiheit im Willkürsinne. Troeltsch describes it as follows:

Alle historischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten werden, dass innerhalb ihrer diese Selbst-erzeugung der Persönlichkeit aus den drängenden Mächten heraus möglich wird.² Es kann nur bedeuten, dass in dem Kampf der aufstrebenden originalen und schöpferischen Tendenzen, ueber deren Herkunft keine weitere Erkenntnis möglich ist, mit den vorangehenden Seelenvorgängen und Tendenzen sowie mit den umgebenden Bedingungen die Stärke des Neuen

1. GS, III, 50.

2. Ibid., 50-51.

1. GS, III, 48-49.

The decisive role of the New, however, is not purely individualistic. It constitutes a creative synthesis which expresses itself in spiritual powers such as the great men of history illustrate.

The conception of das Schöpferische is clearly opposed to the causal principle of equivalence in natural science. Troeltsch holds that for historical enquiry the logical conceptions must be enlarged to include an apparently irrational factor. Bergson has done this by making the logic of creative evolution normative, and has considered the physical world as a benumbing of life which demands a corresponding benumbing of logic. In this contention Bergson goes too far, but his suggestion is significant.¹ Troeltsch is right in seeking the creative forces of history in the depths of individual personality. His position on this point is closely related to the theories of Leibniz, Lotze, and Rickert.

VII. Indeterminismus, Freiheit im Willkürismus

Included in this conception of creativity is a further concept, Freiheit im Willkürismus. Troeltsch describes it as follows:

Es kann nur bedeuten, dass in dem Kampf der anstrebenden originalen und schöpferischen Tendenzen, neben deren Herkunft keine weitere Erkenntnis möglich ist, mit den vorangehenden Seelenvorgängen und Tendenzen sowie mit den massgebenden Bedingungen die Stärke des Willens

abhängig ist von seiner Selbstzusammenfassung und Selbstdurchsetzung, von seinem Anschwellen zu der stärkeren Macht in den Vorgängen Ueberlegung und Selbstbesinnung, von seiner Entscheidung für sich gegen alle abdrängenden Kräfte.¹

According to this conception history is unpredictable and any thought of universal law, be it naturalistic or dialectic, impossible. The primordial depths of character out of which the freest and most autonomous actions arise, cannot be constructed or deduced from anything else, but can only be known or inferred with reference to human action. This charakterologische Bestimmtheit is not a mystical and completed thing or intelligible Ding an sich, but "etwas im Begehren, Denken, und Entscheiden sich selbst Erzeugendes, die Selbsterzeugung der Persönlichkeit, die Persönlichkeit nur in dem Masse ist, als sie aus dem Zusammenstrom der Ideen und Motive sich selbst hervorbringt."²

Here, then, is creative pulsating personality acting within a whole. Personality is fundamental in history.

Alle historischen Gesetzeszusammenhänge und Sinnzusammenhänge müssen so gefasst werden, dass innerhalb ihrer diese Selbsterzeugung der Persönlichkeit aus den drängenden Mächten heraus möglich wird.³

Personality is the bearer of the Common-Spirit, and the ultimately decisive idea in history. It is free and indeterminate.

1. GS, III, 50.

2. Ibid., 50-51.

3. Ibid., 51.

abhängig ist von seiner Selbstbestimmung, von seinen
sinn und Selbstbestimmung, von seinen
Anschließen zu der äußeren Welt in den
Vorgängen Überlegung und Selbstbestimmung,
von seiner Entscheidung für sich gegen alle
abhängenden Kräfte.

According to this conception history is unpredictable and any
thought of universal law, be it naturalistic or dialectic,
impossible. The primordial depths of character out of which
the freest and most autonomous actions arise, cannot be con-
structed or deduced from anything else, but can only be known
or inferred with reference to human action. This character-
istische Bestimmtheit is not a mystical and completed thing
or intelligible Ding an sich, but "etwas im Begreifen, Denken,
und Entscheiden sich selbst Erzeugendes, die Selbstzeugung
der Persönlichkeit, die Persönlichkeit nur in dem Masse ist,
als sie aus dem Zusammenstreifen der Ideen und Motive sich selbst
hervorbringt."

Here, then, is creative pulsating personality acting

within a whole. Personality is fundamental in history.

Alle historischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten
und Sinnzusammenhänge müssen so gefasst
werden, dass innerhalb ihrer diese Selbst-
erzeugung der Persönlichkeit aus den
drängenden Mächten heraus möglich wird.

Personality is the power of the common spirit, and the ulti-
mately decisive idea in history. It is free and indeterminate.

1.	ibid., 50-51.
2.	ibid., 51.
3.	ibid., 51.

The freedom of personality is not only Willkür but it is also subject to Zufall. Zufall, or chance, means that the events of history have no single common root. All mixtures of cultures, all conflicts, renaissances, and revolutions are of this kind. There are also conflicts of Sinneinheiten with wholes of natural causes which seem to have no common ground. Under this conception of Zufall must be listed also the rise of strong talents in human beings, famines, epidemics, and changes in climate which disturb whole cultures and civilizations. Then, there are accidents like finding gold, the coincidence of bad crops with overpopulation, and the falling of a tile upon the head of a passerby. Such contingent elements play a large role in historical processes.¹

All of these events point to the fact that there is no unitary or steady movement in history. There are monotonous ages like prehistoric times and there are chaotic eras where all cultural content is in conflict and no fundamental tendency is present, as in the late periods of antiquity and perhaps as at present. At such times great and significant Sinntotalitäten are infrequent and their unitary bloom is short-lived. One must, accordingly, recognize the lack of unity of certain stretches of historical time.²

We have now described some of the chief elements in the

1. GS, III, 51.

2. Ibid., 52.

The freedom of personality is not only Willkür but it is also subject to Kausalität, or chance, means that the events of history have no single common root. All mixtures of cultures, all conflicts, renaissances, and revolutions are of this kind. There are also conflicts of Sinneseinheiten with wholes of natural causes which seem to have no common ground. Under this conception of Kausalität must be listed also the rise of strong talents in human beings, famines, epidemics, and changes in climate which disturb whole cultures and civilizations. Then, there are accidents like finding gold, the co-incident of bad crops with overpopulation, and the falling of a tile upon the head of a passerby. Such contingent elements play a large role in historical processes.¹

All of these events point to the fact that there is no unitary or steady movement in history. There are monotonous ages like prehistoric times and there are chaotic eras where all cultural content is in conflict and no fundamental tendency is present, as in the late periods of antiquity and perhaps as at present. At such times great and significant Sinneseinheiten are independent and their unitary bloom is short-lived. One must, accordingly, recognize the lack of unity of certain stretches of historical time.²

We have now described some of the chief elements in the

1. ibid., III, 81.
2. ibid., 82.

Individual Totality. Troeltsch has correctly insisted that the Individual Totality exists not in the subjective realm of man's mind but has a real objective status. To borrow a term from contemporary psychology we may say that history presents real Gestalten. These Gestalten exhibit the several characteristics which Troeltsch has ascribed to them: "Ursprünglichkeit und Einmaligkeit, Vertretung, Wert- oder Sinneinheit, Gemeingeist, das Unbewusste, das Schöpferische, und Freiheit im Willkürsinne." The creative and spontaneous source of history is found ultimately in the individual personality. Creation, of course, is no absolute creation among finite creatures who emerge from the stream of life and of consciousness, but a creation which takes place in obedience to an imperative wought which emancipates the self from mere natural and accidental determination. Personality finds its true home in the Historical Totality or corporate personality in which it lives.¹

Besides combining so many aspects of structure and creativity, the Individual Totality also participates in a constant flux of development, for the stream of history hurries ever onward. Troeltsch believes that this developmental process manifests a distinctive logic of its own which we must examine before we can have a total view of the nature of historical wholes.

1. *Op. cit.*, 295.

2. Troeltsch frequently overlooks Heraclitus, but see

1. Cf. below Chapter V.

3. *Ibid.*, 295-297.

Individual Totality. Troeltsch has correctly insisted that the Individual Totality exists not in the subjective realm of man's mind but has a real objective status. To borrow a term from contemporary psychology we may say that history presents real Gestalten. These Gestalten exhibit the several characteristics which Troeltsch has ascribed to them: "Ursprünglichkeit und Einmaligkeit, Vertikung, Wert- oder Sinnhaftigkeit, Gemeinshaft, das Unbewusste, das Schicksalliche, und Freiheit im Willkürlichen." The creative and spontaneous source of history is found ultimately in the individual personality. Creation, of course, is no absolute creation among finite creatures who emerge from the stream of life and of consciousness, but a creation which takes place in obedience to an imperative ought which emancipates the self from mere natural and accidental determination. Personality finds its true home in the Historical Totality or corporate personality in which it lives. Besides combining so many aspects of structure and activity, the Individual Totality also participates in a constant flux of development, for the stream of history hurries ever onward. Troeltsch believes that this developmental process manifests a distinctive logic of its own which we must examine before we can have a total view of the nature of historical wholes.

lichkeit des Selbstverständlichen."¹ This principle is not a simple one and has various meanings. When applied to the conception of being, it makes obsolescent any existence external

CHAPTER FOUR

to becoming. Being must be understood in the "Lebendigkeit seiner Bewegung." When applied to the conception of time it

The Logic of Historical Development

I. Preliminary Definition of Development

Troeltsch holds that the Individual Totalities are in a constant process of development.¹ The term development, however, is ambiguous and demands further explanation and definition. Considered historically as a dynamic principle it is a modern conception. In ancient philosophy it received little or no recognition.² Christianity also did not regard the unity and purpose of life as wrought through the powers immanent in the historical process, but conceived of the force as coming from without.³ Even as late as the 16th and 17th Centuries, when mathematical and scientific inquiries had turned thought into new channels, physical changes were conceived as subordinate to absolute and immutable laws or truth. It was not until the time of Hume and Kant that confidence in such absolutes was shaken.

From the late 18th Century until the present, however, the idea of development in some form or other, together with the genetic method, has become supreme in scientific investigation. "Die genetische Methode gilt als das Selbstverständ-

1. GS, II, 692.

2. Troeltsch frequently overlooks Heraclitus, but see GS, III, 184.

3. Ibid., II, 296-297.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Logic of Historical Development

I. Preliminary Definition of Development

Troeltsch holds that the individual Totalities are in a constant process of development.¹ The term development, however, is ambiguous and demands further explanation and definition. Considered historically as a dynamic principle it is a modern conception. In ancient philosophy it received little or no recognition.² Christianity also did not regard the unity and purpose of life as wrought through the powers immanent in historical process, but conceived of the force as coming from without.³ Even as late as the 16th and 17th Centuries, when mathematical and scientific inquiries had turned thought into new channels, physical changes were conceived as subordinate to absolute and immutable laws or truths. It was not until the time of Hume and Kant that confidence in such absolutes was shaken. From the late 18th Century until the present, however, the idea of development in some form or other, together with the genetic method, has become supreme in scientific investigation. "Die genetische Methode gilt als das Selbstverständnis."

1. GS, II, 692.
2. Troeltsch frequently overlooks Heracleanism, but see GS, III, 184.
3. Ibid., II, 296-297.

lichste des Selbstverständlichen."¹ This principle is not a simple one and has various meanings. When applied to the conception of being, it makes obsolescent any existence external to becoming. Being must be understood in the "Lebendigkeit seiner Bewegung."² When applied to the conception of time it results in the idea of real duration. When applied to historical Christianity, it conflicts with the orthodox conceptions of revelation.³ On the same basis it rules out any absolute and immutable truth. It tends, furthermore, to make any so-called peak of development in history a mere transitional form and not an absolute value. Another characteristic tendency of the evolutionary approach is its interest in the here and now, and a corresponding rejection of other-worldliness. In the sciences the principle of development is reflected in the Kant-Laplace theory of the heavens, in the growing interest in historical research, and in biology.⁴ In philosophy Herder, Goethe, Hegel, and the Positivists employed it, though in different ways.

This range in meaning and usage shows that the term development as applied to the philosophy of history requires specific definition. Troeltsch remarks:

So ist erklärlich dass unter dem Namen derselben Theorie und Methode doch ganz verschiedenartige und widersprechende Betrachtungsweisen hervortreten. Die

1. GS, II, 298.

2. Ibid., 298.

3. Ibid., 300-302.

4. Ibid., 304-308.

1. This principle is not a
 simple one and has various meanings. When applied to the con-
 ception of being, it makes obsolescent any existence external
 to becoming. Being must be understood in the "Lebendigkeit"
 seiner Bewegung.² When applied to the conception of time it
 results in the idea of real duration. When applied to histor-
 ical Christianity, it conflicts with the orthodox conceptions
 of revelation.³ On the same basis it rules out any absolute
 and immutable truth. It tends, furthermore, to make any so-
 called peak of development in history a mere transitional form
 and not an absolute value. Another characteristic tendency of
 the evolutionary approach is its interest in the here and now,
 and a corresponding rejection of other-worldliness. In the
 sciences the principle of development is reflected in the Kant-
 Laplace theory of the heavens, in the growing interest in his-
 torical research, and in biology.⁴ In philosophy Herder,
 Goethe, Hegel, and the positivists employed it, though in dif-
 ferent ways.

This range in meaning and usage shows that the term devel-
 opment as applied to the philosophy of history requires speci-
 fic definition. Treitsch remarks:

So ist eigentlich das unter dem Namen
 derselben Theorie und Methode doch ganz
 verschiedene und widersprechende
 Betrachtungswesen hervorgetreten. Die

1. GS. II, 308.
2. Ibid., 298.
3. Ibid., 300-302.
4. Ibid., 304-308.

Anschauung einer inneren organisch gestaltenden Triebkraft der Gott-Natur oder des absoluten Geistes und diese These einer nur von aussen herein, letztlich durch den Zufall bestimmten Auslese, die trostlose Ergebung in einen sinn- und ziellosen fortwährenden Wechsel, in dem nichts besteht als das Gesetz des Wechsels, und der optimistische Glaube an ein letztes Vollkommenheitsziel, in welchem das Mögliche erreicht sein wird; der Apriorismus einer alles Wirkliche nur in der Evolution fassenden Theorie und der Empirismus einer von Fall zu Fall einsetzenden Beobachtung des Fortschrittes von niederem zu höheren Bildung; alles das liegt in dem Begriff der Entwicklung verborgen und kommt je nach Bedürfnis zum Ausdruck. Diese Methode ist nur ein Beispiel mehr dafür, dass Methoden unendlich fruchtbar und grundlegend für den ganzen Charakter einer wissenschaftlichen Epoche und doch in ihrem Wesen und ihrer Tragweite äussert unklar sein können.¹

From the above we may conclude that if the principle of development is to be applied to history and is to serve as a determining factor in our understanding of Individual Totalities, we must carefully define what we mean by it and distinguish it from its other uses. The problem of this chapter, accordingly, is to make clear what Troeltsch means by development and to investigate epistemological problems involved in that conception. The first task is to distinguish the idea from mere physical and biological evolution and from the idea of progress. The second task is to criticize some of the conceptions of development in the history of philosophy in order the more clearly to trace Troeltsch's own view. This procedure is

1. GS, II, 309.

Anwendung einer inneren organischen Gestalt-
 tenden Triebkraft der Gott-Natur oder des
 absoluten Geistes und diese These einer
 nur von aussen herein, festlich durch den
 Zufall bestimmten Auslese, die trostlose
 Ergebung in einen sinn- und ziellosen fort-
 währenden Wechsel, in dem nichts besteht
 als das Gesetz des Wechsels, und der sp-
 timistische Glaube an ein festes Volk-
 menntes Ziel, in welchem das Mögliche er-
 reicht sein wird; der Apokalyptismus, einer
 alles Wirkliche nur in der Evolution las-
 sendes Theorien und der Engländer einer von
 Teil zu Teil einsetzenden Beobachtung des
 Fortschrittes von niederen zu höheren Bil-
 dung; alles das liegt in dem Begriff der
 Entwicklung verborgen und kommt je nach Be-
 deutung zum Ausdruck. Diese Methode ist
 nur ein Beispiel mehr dafür, dass Methoden
 unendlich verschieden und grundlegend für den
 ganzen Charakter einer wissenschaftlichen
 Epoche und doch in ihrem Wesen und ihrer
 Tragweite äusserst unklar sein können.

From the above we may conclude that if the principle of
 development is to be applied to history and is to serve as a
 determining factor in our understanding of individual totali-
 ties, we must carefully define what we mean by it and distin-
 guish it from its other uses. The problem of this chapter, ac-
 cordingly, is to make clear what Troeltsch means by development
 and to investigate epistemological problems involved in that
 conception. The first task is to distinguish the idea from
 mere physical and biological evolution and from the idea of
 progress. The second task is to criticize some of the concep-
 tions of development in the history of philosophy in order the
 more clearly to trace Troeltsch's own view. This procedure is

necessary because Troeltsch's own exposition follows that method and because his own views are interwoven among the criticisms of others. Like many writers, Troeltsch is much clearer and more systematic in his treatment of others than in stating his own position. His philosophy of history thus lapses frequently into history of philosophy. We shall, however, not review here the whole range of his historical criticism, but shall select those chapters which seem most definitely to bring out, positively and negatively, his own beliefs. In our presentation we shall follow not Troeltsch's order, which begins with Rickert and then proceeds through Hegel, Marx, and the Positivists. Rather we shall begin with Hegel, and then discuss in turn Marx, the Positivists, and Rickert. The third task of the chapter will be to present some epistemological and metaphysical considerations which the author appends to his historical criticisms. Forces which do not exhaust themselves in a single act, but which tend toward an end, a development akin to logical evolution. Thus A. re Development and Evolution develop philosophical In his article on "Historiography" Troeltsch affirms that the principle of development must be taken in its purely historico-empirical sense, and must not be confounded with the idea of development in natural science or with that found in metaphysics. The scientific use of the term is distinguishable from both of the others. It signifies the explanation of be-

1. HRE, VI, 720. In his other writings the sharp distinction between the empirical and metaphysical conception of development is not so rigorously carried out as here.
2. GS, III, 222.

necessarily because Troeltsch's own exposition follows that method and because his own views are interwoven among the claims of others. Like many writers, Troeltsch is much clearer and more systematic in his treatment of others than in stating his own position. His philosophy of history thus lapses frequently into history of philosophy. We shall, however, not review here the whole range of his historical criticism, but shall select those chapters which seem most definitely to bring out, positively and negatively, his own beliefs. In our presentation we shall follow not Troeltsch's order, which begins with Ricket and then proceeds through Hegel, Marx, and the Positivists. Rather we shall begin with Hegel, and then discuss in turn Marx, the Positivists, and Ricket. The third task of the chapter will be to present some epistemological and metaphysical considerations which the author appends to his historical criticism.

A. Development and Evolution

In his article on "Historiography" Troeltsch affirms that the principle of development must be taken in its purely historic-empirical sense, and must not be confounded with the idea of development in natural science or with that found in metaphysics. The scientific use of the term is distinguishable from both of the others. It signifies the explanation of be-

coming by the addition of infinitesimal mechanical changes.¹ In another essay he says:

Die physische Entwicklung handelt von der Bildung relativ dauernder und verwickelter Systeme räumlich-körperlicher Vorgänge und misst deren Höhe an der Ausbreitung der Beziehungen; die biologische handelt von der Kontinuität der Lebewesen und misst die Höhe an den Leistungen für die Gesundheit und Erhaltung der Art; die psychologische handelt von der Bildung zusammenhängender, um ein Leib-Ich gruppiert Bewusstseinserscheinungen samt den unbewussten Voraussetzungen und misst die Höhe an dem Masse, in welchen sie bei Tieren und Menschen als Mechanismus und Apparat für höhere geistige Fähigkeiten dienen kann.²

In contradistinction to these uses of the term, historical development denotes the progress which issues from the essential element of certain psychical efforts, the working out of the consequences that are latent in the earliest beginnings of an act. It denotes furthermore, the dynamical element in psychical forces which do not exhaust themselves in a single act, but which tend toward an end, a development akin to logical evolution. Thus religions develop, morals develop, philosophical ideas develop. Moreover, development is exhibited in the character of individuals and peoples, in the forms of government, and in economic conditions. Hence it is closely related to the Historical Totality, for wherever this tendency appears, it constitutes a principle that organizes the aggregates, and

1. ERE, VI, 720. In his other writings the sharp distinction between the empirical and metaphysical conception of development is not so rigorously carried out as here.
2. GS, III, 222.

coming by the addition of infinitesimal mechanical changes. In

another essay he says:

Die physikalische Entwicklung handelt von der
Bildung relativ dauerhafter und verwickelter
Systeme räumlich-physikalischer Vorgänge und
misst deren Höhe an der Ausbreitung der
Bestandteile; die biologische handelt von der
Kontinuität der Lebewesen und misst die Höhe
an den Leistungen für die Gesundheit und Er-
haltung der Art; die psychologische handelt
von der Bildung zusammenhängender, wie ein-
heitlich gruppierter Bewusstseinsinhalte
und misst die Höhe an dem Masse, in welchem
sie bei Tieren und Menschen als Mechanismus
und Apparat für höhere geistige Tätigkeiten
arbeiten kann.

In contradistinction to these uses of the term, historical
development denotes the process which issues from the essential

element of certain psychological efforts, the working out of the
consequences that are latent in the earliest beginnings of an
act. It denotes furthermore, the dynamical element in psy-
chical forces which do not exhaust themselves in a single act,
but which tend toward an end, a development akin to logical
evolution. Thus religious develop, moral develop, philosophi-
cal ideas develop. Moreover, development is exhibited in the
character of individuals and peoples, in the forms of govern-
ment, and in economic conditions. Hence it is closely related
to the Historical Totality. For whenever this tendency appears,
it constitutes a principle that organizes the aggregate, and

1. ERM, VI, 750. In his other writings the sharp distinc-
tion between the empirical and metaphysical conception
of development is not so rigorously carried out as here.
2. GS, III, 232.

impels them from within.¹ of races, and food-supplies.

Troeltsch also relegates to this sphere such individual qualities as talent. B. Development and Progress occur but sparingly.

Modern thought has linked the principle of development not only with evolution but also with the idea of progress.

Troeltsch warns us that the conception of development as internal propulsion should not be overworked. It clearly does not mean infinite progress. In every particular case development implies only a single concrete impulse controlling a given aggregate.¹ It manifests itself not merely in the fact of advance, but also in the fact of exhaustion.

All progressive developments work also toward regression, so as to make room for fresh movements. The conception in question has, therefore, nothing to do with the conception of an unlimited and continuous progress found in the philosophy of history.¹

The idea of an assumed progress runs counter to the contingent nature of historical process as we outlined it in chapter one. There may at any time converge a series of mutually independent causes which may further and amplify a course of development, but which may frustrate and completely arrest it. There may emerge a higher and better synthesis, but this is not guaranteed. The sphere of contingency includes influences of climate, atmosphere, fertility, geographical position, and natural wealth. It also embraces physiological events such as

1. ERE, VI, 720.

impels them from within.

B. Development and Progress

Modern thought has linked the principle of development not only with evolution but also with the idea of progress. Troeltsch warns us that the conception of development as internal propulsion should not be overworked. It clearly does not mean infinite progress. In every particular case development implies only a single concrete impulse controlling a given aggregate. It manifests itself not merely in the fact of advance, but also in the fact of exhaustion.

All progressive developments work also toward regression, so as to make room for fresh movements. The conception in question has, therefore, nothing to do with the conception of an unlimited and continuous progress found in the philosophy of history.

The idea of an assumed progress runs counter to the contingent nature of historical process as we outlined it in chapter one. There may at any time converge a series of mutually independent causes which may further and amplify a course of development, but which may frustrate and completely arrest it. There may emerge a higher and better synthesis, but this is not guaranteed. The sphere of contingency includes influences of climate, atmosphere, fertility, geographical position, and natural wealth. It also embraces physiological events such as

deaths, inbreeding, mixture of races, and food-supplies. Troeltsch also relegates to this sphere such individual qualities as talent and genius, which sometimes occur but sparingly, sometimes, however, in amazing profusion. All of these contingent factors, both conscious and unconscious, affect the development of the Individual Totalities.¹

C. The Need of a Clear Definition of Development

Historical development is, accordingly, first adequately apprehended when the genetic and evolutionary contributions of the natural sciences have been taken into account. But what marks the characteristic features of the former is the capacity of men to express themselves in Sinnttotalitäten. It is this meaningful and teleological function of historical wholes which marks the essential difference between historical development and development in the natural sciences.

Jedenfalls legt das physikalisch-chemische Denken es nahe, in blossen Reihenbildungen und Kausalzusammenhängen von Einzelvorgang zu Einzelvorgang zu denken, während alle weiteren Stufen in jeweils höherem Masse mit einer Durchformung und Beherrschung dieser Reihenbildung durch phastische, kontinuierlich sich auswirkende Sinntendenzen rechnen müssen.²

Although these considerations are not metaphysical, yet they involve significant questions of epistemology and of

1. ERE, VI, 720; cf. GS, III, 222; cf. also above Chapter III, p.

2. GS, III, 222.

destiny, inheritance, mixture of races, and food-supplies. Troelsch also refers to this sphere each individual qualities as talent and genius, which sometimes occur but sparingly, sometimes, however, in amazing profusion. All of these contingent factors, both conscious and unconscious, affect the development of the individual Totalities.¹

C. The Need of a Clear Definition of Development. Historical development is, accordingly, first adequately apprehended when the genetic and evolutionary contributions of the natural sciences have been taken into account. But what marks the characteristic features of the former is the capacity of men to express themselves in Sinnvolligkeiten. It is this meaningful and teleological function of historical wholes which marks the essential difference between historical development and development in the natural sciences.

Lebenskräfte legt das physikalisch-chemische Denken es nahe, in diesen Reihbildungen und Zusammenhängen von Einzelvorgängen zu Einzelvorgängen zu denken, während alle weiteren Stufen in jeweils höherer Masse mit einer Durchdringung und Beherrschung dieser Reihbildung durch geistige, konstante sich auswirkende Sinnbestimmungen rechnen müssen.

Although these considerations are not metaphysical, yet they involve significant questions of epistemology and of

1. ERG. VI, 230; cf. GS, III, 232; cf. also above Chapter III, p. 232.
2. GS, III, 232.

ethics. And the metaphysical account of development which Troeltsch correctly separates from the strictly empirical must do justice by the latter. The problem arises how the historical process is related to the fundamental forces of the universe, together with the further problem regarding the significance of that process for the living will of each particular age and the relationship between the ideals of the individual and the Common Spirit. Moreover, there is the question of what ideal values can be won and conserved from the process, and what the goal and aim of the whole may be. So soon as we raise these pertinent questions we are no longer describing the development of totalities, but are seeking to understand and to appraise them.

In his account of the empirical principle of development Troeltsch seems to have created a paradox. The historical is contingent, durational, unique, and creative. On the other hand, the Individual Totalities are unities of meaning and value which require norms and laws. But since history is a process through and through, how are norms to be established? How can one find the unconditioned in the conditioned, the absolute in the midst of the historical flux? Troeltsch's position is one which strives to rid the philosophy of history of all its false absolutes, and yet to achieve a synthesis of value and meaning for the individual person and for the Individual Totality in the midst of the process of its development.

ethics. And the metaphysical account of development which
Troeltsch correctly separates from the strictly empirical must
do justice by the latter. The problem arises now the histor-
ical process is related to the fundamental forces of the uni-
verse, together with the further problem regarding the signifi-
cance of that process for the living will of each particular
age and the relationship between the ideals of the individual
and the Common Spirit. Moreover, there is the question of what
ideal values can be won and conserved from the process, and
what the goal and aim of the whole may be. As soon as we raise
these pertinent questions we are no longer describing the de-
velopment of totalities, but are seeking to understand and to
appraise them.

In his account of the empirical principle of development
Troeltsch seems to have created a paradox. The historical is
contingent, accidental, unique, and creative. On the other
hand, the individual totalities are unities of meaning and
value which require norms and laws. But since history is
process through and through, how are norms to be established?
How can one find the unconditional in the conditioned, the ab-
solute in the midst of the historical flux? Troeltsch's posi-
tion is one which strives to rid the philosophy of history of
all its false absolutes, and yet to achieve a synthesis of
value and meaning for the individual person and for the indi-
vidual totality in the midst of the process of its development.

These problems in one form or another will engage us in the remainder of this study. Tillich, writing of Troeltsch, says:

Die Philosophie der Geschichte aber ist effects and
der Versuch, in dem Strom dieser Bedingt-
heiten einen unbedingten Sinn aufzudecken. ideas and
Hier, wie nirgends sonst, muss die Ent-
scheidung ueber das Problem des Relativis- again.
mus fallen und hier ist sie auch für
Troeltsch gefallen.¹

The search for real absolutes which do justice to the material content of the historical flow takes Troeltsch into the rich field of the history of philosophy where he finds many suggestions for the solutions to these problems, but only a few which seem adequate. We shall discuss in order four general solutions of the problem, the Hegelian dialectic, the Marxian dialectic, Positivism, and Rickert's philosophy of history.

The inner meaning of life and of history must at some be in-
dividual.

II. Troeltsch's Criticisms of Previous Positions

A basic identity in A. Hegel's Dialectic

Hegel's dialectic seethes with process. His was "die erste grosse Theorie der historischen Dynamik."² In the dialectic of Hegel, says Troeltsch, there beats the pulse of historical life. Hegel had a sense for the original, living, individual, and contradictory facts of history. Here he found the pulse of history beating with greatness, wealth, passion, and the fullness of existence. Like Goethe he beheld the immediacy of reality in its unspeakable richness, and gave it

1. Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 355. not give him sufficient

2. GS, III, 241. relation to Hegel.

These problems in one form or another will engage us in the remainder of this study. Tillich, writing of Troeltsch, says:

Die Philosophie der Geschichte aber ist der Versuch, in dem Strom dieser Bedingungen einen unbedingten Sinn auszumachen. Hier, wie nirgends sonst, muss die Entscheidung neben das Problem der Relativität fallen und hier ist sie auch für Troeltsch gefallen.¹

The search for real absolutes which do justice to the material content of the historical flow takes Troeltsch into the rich field of the history of philosophy where he finds many suggestions for the solutions to these problems, but only a few which seem adequate. We shall discuss in order four general solutions of the problem, the Hegelian dialectic, the Marxian dialectic, Positivism, and Rickert's philosophy of history.

II. Troeltsch's Criticisms of Previous Positions

A. Hegel's Dialectic

Hegel's dialectic accords with process. His was "die erste grosse Theorie der historischen Dynamik."² In the dialectic of Hegel, says Troeltsch, there beats the pulse of historical life. Hegel had a sense for the original, living, individual, and contradictory facts of history. Here he found the pulse of history beating with greatness, wealth, passion, and the fullness of existence. Like Goethe he beheld the immediacy of reality in its unspeakable richness, and gave it

1. Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 355.
2. GS, III, 244.

expression in his dialectic.¹ Contrary to usual interpretations, the primary thing which Hegel seeks is not the logical and ethical progress of reason (Vernunft), but the effects and expressions of a Reason in life which continually divides and reunites, scatters and gathers, levels and builds up again.²

However, at this point the real problem emerges. The reality of opposites and struggles, of the contradictions of life in its endless differentiations, is subsumed under the unity, continuity, and teleology of reason, which gives to everything its pulsating dialectic.² All things are the expression of a single reason and hence, historically speaking, every moment must possess the full meaning of historical life in itself and must find its place in the dialectic of change. The inner meaning of life and of history must at once be individual and unique in each event and at the same time express a basic identity in all its appearances. Hegel teaches the living unity of events in the particularity of real and contradictory forms.² This constitutes a problem.

Hegel hoped to solve the problem by applying the principle of dialectic. The latter is the theory of the identity of opposites, a logic of motion, which proceeds in the movement of becoming. Becoming received its first great modern philosophical expression in Hegel.³ It is a relative Aufhebung of the

1. GS, III, 245.

2. Ibid., 246.

3. Ibid., 247. On page 184, Troeltsch recognizes Heraclitus' importance, but does not give him sufficient recognition in relation to Hegel.

expression in his dialectic.¹ Contrary to usual interpreta-
tions, the primary thing which Hegel seeks is not the logical
and ethical progress of reason (*Vernunft*), but the effects and
expressions of a Reason in life which continually divides and
reunites, scatters and gathers, levels and builds up again.²
However, at this point the real problem emerges. The
reality of opposites and struggles, of the contradictions of
life in its endless differentiations, is subsumed under the
unity, continuity, and teleology of reason, which gives to
everything its pulsating dialectic.³ All things are the ex-
pression of a single reason and hence, historically speaking,
every moment must possess the full meaning of historical life
in itself and must find its place in the dialectic of change.
The inner meaning of life and of history must at once be in-
dividual and unique in each event and at the same time express
a basic identity in all its appearances. Hegel teaches the
living unity of events in the particularity of real and contra-
dictory forms.⁴ This constitutes a problem.
Hegel hoped to solve this problem by applying the principle
of dialectic. The latter is the theory of the identity of op-
posites, a logic of motion, which proceeds in the movement of
becoming. Becoming received its first great modern philosophi-
cal expression in Hegel.⁵ It is a relative Antiquarian of the

1. GS, III, 245.
2. Ibid., 240.
3. Ibid., 247. On page 184, Trachtenberg recognizes Hera-
clitus' importance, but does not give him sufficient
recognition in relation to Hegel.

principle of contradiction, which was valid for only dead being, and belongs to the sphere of Verstand. Dialectic views the world of experience from a higher synthesis, viz., Ver-nunft. Hegel taught that the essence of spirit (Geist) was not to be at rest, but to progress from one position to its opposite and thence to a unity which in turn progresses dialectically. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis; affirmation, negation, and negation of the negations or reaffirmation - this is the law of logic and of being. This law undergirds everything, human history and also the whole sphere of reality.

The essential factor in history is movement itself, in which at every point the individual and the universal concretely unite, proceeding out of movement and returning to it again. This logic of history thus reveals the deepest meaning of logic itself.¹

The spirit which manifests itself in this dialectic is not an individual finite logical subject, but is the Universal Divine Spirit himself, who proceeds out of himself in the form of finitude and returns to himself, thus overcoming the mere process of worldbecoming. He is himself a timeless and purely logical process, which seems to the finite subject - one does not know just why - to be temporal.² Troeltsch comments:

1. GS, III, 248.

2. Ibid., 250.

principle of contradiction, which was valid for only dead be-
 ing, and belongs to the sphere of Verstand. Dialectic views
 the world of experience from a higher synthesis, viz., Ver-
stand. Hegel taught that the essence of spirit (Geist) was not
 to be at rest, but to progress from one position to its oppo-
 site and thence to a unity which in turn progresses dialectical-
 ly. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis; affirmation, negation, and
 negation of the negation or reaffirmation - this is the law of
 logic and of being. This law underlies everything, human his-
 tory and also the whole sphere of reality.

The essential factor in history is movement itself, in
 which at every point the individual and the universal concrete-
 ly unite, proceeding out of movement and returning to it again.
 This logic of history thus reveals the deepest meaning of logic
 itself.¹

The spirit which manifests itself in this dialectic is not
 an individual finite logical subject, but is the Universal
 Divine Spirit himself, who proceeds out of himself in the form
 of finitude and returns to himself, thus overcoming the mere
 process of worldbecoming. He is himself a timeless and purely
 logical process, which seems to the finite subject - one does
 not know just why - to be temporal.² Froelich comments:

1. GS, III, 348.
2. Ibid., 350.

Damit ist die strenge Einheit des Daseinsgrundes, das Gesetz der Bewegung und die Klarheit des Weltzieles auf dem Weg der neuen dialektischen, gerade in der Erkenntnistheorie zugleich metaphysischen Logik erreicht. Die Bewegungslogik gründet in einer Identitätsphilosophie, in der der Allgeist mit dem bewegten Ausdruck seiner selbst identisch ist und daher von jedem Punkt seiner Einzelrealisierung auf sich selbst durch Analyse zurückgehen kann.¹

It would be unfair, says Troeltsch, to call Hegel's mode of thought an apriori construction. He does not deduce the materials of history out of apriori principles. On the contrary, the dialectic is a purely formal a priori which is only an Ordnungs- und Durchdringungsmittel for the empirical data.²

Hegel has no desire to exclude the empirical and critical, the pragmatic, and the psychological investigations from due consideration; but rather presupposes them and arranges the materials which they contribute according to the dialectical principle.

Das dialektische Geschichtsbild ist Rekonstruktion gegebener, anschaulicher, und konkreter Materialien zu einem Ganzen, nicht apriorische Deduktion des inhaltlichen Geschehens und seiner Folgereihen aus der Idee. Das ist ueberaus wichtig und ist leider unendlich oft verkannt, oder missverstanden worden.³

There is another significant point concerning the Hegelian dialectic which must not be overlooked, but which was neglected by the Junghegelianer. Just as Hegel did not construct concrete

1. GS, III, 250-251.

2. Ibid., 253.

3. Ibid., 254.

Damit ist die strenge Einheit des Beweises-
grundes, das Gesetz der Bewegung und die
Klarheit des Weltbildes auf dem Weg der
neuen dialektischen, gerade in der Er-
kenntnistheorie zugleich metaphysischen
Logik erreicht. Die Bewegungstheorie gründet
in einer Identitätstheorie, in der der
Allgeist mit dem bewegten Ausdruck seiner
selbst identisch ist und daher von jedem
Punkt seiner Einzelrealisierung aus sich
selbst durch Analyse zurückgehen kann.¹

It would be unfair, says Troeltsch, to call Hegel's mode
of thought an a priori construction. He does not deduce the
materials of history out of a priori principles. On the con-
trary, the dialectic is a purely formal a priori which is only
an Ordnungs- und Durchdringungsmittel for the empirical data.²
Hegel has no desire to exclude the empirical and critical, the
pragmatic, and the psychological investigations from the con-
sideration; but rather presupposes them and arranges the ma-
terials which they contribute according to the dialectical
principle.

Das dialektische Geschichtsbild ist Rekon-
struktion gegeben, anschaulicher, und
konkreter Materialien zu einem Ganzen,
nicht apriorische Deduktion des inhaltlichen
Geschehens und seiner Folgerungen aus der
Idee. Das ist wiederum wichtig und ist
leider unendlich oft verkannt, oder missver-
standen worden.³

There is another significant point concerning the Hegelian
dialectic which must not be overlooked, but which was neglected
by the Junghegelianer. Just as Hegel did not construct concrete

1. GS, III, 250-251.
2. Ibid., 253.
3. Ibid., 254.

history apriori, so also he avoids all attempts to construct the future. He restricted his method to what was already known. The whole can be constructed only after the whole lies before one. The fact that Hegel made no predictions shows how truly he bound himself to the empirical.¹

Still another achievement must be added to Hegel's praise. He does not seek to exclude everything irrational, individual, accidental, or contrary to purpose from his theory. The whole dynamic process is for him a development of conscious reason out of its primordial opposition, out of unconscious reason, out of the pure empirical data of existence.

Then again, he attacks the principle of causality and uses in its place the principle of dialectic. This conception affords him both continuity and flux and does no violence to the actual movement of history,² whereas the conception of causality cannot account for essential elements, like flow, internal unity, and the gradation of values.³

Moreover, the dialectical account of history provides a basis for the understanding of Spirit in masses, peoples (Völker), and group unities. Troeltsch says very acutely,

Wie die moderne mechanistische Naturwissenschaft und der ethisch-rechtlich-politische Individualismus untereinander zusammenhängen, so hängt auch die Dialektik mit der Erfassung des Geistes als

1. GS, III, 255.

2. Ibid., 257.

3. Ibid., 257-258.

3. Ibid., 263.

history apriori, so also he avoids all attempts to construct the future. He restricted his method to what was already known. The whole can be constructed only after the whole lies before one. The fact that Hegel made no predictions shows how truly he bound himself to the empirical.¹

Still another achievement must be added to Hegel's praise. He does not seek to exclude everything irrational, individual, accidental, or contrary to purpose from his theory. The whole dynamic process is for him a development of conscious reason out of its primordial opposition, out of unconscious reason, out of the pure empirical data of existence.

Then again, he attacks the principle of causality and uses in its place the principle of dialectic. This conception affords him both continuity and flux and does no violence to the actual movement of history,² whereas the conception of causality cannot account for essential elements, like flow, internal unity, and the gradation of values.³

Moreover, the dialectical account of history provides a basis for the understanding of spirit in masses, peoples (Völker), and group unities. Tasselsack says very sentely,

Wie die moderne mechanistische Naturwissenschaft und der ethisch-rechtlich-politische Individualismus untereinander zusammenhängen, so hängt auch die Dialektik mit der Entwicklung des Geistes als

1. GS. III, 255.
2. Ibid. 257.
3. Ibid. 257-258.

in Massen, Völkern und Gruppeneinheiten
sich bewegend zusammen.¹

The state is the dialectical unity of the Gemeinschaft and Individuum.² Out of the oppositions and struggles, moreover, of nations there crystallizes dialectically the unity of mankind, which is only conceivable as the synthesis of Volkerindividualitäten. The state is basic for Hegel and colors his conceptions of religion, art, and philosophy. Into his conception of the state he crowded many other factors:

Staat und Gesellschaft, Macht und Kultur,
Nation und Recht, Religion und Weltleben,
einseitige Kraft und harmonische Fülle,
Naivetät und Reflexion, Tradition und Ursprünglichkeit, Geschichtsfolge und System.³

Having compressed so much into a single synthesis, Hegel's simple formula of World History as "Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit," seems inadequate. The idea has a double meaning and combines apparently contradictory elements. Just as his system as a whole unites contemplation and activity, determinism and creative originality, universal necessity and conscious teleology, so too his conception of freedom contains a Janusgesicht.³ On the one hand, freedom means the autonomous affirmation of an ideal and a striving for a common life with other free beings. This is its Kantian aspect. On the other hand, this first definition is aufgehoben in the dialectical necessity of Vernunft, in which complete and selfconscious

1. GS, III, 258.

2. Ibid., 259.

3. Ibid., 263.

in Massen, Völkern und Gruppenbewegungen.¹
 The state is the dialectical unity of the Gemeinschaft and Individualismus.² Out of the oppositions and struggles, moreover, of nations there crystallizes dialectically the unity of mankind, which is only conceivable as the synthesis of Völkerindividualism. The state is basic for Hegel and colors his conceptions of religion, art, and philosophy. Into his conception of the state he crowded many other factors:
 Staat und Gesellschaft, Macht und Kultur,
 Nation und Recht, Religion und Weltleben,
 einheitliche Kraft und harmonische Fülle,
 Selbst und Reflexion, Tradition und Ursprünglichkeit, Geschichtstote und System.³
 Having compressed so much into a single synthesis, Hegel's simple formula of World History as "Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit," seems inadequate. The idea has a double meaning and combines apparently contradictory elements. Just as his system as a whole unites contemplation and activity, determinism and creative originality, universal necessity and concrete teleology, so too his conception of freedom contains a Janusgesicht.⁴ On the one hand, freedom means the autonomous affirmation of an ideal and a striving for a common life with other free beings. This is its Kantian aspect. On the other hand, this first definition is unvollkommen in the dialectical necessity of Vernunft, in which complete and self-conscious

1. GS. III, 258.
2. Ibid., 259.
3. Ibid., 258.

freedom means understanding the logical necessity of the dialectical movement as a whole. This is his final Spinozistic conclusion.¹

In this latter phase of the dialectic the dualism between ought and the endless process which confronts it has been negated, and the process stands determined and complete. The Marxian interpretation of the dialectic denied this completion, and uses the dialectic as a tool with which to invade the future. By so doing the historical process goes over into a Kantian or Fichtean Sollen.² Hegel, however, confined the whole dialectic within the bounds of a Spinozistic philosophy of identity.

The monism of Hegel is the key to the chief criticisms that must be brought against his system. His philosophy results in a monistic Universalgeschichte. In so doing it violates the principle of Individual Totalities. His violation consists in the fact that his interest in the German State tended to minimize the unique significance of the individual person and tended also to dissolve the intrinsic meaning and value of previous totalities, making them but instruments for the arrival of later stages of the dialectic. The German State is a peculiar unity of the Hellenic city state, of the Lutheran state-religion, of individual humanity and liberal bureaucracy,

1. GS, III, 264.

2. Ibid., 265.

freedom means understanding the logical necessity of the dialectical movement as a whole. This is his final Spinozistic conclusion.¹

In this latter phase of the dialectic the dualism between ought and the endless process which confronts it has been negated, and the process stands determined and complete. The Marxian interpretation of the dialectic denied this completion, and uses the dialectic as a tool with which to invade the future. By so doing the historical process goes over into a Kantian or Fichtean Solien.² Hegel, however, confined the whole dialectic within the bounds of a Spinozistic philosophy of identity.

The monism of Hegel is the key to the chief criticisms that must be brought against his system. His philosophy rests in a monistic Universalgeschichte. In so doing it violates the principle of individual totalities. His violation consists in the fact that his interest in the German State tended to minimize the unique significance of the individual person and tended also to dissolve the intrinsic meaning and value of previous totalities, making them but instruments for the arrival of later stages of the dialectic. The German State is a peculiar unity of the Hellenic city state, of the Lutheran state-religion, of individual humanity and liberal bureaucracy.

1. *ibid.*, III, 264.
2. *ibid.*, 265.

but also the incarnation of spirit (Geist), of the state in the objective spirit, of the incorporation of individual in mankind, and finally the incarnation of God himself.¹ As over against such a view Troeltsch maintains:

Die Historie kennt keinen Allgemeinbegriff, aus dem sie Inhalt und Reihenfolge des Geschehenen ableiten könnte, sondern nur konkrete, individuelle, jedesmal im Gesamtzusammenhang bedingte, im Kern aber unableitbare und rein tatsächliche Erscheinungen. Die Historie kennt deshalb keine mit tatsächlichen Allgemeinheiten zusammenfallenden Werte und Normen, sondern kennt diese nur als allgemein gültige oder Gültigkeit beansprechende Gedanken, die stets in individueller Form auftreten und ihre Allgemeingültigkeit nur im Kampfe gegen das bloss Tatsächliche kund tun.²

When we apply this criticism to a definite problem such as the development of Christianity, it becomes clear just what is meant.

Auch die Geschichte des Christentums hat ihrerseits immer deutlicher die beirrenden Stufenkonstruktion aufgegeben, die Urchristentum, Katholizismus und Protestantismus als Glieder einer logischen Reihe betrachten.... Keine Periode ist lediglich Durchgangsstufe, jede hat in ihrer Gesamtlage ihren eigenen Sinn und ihre selbstgenugsame Bedeutung.³

This criticism is directed against Hegel's attempt completely to rationalize the process of history.⁴ Everything was

1. GS, III, 268-269.

2. ACR, 29.

3. Ibid., 40. Troeltsch frequently quotes the saying of Ranke, "Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott."

4. GS, III, 273.

but also the incarnation of spirit (Geist), of the state in the
objective spirit, of the incorporation of individual in man-
kind, and finally the incarnation of God himself.¹ As over

against such a view Troeltsch maintains:

Die Historie kennt keinen Allgemeinen-
Geist, aus dem alle Inhalt und Reihenfolge
des Geschehens ableiten könnte, sondern
nur konkrete, individuelle, jedesmal im
Gesamtsammenhang bedingte, im Kern aber
unabhängige und rein faktische Zusammen-
hänge. Die Historie kennt deshalb keine
mit faktischen Allgemeinen zusammen-
hängenden Worte und Normen, sondern kennt
diese nur als allgemeine Gültigkeit oder Gültig-
keit bestimmter Gedanken, die stets
in individueller Form auftreten und ihre
Allgemeingültigkeit nur im Kampfe gegen
das bloße Faktische handhaben.²

When we apply this criticism to a definite problem such as
the development of Christianity, it becomes clear just what is
meant.

Auch die Geschichte des Christentums hat
innerhalb immer deutlicher die betriebs-
ständigen Funktionen aufgegeben, die Ur-
christentum, Katholizismus und Protestan-
tismus als Glieder einer logischen Reihe
betrachten.... Keine Periode ist ledig-
lich Durchgangsstufe, jede hat in ihrer
Gesamtlage ihren eigenen Sinn und ihre
selbständige Bedeutung.³

This criticism is directed against Hegel's attempt com-
pletely to rationalize the process of history.⁴ Everything was

1. GS. III, 288-289.
2. AGR, 29.
3. Ibid., 40. Troeltsch frequently quotes the saying of
Harnack, "jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott."
4. GS. III, 273.

interpreted as spirit, expressing itself in a monistic dialectical movement. In history spirit is merely producing itself. And the whole scheme of human events is nothing but Reason's becoming self-conscious of its own concrete unity. This view does violence to the material facts of history, as Marx and other sociologists rightly pointed out.¹

An even more objectionable consequence of Hegel's monism is that what appear to be changes, concretions, and individualizations are merely changes in the form of universal being or spirit. Thus, volition, value, and individual reality are sacrificed to continuity and logical necessity and become mere appearances. Troeltsch confirms Lotze's attack on this position. He says:

Der Verlauf der Geschichte sei die grosse furchtbare und tragische Schlachtbank, auf welcher alles individuelle Glück und Leben geopfert werde, damit die Entwicklung der allgemeinen Idee der Menschheit von Statten gehe.²
Recht eigentlich aber einen Stein statt des Brotes gibt uns diese Ansicht mit ihrer Geringschätzung des individuellen Lebens gegenüber der Entwicklung der Idee.³

Troeltsch himself holds that human beings in Hegel's view appear to be only marionettes in a show of which they know nothing.⁴ But he hastens to add that one receives this impression only when one meditates not on the dialectic, which in itself

1. GS, III, 274.

2. MIK, III, 33. The use of the word concrete here is

3. MIK, III, 36. the Hegelian meaning of the term, for in

4. GS, III, 275. the completely related.

5. GS, III, 276.

interpreted as spirit, expressing itself in a monistic dialectical movement. In history spirit is merely producing itself. And the whole scheme of human events is nothing but Reason's becoming self-conscious of its own concrete unity. This view does violence to the material facts of history, as Marx and other sociologists rightly pointed out.¹

An even more objectionable consequence of Hegel's monism is that what appear to be changes, corrections, and individualities are merely changes in the form of universal being or spirit. Thus, volition, value, and individual reality are ascribed to continuity and logical necessity and become mere appearances. Troeltsch confirms Lotze's attack on this position. He says:

Der Verlauf der Geschichte sei die grosse
 unrichtige und tragische Schicksalsbahn,
 auf welcher alles individuelle Glück und
 Leben geopfert werde, damit die Entwicklung
 der allgemeinen Idee der Menschheit von
 Statten gehe.²
 Recht eigentlich aber einen Stein statt des
 Brotes gibt uns diese Ansicht mit ihrer
 Geringschätzung des individuellen Lebens
 Gegenüber der Entwicklung der Idee.³

Troeltsch himself holds that human beings in Hegel's view appear to be only marionettes in a show of which they know nothing.⁴ But he hastens to add that one receives this impression only when one meditates not on the dialectic, which in itself

1. GS, III, 274.
2. MII, III, 38.
3. MII, III, 38.
4. GS, III, 275.

is realistic enough, but on the metaphysical monism into which Hegel compressed it.

Finally, the philosophy of identity vitiates any attempt at a satisfactory treatment of time. Hegel wavers between a purely logical timeless process of the whole, on the one hand, and on the other the concrete time (konkrete Zeitlichkeit) of the finite appearances within the dialectic.¹ Mere chronological time is often entirely set aside by him in order to express the rhythm of the dialectical movement, but this is then aufgehoben in the timeless Absolute. Troeltsch's criticism here is fair only against a certain tendency in Hegel. He consistently held to the view that the absolute is not a merely logical idea, but "die ewige an und für sich seiende Idee (die) sich ewig als absoluter Geist betätigt, erzeugt und genießt."² In later philosophies of history, thinkers substituted a less rational and a more volitional (Schopenhauer's) conception of the stream of life, as is apparent in Nietzsche, Dilthey, Simmel, and Bergson. In these men, however, we find tendencies to a complete lack of logical direction (Steuerlosigkeit) or irrationalism.³ Troeltsch does not think we are warranted in going so far as this. His own thought, however, tended to go more and more in this direction.

In summing up Troeltsch's relation to Hegel, the following

-
1. GS, III, 276. The use of the word concrete here is clearly not the Hegelian meaning of the term, for in Hegel it means the completely related.
 2. EPW, #577.
 3. GS, III, 276.

is realistic enough, but on the metaphysical monism into which Hegel compressed it. Finally, the philosophy of identity violates any attempt at a satisfactory treatment of time. Hegel wavers between a purely logical timeless process of the whole, on the one hand, and on the other the concrete time (*konkrete Zeitlichkeit*) of the finite appearances within the dialectic.¹ Here chronological time is often entirely set aside by him in order to express the rhythm of the dialectical movement, but this is then subordinated in the timeless Absolute. Troeltsch's criticism here is fair only against a certain tendency in Hegel. He consistently held to the view that the Absolute is not a merely logical idea, but "die ewige an und für sich seiende Idee (die sich ewig als absolute Geist betätigt, erzeugt und genießt." In later philosophies of history, thinkers substituted a less rational and a more volitional (Schopenhauer's) conception of the stream of life, as is apparent in Nietzsche, Dilthey, Simmel, and Bergson. In these men, however, we find tendencies to a complete lack of logical direction (*Stoßlosigkeit*) or irrationalism.² Troeltsch does not think we are warranted in going so far as this. His own thought, however, tended to go more and more in this direction.

In summing up Troeltsch's relation to Hegel, the following

1. GS, III, 276. The use of the word concrete here is clearly not the Hegelian meaning of the term, for in Hegel it means the completely related.
2. *ibid.*, 277.
3. GS, III, 276.

may be said:

Unangetastet bleibt der Kern der letzteren (d. h. Dialektik) selbst, die Idee der historischen Dynamik rein für sich, die Auflösung des Individuellen und des Allgemeinen ineinander, die Einsenkung der pragmatischen Kausalitäten und persönlichen Zwecksetzungen in eine tiefere Schicht der eigentlichen Lebensbewegung, die sich in beiden nicht erschöpft und mit dem blossen reflektierenden Verstand nicht aufgefangen und zergliedert werden kann.¹

What must be rejected in Hegel can be traced to the embedding of the dialectic in an epistemology and a metaphysics of identity.

Many Marxian epistemologists have not understood the dialectic at all, and have not B. Marx's Dialectic theory of causality.

After the death of Hegel the universal hold of his system upon the minds of contemporary thinkers broke down. This downfall was due to two things: 1) divisions which arose out of the internal structure of the system, and 2) the ascent of reforms both in politics and in the natural and mathematical sciences. "Die veränderte Atmosphäre hat es erstickt, nicht die Logik von innen ueberwunden."² Hegel's influence lived on, expressing itself in art, literature, and historical science, but the inner essence of the triadic logic was discarded. Marxism, alone, of all the Geisteswissenschaften, preserved the principle of the dialectic intact.

1. GS, III, 276-277.

2. Ibid., 314.

may be said: ...

Unangetastet bleibt der Kern der letzten (d. h. Dialektik) selbst, die Idee der historischen Dynamik, die die Auflösung des Individuellen und des Allgemeinen in einander, die Einsamkeit der pragmatischen Kausalitäten und persönlichen Zwischenschritten in eine tiefere Einheit der eigentlichen Lebensbewegung, die sich in beiden nicht erschöpft und mit dem blossen reflektierenden Verstand nicht aufzufassen und verglichen werden kann.

What must be rejected in Hegel can be traced to the embedding

of the dialectic in an epistemology and a metaphysics of

identity.

After the death of Hegel the universal hold of his system

upon the minds of contemporary thinkers broke down. This down-

fall was due to two things: 1) divisions which arose out of the

internal structure of the system, and 2) the ascent of reforms

both in politics and in the natural and mathematical sciences.

"Die veränderte Atmosphäre hat es erstarkt, nicht die Logik von

innen herabzuwachen." Hegel's influence lived on, expressing it-

self in art, literature, and historical science, but the inner

essence of the triadic logic was discarded. Marxism, alone, of

all the Geisteswissenschaften, preserved the principle of the

dialectic intact.

1. ibid., 314. 2. ibid., 314. 3. ibid., 314.

4. ibid., 314. 5. ibid., 314. 6. ibid., 314.

7. ibid., 314. 8. ibid., 314. 9. ibid., 314.

10. ibid., 314. 11. ibid., 314. 12. ibid., 314.

13. ibid., 314. 14. ibid., 314. 15. ibid., 314.

16. ibid., 314. 17. ibid., 314. 18. ibid., 314.

19. ibid., 314. 20. ibid., 314. 21. ibid., 314.

The dialectic was, however, basically altered. Its philosophical foundations and its spiritual meaning were concealed and ruined (verdorben), but it maintained its fundamental opposition to the mechanical and atomistic conception of causality, and it preserved its constructive power to account for the concrete movement (Bewegtheit) of reality. Furthermore, like Hegel's, this philosophy was an attempt to reconstruct a universal conception of historical development together with a normative cultural standard for both the present and the future.¹

Many Marxian epigones have not understood the dialectic at all, and have made of it a mechanical theory of causality. The unity of being, movement, and goal was dissolved into a "Kantische Richtung auf den ethischen Endzweck."

Dann konnte man ueber Kausalität und Teleologie, Determinismus und Freiheit disputieren, die - in Wahrheit nicht vorhandenen - Beziehungen zu Kant und Fichte aufsuchen und Marx zum Kantianer stempeln oder fortentwickeln. Man konnte weiterhin die von Marx im Stile Hegels und Feuerbachs konstruierte Urgeschichte aus Spencer, Morgan, Darwin oder ähnliche Theorien ergänzen und ersetzen, um ihn auf die Höhe der Forschung und der rein kausalen Entwicklungserkenntnisse zu bringen.²

But all such attempts are false to the true Marx. Troeltsch shares with him the attack on mechanical causality and a

1. GS, III, 315.

2. Ibid., 315-316. For an account of the opposition to dialectic see footnote on page 316.

3. Ibid., 319. See Ibid., 33 for Troeltsch's contempt of mere contemplation.

The dialectic was, however, basically altered. Its philosophical foundations and its spiritual meaning were concealed and ruined (verdorben). But it maintained the fundamental position to the mechanical and atomistic conception of causality, and it preserved its constitutive power to account for the concrete movement (Bewegtheit) of reality. Furthermore, like Hegel's, this philosophy was an attempt to reconstruct universal conception of historical development together with a normative cultural standard for both the present and the future.

Many Marxian epigones have not understood the dialectic at all, and have made of it a mechanical theory of causality. The unity of being, movement, and goal was dissolved into a "Kantische Richtung auf den ethischen Endzweck."

Denn konnte man weder Kausalität und Teleologie, Determinismus und Freiheit diskutieren, die in Wahrheit nicht vorhandenen Beziehungen zu Kant und nicht zwischen Marx und Kantianer stehen oder fortentwickeln. Man konnte weiterhin die von Marx im Sinne Hegels und Feuerbachs konstruierte Urgeschichte aus Spencer, Morgan, Darwin oder ähnliche Theorien ergänzen und ersetzen, um ihn auf die Höhe der Forschung und der rein kausalen Entwicklungserkenntnis zu bringen.²

But all such attempts are false to the true Marx. Troeltsch shares with him the attack on mechanical causality and a

1. GS, III, 318.
2. Ibid., 318-319. For an account of the opposition to dialectic see footnote on page 318.

naturalistic conception of development.¹

Troeltsch has a high regard for Marx's interpretation of history. Though a product of the decay of the Hegelian school, the theory has undeniable significance. Its highest achievement is the critique of capitalism. Marx recognizes the historical nature of capitalistic society. His was an "Entdeckung und Analyse der modernen kapitalistischen Gesellschaft selbst als einer völlig singulären historischen Erscheinung."² Marx was able to combine sociology with philosophy in such a way as to bring out clearly the essential inner unity of historical processes.

Moreover, Marx shared the tendency of the left-wing Hegelians to investigate immediate concrete and sensible experience in contrast to the verbegrifflichte Spiritualität des Systems and also the tendency to seek historical goals which seemed to be rationally necessary for future society instead of concluding with a mere contemplation of the completed Progress of the Idee.³

Bei Hegel ist eben der Progress vollendet, während er bei Marx vor seiner wichtigsten Leistung erst steht. Deshalb geht bei Marx

1. See above pages 24ff.; GS, III, 328. Troeltsch holds "dass die jetzt so häufige Zusammenstellung von Marx und Kant nur einen Sinn hat, dass bei beiden das rationale und revolutionäre Ideal des 18. Jahrhunderts als gemeinsam zutage tritt. Im uebrigen ist keine Vereinigung möglich und besteht nicht die leiseste Berührung."
2. GS, III, 150 n.
2. GS, III, 318.
3. Ibid., 319. See Ibid., 68 for Troeltsch's contempt of mere contemplation.

naturalistic conception of development. Troeltsch has a high regard for Marx's interpretation of history. Though a product of the decay of the Hegelian school, the theory has undeniable significance. Its highest achievement is the critique of capitalism. Marx recognized the historical nature of capitalist society. His was an "Entdeckung und Analyse der modernen kapitalistischen Gesellschaft selbst als einer völlig einzigen historischen Erscheinung."² Marx was able to combine sociology with philosophy in such a way as to bring out clearly the essential inner unity of historical processes. Moreover, Marx shared the tendency of the left-wing Hegelians to investigate immediate concrete and sensible experience in contrast to the vergeistlichte Geistualität of the systems and also the tendency to seek historical goals which seemed to be rationally necessary for future society instead of concluding with a mere contemplation of the completed progress of the idea.³

Bei Hegel ist eben der Prozess vollendet, während er bei Marx von seinen wichtigsten Leistungen erst steht. Deshalb geht bei Marx

1. See above pages 24ff.; 33, 111, 328. Troeltsch holds "dass die jetzt so häufige Zusammenstellung von Marx und Kant nur einen Sinn hat, dass bei beiden das rationale und revolutionäre Ideal des 18. Jahrhunderts als Gemeinsamkeit zutage tritt. Im übrigen ist keine Vereinigung möglich und besteht nicht die leiseste Berührung."
2. 33, 111, 318.
3. Ibid., 318. See Ibid., 33 for Troeltsch's contempt of mere contemplation.

Feuerbach, die Dialektik an diesem Punkte ueber zu, but with a
einem Kantischen oder Fichtischen Sollen.¹

realistic dialectic. This realistic method negates all philo-

The above quotation reflects a marked practical motif in
sophical a priori constructions and supernatural realities.

Marx, one that is also shared by Troeltsch though in a dif-
It gives a material interpretation to the ideas of right, and
ferent form.

of the Hegelian system retains only the materialistic Gesell-

schaft.
Er wollte ueber Hegel hinaus zu neuen
Zielen, aber zu wirklich praktischen
Zielen.²

Er hungerte, wie uebrigens Hegel selbst,
nach Realität und wollte die Dialektik
ebenso wie ihre Fortführung zur revolu-
tionären Umgestaltungen der Dinge ledig-
lich aus der realen Lebensbewegung selbst
heraus gewinnen.³

does not receive its law from the unfolding of spirit, but

Marx himself writes in his "Elf Thesen ueber Feuerbach":

creates its own spirit, and expresses itself in an image of

the real schieden interpretiert, es kommt aber
darauf an, sie zu verändern.⁴

Wie der Mensch die Welt erschafft, so

Some critics have held that there is fundamentally no

philosophy of history in Marx, but only a social theory.⁵ The

decisive factor in history is always the economic complex,

particularly the "relations of production" (Produktionsverhält-

nisse). Thus it would seem that Marx's historical materialism

And yet, says Troeltsch, this is not really materialism. Mate-

is only a sociological, not a metaphysical conception. This

ism for Marx meant the destruction of all independent ide-

is, however, going too far. Marx wavers between sociology and

ology and mystical conceptions (metaphysik) together with

economics on the one hand and metaphysics on the other.

The term materialism in Marx has led to gross misunder-
the underlying economic and social processes. The materialistic
standing. Troeltsch is right when he says that in Marx, as in
element is really a polemic against mere ideology.

1. GS, III, 265.

2. Ibid., 320.

3. Ibid., 321.

4. Ueber historischen Materialismus. (UHM), I, 53.

5. Hartmann, PGS, 9.

the Dialectic an diesem Punkte aber zu einem Kantischen oder Fichtischen Solien.¹

The above quotation reflects a marked practical motif in Marx, one that is also shared by Troeltsch though in a different form.

Er wollte aber Hegel hinaus zu neuen Zielen, aber zu wirklich praktischen Zielen.²

Er hingegen, wie nebst Hegel selbst, nach Realität und wollte die Dialektik ebenso wie ihre Fortführung zur revolutionären Umgestaltung der Dinge lediglich aus der realen Lebensbewegung selbst heraus gewinnen.³

Marx himself writes in his "Elftes Thesen über Feuerbach":

Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert, es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern.⁴

Some critics have held that there is fundamentally no philosophy of history in Marx, but only a social theory.⁵ The decisive factor in history is always the economic complex, particularly the "relations of production" (Produktionsverhältnisse). Thus it would seem that Marx's historical materialism is only a sociological, not a metaphysical conception. This is, however, going too far. Marx wavers between sociology and economics on the one hand and metaphysics on the other.

The term materialism in Marx has led to gross misunderstandings. Troeltsch is right when he says that in Marx, as in

1. GE, III, 285.
 2. Ibid., 320.
 3. Ibid., 321.
 4. Über historischen Materialismus. (UHM), I, 53.
 5. Hartmann, PGS, 9.

Feuerbach, we are dealing not with a materialistic, but with a realistic dialectic.¹ This realistic method negates all philosophical apriori constructions and superempirical realities. It gives a material interpretation to the ideas of right, and of the Hegelian system retains only the bürgerliche Gesellschaft.

An Stelle aller Philosophie trat also lediglich ihr verbleibender Rest, die realistisch verstandene Dialektik.²

This dialectic does not proceed out of the spirit, and does not receive its laws from the unfolding of spirit, but creates its own spirit, which expresses itself as an image of the real processes of history.

Wie der Mensch selbst das Erzeugnis des realen Prozesses ist, so sind auch alle seine politischen, ethischen, religiösen Schöpfungen lediglich Wirkungen realster sinnlicher und interessenhafter Erlebnisse und, solange sie noch in eine transzendente Welt hinüberprojiziert werden, lediglich mystisch-phantastische Reflexe eines rein empirischen Geschehens und Erlebens.³

And yet, says Troeltsch, this is not really materialism. Materialism for Marx means the destruction of all independent ideology and mystical conceptions (Begriffsmystik) together with the construction and deduction of all spiritual worlds out of the underlying economic and social processes. The materialistic element is really a polemic against mere ideology.⁴

1. GS, III, 321, 325.

2. Ibid., 323.

3. Ibid., 324.

4. Ibid., 326.

Feuerbach, we are dealing not with a materialistic, but with a
 realistic dialectic.¹ This realistic method negates all philo-
 sophical a priori constructions and superempirical realities.
 It gives a material interpretation to the ideas of right, and
 of the Hegelian system retains only the bürgerliche Gesell-

schaft.

Am Stelle aller Philosophie trat also
 lediglich ihr verbleibender Rest, die
 realistisch verstandene Dialektik.²
 This dialectic does not proceed out of the spirit, and
 does not receive its laws from the unfolding of spirit, but
 creates its own spirit, which expresses itself as an image of
 the real processes of history.

Wie der Mensch selbst das Krzenum des
 realen Prozesses ist, so sind auch alle
 seine politischen, ethischen, religiösen
 Schöpfungen lediglich Wirkungen realer
 sinnlicher und interessanter Krzenum
 und, solange sie noch in eine transzendente
 Welt hineingeprojektiert werden, lediglich
 mystisch-phantastische Reflexe eines rein
 empirischen Geschehens und Krzenums.³
 And yet, says Trotsch, this is not really materialism. Mate-
 rialism for Marx means the destruction of all independent ide-
 ology and mystical conceptions (Geistlichmythik) together with
 the construction and deduction of all spiritual worlds out of
 the underlying economic and social processes. The materialistic
 element is really a polemic against mere ideology.⁴

1. GE, III, 321, 322.
2. Ibid., 323.
3. Ibid., 324.
4. Ibid., 326.

Marx's theory of historical development had a decided anti-religious effect, but anti-religion and materialism are not necessary essentials for his socialism. In an essay entitled, "Atheistische Ethik" Troeltsch points out that the connection between Socialism and atheism is really accidental.

Die Beobachtungen des schweren wirtschaftlichen Gegensatzes und das Gefühl einer in der Natur des kapitalistischen Systems liegenden Verdammung zum Elend, die kurz-sichtige, heute beliebte Verwendung von Religion und Kirche im Dienste des Besitzes und der bestehenden Ordnung mag atheistische Gedanken annehmbar und glaubhafter machen, als sie ohne die Empfindung einer derartigen Notlage wären; es mag Zweifel und Bedenken hier und dort hervorrufen und insbesondere sehr ungünstige Bedingungen für die Pflege des religiösen Lebens schaffen. Aber eine prinzipielle atheistische Gesamtanschauung entsteht hieraus allein nicht.¹

Moreover, Troeltsch makes positive use of Marx in his work on the Soziallehren. The Marxist method, he says, is gradually transforming all our historical conceptions including our ideas of past and future. However, the Soziallehren claims to have shown that everything specifically religious and especially the great peaks (Knotenpunkte) of religious development are an independent expression of religious life.

Jesus, Paulus, Origenes, Augustin, der hl. Thomas, der hl. Franz, der hl. Bonaventura, Luther, Calvin, sie können in ihrem Fülle und Denken nicht aus Klassenkämpfen und ökonomischen Interessen hergeleitet werden.²

1. GS, II, 531-532.

2. GS, I, 975.

Marx's theory of historical development had a decided
anti-religious effect, but anti-religion and materialism are
not necessary essentials for his socialism. In an essay en-
titled, "Atheistische Ethik" Troeltsch points out that the con-
nection between socialism and atheism is really accidental.

Die Beobachtungen des schweren wirtschaft-
lichen Gegensatzes und das Gefühl einer in
der Natur des kapitalistischen Systems
liegenden Veranlassung zum Wandel, die kurz-
zeitige, heute beliebte Verwerfung von
Religion und Kirche im Dienste des Sozialen
und der bestehenden Ordnung mag ästhetische
Gedanken annehmbar und glaubhafter machen,
als die ohne die Verbindung einer dazwischen-
liegenden Welt; es mag Zweifel und Bedenken
hier und dort hervorgerufen und insbesondere
sehr ungünstige Bedingungen für die Pflege
des religiösen Lebens schaffen. Aber eine
prinzipielle ästhetische Gesinnung
entsteht hieraus allein nicht.

Moreover, Troeltsch makes positive use of Marx in his work on
the Socialism. The Marxist method, he says, is gradually
transforming all our historical conceptions including our ideas
of past and future. However, the Socialism claims to have
shown that everything essentially religious and especially the
first period (Knotenpunkte) of religious development are an in-
dependent expression of religious life.

Jesus, Paulus, Origenes, Augustin, der hl.
Thomas, der hl. Franz, der hl. Bonaventura,
Luther, Calvin, sie können in ihrem Willen
und Denken nicht aus Klassenkämpfen und
ökonomischen Interessen hergeleitet werden.

On the other hand, it is clear that in the causal connection out of which their peculiar forms of religious thought gained stimulus, force, movement and aim, social and economic forces were at work, though this was not always apparent, and their significance varied greatly. Thus, one would have to say that whereas all attempts to make Christianity into a changeful reflection of economic and social history are a foolish fashion,¹ yet the understanding of religious events is considerably widened by giving attention to this cooperative (mitwirkend) element.

It is clear from the above discussion that the Marxian dialectic basically altered Hegel's principles of development. These differences may be summarized and criticized under several heads.

1) "Die Verbindung der rein realistisch-deterministischen Entwicklung mit revolutionärer Prophetie und absoluter Forderung."² In making this shift Marx succumbed to a teleological conception of history. Although he regularly condemned all teleology as mystical ideology, yet his dialectic is clearly teleological. From Urkommunismus the dialectic passes through a period of class struggles to the ideal of a classless society.³

1. GS, I, 977. Troeltsch's criticism and acknowledgement of the Marxian interpretations of early Christianity are given in this same work, S. 2-15.

2. GS, III, 334.

3. Ibid., 334-336.

On the other hand, it is clear that in the causal connection out of which their peculiar forms of religious thought gained stimulus, forces, movement and aim, social and economic forces were at work, though this was not always apparent, and their significance varied greatly. Thus, one would have to say that whereas all attempts to make Christianity into a changeless reflection of economic and social history are a foolish fashion,¹

yet the understanding of religious events is considerably widened by giving attention to this cooperative element.

It is clear from the above discussion that the Marxian dialectic basically altered Hegel's principles of development. These differences may be summarized and criticized under several heads.

1) "Die Verleugnung der rein realistischen-deterministischen Entwicklung der revolutionären Prophezie und absoluten Fortschritt." In making this shift Marx succeeded in a teleological conception of history. Although he regularly condemned all teleology as mystical ideology, yet his dialectic is clearly teleological. From Grundrisse the dialectic passes through a period of class struggles to the ideal of a classless society.

1. G. I. 977. Trostsch's criticism and acknowledgment of the Marxian interpretation of early Christianity are given in this same work, 3. 2-18.
2. G. I. 111, 334.
3. Ibid., 334-335.

2) "Die Dialektik ist naturalisiert."¹ This does not mean that the dialectic has been made a natural law analogous to the laws of natural science. But on the other hand it is no longer the idealistic principle of Hegel's logic.² The stages of industrial society are not instances of the application of a universal psychological law or a general tendency of development, but concrete, individual, historical, and unique facts which operate in history. Marx seeks for his facts only in the socio-economic field.

3) "Die Dialektik ist oekonomisiert."³ This factor needs hardly any further elucidation. It lies at the basis of his Unterbau-Ueberbau theory, which was the most interesting of his doctrines.⁴ This is the view

dass die Ideenwelt auf dem Grund nicht nur der Gemeinschaft ueberhaupt, wie Feuerbach lehrte, sondern auf dem Grunde ökonomisch und technisch bestimmt geprägter und von bestimmten, damit zusammenhängenden Interessen erfüllter Gemeinschaft aufruht, dass alles Recht, alle politische Theorie, alle Sitte und soziale Idealbildung oder Ethik, schliesslich aber auch alle Philosophie, Kunst, Literatur und Religion von diesem Untergrunde her gefärbt, mitbestimmt, bewusst oder unbewusst geleitet ist.⁵

It is a curious commentary on this type of historical exposition to note that the ideology of the ruling classes is described as Heuchelei and Selbstbetrug,⁶ whereas the ideology

1. GS, III, 338.

2. Ibid., 339.

3. Ibid., 340.

4. Ibid., 347.

5. Ibid., 343.

6. Ibid., 347; cf. Laidler, HST, 202.

2) "Die Dialektik ist naturalistisch." This does not mean that the dialectic has been made a natural law analogous to the laws of natural science. But on the other hand it is no longer the idealistic principle of Hegel's logic.² The stages of industrial society are not instances of the application of a universal psychological law or a general tendency of development, but concrete, individual, historical, and unique facts which operate in history. Marx seeks for his facts only in the socio-economic field.

3) "Die Dialektik ist oekonomistisch."³ This factor needs hardly any further elucidation. It lies at the basis of his Unterbau-Überbau theory, which was the most interesting of his doctrines.⁴ This is the view

dass die Ideenwelt auf dem Grund nicht nur der Gemeinschaft überhaupt, wie Feuerbach lehrte, sondern auf dem Grunde ökonomisch und technisch bestimmt geprüfter und von bestimmten, damit zusammenhängenden Interessen erwählter Gemeinschaft ruht, dass alles Recht, alle politische Theorie, alle Ethik und soziale Ideallösung oder Ethik, schließlich aber auch alle Philosophie, Kunst, Literatur und Religion von diesem Untergrunde her geformt, mitbestimmt, beeinflusst oder überhaupt geleitet ist.⁵

It is a curious commentary on this type of historical explanation to note that the ideology of the ruling classes is described as Herrschafts- und Selbstbehauptung,⁶ whereas the ideology

1. GS, III, 338.
2. Ibid., 339.
3. Ibid., 340.
4. Ibid., 347.
5. Ibid., 345.
6. Ibid., 347; cf. Ibid., III, 302.

of the proletariat seems to be exempt from such errors. "Die Troeltsch is right in denying the economic determinism of the superstructure of society, and Marx himself admitted that the economic was not the only factor.

4) The transformation of the logical contradictories of dialectic into class struggles.¹ This is closely allied to the above point. Men create the superstructure of life in the service of social conflicts, not out of love for spirituality.² The excessive abuse of this type of explanation has already been criticized above. Troeltsch points out that even if the class struggle should eventuate in a revolution, the latter could not possibly of itself accomplish the spiritual and social transformation of society which Marx predicted. The narrowly conceived and contained contradictions. Its scientific temporary anarchy of values in Germany supports this thesis. To limit the dialectic to class struggle means the overthrow of any intelligible conception of dialectic.³ Eine Dialektik, die nicht mehr mit logischen oder logisch verkleideten ethisch-religiösen Gegensätzen arbeitet, ist faktisch ueberhaupt keine eigentliche Dialektik mehr.³ relevant.

Marx's writings have been much more successful as means of party agitation than as a solution for the problems of the philosophy of history.⁴ And yet, his theory has constructive value. He makes a productive use of the principle of Histor-

1. GS, III, 350.

2. Ibid., 351.

3. Ibid., 353.

4. Ibid., 354.

of the proletariat seems to be exempt from such errors. Trotsch is right in denying the economic determinism of the superstructure of society, and Marx himself admitted that the economic was not the only factor.

4) The transformation of the logical contradictions of dialectic into class struggles.¹ This is closely allied to the above point. Men create the superstructure of life in the service of social conflicts, not out of love for spirituality. The excessive abuse of this type of explanation has already been criticised above. Trotsch points out that even if the class struggle should eventuate in a revolution, the latter could not possibly of itself accomplish the spiritual and social transformation of society which Marx predicted. The temporary anarchy of values in Germany supports this thesis. To limit the dialectic to class struggle means the overthrow of any intelligible conception of dialectic.

Seine Dialektik, die nicht mehr mit logischen oder logisch verknüpften ethisch-religiösen Gegenständen arbeitet, ist faktisch leer. Haupt keine eigentliche Dialektik mehr.²

Marx's writings have been much more successful as means of party agitation than as a solution for the problems of the philosophy of history.³ And yet, his theory has constructive value. He makes a productive use of the principle of history-

1.	08. III. 380.
2.	Ibid., 381.
3.	Ibid., 382.
4.	Ibid., 384.

ical Totalities, as he says in Das Elend der Philosophie, "Die Produktionsverhältnisse jeder Gesellschaft bilden ein Ganzes."¹ Like Hegel he shows the development from within of these wholes.

Die Historie hat, wie bei Hegel, einen zentralen Gegenstand, eine grundlegende Einheit der Forschung; das ist die soziologische Gruppe oder das Volk. Nur erscheint die Gruppe bei Marx nicht als vernunftgeeeintes Ganzes oder als Staat und Rechtsinstitution, sondern als oekonomisch bedingte Struktur der Gesellschaft.² Marx ist wie Hegel und fast alle Modernen von einer solchen ins Unbegrenzte aufsteigenden Entwicklung des Ganzen als Ganzen grundlegend ueberzeugt.³

On the other hand, this monistic economic interpretation was not successfully carried out. The dialectic was too narrowly conceived and contained contradictions. Its scientific elements have been taken up into sociology, where the Unterbau-Ueberbau theory has furnished a very fruitful approach to many problems. But the grand universal historical construction has spent its force mainly in practical revolutionary propaganda.⁴ The critical function of Marxism, however, is still relevant.

1. 91. Some hold that the wholes in Marx's philosophy of history are only economic ones, but it may be replied that this overlooks the whole Unterbau-Ueberbau conception of the dialectic. And yet, Troeltsch is right in insisting that Marx appeals too much to the economic determinism of the wholes.

2. GS, III, 354.

3. Ibid., 356.

4. Ibid., 369-370.

local Totalitarian, as he says in Das Ende der Philosophie. "Die
Produktionsverhältnisse jeder Gesellschaft bilden ein Ganzes."

Like Hegel he shows the development from within of these
wholes.

Die Historie hat, wie bei Hegel, einen zen-
tralen Gegenstand, eine grundlegende Ein-
heit der Forschung; das ist die soziologische
Gruppe oder das Volk. Nur erscheint die
Gruppe bei Marx nicht als vernunftgeleitetes
Ganzes oder als Staat und Rechtsinstitution,
sondern als ökonomisch bedingte Struktur
der Gesellschaft.²
Marx ist wie Hegel und fast alle Modernen
von einer solchen im Unbegrenzten auf-
steigenden Entwicklung des Ganzen als
Ganzen Grundlegend überzeugt.³

On the other hand, this monistic economic interpretation
was not successfully carried out. The dialectic was too nar-
rowly conceived and contained contradictions. Its scientific
elements have been taken up into sociology, where the Unterschied-
Ueberbau theory has furnished a very fruitful approach to many
problems. But the grand universal historical construction has
spent its force mainly in practical revolutionary propaganda.⁴
The critical function of Marxism, however, is still relevant.

1. Some hold that the whole in Marx's philosophy of
history are only economic ones, but it may be replied
that this overlooks the whole Unterschied-Ueberbau con-
ception of the dialectic. And yet, Friedrich is right
in insisting that Marx speaks too much to the eco-
nomic determinism of the whole.

2. ibid., III, 384.
3. ibid., 388.
4. ibid., 388-370.

C. The Historical Dynamic of Positivism

The Marxian dialectic which we have thus examined was a realistic criticism of historical development along economic and social lines. In its emphasis on collective unities and dialectical development Marxism repudiated the abstract mechanical and purely inductive conception of causation as we find it in natural science.¹ This latter mode of thought, however, maintained an almost independent existence alongside of dialectic, and in many quarters entirely replaced it during a large part of the Nineteenth Century. Its most popular form of philosophical expression was found in Positivism.

Like the Hegel-Marx point of view, Positivism construes the historical object as the social group, the cultural totality of a people (Volk) or of an era.² This social whole, however, is construed quite differently from the Hegelian or Marxian totality, especially as relates to the idea of development. Positivism described the group as a statistical summation of individual elements. The whole is a compound; it is not an objectively existing totality. There is no identity³ which runs through all the individual elements and which gives it a necessary unity or the basis for an internal logical or historical development as was the case in Hegel and Marx. The model according to which the Positivists operated was natural

1. GS, III, 371.

2. Ibid., 373.

3. Ibid., 374.

C. The Historical Dynamic of Positivism

The Marxian dialectic which we have thus examined was a realistic criticism of historical development along economic and social lines. In its emphasis on collective entities and dialectical development Marxism repudiated the abstract mechanical and purely inductive conception of causation as we find it in natural science.¹ This latter mode of thought, however, maintained an almost independent existence alongside of dialectic, and in many quarters entirely replaced it during a large part of the nineteenth century. Its most popular form of philosophical expression was found in Positivism.

Like the Hegel-Marx point of view, Positivism considered the historical object as the social group, the cultural totality of a people (Volk) or of an era.² This social whole, however, is construed quite differently from the Hegelian or Marxian totality, especially as relates to the idea of development. Positivism described the group as a statistical summation of individual elements. The whole is a compound; it is not an objectively existing totality. There is no identity which runs through all the individual elements and which gives it a necessary unity or the basis for an internal logical or historical development as was the case in Hegel and Marx. The model according to which the Positivists operated was natural

1. *ibid.*, 371.
 2. *ibid.*, 373.
 3. *ibid.*, 374.

science. Its method was taken over into sociology and dominated the latter's whole range of researches.

There were two concepts which were especially important. The first was a merely chronological conception of time,¹ and the second, that the causal relations are purely scientific. This causal genetic point of view held that the changes in the group were due to the change in position of small units of nature and of mind out of which the wholes are constructed. As Troeltsch says:

Es gibt nur die kleinsten, erst der analysierenden Wissenschaft zugänglichen Wirkungen, aus denen sich die relativ zusammenhängenden und dauerhaften Komplexe aufbauen, und die Summierung kleinster Veränderungen, durch deren Gesamtwirkung sie sich verändern und gegebenenfalls schliesslich in eine andere Dauerform umbilden.²

That the universal, collective, overindividual "Ensemble" or "Komplex" should be prominent in historical study is recognized as essential, but these overindividual characteristics are only the first impressions which history presents. The wholes must be dissolved into smaller units like those found in biology and, where possible, analogous to the basic units of physics.

History for the Positivists, says Troeltsch, is not understood in its own terms. On the contrary, development means the explanation of apparent wholes of process as the sum of the

1. GS, III, 374.

2. Ibid., 378.

science. Its method was taken over into sociology and dominated the latter's whole range of research. There were two concepts which were especially important. The first was a merely chronological conception of time,¹ and the second, that the causal relations are purely scientific. This causal genetic point of view held that the changes in the group were due to the change in position of small units of nature and of mind out of which the wholes are constituted. As

Troeltsch says:

Es gibt nur die kleinsten, erst der analytischen Wissenschaft zugehörigen Wirkungen, aus denen sich die relativ zusammenhängenden und dauerhaften Komplexe aufbauen, und die Summe kleinerer Veränderungen, durch deren Gesamtwirkung sie sich verändern und gegebenenfalls vollständig in eine andere Dauerform umfallen.²

That the universal, collective, overindividual "Ensemble" or "Komplex" should be prominent in historical study is recognized as essential, but these overindividual characteristics are only the first impressions which history presents. The wholes must be dissolved into smaller units like those found in biology and, where possible, analogous to the basic units of physics.

History for the positivists, says Troeltsch, is not understood in its own terms. On the contrary, development means the explanation of apparent wholes of process as the sum of the

1. *Op. cit.*, 374.
2. *Ibid.*, 378.

smallest effects, i. e., as mere recombinations of previously existing elements. These are repeated and thus provide for the prediction of the future. Teleology is spurned while necessity is praised. Thus we have only empirical generalizations, but no purpose in the whole. The net result is a positivistic and practical determinism. On this principle the appearance of really novel and unique historical forces is ruled out.¹

Basic conceptions like humanity, progress, and universal history which Positivism discusses have no metaphysical basis but are assumed to be aspects of natural law. The ideals of humanity and progress are particularized and identified with specific concrete historical movements, but are taken to have no metaphysical foundation. Thus American democracy, English parliamentarism, and the French Revolution all in turn serve as embodiments of the essence of humanity.² There is, however, no real deduction or grounding of these principles.

When we turn to specific men, like St. Simon, Comte, Mill, and Spencer, we find these above-mentioned tendencies and principles exemplified in detail. It will not be necessary to analyze the thought of each man in turn, but it will suffice to point out the difficulties which Troeltsch finds involved in their common assumptions and presuppositions. In the first

1. GS, III, 379.

2. Ibid., 382; cf. Naturrecht und Humanität in der Welt-politik, by the same author.

smallest effects, i. e., as mere recombinations of previously existing elements. These are repeated and thus provide for the prediction of the future. Teleology is spurned while necessity is praised. Thus we have only empirical generalizations, but no purpose in the whole. The net result is a positivistic and practical determinism. On this principle the appearance of really novel and unique historical forces is ruled out.¹

Basic conceptions like humanity, progress, and universal history which Positivism discusses have no metaphysical basis but are assumed to be aspects of natural law. The ideals of humanity and progress are particularized and identified with specific concrete historical movements, but are taken to have no metaphysical foundation. Thus American democracy, English parliamentarism, and the French Revolution all in turn serve as embodiments of the essence of humanity.² There is, however, no real deduction or grounding of these principles. When we turn to specific men, like St. Simon, Comte, Mill, and Spencer, we find these above-mentioned tendencies and principles exemplified in detail. It will not be necessary to analyze the thought of each man in turn, but it will suffice to point out the difficulties which Troeltsch finds involved in their common assumptions and presuppositions. In the first

1. GS, III, 279.
2. Ibid., 382; cf. Naturrecht und Humanität in der Welt-
politik, by the same author.

place, the conception of a dynamic world is a "mitgebrachte Kategorie," and Comte's "Dreistadiengesetz" is purely an assumption¹ which can nowhere be adequately grounded. In the second place, the whole naturalistic method is internally inconsistent; for a) it tries to make a unity out of isolated units, and b) it makes mind completely dependent on the physiological organism and hence condemns all so-called progress to the fatalism of natural phenomena. In the third place, Positivism has a contradictory conception of mind. On the one hand, it makes mind the leading and organizing principle, and on the other, it relegates it to the weakest part of the brain.²

These fundamental difficulties are not mitigated by Spencer's attempt to combine Darwinism with Nineteenth Century Liberalism, for even in Spencer the same associationistic conception of mind prevails, thus ruling out any basic unity in personality and any unifying principle in the Historical Totalities. Moreover, the biological interpretation of mind as a means of adaptation to the environment is not adequate to account for the empirical facts of history. No real inner logical or psychological development within the wholes of history can take place on so narrow a basis. The contributions which the Positivists made to historical thought were largely negative, and do not interest us here. Troeltsch's final appraisal of

1. GS, III, 407. 27 (1923) 289-290; cf. GS, III, 662.

2. Ibid., 409. 28 (1924) 356.

place, the conception of a dynamic world is a "mitgetragene Kategorie," and Comte's "Dreistadiengesetz" is purely an assumption which can nowhere be adequately grounded. In the second place, the whole naturalistic method is internally inconsistent; for a) it tries to make a unity out of isolated units, and b) it makes mind completely dependent on the physical organism and hence condemns all so-called progress to the fatalism of natural phenomena. In the third place, Positivism has a contradictory conception of mind. On the one hand, it makes mind the leading and organizing principle, and on the other, it relegated it to the weakest part of the brain. These fundamental difficulties are not mitigated by Spencer's attempt to combine Darwinism with Nineteenth Century Liberalism, for even in Spencer the same associationistic conception of mind prevails, thus ruling out any basic unity in personality and any unifying principle in the Historical Totalities. Moreover, the biological interpretation of mind as a means of adaptation to the environment is not adequate to account for the empirical facts of history. No real inner logical or psychological development within the wholes of history can take place on so narrow a basis. The contributions which the Positivists made to historical thought were largely negative, and do not interest us here. Treitschke's final appraisal of

I. 1. 25. III. 407.
S. 1. 25. III. 409.

had accepted in a general way the conception of individual this general standpoint is well expressed in a criticism which he made of Spencer's conception of evolution:

In Wahrheit ist jener allgemeine Evolutionsbegriff, soweit er sich von den Hegelschen Gedanken gelöst hat, ueberhaupt kein Entwicklungs-, sondern ein blosser Veränderungs-begriff.¹

The problem of finding an adequate philosophical formula of development has not been solved thus far. But certain definite conceptions have been ruled out because they did not adequately account for Historical Totalities and for their inner processes. Tillich summarizes this attack of Troeltsch as follows:

Das absolute Zeitalter Hegels fällt ebenso unter dieses Gericht wie die organologische Beruhigtheit der deutschen historischen Schule. Die Dynamik der Geschichte treibt aus jedem Ruhepunkt einer absoluten Position heraus. Aber sie führt auch nicht zu einen künftigen Ruhepunkt. Die utopische Absolutheit des Marxismus wird ebenso aufgelöst wie das immanente Entwicklungsziel des Positivismus.²

D. Troeltsch's Criticism of Rickert

When we turn our attention from Hegel, Marx, and the Positivists to Rickert, we confront a man who determined in many ways the direction of Troeltsch's thought. While under the influence of Lotze's teaching during his student days, Troeltsch

1. GS, III, 119; cf. Lotze, XIX, VI-VIII.

1. Kant Studien, 27 (1922) 269-270; cf. GS, III, 662.
2. Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 356.

3. Ibid., 236.

4. Ibid., 237.

this general standpoint is well expressed in a criticism which he made of Spengler's conception of evolution:

In Wahrheit ist jener allgemeine Evolutions-
begriff, soweit er sich von den Hegelschen
Gedanken gelöst hat, überhaupt kein Ent-
wicklungs-, sondern ein bloßer Veränderungs-
begriff.¹

The problem of finding an adequate philosophical formula of development has not been solved thus far. But certain definite conceptions have been ruled out because they did not adequately account for historical totalities and for their inner processes. Tillich summarizes this attack of Troeltsch as follows:

Das absolute Zeitalter Hegels fällt ebenso
unter dieses Gericht wie die organologische
Bewertung der deutschen historischen
Schule. Die Dynamik der Geschichte treibt
aus jedem Ruhepunkt einer absoluten Position
heraus. Aber sie führt auch nicht zu einem
künftigen Ruhepunkt. Die utopische Absolute-
heit des Marxismus wird ebenso aufgelöst wie
das immanente Entwicklungsziel des Positivis-
mus.²

D. Troeltsch's Criticism of Rickert

When we turn our attention from Hegel, Marx, and the Positivists to Rickert, we confront a man who determined in many ways the direction of Troeltsch's thought. While under the influence of Lotze's teaching during his student days, Troeltsch

1. Kant Studien, 27 (1922) 269-270; cf. GS, III, 662.
2. Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 356.

had accepted in a general way the conception of individual causality¹ which the former presented in his discussions on history. This principle was the foundation of Rickert's philosophy. In our previous discussions we have seen how Troeltsch expanded individual causality to include the Individual Totality.² The word Individual as used in Rickert and in Troeltsch does not indicate an opposition to society or human types, but, as we have seen,³ merely to abstract universal laws. "Individual" represents the uniqueness, creativity, and Einmaligkeit of historical objects, be they epochs, tendencies of culture, states, peoples, masses, classes, or individual persons.⁴

In many ways Rickert's formal presentation of this principle seems adequate to describe the structure of Troeltsch's Historical Totalities. But when it comes to describing the temporal and developmental dynamic of the wholes, it seems incomplete and inadequate. Rickert's whole method is static because he has no proper conception of time. He knows or acknowledges, says Troeltsch, only the Kantian mathematical conception of time and not the time of concrete duration.⁵ This is, perhaps, his basic fault, for without an adequate conception of time historical objects are inexplicable.⁶

1. GS, III, 119; cf. Lotze, MIK, VI-VIII.

2. See above Chapter Two.

3. See above Chapter Three.

4. GS, III, 120.

5. Ibid., 236.

6. Ibid., 237.

had accepted in a general way the conception of individual causality which the former presented in his discussions on history. This principle was the foundation of Ricket's philosophy. In our previous discussions we have seen how Troeltsch expanded individual causality to include the individual Totality.² The word individual as used in Ricket and in Troeltsch does not indicate an opposition to society or human types, but, as we have seen,³ merely to abstract universal laws. "Individual" represents the uniqueness, creativity, and Einmaligkeit of historical objects, be they epochs, tendencies of culture, states, peoples, masses, classes, or individual persons.⁴

In many ways Ricket's formal presentation of this principle seems adequate to describe the structure of Troeltsch's Historical Totalities. But when it comes to describing the temporal and developmental dynamic of the wholes, it seems incomplete and inadequate. Ricket's whole method is static because he has no proper conception of time. He knows or acknowledges, says Troeltsch, only the Kantian mathematical conception of time and not the time of concrete duration.⁵ This is, perhaps, his basic fault, for without an adequate conception of time historical objects are inexplicable.⁶

1. GS, III, 119; cf. Lotze, *NIK*, VI-VIII.

2. See above Chapter Two.

3. See above Chapter Three.

4. GS, III, 120.

5. *Ibid.*, 236.

6. *Ibid.*, 237.

Closely related to time, through the doctrine of schematism, is Kant's conception of cause. Rickert is like Kant on this point, says Troeltsch. Rickert's whole treatment of time and cause seem completely Kantian, and thus his otherwise fruitful conception of Individuality lacks dynamic development.¹ It was too formal and lifeless.

Das hängt mit der Grundrichtung auf blosse, den Raumdungen analoge Gegenständlichkeit zusammen, und macht die Unmöglichkeit eines echten Entwicklungsbegriffes schon in der empirischen Forschung vollständig. Rickert kann demgemäss individuelle Gegenstände oder Vorgänge auflösen und diese dann in zeitlichen und kausalen Reihen verbinden; er kann weiterhin umfassende individuelle Gegenstände nach dieser gleichen Regel miteinander verbinden; aber immer ist es Auflösung in Stadien und Wiederverbindung dieser Stadien. So macht er sich selbst den Einwurf, dass seine Methode nur zu 'fertigen oder ruhenden' Objekten führen zu können scheine.²

Troeltsch received from Rickert also his emphasis on the value structure of Historical Totalities. This dependence we sketched above under Sinn- oder Werteinheiten.³ Rickert seemed unable to explain, however, how we can proceed from the formal or absolute system of ideal values, which he constructed, to the actual values of history and vice versa. Rickert, says Troeltsch, does not secure his system of values out of history itself, and hence it is not apparent what relation such norms

1. GS, III, 239. Troeltsch's conception of time is like Bergson's; see S. 642-643.

2. Ibid., 237.

3. See above, page

Closely related to time, through the doctrine of schemata-
 time, is Kant's conception of cause. Rickert is like Kant on
 this point, says Troeltsch. Rickert's whole treatment of time
 and cause seem completely Kantian, and thus his otherwise
 fruitful conception of individuality lacks dynamic develop-
 ment.¹ It was too formal and lifeless.

Das hängt mit der Grundrichtung an, dass
 den Raumdingen analoge Gegenständlichkeit
 zusammen, und macht die Unmöglichkeit eines
 echten Entwicklungsbegriffes schon in der
 empirischen Forschung vollständig. Rickert
 kann demgegenüber individuelle Gegenstände
 oder Vorgänge auflösen und diese dann in
 zeitlichen und kausalen Reihen verbinden; ex
 kann weiterhin umfassende individuelle Ge-
 genstände nach dieser gleichen Regel mit-
 einander verbinden; aber immer ist es Auf-
 lösung in Stadien und Wiederverbindung
 dieser Stadien. So macht er sich selbst den
 Einwurf, dass seine Methode nur zu 'fertigen'
 oder 'abgemachten' Objekten führen zu können
 scheine.²

Troeltsch received from Rickert also his emphasis on the
 value structure of historical totalities. This dependence we
 sketched above under Ein- oder Wertseinheiten.³ Rickert
 seemed unable to explain, however, how we can proceed from the
 formal or absolute system of ideal values, which he constructed,
 to the actual values of history and vice versa. Rickert, says
 Troeltsch, does not secure his system of values out of history
 itself, and hence it is not apparent what relation such norms

1. GS, III, 239. Troeltsch's conception of time is like
 Hegel's; see S. 642-643.
 2. Ibid., 237.
 3. See above, page

can have to the historical process. As a result three basic difficulties emerge:

1. "Das Rickertsche Wertsystem, soweit es wirklich auf rein formale, apriorische und vernunftnotwendige Werte zurückgeführt ist, ist gegen die Geschichte nicht bloss indifferent, sondern dem Flusse und der Unendlichkeit des Werdens geradezu entgegengesetzt."¹ Through a purely formalistic means, Rickert tries to satisfy two needs; the apriori systematics of value and the historical movement itself.² The result is nothing but the old Kantian opposition between sense and reason, feeling and transcendental necessity, pathology and autonomy,³ which leads to anti-historicism (Antihistorismus).⁴ Moreover, this method of valuation gives us no principle of historical selection or of organization within the Individual Totalities.⁵ History becomes nothing else than an "Arsenal von Beispielen für die Werttheorie."⁶

2. Rickert's approach is too contemplative. Troeltsch says that Rickert's Wertsystem is simply a norm (Massstab), but not a Formungsprinzip for the empirical historical unities; it affords no principle of selection among values in history but merely contemplates them from without. The norms are thus not

1. GS, III, 151-152.

2. Ibid., 153.

3. Ibid., 153-154.

4. Ibid., 154.

5. Ibid., 155.

6. Ibid., 156.

can have to the historical process. As a result three basic difficulties emerge:

1. "Das Rickerische Wertesystem, soweit es wirklich auf rein formale, apriorische und vernunftnotwendige Werte zurückgeführt ist, wegen der Geschichte nicht bloss indifferent, sondern dem Flusse und der Unendlichkeit des Werdens geradezu entgegengesetzt."¹ Through a purely formalistic means, Ricker tries to satisfy two needs: the a priori systematic of value and the historical movement itself.² The result is nothing but the old Kantian opposition between sense and reason, feeling and transcendental necessity, pathology and autonomy,³ which leads to anti-historicism (Antihistorismus).⁴ Moreover, this method of valuation gives us no principle of historical selection or of organization within the individual Totalities.⁵ History becomes nothing else than an "Arsenal von Beispielen für die Werttheorie."⁶

2. Ricker's approach is too contemplative. Töwle says that Ricker's Wertesystem is simply a norm (Normstab), but not a Formungsprinzip for the empirical historical entities; it affords no principle of selection among values in history but merely contemplates them from without. The norms are thus not

1.	Gd. III, 151-152.
2.	Ibid., 153.
3.	Ibid., 153-154.
4.	Ibid., 154.
5.	Ibid., 155.
6.	Ibid., 156.

indigenous in history, but external to it and produced by pure reason. The Messstab is but an Inbegriff of certain ideals to which nothing in empirical history can correspond. Thus while Rickert seems to concede a great deal to history in his logic of history, he takes it all back again in his theory of value and of historical norms.¹

3. This point leads to a third criticism. For Rickert the decisive thing is not the object, but the interest which selects the object out of the continuum of its Erlebniswirklichkeit.² The object is discovered and formed through the particular method which is employed. The historical object is extracted from its living whole purely through a process of abstraction and in no wise on the basis of the inner composition and peculiarity of the object, i. e., not from the anschaulich-seelische Realität itself. The subject thus creates its own object.³ This is a wrong method, says Troeltsch. The historian must ground his investigation more firmly in the actual object.

As in the case of time and causality, so too here, the Kantian influence predominates.⁴ The principle of development requires a less external and a more internal method of investigation.

Das Ineinander von Gegenstand und Methode kann der Methode nur gerecht werden, wenn auch dem Gegenstand, und hier vor allem

1. GS, III, 156.

2. Ibid., 231.

3. Ibid., 230.

4. Ibid., 232.

indigenous in history, but external to it and produced by pure reason. The Hegelian is but an inherent of certain ideas to which nothing in empirical history can correspond. Thus while Rieker seems to concede a great deal to history in his logic of history, he takes it all back again in his theory of value and of historical norms.¹

3. This point leads to a third criticism. For Rieker the decisive thing is not the object, but the interest which selects the object out of the continuum of its Erlebniswirklich-keit.² The object is discovered and formed through the particular method which is employed. The historical object is extracted from its living whole purely through a process of abstraction and in no wise on the basis of the inner composition and peculiarity of the object, i. e., not from the unveränderlich-keitsmäßige Realität itself. The subject thus creates its own object.³ This is a wrong method, says Troeltsch. The historian must ground his investigation more firmly in the actual object. As in the case of time and causality, so too here, the Kantian influence predominates.⁴ The principle of development requires a less external and a more internal method of investigation.

Das Ineinander von Gegenstand und Methode kann der Methode nur gerecht werden, wenn auch der Gegenstand, und hier vor allem

1. *ibid.*, 111, 156.
2. *ibid.*, 231.
3. *ibid.*, 230.
4. *ibid.*, 232.

regard to der inneren Bewegtheit des historischen Lebens, sein volles, ganz realistisches Recht wird.¹

Thus it becomes clear that for Rickert development is an arrangement of the investigator, who presents the facts as if they served the realization of values. On the other hand, for the historian, development is an inner movement of the object itself in which we must intuitively submerge ourselves or recognize that one is actually submerged in it.² To understand the inner movement of history involves understanding the nature of time. But Troeltsch's criticism of Rickert on this point we have already mentioned. Suffice it to say that Troeltsch conceives of development by means of a more concrete conception of time. Though in general he builds on the logic of history which Rickert developed, he nevertheless goes beyond the latter in that he emphasizes more the contingent and creative character of Individual Totalities; above all, he makes the principle of development the decisive historical conception.³ In so doing he tries to bridge the gap between a formal system of values and individual reality.³

3) E. Troeltsch's Conception of Development

From Troeltsch's criticisms of Hegel, Marx, the Positivists, and Rickert we may glean the following propositions with

1. GS, III, 233.

2. Ibid., 234; cf. 151

3. Cf. Tillich, op. cit., 356. See also GS, III, 642 ff. where Troeltsch discusses Bergson at length.

der inneren Bewegtheit des historischen
Lebens, sein volles, ganz realisiertes
Recht wird.¹

Thus it becomes clear that for Rieker development is an
arrangement of the investigator, who presents the facts as if
they served the realization of values. On the other hand, for
the historian, development is an inner movement of the object
itself in which we must intuitively submerge ourselves or
recognize that one is actually submerged in it.² To understand
the inner movement of history involves understanding the na-
ture of time. But Troeltsch's criticism of Rieker on this
point we have already mentioned. Suffice it to say that
Troeltsch conceives of development by means of a more concrete
conception of time. Though in general he builds on the logic
of history which Rieker developed, he nevertheless goes beyond
the latter in that he emphasizes more the contingent and cre-
ative character of individual Totalities; above all, he makes
the principle of development the decisive historical concep-
tion. In so doing he tries to bridge the gap between a formal
system of values and individual reality.³

E. Troeltsch's Conception of Development

From Troeltsch's criticisms of Hegel, Marx, the Positi-
vists, and Rieker we may glean the following propositions with

1. GS, III, 233.
2. Ibid., 234; cf. 151.
3. Cf. Tillet, op. cit., 356. See also GS, III, 242 ff.
where Troeltsch discusses Bergson at length.

regard to historical development. the data of history, has a

1) Historical development denotes a dynamic psychical process which tends toward an end, a development akin to logical evolution.¹

2) Historical development does not mean universal progress; on the contrary, development is contingent.²

3) Historical development is a teleological process which expresses itself through the internal unity of meaning and value of the Individual Totality.³

4) Time in historical development must be conceived of as concrete duration, and not as mathematical physical time.⁴

5) Any monistic Universalgeschichte must be rejected in favor of a view which gives due consideration to the intrinsic value of every Individual Totality. "Jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott."⁵

6) The irrational, individual, accidental, and dysteleological facts of history must be admitted and accounted for.⁶

7) Historical development should not only include a survey of the past (Hegel), but should also take account of future goals (Marx).⁷

8) The economic interpretation of history, though in itself

1. See above page 90; cf. HRE, VI, 720; GS, III, 657.

2. See above pages 91-93; cf. GS, III, 382.

3. See above pages 92, 113; cf. GS, III, 77, 112, 132.

4. Cf. GS, III, 184, 185, 642-643.

5. See above page 100; cf. GS, III, 121, 132.

6. See above page 91ff.

7. See above page 106; cf. GS, III, 77, 132.

regard to historical development. The historical process which tends toward an end, a development akin to logical evolution.¹

2) Historical development does not mean universal process; on the contrary, development is contingent.²

3) Historical development is a teleological process which expresses itself through the internal unity of meaning and value of the individual totality.³

4) Time in historical development must be conceived of as concrete duration, and not as mathematical physical time.⁴

5) Any scientific Universalgeschichte must be rejected in favor of a view which gives due consideration to the intrinsic value of every individual totality. "Jede Epoche ist unmittelsam an Gott." ⁵

6) The irrational, individual, accidental, and dialectical facts of history must be admitted and accounted for.⁶

7) Historical development should not only include a survey of the past (Hegel), but should also take account of future goals (Marx).⁷

8) The economic interpretation of history, though in it-

1. See above page 80; cf. *ERN*, VI, 720; 98, III, 657.
 2. See above pages 91-93; cf. 98, III, 383.
 3. See above pages 92-93; cf. 98, III, 77, 112, 132.
 4. Cf. 98, III, 184, 185, 242-243.
 5. See above page 100; cf. 98, III, 181, 132.
 6. See above page 91ff.
 7. See above page 106; cf. 98, III, 77, 132.

self inadequate to account for all the data of history, has a valid place as one method of historical research.¹

9) Historical development takes place in and through real unity and identity in the wholes or totalities. These are not fictions, as the Positivists contended.²

10) The process of historical development is not a mere product of the investigator's mind, but must be recognized as an objectively real process independent of our minds.³

11) The philosophy of historical development is not mere contemplation from without, but should constitute a Formungsprinzip for values in history.⁴

These are the general conclusions which may be drawn from the previous sections of this chapter. They are principles which the writer believes Troeltsch to hold. To these eleven propositions, however, we must add several other which are derived from Troeltsch's more systematic presentation of his own view.⁵

1) Historical development is grounded in human personality. This grounding is two-fold. First, there is the development of the embryonic tendencies and ideas of personality in their interplay with environmental factors. Secondly, personality has the capacity to adapt permanent or changing, natural,

1. See above page 109; cf. GS, III, 756.

2. See above page 114; cf. GS, III, 142.1.

3. See above page 122.

4. See above page 121; cf. GS, III, 70, 113-114.

5. These additional points are based on an essay entitled, "Historie und Erkenntnistheorie," GS, III, 656-693.

self inadequate to account for all the data of history, has a valid place as one method of historical research.¹

9) Historical development takes place in and through real unity and identity in the wholes or totalities. These are not fictions, as the positivists contended.²

10) The process of historical development is not a mere product of the investigator's mind, but must be recognized as an objectively real process independent of our minds.³

11) The philosophy of historical development is not mere contemplation from without, but should constitute a formative principle for values in history.⁴

These are the general conclusions which may be drawn from the previous sections of this chapter. They are principles which the writer believes Troeltsch to hold. To these eleven propositions, however, we must add several other which are derived from Troeltsch's more systematic presentation of his own view.⁵

1) Historical development is grounded in human personality. This grounding is two-fold. First, there is the development of the embryonic tendencies and ideas of personality in their interplay with environmental factors. Secondly, personality has the capacity to adapt permanent or changing natural

1. See above page 109; cf. GS, III, 738.
2. See above page 114; cf. GS, III, 142.
3. See above page 122.
4. See above page 121; cf. GS, III, 70, 113-114.
5. These additional points are based on an essay entitled, "Historie und Erkenntnistheorie," GS, III, 656-693.

social, and historical conditions in accordance with its purposes. Both of these activities are teleological, but consciousness plays a larger role, says Troeltsch, in the first than in the second. Nevertheless, it is in the activity of both together that the clue to the understanding of historical development is won, for the Individual Totalities partake both of conscious and of unconscious elements, and express purpose, meaning, and adaptation.¹

2) Although the inner logic of the developing totality rests finally upon the goal or purpose of these wholes, which express conscious forces, nevertheless, unconscious factors often interrupt the historical processes. Men are often swept off their feet by unanticipated consequences of their own actions. Moreover, the later effects of human tendencies and impulses often clash with contradictory earlier ones which are still influencing the activities of the whole.² The unconscious and the conscious elements are not always equally balanced, and the former often prevent the proper expression of the latter.³

3) The concept of development must take into account both the universal and the inner continuity, the unity of the movement of the whole and the fluid inner unity. Hegel's dialectic, says Troeltsch, expresses the first of these two factors; Berg-

1. GS, III, 657; see above, Ch. III, p. 71.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., 658.

3. Ibid., 661; cf. 662, 664-665.

social, and historical conditions in accordance with its purposes. Both of these activities are teleological, but consciousness plays a larger role, says Troeltsch, in the first than in the second. Nevertheless, it is in the activity of both together that the clue to the understanding of historical development is won, for the individual Totalities partake both of conscious and of unconscious elements, and express purpose, meaning, and adaptation.¹

2) Although the inner logic of the developing totality rests finally upon the goal or purpose of these wholes, which express conscious forces, nevertheless, unconscious factors often interrupt the historical processes. Men are often swept off their feet by unanticipated consequences of their own actions. Moreover, the later effects of human tendencies and impulses often clash with contradictory earlier ones which are still influencing the activities of the whole.² The unconscious and the conscious elements are not always equally balanced, and the former often prevent the proper expression of the latter.³

3) The concept of development must take into account both the universal and the inner continuity, the unity of the movement of the whole and the fluid inner unity. Hegel's dialectic, says Troeltsch, expresses the first of these two factors; Berg-

1. *ibid.* III, 687; see above, Ch. III, p. VI.

2. *ibid.* cit.

3. *ibid.* 688.

son's conception of duration and movement the second. But Hegel reduced the logic of this movement to universal movements of pure theoretical thought, while, on the other hand, Bergson shows only the flux of everything and the dissolution of every individual living being into universal activity, without any division or structure of the process.¹ History has no real unity or form on this basis. Troeltsch's criticism of Hegel here seems unfair, for Hegel is much more empirical than this view credits him with being. There was a tendency in Hegelian thought, however, toward Spinozism which did not give ample recognition to the individual and unique facts of life. A synthesis of Hegel and Bergson is thus desirable.²

4) Historical development cannot be understood as a mere subform of cosmic evolution.³ The attempt to solve historical problems by making history subsidiary to some universal evolutionary process goes at the problem backwards. In order to explain the developmental tendencies of Individual Totalities it is not necessary to make such a deduction. Indeed, the tendencies of Individual Totalities are the basis for the universal laws and make our formulations of them possible, not the reverse. There is no objection to trying to find the place of history in the universal cosmic process, but the latter can

1. GS, III, 659; cf. 141. Hegel's conception of the concrete universal and of dialectical process is not adequately accounted for at this point.

2. Ibid., 660.

3. Ibid., 661; cf. 662, 664-665.

son's conception of duration and movement the second. But Hegel reduced the logic of this movement to universal movements of pure theoretical thought, while, on the other hand, Bergson shows only the flux of everything and the dissolution of every individual living being into universal activity, without any division or structure of the process.¹ History has no real unity or form on this basis. Troeltsch's criticism of Hegel here seems unfair, for Hegel is much more empirical than this view credits him with being. There was a tendency in Hegelian thought, however, toward Spinozism which did not give ample recognition to the individual and unique facts of life. A synthesis of Hegel and Bergson is thus desirable.²

4) Historical development cannot be understood as a mere uniform or cosmic evolution.³ The attempt to solve historical problems by making history subsidiary to some universal evolutionary process goes at the problem backwards. In order to explain the developmental tendencies of individual totality it is not necessary to make such a deduction. Indeed, the tendencies of individual totalities are the basis for the universal laws and make our formulations of them possible, not the reverse. There is no objection to trying to find the place of history in the universal cosmic process, but the latter can

1. GS, III, 659; cf. IAI. Hegel's conception of the concrete universal and of dialectical process is not adequately accounted for at this point.
2. Ibid., 660.
3. Ibid., 681; cf. 682, 684-685.

give us no clue as to the logic of the former.¹

This brings us back to one of the central problems of our discussion, viz., whether the process as Troeltsch has described it is a mere pragmatic arrangement of the facts, a transcendental logically constructed product of thought, or whether a real unity and connection has been intuited and grasped.² Accordingly, our problem is an epistemological one. Troeltsch flatly rejects the Neo-Kantian idea of the production of the object through thought.³ His own view appeals to Leibniz and Malebranche. The unity Troeltsch holds that Leibniz conceived of the ego as a monad, which by virtue of the unconscious or its identity with universal consciousness participates in the whole content of reality, including external things and other selves (das Fremdseelische). The monad carries these potentially (virtuell) in itself, and under certain circumstances it is able to relate all of these things to itself. Moreover, by logical means it is able to supplement and enlarge far beyond conscious experience the intuited relationships which they contain.

Er hat die endlichen Geister durchströmenden Lebenszusammenhänge als innergöttliche, in der ontologischen und teleologischen Einheit des göttlichen Lebens begründete, kontinuierliche Bewegungen zugleich schauen und denken können, wenn er auch den Auftrieb allzu eng in der Vollendung des Wis-

1. GS, III, 667.

2. Ibid., 672.

3. Ibid., 673.

give us no clue as to the logic of the former.¹

This brings us back to one of the central problems of our discussion, viz., whether the process as Troeltsch has described it is a mere pragmatic arrangement of the facts, or whether it is a more profound logical product of thought, or whether a real unity and connection has been intuited and grasped.² Accordingly, our problem is an epistemological one. Troeltsch finally rejects the Neo-Kantian idea of the production of the object through thought.³ His own view appeals to Leibniz and Wolfenbützel.

Troeltsch holds that Leibniz conceived of the ego as a monad, which by virtue of the unconscious or its identity with universal consciousness participates in the whole content of reality, including external things and other selves (das Fremde). The monad carries these potentially (virtually) in itself, and under certain circumstances it is able to relate all of these things to itself. Moreover, by logical means it is able to supplement and enlarge far beyond conscious experience the intuited relationships which they contain.

Er hat die endlichen Geister durchströmen-
den Lebenszusammenhänge als innerweltliche,
in der ontologischen und teleologischen
Einheit des göttlichen Lebens begründete,
kontinuierliche Bewegungen zugleich schauen
und denken können, wenn er auch den Auf-
trieb alles eng in der Vollendung des Wis-

1. 68, III, 687.
2. Ibid., 672.
3. Ibid., 672.

sens und die Kontinuität allzu naturalistisch
in der mathematischen Folge der Differentiale
gesehen hat.¹

The monad signifies the identity of the finite and the infinite spirit together with the finiteness and individuality of the former. What is of interest to Troeltsch in this conception is not the bizarre mathematical aspects of the monad or its windowlessness (Fensterlosigkeit), but the participation of the finite in the infinite. It was with the same motif, says Troeltsch, that Malebranche held to the participation of the finite mind in the inner life of the absolute spirit.² The unity of becoming and all process are explained not by the causal principle (in its empirical linear sense and its series of effects), but by participation in the fundamental life-unity behind all phenomena. Thus also is explained our knowledge of other selves, their content, goals, and values. All these are known in God.

"Nichts ist aussen, nichts ist innen," und
es ist "Kern der Natur mitten im Herzen,"
aber nicht bloss der Körpernatur, sondern
der alles Fremdseelische zugleich umfas-
senden Gottesnatur.²

It is on this basis that Troeltsch hopes to overcome the difficulties of and to unite both the Hegelian and the Bergsonian points of view ("der Streit der Lebensanschauer und der Formdenker"). The conceptual forms which were received in in-

1. GS, III, 675.

2. Ibid., 676.

112
This is seen and the continuity of the mathematical
in the mathematical sense of the differential
calculus.

The monad signifies the identity of the finite and the in-
finite spirit together with the finiteness and individuality
of the former. What is of interest to Troeltsch in this con-
ception is not the diverse mathematical aspects of the monad
or its windowlessness (*Unverletzlichkeit*), but the participation
of the finite in the infinite. It was with the same motif, says
Troeltsch, that Malebranche held to the participation of the
finite mind in the inner life of the absolute spirit.² The
unity of becoming and all process are explained not by the
causal principle (in its empirical linear sense and its series
of effects), but by participation in the fundamental life-unity
behind all phenomena. Thus also is explained our knowledge of
other selves, their content, goals, and values. All these are
known in God.

"Nichts ist aussen, nichts ist innen," und
es ist "Kern der Natur mitten im Herzen."
aber nicht bloss der Körpernatur, sondern
der alles Fremde gleich anziehend
und göttlich.

It is on this basis that Troeltsch hopes to overcome the
difficulties of and to unite both the Hegelian and the Berg-
sonian points of view ("der Streit der Lebensanschauer und der
Formalisten"). The conceptual forms which were received in in-

1. GS. III, 675.
2. Ibid., 675.

tuition and expanded in thought are the inner connections yet (Zusammenhänge) of the divine spirit. Troeltsch holds that this conception must not be confused with the Spinozistic identity of thought and thing. But when he describes this relation as "die wesenhafte und individuelle Identität der endlichen Geister mit dem unendlichen Geiste und eben damit die intuitive Partizipation an dessen konkretem Gehalt und bewegter Lebenseinheit,"¹ it is difficult to avoid a monistic interpretation. Intuition is for Troeltsch the key to the solution of these problems. And yet, it would seem that there are only two possible alternatives present; either the intuition is an immediate participation in the divine nature or the intuition is only of God. In the first case, we would have a monistic knowledge relationship which would commit us to a metaphysics of identity. In the latter case, it would be problematic whether the intuition gave us real knowledge or not, and the intuition would require further verification. There seems to be a confusion in Troeltsch's own conception, for, although he speaks of participation, he also speaks of occasional causes, and says explicitly that intuitions are not immediate.² He continually strives to avoid a philosophy of identity.

Troeltsch admits that we must not try to prove too much by this principle of participation; for the monad remains a finite

1. GS, III, 677.

2. Ibid., 684.

3. Ibid., 678.

tion and expanded in thought are the inner connections
(Zusammenhänge) of the divine spirit. Troeltsch holds that

this conception must not be confused with the Spinozistic
identity of thought and thing. But when he describes this re-
lation as "die wesentliche und individuelle Identität der end-
lichen Geister mit dem unendlichen Geiste und eben damit die
intuitive Partizipation an dessen konkretem Geiste und bewegter
Lebensmacht,"¹ it is difficult to avoid a monistic interpre-
tation. Intuition is for Troeltsch the key to the solution of
these problems. And yet, it would seem that there are only
two possible alternatives present: either the intuition is an
immediate participation in the divine nature or the intuition
is only of God. In the first case, we would have a monistic
knowledge relationship which would commit us to a metaphysics
of identity. In the latter case, it would be problematic
whether the intuition gave us real knowledge or not, and the
intuition would require further verification. There seems to
be a confusion in Troeltsch's own conception, for, although he
speaks of participation, he also speaks of occasional causes,
and says explicitly that intuitions are not immediate.² He
continually strives to avoid a philosophy of identity.
Troeltsch admits that we must not try to prove too much by
this principle of participation, for the matter remains a finite

1. GS, III, 677.
2. Ibid., 684.

monad. Even though it has its ground and essence in God, yet it remains a finite being and its knowledge is very limited. Moreover, the limitation is not merely quantitative, as would be the case if the monad participated in only a section of God's mind, but the limitation is qualitative and the identity of monad and God is conditioned.¹ This is apparent because; 1) all intuition depends on the real interaction of the monad with its environment. 2) Knowledge is dependent on the sense organs and the general conditions of the body. 3) Human logic is obviously limited in its capacity to overcome contradictions and antinomies. 4) All human thought is ultimately circular.² Troeltsch's position here seems to be at once monistic and dualistic. On the one hand there is the Identitätscharakter of our knowledge and on the other hand knowledge is anthropological. He says:

Hinter allem und am Ende von allem steht die Metalogik, in welcher unsere anthropologisch bedingten logischen Mittel und der göttliche Lebenszusammenhang auf völlig unbekannte Weise zusammenhängen.²

In spite of these theoretical difficulties, Troeltsch insists that this is the only proper solution of the problem of knowing other selves and Individual Totalities. And on our ability of knowing other selves depend the possibilities of common thought, philosophizing, and action.³

1. GS, III, 677.

2. Ibid., 678.

3. Ibid., 678.

monad. Even though it has its ground and essence in God, yet it remains a finite being and its knowledge is very limited. Moreover, the limitation is not merely quantitative, as would be the case if the monad participated in only a section of God's mind, but the limitation is qualitative and the identity of monad and God is conditioned.¹ This is apparent because:

1) All intuition depends on the real interaction of the monad with its environment. 2) Knowledge is dependent on the sense organs and the general conditions of the body. 3) Human logic is obviously limited in its capacity to overcome contradictions and antinomies. 4) All human thought is ultimately circular.² Troeltsch's position here seems to be at once monistic and dualistic. On the one hand there is the Identitätscharakter of our knowledge and on the other hand knowledge is anthropological. He says:

Hinter allem und am Ende von allem steht die Metaphysik, in welcher unsere anthropologisch bedingten logischen Mittel und der göttliche Lebenszusammenhang sich verknüpfen. 3

In spite of these theoretical difficulties, Troeltsch insists that this is the only proper solution of the problem of knowing other selves and individual totalities. And on our ability of knowing other selves depend the possibilities of common thought, philosophizing, and action.³

1. GS, III, 677.
2. Ibid., 678.
3. Ibid., 678.

change the Das Fremdseelische kann nur erkannt werden, weil wir es vermöge unserer Identität mit dem Allbewusstsein anschaulich in uns selber tragen und es verstehen und empfinden können wie unser eigenes Leben, indem wir es doch zugleich als ein fremdes, einer eigenen Monade angehöriges empfinden.¹

Just how Troeltsch could affirm this after he had admitted that the relation between the transcendental subject and the psychological subject is völlig dunkel, remains a mystery.² But it is on the basis of such an epistemology that he proceeds to affirm that the concepts of development are nothing but the "Selbsterfassung der inneren, geschauten und durch die Vermittlungen miterlebten, werdenden Sinnzusammenhänge des Geschehens selbst."³ Ultimately, it seems to remain an act of faith that the whole stream of living history is embedded somehow in the reality of God, a God who somehow combines the positive qualities of Hegel's and of Bergson's philosophies. Behind all of the later writings of Troeltsch there is the background of his earlier positive religious metaphysics. In one of his essays, "Die christliche Weltanschauung und ihre Gegenströmungen," published in 1894 he grounds his theory of development in a Selbstmitteilung Gottes. "Denn Gott ist, ja selbst das Sein, das Zentrum, das Absolute in diesem ewigen Fluss und Werden relativ sich bedingender Begebnisse und Endlichkeiten."⁴ In this essay he also affirms that in all

1. GS, III, 684.

2. Ibid., 681.

3. Ibid., 686.

4. GS, I, 311.

Das Fremdeelische kann nur erkannt werden,
 weil wir es vorwiegend unserer Identität mit
 dem Allbewusstsein angeschlossen in uns selber
 tragen und es verstehen und empfinden können
 wie unser eigenes Leben, indem wir es doch
 zugleich als ein fremdes, einen eigenen Mo-
 naden angehängtes empfinden.¹

Just how Troeltsch could affirm this after he had admitted that
 the relation between the transcendental subject and the psy-
 chological subject is völlig dunkel, remains a mystery.² But
 it is on the basis of such an epistemology that he proceeds
 to affirm that the concepts of development are nothing but the
 "Selbsterfassung der inneren, geschauten und durch die Ver-
 mittlungen mittelbar, verbundenen Sinnzusammenhänge des Ge-
 schehens selbst."³ Ultimately, it seems to remain an act of
 faith that the whole stream of living history is embedded
 somehow in the reality of God, a God who somehow combines the
 positive qualities of Hegel's and of Bergson's philosophies.
 Behind all of the later writings of Troeltsch there is
 the background of his earlier positive religious metaphysics.
 In one of his essays, "Die christliche Weltanschauung und
 ihre Gegenströmungen," published in 1894 he grounds his theory
 of development in a Selbstmitteilung Gottes. "Denn Gott ist
 ja selbst das Sein, das Zentrum, das Absolute in diesem ewigen
 Fluss und Werden relativ sich bedingender Ergebnisse und End-
 lichkeiten."⁴ In this essay he also affirms that in all

1. GS, III, 484.
2. Ibid., 481.
3. Ibid., 488.
4. GS, I, 311.

change there must be an abiding truth. This "ist eine Forderung jedes idealen Glaubens, auf die verzichten auf den Sinn der Welt verzichten heissen würde."¹ The certainty amid the flux of human history concerning the meaning and the abiding truth of existence is affirmed in religion, in a belief in eternal truth, which is imparted by God himself.²

This religious certainty was given up by Troeltsch at least theoretically in his later years. In the concluding chapter the significance of this change will become apparent.

What is of immediate importance is to point out that the Individual Totalities which appear in constant development, and which are nevertheless unities of meaning and value, require further validation. How are the unities of value to be criticized and changed, and what place does the individual have in the process of the whole? In the construction of future experience what are the cultural syntheses which should be effected? We have seen how Troeltsch has rejected several types of developmental interpretation and has affirmed a teleological temporal development within the limits of Individual Wholes. The remaining task of our study is to investigate the principles which lie behind the creation of cultural syntheses, as Troeltsch calls them.

1. GS, I, 311, loc. cit.

2. Loc. cit.

change there must be an abiding truth. This "ist eine Forde-
 rung jedes idealen Glaubens, auf die verschiedensten aus dem Sinn
 der Welt verschieden lassen würde." The certainty and the
 flux of human history concerning the meaning and the abiding
 truth of existence is affirmed in religion, in a belief in
 eternal truth, which is imparted by God himself.²
 This religious certainty was given up by Troeltsch at
 least theoretically in his later years. In the concluding
 chapter the significance of this change will become apparent.
 What is of immediate importance is to point out that the
 individual totalities which appear in constant development,
 and which are nevertheless unities of meaning and value, re-
 quire further validation. How are the unities of value to be
 criticized and changed, and what place does the individual
 have in the process of the whole? In the construction of fu-
 ture experience what are the cultural syntheses which should
 be effected? We have seen how Troeltsch has rejected several
 types of developmental interpretation and has affirmed a tele-
 ological temporal development within the limits of individual
 wholes. The remaining task of our study is to investigate the
 principles which lie behind the creation of cultural syntheses,
 as Troeltsch calls them.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Cultural Synthesis

I. Development and the Cultural Synthesis

Troeltsch's conception of historical development requires that the study of history cannot be concluded properly with the present, but involves decisions and constructions for the future. Life requires that we not only review the past, but also seek to direct the course of the future. In his essays published under the name of Christian Thought, he constantly refers to this function of philosophy. He speaks of "the problem of controlling and dominating the immense stream of historical life, a stream which grows continually more rapid and more extended, and not merely of constructing theoretically its successive stages and its laws of movement. But this means.... that History requires us to come to grips with the idea of an abiding system of values which shall give us our standards."¹ We shall try to show that Troeltsch fails to give an adequate foundation for such an abiding system of values, and that, accordingly, his principle of Individual Totalities breaks down at a crucial point.

1. CT, 42.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Cultural Synthesis

I. Development and the Cultural Synthesis

Troeltsch's conception of historical development requires

that the study of history cannot be concluded properly with the present, but involves decisions and constructions for the future. It requires that we not only review the past, but also seek to direct the course of the future. In his essays published under the name of Christian Thought, he constantly refers to this function of philosophy. He speaks of "the problem of controlling and dominating the immense stream of historical life, a stream which grows continually more rapid and more extended, and not merely of constructing theoretically its suc-

cessive stages and its laws of movement. But this means... that history requires us to come to grips with the idea of an abiding system of values which shall give us our standards." We shall try to show that Troeltsch fails to give an adequate foundation for such an abiding system of values, and that, accordingly, his principle of individual totalities breaks down at a crucial point.

A. The Practical Nature of the Philosophy of History

There exists, says Troeltsch, no purely contemplative science, whether about the objects of nature or about history; whether in the motives of a particular science or in its results, there is always a practical interest. Spinoza's pure contemplation led to ethics, and Kant's theories of pure reason limited knowledge so as to make room for faith.¹ There is thus a very practical problem which confronts the philosopher, for the logic of history without a construction of the future is a mere torso.² Such a construction must take account of both the logical and the empirical elements of the developmental process. Unless empirical history is secured by logical foundations it is like a house without a foundation. Logic alone, however, would give a mere ideal; it would present only the general outlines sketched by a dreaming soul or a sovereign will. All of our knowledge of the past must serve as the foundation of understanding the present and of constructing the future.³

B. Problems of a Cultural Synthesis

Historical development must eventuate then, according to Troeltsch, in a cultural synthesis. That such a synthesis cannot be deduced from a rationalistic monism, the previous chapter has clearly shown.⁴ History knows no universal concept out

1. GS, III, 70.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., 77.

4. See Chapter Four.

A. The Practical Nature of the Philosophy of History

There exists, says Troeltsch, no purely contemplative science, whether about the objects of nature or about history; whether in the motives of a particular science or in its results, there is always a practical interest. Spinoza's pure contemplation led to ethics, and Kant's theories of pure reason limited knowledge so as to make room for faith.¹ There is thus a very practical problem which confronts the philosopher, for the logic of history without a construction of the future is a mere torso.² Such a construction must take account of both the logical and the empirical elements of the developmental process. Unless empirical history is secured by logical foundations it is like a house without a foundation. Logic alone, however, would give a mere ideal; it would present only the general outlines sketched by a dreaming soul or a sovereign will. All of our knowledge of the past must serve as the foundation of understanding the present and of constructing the future.³

B. Problems of a Cultural Synthesis

Historical development must eventually then, according to Troeltsch, in a cultural synthesis. That such a synthesis cannot be deduced from a rationalistic monism, the previous chapter has clearly shown.⁴ History knows no universal concept out

1. GS, III, 70.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., 77.
4. See Chapter Four.

of which it can deduce the content and succession of its events, but knows only concrete, individual, and unique facts.¹ The author holds that all universal norms and values arise only as ideas which require validation in the empirical data themselves.

The individual in history is a problem, an Aufgabe or a Sollen. Each center of activity in history is an ought for Troeltsch and contains a universal which must be evolved. The recognition of this fact shows that the purely presentative and research aspects of history must be supplemented by a handelnde Geschichte, or, what is the same thing, a study of the individual constantly forming and reforming himself.² Ought in history brings together the philosophy of history and ethics.³ All philosophers are forced to face the problem of ethics. But this cannot be purely a study on its own account. It is a practical necessity. In his essay on "Historiography" Troeltsch writes: der Historismus. With it we shall conclude our investi-

The chaos of value-judgments, the perplexing impression made by which is but intensified by the perpetually fluctuating course of history, can be transcended only by grouping the questions together and finding their answers in a complete system of values.

Such a system of values, however, is neither more nor less than Ethics.⁴

As discussed in Christian Thought ethics presents two main aspects, the morality of conscience and the ethics of cultural

-
1. ACR, 29.
 2. GS, III, 78.
 3. Ibid., 79, 81.
 4. ERE, VI, 722.

of which it can deduce the content and succession of its events, but knows only concrete, individual, and unique facts.¹ The author holds that all universal norms and values arise only as ideas which require validation in the empirical data themselves.

The individual in history is a problem, an Anders or a Sollen. Each center of activity in history is an event for Troeltsch and contains a universal which must be evolved. The recognition of this fact shows that the purely presentative and research aspects of history must be supplemented by a handlungs Geschichte, or, what is the same thing, a study of the individual constantly forming and reforming himself.² Geyser in history brings together the philosophy of history and ethics.³ All philosophers are forced to face the problem of ethics. But this cannot be purely a study on its own account. It is a practical necessity. In his essay on "Historiography" Troeltsch

written:

The chaos of value-judgments, the perplexing impression made by which is but intensified by the perpetually fluctuating course of history, can be transcended only by grouping the questions together and finding their answers in a complete system of values. Such a system of values, however, is neither more nor less than Ethics.⁴

As discussed in Christian Thought ethics presents two main aspects, the morality of conscience and the ethics of cultural

1. ACE, 29.
2. CE, III, 78.
3. Ibid., 79, 81.
4. ERE, VI, 782.

values.

Besides the specific problems of ethics the construction of a cultural synthesis requires finding norms by which we can understand historical epochs and appraise concrete values. Troeltsch holds that since all values are immanent in history the norms of criticism must also be derived from history.¹ These norms are a priori and spring up out of the spontaneous creativity of history itself.² The a priori is necessary both for the understanding of the epoch in which one finds oneself and for the cultural synthesis.³

This then leads to the problems of religion. Is Christianity absolute? Here we shall have to examine the religious a priori of Troeltsch and his general religious philosophy, for behind all of his ethical and valuational discussions lies a religious metaphysics.

The cultural synthesis at which Troeltsch arrives is called der Europäismus. With it we shall conclude our investigation of his philosophy of history.

II. Philosophy and the Norms of History

To be historical and to be relative are identical.⁴ Modern historical criticism has dissolved all dogmas into the flux of process until no absolute values seem to remain intact.⁵

-
1. GS, III, 117.
 2. Ibid., 167-168.
 3. Ibid., 172.
 4. Ibid., 52.
 5. ACR, 3-4.

values. Besides the specific problems of ethics the construction of a cultural synthesis requires finding norms by which we can understand historical epochs and appraise concrete values. Troeltsch holds that since all values are immanent in history the norms of criticism must also be derived from history.¹ These norms are a priori and spring up out of the spontaneous creativity of history itself.² The a priori is necessary both for the understanding of the epoch in which one finds oneself and for the cultural synthesis.³ This then leads to the problems of religion. Is Christianity entirely absolute? Here we shall have to examine the religious a priori of Troeltsch and his general religious philosophy, for behind all of his ethical and valuational discussions lies a religious metaphysics. The cultural synthesis at which Troeltsch arrives is called *der Europäismus*. With it we shall conclude our investigation of his philosophy of history.

II. Philosophy and the Norms of History

To be historical and to be relative are identical.⁴ Modern historical criticism has dissolved all dogmas into the flux of process until no absolute values seem to remain intact.⁵

1. GS, III, 114.
2. Ibid., 127-128.
3. Ibid., 123.
4. Ibid., 28.
5. AGR, 3-4.

This, however, says Troeltsch, does not condemn us to an absolute relativism or skepticism, as many suppose. Skeptical relativism is due to three things: 1) The detailed treatments of historical problems are often so analytical and abstract that they tend to destroy the sense of the whole movement of history. 2) By explaining everything out of the previously given (analogous to the methods of natural science), some historians invite a skeptical attitude toward values. 3) The hypothetical nature of a scientific investigation which aims to give no judgment of right and wrong in history often leads to a disregard of all values and hence to belief that one event in history is as good as another, or that all are equally indifferent to norms.¹ Troeltsch believes that this relativism is not necessary, but that norms do exist in history and that one can arrive at an adequate basis of judgment. Relativism for him means only that all historical appearances are dependent on a whole which is itself not a material absolute, and that only from the point of view of one's place in the whole can an evaluation take place.² There is no absolute, changeless, and unconditioned timeless value in history. Such norms may lie beyond history in a realm "das nur der Ahnung und dem Glauben zugänglich ist."³ History does not exclude norms; on the contrary its essential work is "gerade die Her-

1. ACR, 53-54.

2. Ibid., 57.

3. Loc. cit.

Thus, however, says Troeltsch, does not condemn us to an absolute relativism or skepticism, as many suppose. Skeptical relativism is due to three things: 1) The detailed treatment of historical problems are often so analytical and abstract that they tend to destroy the sense of the whole movement of history. 2) By explaining everything out of the previously given (analogous to the methods of natural sciences), some historians invite a skeptical attitude toward values. 3) The hypothetical nature of a scientific investigation which aims to give no judgment of right and wrong in history often leads to a disregard of all values and hence to belief that one event in history is as good as another, or that all are equally indifferent to norms. Troeltsch believes that this relativism is not necessary, but that norms do exist in history and that one can arrive at an adequate basis of judgment. Relativism for him means only that all historical appearances are dependent on a whole which is itself not a material absolute, and that only from the point of view of one's place in the whole can an evaluation take place. There is no absolute, changeless, and unconditioned timeless value in history. Such norms may lie beyond history in a realm "das nur der Abstraktion und dem Gedanken zugänglich ist." History does not exclude norms; on the contrary its essential work is "gerade die Her-

1. ACR. 53-54.
2. 1019. 57.
3. 100. 51.

vorbringung der Normen und der Kampf um Zusammenfassung dieser Normen."¹

Troeltsch here has emphasized an important point. No concrete value in history is final. All of our values are historically conditioned and are in need of constant revision. Whether the ideal values and the system of values by which we judge the present and make plans for the future completely transcend history or are in history remains to be examined below. The fundamental proposition stands that all of our values, like Christianity itself, in all the moments of their history are purely historical appearances and possess all the limitations of individual events.² Troeltsch does not deny the fact of norms in history, but does he give them an adequate foundation? ^{ical particular even in our creations of the future. This}

A. The Significance of the Individual Totality

The material philosophy of history must confine itself to the cultural environment (Historical Totality) of the philosopher. The latter must be so steeped in the whole process and inner continuity of this whole that his construction will appear to arise logically out of the whole past of his Totality.³ History, we have learned, cannot be regarded as a process in which a universal and everywhere similar principle, though con-

1. ACR, 57-58.

2. Ibid., 51; of. Chapter III.

3. GS, III, 75.

Verbindung der Normen und der Kampf um Zusammenfassung dieser Normen.¹

Troeltsch here has emphasized an important point. No concrete value in history is final. All of our values are historically conditioned and are in need of constant revision. Whether the ideal values and the system of values by which we judge the present and make plans for the future completely transcend history or are in history remains to be examined below. The fundamental proposition stands that all of our values, like Christianity itself, in all the moments of their history are purely historical appearances and possess all the limitations of individual events.² Troeltsch does not deny the fact of norms in history, but does he give them an adequate foundation?

A. The Significance of the Individual Totality. The material philosophy of history must confine itself to the cultural environment (Historical Totality) of the philosopher. The latter must be so steeped in the whole process and inner continuity of this whole that his construction will appear to arise logically out of the whole past of his Totality.³ History, we have learned, cannot be regarded as a process in which a universal and everywhere similar principle, though con-

1. AGR, 87-88.
2. Ibid., 81.
3. GR, III, 72.

in various social complexes which are in the past, present, and future, is operating; nor is it a continual re-combining of elemental psychical powers which indicate a general trend toward a rational end or goal of evolution. History is rather

an immeasurable, incomparable profusion of always-new, unique, and hence individual tendencies, welling up from undiscovered depths, and coming to light in each case in unsuspected places and under different circumstances.¹

The fundamental concept here is the Individual Totality. All the cultural values are limited in Troeltsch's view to Historical Totalities. The latter stand over against each other as autonomous wholes. One totality cannot prescribe the norms for the others. Thus we remain in the realm of the historical particular even in our creations of the future. This occurs

in the more radical sense of a molding of universal tendencies into historical creations of culture - a molding which is peculiar, unique, and sui generis; and here the whole spirit of an epoch, which, at the least, strongly influences such creations and coordinates them in a certain unity, is of itself a full individual system of thought in harmony with the whole set of conditions of the epoch.²

If the stream of history is to be dammed, then, it must be within the Individual Totality in which we find ourselves. But we do not live, says Troeltsch, in just one whole; we live

1. CT, 13-14; cf. Chapter III.

2. CT, 83.

frused and obscured, is operating; nor is it a continual re-
combining of elemental powers which indicates a gen-
eral trend toward a rational end or goal of evolution. His-
tory is rather

an immeasurable, incomparable procession of
always-new, unique, and hence individual
tendencies, welling up from undiscovered
depths, and coming to light in each case
in unexpected places and under different
circumstances.

The fundamental concept here is the Individual Totality.
All the cultural values are limited in Troeltsch's view to
Historical Totalities. The latter stand over against each
other as autonomous wholes. One totality cannot prescribe the
norms for the others. Thus we remain in the realm of the his-
torical particular even in our creations of the future. This

occurs

in the more radical sense of a molding of
universal tendencies into historical cre-
ations of culture - a molding which is
peculiar, unique, and sui generis; and
here the whole spirit of an epoch, which
at the least, strongly influences such
creations and coordinates them in a cer-
tain unity, is of itself a full individual
system of thought in harmony with the
whole set of conditions of the epoch.

If the stream of history is to be dammed, then, it must
be within the Individual Totality in which we find ourselves.
But we do not live, says Troeltsch, in just one whole; we live

in various social complexes which "are in the last resort concentric and each of which has its own intellectual content."¹ However, these complexes cannot be elevated into a universal form or a single all-determining accent. A universal concept, like Humanity, would not be very definite and hence cannot be a concrete value. The social complexes in which we live are some particular cultural sphere, a national community, a family, besides many other special associations and social circles. "In all these complexes we live simultaneously, without difficulty and without confusion."² Whether these historical wholes can be transcended is the essential problem which we have to face. In his later writings Troeltsch maintained that the norms of value as well as the concrete values chosen are limited within the bounds of the Individual Totality. In his earlier writings, however, he held to a type of Platonism which though recognizing the uniqueness and Einmaligkeit of historical events, yet preserved a universal validity and absoluteness for some values.

B. Troeltsch's Platonism

When trying to understand Troeltsch's solution to the problems here presented, we are limited by the fact that he nowhere gives a consistent or complete account of his own posi-

1. CT, xiii-xviii, quoted from Deutsche Nation, "Ernst
1. CT, 121. on the Problem des Historismus," March.
2. Ibid., 123.

in various social complexes which "are in the last resort con-
 centric and each of which has its own intellectual content."¹
 However, these complexes cannot be elevated into a universal
 form or a single all-determining accent. A universal concept,
 like Humanity, would not be very definite and hence cannot be
 a concrete value. The social complexes in which we live are
 some particular cultural sphere, a national community, a fam-
 ily, besides many other special associations and social cir-
 cles. "In all these complexes we live simultaneously, without
 difficulty and without contradiction."² Whether these historical
 wholes can be transcended is the essential problem which we
 have to face. In his later writings Troeltsch maintained that
 the norms of value as well as the concrete values chosen are
 limited within the bounds of the individual totality. In his
 earlier writings, however, he held to a type of Platonism
 which though recognizing the uniqueness and Einmaligkeit of
 historical events, yet preserved a universal validity and ab-
 soluteness for some values.

B. Troeltsch's Platonism

When trying to understand Troeltsch's solution to the
 problems here presented, we are limited by the fact that he
 nowhere gives a consistent or complete account of his own posi-

1. CT, 121.
 2. Ibid., 123.

tion. His criticisms of others are usually brilliant, but his own position is difficult to appraise. Baron von Hügel quotes Friedrich Meinecke as saying of him:

His friends....have been driven to confess that his positive leading ideas and aims stood in a certain disproportion to the amazing riches of his speculative historical outlook; and that his weighty speech would often curiously ebb away when, at the end of impressive reproductions of the life and thoughts of others, he was put to develop his own position in a firm, clear, and unambiguous manner.¹

Although much in Troeltsch's view is obscure, there seems clearly to be present in his thought a shift from an earlier more rationalistic and Kantian viewpoint (we might also say Lotzean) to a later intensely anti-monistic and even anti-rationalistic point of view. Perhaps the clearest expression of his earlier standpoint is found in an essay which appeared in the Harvard Theological Review in 1912, entitled, "Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion." In this essay, written in honor of William James, he discussed two points, 1) the contrast between James' ideas and the European philosophy of religion, and 2) the positive value of James' views. The two systems of thought, said he, have much in common. Both set out not from given theological norms of truth, but from the whole field of religious phenomena. Secondly,

1. CT, xxii-xxiii, quoted from Deutsche Nation, "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus," March, 1923. I have not been able to consult this article first hand.

2. Ibid., 407.
3. Ibid., 407-408.

I. CT, xxii-xxiii, quoted from Deutsche Nation, "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus," March, 1923. I have not been able to consult this article first hand.

views. The two systems of thought, said he, have much in common. Both set out from given theological norms of truth, but from the whole field of religious phenomena. Secondly, philosophy of religion, and 2) the positive value of James' points, 1) the contrast between James' ideas and the European essay, written in honor of William James, he discussed two ideas and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion." In this in the Harvard Theological Review in 1912, entitled, "Empirical of his earlier standpoint is found in an essay which appeared rationalistic point of view. Perhaps the clearest expression of a later intensely anti-monistic and even anti-

Although much in Troeltsch's view is obscure, there seems clearly to be present in his thought a shift from an earlier more rationalistic and Kantian viewpoint (we might also say Lotzean) to a later intensely anti-monistic and even anti-rationalistic point of view. Perhaps the clearest expression of his earlier standpoint is found in an essay which appeared in the Harvard Theological Review in 1912, entitled, "Empirical and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion." In this essay, written in honor of William James, he discussed two points, 1) the contrast between James' ideas and the European philosophy of religion, and 2) the positive value of James' views. The two systems of thought, said he, have much in common. Both set out from given theological norms of truth, but from the whole field of religious phenomena. Secondly, philosophy of religion, and 2) the positive value of James' points, 1) the contrast between James' ideas and the European essay, written in honor of William James, he discussed two ideas and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion." In this in the Harvard Theological Review in 1912, entitled, "Empirical of his earlier standpoint is found in an essay which appeared rationalistic point of view. Perhaps the clearest expression of a later intensely anti-monistic and even anti-

and unambiguous manner. I develop his own position in a firm, clear, and life and thoughts of others, he was put to the end of impressive reproductions of the would often curiously add away when, at a somewhat ideal outlook; and that his weighty speech and amazing riches of his speculative history stood in a certain proportion to the that his positive leading ideas and aims form of a his friends... have been driven to confess

Friedrich Meinecke as saying of him: "He was a great man. His own position is difficult to appreciate. Baron von Hügel praises him. His criticism of others are usually brilliant, but his

the goal is not determined by outside authority or dogma. Thirdly, there is no assumption of a miraculous supernaturalism.¹

4) The consciousness, from which the investigation of religion sets out, is more than mere fact. "Being a kind of both the necessary and the contingent. Such a way of thinking gains its final security only when it finds in the individual consciousness, of itself always contingent, in the available, whereas we see in it the demand of reason, asserting itself as soon as the constraint of inherited prejudice is withdrawn."²

The fundamental characteristic of European philosophy of religion is its Platonism. "Its consistent aim is to transcend the merely actual through the demonstration that, seething and developing within it, is a rationally necessary conceptual element."³

The leading ideas of the Platonic tradition to which Troeltsch then subscribed are as follows: 1) that "consciousness, as a finite concretion of the universal cosmic consciousness, and taken together with the necessary presuppositions which are a priori and potentially contained in it, is the source of religion."⁴ 2) The a priori is the kernel of the religious phenomena.⁵ 3) The essence of religion actually appears as a constantly changing and mobile phenomenon. This

1. Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 402.

2. Ibid., 403.

3. Ibid., 404.

4. Ibid., 407.

5. Ibid., 407-408.

the goal is not determined by outside authority or dogma. Thirdly, there is no assumption of a miraculous supernatural-

ism.¹

The characteristic differences must be sought within the sphere of common presupposition. James is "distinguished from others solely by the fact that to him the presupposition pre- sents itself as the only vital working hypothesis at present available, whereas we see in it the demand of reason, asserting itself as soon as the constraint of inherited prejudice is withdrawn."²

The fundamental characteristic of European philosophy of religion is its Platonism. "Its constant aim is to transcend the merely actual through the demonstration that, existing and developing within it, is a rationally necessary conceptual ele- ment."³

The leading ideas of the Platonic tradition to which Troeltsch then subscribed are as follows: 1) that "conscious- ness, as a finite conception of the universal cosmic conscious- ness, and taken together with the necessary presuppositions which are a error and potentially contained in it, is the source of religion."⁴ 2) The a priori is the kernel of the re- ligious phenomenon.⁵ 3) The essence of religion actually ap- pears as a constantly changing and mobile phenomenon. This

1.	Rev. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 402.
2.	Ibid., 403.
3.	Ibid., 404.
4.	Ibid., 407.
5.	Ibid., 407-408.

James starts from consciousness but this latter is stream of consciousness never lies quite in broad daylight and consequently void of all apriori unity and devoid of all connection between contingent consciousness and consciousness in general.¹

4) The consciousness, from which the investigation of religion furthermore, the worth of religion and the recognition of its sets out, is more than mere fact, "being a compound of both depend upon its actual working, "not upon the demonstration the necessary and the contingent. Such a way of thinking that it is derived from any source", whether psychological, or gains its final security only when it firmly anchors the individual consciousness, of itself always contingent, in the religion is in fact possible."² This leads to the next point, holding-ground of 'consciousness in general'.²

Troeltsch holds that James' radical empiricism is radical its premise of a unitary science, cease to comprehend the anti-Platonism. He is opposed to all apriorism, to every rational stages of evolution as teleological. James moves the rational theory of knowledge, and to any presupposition in favor of necessity and synthesis.³ Troeltsch says that James' dependent on general physical condition and on nervous constitution.³ Moreover, any standard of discrimination and idealism and idealized utilitarianism. "Knowledge is guaranteed solely by practical faith and determined solely by standard emerge in the vital movements and adjustments which the degree of its verification in practice. For him the individual is everything; and the individual is an element in a race."⁴ Here the idea of a value for life takes the place of continuous stream which makes everything relative."⁴ In this truth or validity,⁵ and ontology is left peculiarly vague. scheme logic is only a labor-saving device. "The ethical and

The basic difference between the Platonism of the European other necessities, the values and ideals, are the more or less an tradition and the empiricism of James is the contrast provisional condensation of experience concerning what enhances, steadies, and harmonizes life."⁴ Like the Platonists,

1. Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 408.

2. Ibid., 408-409. 3 (1912) 412-413.

3. Ibid., 409.

4. Ibid., 410-413.

4. Ibid., 415.

5. Ibid., 416-417.

essence never lies quite in broad daylight and consequently the problem remains whether it is ever realized completely.¹

4) The consciousness, from which the investigation of religion sets out, is more than mere fact, "being a compound of both the necessary and the contingent. Such a way of thinking gains its final security only when it firmly anchors the individual consciousness, of itself always contingent, in the holding-ground of 'consciousness in general'.²

Troeltsch holds that James' radical empiricism is radical anti-Platonism. He is opposed to all apriorism, to every rational theory of knowledge, and to any presupposition in favor of necessity and synthesis.³ Troeltsch says that James' way to normative and valid knowledge is by means of biological evolutionism and idealized utilitarianism. "Knowledge is guaranteed solely by practical faith and determined solely by the degree of its verification in practice. For him the individual is everything; and the individual is an element in a continuous stream which makes everything relative."⁴ In this scheme logic is only a labor-saving device. "The ethical and other necessities, the values and ideals, are the more or less provisional condensation of experience concerning what chances, steadies, and harmonizes life."⁵ Like the Platonists,

1.	Harry. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 408.
2.	Ibid., 408-409.
3.	Ibid., 409.
4.	Ibid., 410.
5.	Ibid., 410-411.

James starts from consciousness but this latter is stream devoid of all apriori unity and devoid of all connection between contingent consciousness and consciousness in general.¹ Furthermore, the worth of religion and the recognition of it depend upon its actual working, "not upon the demonstration that it is derived from any 'source', whether psychological, or zoological, or ontological. The result is that no idea of religion is in fact possible."² This leads to the next point, namely, that while the European philosophy of religion, "from its premise of a unitary essence, seeks to comprehend the historical stages of evolution as teleological, James knows the varieties only as psychological variations, in every case dependent on general psychical condition and on nervous constitution."³ Moreover, any standard of discrimination and gradation as rationally necessary does not exist. Rather "does the standard emerge in the vital movements and adjustments which contribute to the self-preservation and self-expansion of the race."⁴ Here the idea of "value for life takes the place of truth or validity,"⁵ and ontology is left peculiarly vague.

The basic difference between the Platonism of the European tradition and the empiricism of James is the contrast between the inner majesty of the absolutely necessary and valid, on the one hand, and the practical vitality and concreteness, unim-

-
1. Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 412-413.
 2. Ibid., 413.
 3. Ibid., 414-415.
 4. Ibid., 415.
 5. Ibid., 416-417.

James starts from consciousness but this latter is stream de-
void of all a priori unity and devoid of all connection be-
tween contingent consciousness and consciousness in general.¹
Furthermore, the worth of religion and the recognition of it
depend upon its actual working, "not upon the demonstration
that it is derived from any 'source', whether psychological, or
zoological, or ontological. The result is that no idea of re-
ligion is in fact possible."² This leads to the next point,
namely, that while the European philosophy of religion, "from
its premise of a unitary essence, seeks to comprehend the his-
torical stages of evolution as teleological, James knows the
varieties only as psychological variations, in every case de-
pendent on general psychological condition and on nervous consti-
tution."³ Moreover, any standard of discrimination and grade-
tion as rationally necessary does not exist. Rather "does the
standard emerge in the vital movements and adjustments which
contribute to the self-preservation and self-expansion of the
race."⁴ Here the idea of "value for life takes the place of
truth or validity."⁵ and ontology is left peculiarly vague.
The basic difference between the Platonism of the Europe-
an tradition and the empiricism of James is the contrast
between the inner majesty of the absolutely
necessary and valid, on the one hand, and
practical vitality and concreteness, anim-

1. Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 412-413.
2. Ibid., 413.
3. Ibid., 414-415.
4. Ibid., 415.
5. Ibid., 416-417.

paired by scientific abstractions or by ideas of unity or law, on the other. The one view inclines to monism and pantheism, the other to untiring activity and to living interaction between God and the soul. The one finds its demonstration in its intuitive apprehension of the necessary and the universally valid, the other in the spiritual power and effect of the mystical state.¹

Troeltsch says that "for myself I can only accept the a priori, transcendental philosophy. It seems to me closely bound up with the recognition of all logical validity."² He goes on to affirm that a doctrine of values in the field of ethics and aesthetics is not to be constructed without the idea of an element unqualifiedly valid, issuing from the nature of consciousness. "In religion a relation to a whole, to an absolute, to something possessing inner necessity, is always indispensable."² Thus Troeltsch is here a substantial Platonist.³ Nevertheless, he admits the significance of James' point of view and confesses that "the impression of James' presentation, living, unprejudiced, saturated with reality, grows on me."³ What must be done is to "adapt into Platonism the element of truth which Pragmatism holds."³

This synthesis of Platonism and Pragmatism can be effected, he believes, in the following way. The transcendental method starts from a purely psychological analysis and seeks the point where the apriori element of consciousness asserts

1. Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 418.

2. Ibid., 419.

3. Ibid., 420.

James, paired by scientific abstractions or by ideas of unity or law, on the other. The one view inclines to monism and pantheism, the other to uniting activity and to living interaction between God and the soul. The one finds its demonstration in its intuitive apprehension of the necessary and the universal, the other in the spiritual power and beyond effect of the mystical state.

Thus Troeltsch says that "for myself I can only accept the a priori, transcendental philosophy. It seems to me closely bound up with the recognition of all logical validity." He goes on to affirm that a doctrine of values in the field of ethics and aesthetics is not to be constructed without the idea of an element unqualifiedly valid, issuing from the nature of consciousness. "In religion a relation to a whole, to an absolute, to something possessing inner necessity, is always indispensable." Thus Troeltsch is here a substantial Platonist. Nevertheless, he admits the significance of James' point of view and confesses that "the impression of James' presentation, living, unprejudiced, saturated with reality, grows on me." What must be done is to "adapt into Platonism the element of truth which Pragmatism holds." This synthesis of Platonism and Pragmatism can be effected, he believes, in the following way. The transcendental method starts from a purely psychological analysis and seeks the point where the spiritual element of consciousness asserts

1.	Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 418.
2.	Ibid., 419.
3.	Ibid., 420.

itself. Such an analysis must proceed in purely positive and empirical fashion, and can "operate, provisionally, with the fundamental assumptions of empiricism and pragmatism. But all that is a purely provisional description and analysis of the phenomena."¹ "James, by retaining, as he does, in such an analysis the conception of the religious object as a residual datum, indicates the point at which the transcendental analysis can start and penetrate deeper."² In this essay Troeltsch does not make this penetration, and we shall investigate his analysis of this problem later.³

The issues now lie clearly before us, and the general nature of Troeltsch's solution is here indicated. Though the discussion above is limited to the field of religion, the fundamental problem is the same for the whole sphere of experience, including history. Troeltsch is seeking an element in consciousness which will serve as a center of validation and as the logical basis for ethics and a system of values. Such a center of validation will aid him in constructing the cultural synthesis which carries on the work of historical development. This center of validation he calls an a priori. It is not going too far to assert that the whole case of Troeltsch's philosophy of history rests on the solution of this problem of an a priori.

1. Harv. Theol. Rev., 5 (1912) 420.

2. Ibid., 420-421.

3. See below, pages 153-162.

itself. Such an analysis must proceed in purely positive and empirical fashion, and can "operate, provisionally, with the fundamental assumptions of empiricism and pragmatism. But all that is a purely provisional description and analysis of the phenomena."¹ James, by retaining, as he does, in such an analysis the conception of the religious object as a residual datum, indicates the point at which the transcendental analysis can start and penetrate deeper.² In this essay Troeltsch does not make this penetration, and we shall investigate his analysis of this problem later.³

The issues now lie clearly before us, and the general nature of Troeltsch's solution is here indicated. Though the discussion above is limited to the field of religion, the fundamental problem is the same for the whole sphere of experience, including history. Troeltsch is seeking an element in consciousness which will serve as a center of validation and as the logical basis for ethics and a system of values. Such a center of validation will aid him in constructing the cultural synthesis which carries on the work of historical development. This center of validation he calls an a priori. It is not going too far to assert that the whole case of Troeltsch's philosophy of history rests on the solution of this problem of an a priori.

-
1. *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, 5 (1912) 420.
 2. *Ibid.*, 420-421.
 3. See below, pages 153-162.

That Troeltsch rejects all absolute universal material norms in history hardly needs repeating. On the contrary, all norms must be found in historical reality itself.¹

Der individuelle immanente Wert eines historischen Gebildes muss daher zuerst stets an sich selbst gemessen sein.²

But how can the concrete historical life be judged?³ Here there emerges one of the basic philosophical problems with regard to the Individual Totality. The latter is a unity of meaning and value. But what shall be the criterion of judging it? In this field, says Troeltsch, Kant was a pioneer, but unfortunately his method applied much more to the natural sciences than to history.⁴ As in the discussion of the philosophy of religion so too in the field of history there are several possibilities. The following quotation brings out clearly what issues Troeltsch confronted in his thought on this problem.

Geht man von Idee und Massstab aus, so gerät man in einen geschichtslosen Rationalismus und verliert die Beziehung zur empirischen Historie und ihrer Praxis. Geht man vom Historisch-Individuellen aus und bleibt man dadurch im Einklang mit der Forschung, so drohen grenzenloser Relativismus und Skeptizismus. Sucht man beides in kunstreichen Entwicklungsbegriffen sich zu nähern, so brechen die beiden Bestandteile immer wieder auseinander. Nimmt man den Standort resolut in gegenwärtiger Entscheidung und Gestaltung, so verliert man

1. GS, III, 111.

2. Ibid., 117.

3. Ibid.: 122-168.

4. Ibid.: 126.

... dass die Geschichte in der Vergangenheit ...
C. Inner-historische Normen
Dass Troeltsch rejects all absolute universal material
norms in history hardly needs repeating. On the contrary, all
norms must be found in historical reality itself.
Der individuelle immanente Wert eines his-
torischen Geschehens muss daher zuerst selbst
an sich selbst gemessen sein.
But how can the concrete historical life be judged? Here
there emerges one of the basic philosophical problems with re-
gard to the Individual Totality. The latter is a unity of
meaning and value. But what shall be the criterion of judging
it? In this field, says Troeltsch, Kant was a pioneer, but
unfortunately his method applied much more to the natural sci-
ences than to history. As in the discussion of the philosophy
of religion no too in the field of history there are several
possibilities. The following proposition brings out clearly
what issues Troeltsch confronted in his thought on this problem.
Gibt man von Idee und Massstab aus, so
gibt man in einem geschichtlichen Ent-
wicklungsstadium und verliert die Beziehung zur
gesamten Historie und inneren Praxis.
Gibt man von Historisch-Individuellem aus
und bleibt man dabei im Hinblick auf den
Fortschritt, so drohen grenzenloser Relativis-
mus und Skeptizismus. Gibt man beides her
Kunstformen Entwicklungsgeheimnissen sich an
an, so drohen die beiden Bestandteile
immer wieder auseinander. Will man den
Standort respekt in gegenwärtiger Ent-
scheidung und Gestaltung, so verliert man

1.	111. 111.
2.	111. 111.
3.	111. 111.
4.	111. 111.

nur allzu leicht Geschichte und Idee zugleich. Empfindet man die vollen Schwierigkeiten des Problems, dann wird es quälend und man wendet sich gerne zu den Autoritäten und Offenbarungen der Kirche zurück, wie es alte und neue Romantiker aus begreiflichen Gründen getan haben und wieder tun werden, oder man wendet sich von dem historischen Abendland ueberhaupt ab zu dem geschichtslosen Orient, seiner Mystik und seinem Nirvana, wie das Schopenhauer unternommen hat und wie es seitdem so oft als Unterschied und Vorzug der viel tieferen Orients gefeiert wird.¹

The alternative which Troeltsch accepts is to seek for a hidden Produktionskraft of the spirit in which autonomous reason can give rise to norms and ideals which are required for history.² The kind of norm which will satisfy the requirements will be spontaneous, a priori, certain, without being timeless, universal, and absolute.

Sie bedeutet zugleich, dass solche Massstäbe selbst als individuelle Setzungen aus jeder grossen Gesamtsituation heraus neu gebildet und gefunden werden müssen.³

The historical norm must be an a priori spontaneous creation which is self validating.

Das letzte Geheimnis dieser Vorgänge ist der Glaube an die darin offenbare und zwingende momentane Vernunft und die Kraft des Willens, einen solchen Glauben zu bejahen.⁴

Such a norm, says Troeltsch, is a criticism of previous his-

-
1. GS, III, 169.
 2. GS, III, 162. See also the following discussion where the merits of these alternatives are discussed, 162-164.
 3. GS, III, 164. IV, pages 128-131.
 4. Ibid., 166.
 4. Ibid., 167-168.

1. GS, III, 182. See also the following discussion where the merits of these alternatives are discussed, 182-184.
2. GS, III, 184.
3. Ibid., 185.
4. Ibid., 187-188.

Such a norm, says Troeltsch, is a criticism of previous his-

Das letzte Geheimnis dieser Vorgänge ist der Glaube an die darin offenbare und zwingende momentane Vernunft und die Kraft des Willens, einen solchen Glauben zu bejahen.⁴

which is self-validating.

The historical norm must be an effort spontaneous creation

nein gebildet und gesteuert werden müssen.³ aus jeder grossen Gesellschaft heraus atße selbst als individuelle Setzungen Sie bedeutet zugleich, dass solche Mass-

timeless, universal, and absolute.

ments will be spontaneous, a priori, certain, without being history.² The kind of norm which will satisfy the require-

non can give rise to norms and ideals which are required for

hidden Produktionskraft of the spirit in which autonomous res-

The alternative which Troeltsch accepts is to seek for a

und Vorrang der viel tieferen Orienta ge- und wie es seitdem so oft als Unterscheid vana, wie das Schopenhauer unternehmen hat lösen Orient, seiner Mystik und seinem Nir- Abendland überhaupt so zu dem Geschichte- oder man wendet sich von dem historischen Grunden setzen haben und wieder tun werden, alte und neue Romantiker aus begreiflichen und Offenbarungen der Kirche zurück, wie es und man wendet sich gerne zu den Autoritäten Ketten des Problems, dann wird es deutlich gleich. Empfiehlt man die vollen Schwierig- nur allein leicht Geschichte und Idee zu-

tory and a creation of the future.¹ It is a practical decision which is sovereign and distinctive, which is grounded in itself, and which cannot be deduced from anything else.² Naturally, such norms differ among different thinkers, for each has a different historical background upon which to draw. For each thinker the decision to choose a certain norm is an act of faith.³ And this act of faith is a product of intuitive thought.⁴

1. Intuition

The inner-historical norm is distinctly intuitive. We have met Troeltsch's appeal to intuition before in our discussion of development.⁵ He bases a great deal on this concept. By means of intuition he tries to ground the cultural norm in the life of the Absolute.

Die Bildung der Massstäbe....ist also Sache des Glaubens in dem tiefen und vollen Sinne des Wortes; die Betrachtung eines aus dem Leben herausgebildeten Gehaltes als Ausdruck und Offenbarung des göttlichen Lebensgrundes und der inneren Bewegung dieses Grundes auf einen uns unbekannten Gesamtsinn der Welt hin, die Ergreifung des aus der jeweiligen Lage erwachsenden Kulturideals als eines Repräsentanten des unerkennbaren Absoluten.⁶

If we can show that intuition is not an adequate principle for the creation and validation of cultural syntheses, then

1. GS, III, 169.

2. Ibid., 170, 172.

3. Ibid., 175.

4. Ibid., 176.

5. See above Ch. IV, pages 128-131.

6. GS, III, 175.

theory and a creation of the future. It is a practical decision which is sovereign and distinctive, which is grounded in itself, and which cannot be deduced from anything else. Naturally, such norms differ among different thinkers, for each has a different historical background upon which to draw. For each thinker the decision to choose a certain norm is an act of faith. And this act of faith is a product of intuitive thought.

1. Intuition

The inner-historical norm is distinctively intuitive. We have met Troeltsch's appeal to intuition before in our discussion of development. He bases a great deal on this concept. By means of intuition he tries to ground the cultural norm in the life of the Absolute.

Die Bildung der Massstäbe... ist also Sache des Glaubens in dem tiefen und vollen Sinne des Wortes; die Betrachtung eines aus dem Leben herausgegliederten Gehaltes als Ausdruck und Offenbarung des göttlichen Lebensgrundes und der inneren Bewegung dieses Grundes auf einen uns unbekannten Gesamtplan der Welt hin, die Zergliederung des aus der jeweiligen Lage erscheinenden Kulturbereichs als eines Herrschaftenden des unbekannten Absoluten.

If we can show that intuition is not an adequate principle for the creation and validation of cultural syntheses, then

1. GE, III, 159.
2. Ibid., 170, 172.
3. Ibid., 173.
4. Ibid., 176.
5. See above Ch. IV, pages 128-131.
6. GE, III, 175.

the whole future of historical development within the Individual Totality is jeopardized. Intuition as a principle raises a good many difficulties. In itself no clear conception attaches to intuition. It resembles an immediate experience of whatever kind that is present to consciousness. Intuition is at once a participation in the divine life, and yet it is not immediate. Epistemologically there seems to be a constant shifting between monism and dualism. As used by Troeltsch the word intuition usually has a rational connotation though this is not carefully worked out, yet when associated with the religious a priori or the historical a priori, intuition seems to be anti-intellectualistic.

The intuition of cultural norms in Troeltsch seems to presuppose a synoptic view of historical facts. It is the focus point of all our knowledge of the past and our constructions of the future.

Immer erst in der Berührung zwischen Vergangenen und Gegenwärtigen bildet sich der eigentliche letzte entscheidende Massstab, der zugleich die Zukunftsgestaltung in die unbekannte endlose Zukunft hineintreibt.¹

Besides being based on a synoptic view of things the intuition points to a metaphysical ground which is the final basis of all things. However, Troeltsch is vague as to the explicit nature of the world ground and how it functions in the intuition. We are assured, that the intuited norm is free

1. GS, III, 178.

the whole future of historical development within the individual-
as totality is jeopardized. Intuition as a principle raises a
good many difficulties. In itself no clear conception attaches
to intuition. It resembles an immediate experience of whatever
kind that is present to consciousness. Intuition is at once a
participation in the divine life, and yet it is not immediate.
Epistemologically there seems to be a constant shifting be-
tween monism and dualism. As used by Troeltsch the word in-
tuitum usually has a rational connotation though this is not
carefully worked out, yet when associated with the religious
a priori or the historical a priori, intuition seems to be
anti-intellectualistic.

The intuition of cultural norms in Troeltsch seems to pre-
suppose a synoptic view of historical facts. It is the focus
point of all our knowledge of the past and our conceptions
of the future.

Immer erst in der Betrachtung zwischen Ver-
gangen und Gegenwart bildet sich der
eigentliche letzte entscheidende Massstab,
der zugleich die Zukunftsgestaltung in die
unbekannte endlose Zukunft hineinreicht.

Besides being based on a synoptic view of things the in-
tuitum points to a metaphysical ground which is the final ba-
sis of all things. However, Troeltsch is vague as to the ex-
plicit nature of the world ground and how it functions in the
intuition. We are assured, that the intuited norm is free

from any mere romanticism. There are guarantees of this: 1) Such thinking is saved from romanticism by the fact that the philosopher is scientifically trained, and a scientific knowledge of nature will keep the norm within reasonable bounds. 2) The philosopher is also conscious of the fact that climate, geography, and anthropology, as well as mind, are determining factors in history. 3) The logical requirements of unity and consistency are also important ("die logische Forderung der Vereinheitlichung und Verknüpfung jedes Zusammenhanges in sich selbst.") 4) The formal demands of certain ethical principles are also a guarantee.¹

These guarantees show that the intuition is not the sole criterion of the cultural synthesis, but that a number of factors have to be taken into account. This would make intuition but the psychological form of the experience which had its validation elsewhere. There can be no doubt that any decision about the future will be an act of faith and necessarily hypothetical. Such a view, however, would be departing from Troeltsch's position; for him the intuition is no mere hypothesis. What he is seeking is some element in consciousness which is a priori. He wishes to validate experience at its source. But intuition of itself is not an adequate criterion of truth; it may give us insights, though these are in no sense final. They are acts of faith concerning the Absolute.

1. GS, III, 176.

from any mere romanticism. There are guarantees of this: 1) Such thinking is saved from romanticism by the fact that the philosopher is scientifically trained, and a scientific knowledge of nature will keep the norm within reasonable bounds. 2) The philosopher is also conscious of the fact that climate, geography, and anthropology, as well as mind, are determining factors in history. 3) The logical requirements of unity and consistency are also important ("die logische Forderung der Vereinheitlichung und Verknüpfung jedes Zusammenhanges in sich selbst.") 4) The formal demands of certain ethical principles are also a guarantee. These guarantees show that the intuition is not the sole criterion of the cultural synthesis, but that a number of factors have to be taken into account. This would make intuition but the psychological form of the experience which had its validation elsewhere. There can be no doubt that any decision about the future will be an act of faith and necessarily hypothetical. Such a view, however, would be departing from Troeltsch's position; for him the intuition is no mere hypothesis. What he is seeking is some element in consciousness which is a priori. He wishes to validate experience at its source. But intuition of itself is not an adequate criterion of truth; it may give us insights, though these are in no sense final. They are acts of faith concerning the Absolute.

We must conclude, then, that intuition fails to validate the cultural synthesis and on this point the principle of Individual Totalities is seriously challenged. But which Troeltsch still insists is consistent.

2. The A Priori The third way seems to be. What does Troeltsch mean by an a priori? He first developed the conception in connection with his philosophy of religion and later applied it to history. It is for him the basic problem of all knowledge. Heinenmann writes that it is Troeltsch's greatest problem, "ja geradezu als das Geheimnis der Wirklichkeit, die Verbindung dieses Irrational-Individuellen mit dem Apriorisch-Rational-Allgemeinen herzustellen."¹

Knudson holds that "in the religious apriorism of Troeltsch we have a justification of religion from the standpoint of reason.... There is not only a logical or theoretical reason, but there is also a moral reason, an aesthetic reason, and a religious reason; in other words, there is a reason that embraces all the structural interests of the human mind."² Troeltsch dealt with the problem of the a priori frequently, but developed his own view particularly in three essays: "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft," (1904), "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," (1909), and "Logos und Mythos in der Theologie und Religionsphilosophie," (1913).³

Knudson points out that in the first of these essays Troeltsch

1. SPT, 105f.

2. See also below on the historical a priori, pp. 157ff.

3. NWP, 215-216.

4. PT, 248f.; cf. GS, III, 180.

5. The first of these was published in Tübingen. The last two may be found in GS, II.

We must conclude, then, that intuition fails to validate the
 cultural synthesis and on this point the principle of individual-
 al Totalität is seriously challenged.

2. The A Priori

What does Troeltsch mean by an a priori? He first devel-
 oped the concept in connection with his philosophy of re-
 ligion and later applied it to history. It is for him the ba-
 sis problem of all knowledge. Heumann writes that it is
 Troeltsch's greatest problem, "to establish a basis for the
 der Wirklichkeit, die Verbindung dieser individual-individu-
 len mit dem historisch-national-allgemeinen herzustellen."¹
 Heumann holds that "in the religious sphere of Troeltsch
 we have a justification of religion from the standpoint of rea-
 son.... There is not only a logical or theoretical reason, but
 there is also a moral reason, an aesthetic reason, and a re-
 ligious reason; in other words, there is a reason that embraces
 all the structural interests of the human mind."² Troeltsch
 dealt with the problem of the a priori extensively, but devel-
 oped his own view particularly in three essays: "Psychologie
 und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft," (1904),
 "Die Frage des religiösen Axioms," (1909), and "Logos und
 Mythos in der Theologie und Religionswissenschaft," (1913).³
 Heumann points out that in the first of these essays Troeltsch

1. *WZ, 218-219.*
 2. *PT, 248f.; cf. 68, 111, 180.*
 3. The first of these was published in Tübingen. The
 last two may be found in 68, II.

is quite rationalistic in his interpretation of the a priori; in the second essay he brings out a special sense of it which is not rationalistically construed, but which Troeltsch still insists is consistent with reason. The third essay seems to be anti-intellectualistic.¹ Troeltsch's thought thus seems constantly to have moved in the direction of antirationalism. This I think can be definitely shown along several different lines, one of which we are to discuss here.²

According to Knudson's interpretation, Troeltsch's first interest was to show that religion "is rooted in human nature, and not only in human nature, but in reason itself."³ The apriori character of religion is guaranteed "by its inevitableness, by the feeling of obligation immanent in it, and by its structural relation to a rational world-view."⁴ As developed in his second essay, Troeltsch holds, says Knudson, that "the religious a priori is unique, distinct from the intellectual, the moral, and the aesthetic. It is not an intellectual principle nor an appendix to morality, but something peculiar, realized only in experience itself. It is not, therefore, a 'rational' a priori in the same sense as is the theoretical a priori.... There is, consequently, a question whether the word 'rational' should be applied to the relig-

1. SPT, 105f.

2. See also below on the historical a priori, pp. 157ff.

3. SPT, 102-103.

4. Ibid., 103.

5. Ibid., 758.

6. Ibid., 760.

is quite rationalistic in his interpretation of the a priori;
 in the second essay he brings out a special sense of it which
 is not rationalistically conceived, but which Troeltsch still
 insists is consistent with reason. The third essay seems to
 be anti-intellectualistic.¹ Troeltsch's thought thus seems
 constantly to have moved in the direction of antirationalism.
 This I think can be definitely shown along several different
 lines, one of which we are to discuss here.²
 According to Knudsen's interpretation, Troeltsch's first
 interest was to show that religion "is rooted in human nature,
 and not only in human nature, but in reason itself."³ The
 a priori character of religion is guaranteed "by its inevita-
 bleness, by the feeling of obligation immanent in it, and by
 its structural relation to a rational world-view."⁴ As de-
 veloped in his second essay, Troeltsch holds, says Knudsen,
 that "the religious a priori is unique, distinct from the in-
 tellectual, the moral, and the aesthetic. It is not an intel-
 lectual principle nor an appendix to morality, but something
 peculiar, realized only in experience itself. It is not,
 therefore, a 'rational' a priori in the same sense as is the
 theoretical a priori.... There is, consequently, a question
 whether the word 'rational' should be applied to the relig-

1. SPT, 105f.
2. See also below on the historical a priori, pp. 157ff.
3. SPT, 102-103.
4. Ibid., 103.

ious a priori."¹ Farther on Knudson says that when Troeltsch is emphasizing the unity of man's rational nature, he speaks of the a priori of reason, but when he wishes to set forth the distinctive qualities of the great interests of life he says that each of these has its own a priori. "The religious a priori, for instance, has its own completely anti-intellectual peculiarity."² However, the attempt to satisfy "both the intellectual and the nonintellectual elements in reason leaves his thought in a state of unstable equilibrium."³ Knudson's exposition and criticism correspond with the facts. One may go further, however, and affirm that Troeltsch's thought moves steadily in the direction of irrationalism. The rational interpretation of the a priori to which Knudson refers is clearly present in the first essay. In the second there is also still an intellectual emphasis. Here he says:

Nun gehe ich freilich immerhin auch in dieser zweiten Fassung des Apriori ueber Kant nicht unerheblich hinaus. Indem ich die synthetische Funktion desselben im Aufbau der einheitlichen Persönlichkeit betone und damit diese letztere auf einen hinter dem Ablauf der Seelennatur und ihres Wirkungszusammenhanges liegenden, jene Aprioris ausstrahlenden Vernunftkern zurückführe, gelange ich zu der Metaphysik des noumenalen Charakters.⁴

And yet, even here he emphasizes the nonrational factors and speaks of the religious a priori as an Evidenzgefühl.⁵

-
1. SPT, 105.
 2. Ibid., 107.
 3. Ibid., 108.
 4. GS, II, 758.
 5. Ibid., 760.

four a priori.¹ Further on Kant says that when Treitschke is emphasizing the unity of man's rational nature, he speaks of the a priori of reason, but when he wishes to set forth the distinctive qualities of the great interests of life he says that each of these has its own a priori. "The religious a priori, for instance, has its own completely anti-intellectual peculiarity."² However, the attempt to satisfy "both the intellectual and the nonintellectual elements in reason leaves his thought in a state of unstable equilibrium."³ Kant's exposition and criticism correspond with the facts. One may go further, however, and affirm that Treitschke's thought moves steadily in the direction of irrationalism. The rational interpretation of the a priori to which Kant refers is clearly present in the first essay. In the second there is also still an intellectual emphasis. Here he says:

Man geneht freilich immerhin auch in der zweiten dieser zweiten Fassung des A priori weiter. Kant nicht unerheblich hinaus. Indem ich die synthetische Funktion derselben im Aufbau der einheitlichen Personlichkeit betone und damit diese letztere auf einen hinter dem Akt der Bewusstseins und ihres Wirkzusammenhangs liegenden, jene A priori abstrahierenden Vernunftkern zu der Axiomatik, gelange ich zu der Metaphysik des nominalen Charakters.⁴

And yet, even here he emphasizes the nonrational factors and

speaks of the religious a priori as an Evidenzgesetz.⁵

- | | |
|----|--------------|
| 1. | Erd. 105. |
| 2. | Erd. 107. |
| 3. | Erd. 108. |
| 4. | GS. II, 758. |
| 5. | Erd. 760. |

The third essay, which appeared four years later, is predominantly anti-intellectual in its interpretation of the religious a priori. Troeltsch says that we must understand religion "in seiner völlig antiintellektualistischen Eigentümlichkeit."¹ The norms of religion must be purely religious.

Er muss verzichten, die Religion an objektiven, ausserhalb ihrer liegenden und eben darum sich nicht berührenden Normen zu messen, und muss die Entscheidung aus der im Streitfalle sich mit innerer Kraft äussernden Subjektivität entnehmen.¹

One must admit, however, that in spite of these irrationalistic interpretations, Troeltsch always returns to his transcendentalism and insists that religion is grounded in the activity of reason itself.²

In all this the real nature of the a priori is left vague and indeterminate. Not content with a merely rational a priori, the author seeks for an anti-intellectual element in experience which is self-evidencing. Reason alone does not seem adequately to account for what is unique in experience itself. The unique quality of religious experience leads Troeltsch at times to lean strongly towards Schleiermacher's a priori of feeling.³ Since Troeltsch did not give any definite content to this a priori, Knudson's criticism that he leaves it in a state of unstable equilibrium seems just. Some critics, like Traub and Jelke, have insisted that Troeltsch is able by his anti-intel-

1. GS, II, 820.

2. Ibid., 830.

3. Ibid., 820.

The third essay, which appeared four years later, is predominantly anti-intellectual in its interpretation of the religions a priori. Troeltsch says that we must understand religion "in seiner völlig antintellectuellen Eigenheit." The norms of religion must be purely religious.

Er muss verzichten, die Religion an objektiven, ausserhalb ihrer liegenden und eben darum sich nicht bestimmenden Normen zu messen, und muss die Entscheidung aus der im Streitfall sich mit innerer Kraft neu bestimmenden Subjektivität entnehmen.

One must admit, however, that in spite of these irrationalistic interpretations, Troeltsch always returns to his transcendentalism and insists that religion is grounded in the activity of reason itself.

In all this the real nature of the a priori is left vague and indeterminate. Not content with a merely rational a priori, the author seeks for an anti-intellectual element in experience which is self-evidencing. Reason alone does not seem adequate-

ly to account for what is unique in experience itself. The unique quality of religious experience leads Troeltsch at times to lean strongly towards Schleiermacher's a priori of feeling.

Since Troeltsch did not give any definite content to this a priori, Knudsen's criticism that he leaves it in a state of unstable equilibrium seems just. Some critics, like Trapp and Jelinek, have insisted that Troeltsch is able by his anti-intel-

- 1. Op. cit., 830.
- 2. Ibid., 830.
- 3. Ibid., 830.

lectualism to arrive not at something real but only at something phenomenal.¹ The validity of religion lies in the unity of reason, and any nonrational element in consciousness must be brought before the bar of reason if its claims are to be vindicated. An anti-intellectual a priori is a datum, a problem for further investigation.

When we turn from the religious a priori to the historical a priori, the difficulties cited above are even more apparent. Troeltsch constantly insists that here the a priori is not the mere Kantian conception, but a spontaneous power arising out of the creativity of the individual.

Das bedeutet eine nicht weiter ableitbare spontane Kraft des Geistes und eine Ueberführung durch den inhaltlichen Sinn, der für seine Begründung nicht weiter einen Sinn usw. braucht.²

Such an a priori is a simple fact of life, and the recognition of it a decision of the will. Without such a recognition by the will, says Troeltsch, there is no valid a priori.² This decision of the will is something quite different from Kant's conception, for the a priori in Kant is not immanent in experience,² An a priori deduction of it is not possible.³

At this point, however, Troeltsch comes dangerously close to the pragmatism of James which he was contesting in his essay on Platonism, for he now speaks of an intuitive feeling of

1. Cited in Rintelen, op. cit., 355 n.

2. GS, III, 179.

3. Ibid., 180.

idealism to arrive not at something real but only at some-
 thing phenomenal.¹ The validity of religion lies in the unity
 of reason, and any nonrational element in consciousness must
 be brought before the bar of reason if its claims are to be
 vindicated. An anti-intellectual a priori is a datum, a prop-
 lem for further investigation.

When we turn from the religious a priori to the historical
 a priori, the difficulties cited above are even more apparent.
 Troeltsch constantly insists that here the a priori is not the
 mere Kantian conception, but a spontaneous power arising out of
 the creativity of the individual.

Das bedeutet eine nicht weiter ableitbare
 spontane Kraft des Geistes und eine Ueber-
 thebung durch den inhaltlichen Sinn, der
 für seine Begründung nicht weiter einen
 Sinn nach voraussetzt.²

Such an a priori is a simple fact of life, and the recognition
 of it a decision of the will. Without such a recognition by
 the will, says Troeltsch, there is no valid a priori.³ This
 decision of the will is something quite different from Kant's
 conception, for the a priori in Kant is not immanent in experi-
 ence.⁴ An a priori deduction of it is not possible.⁵

At this point, however, Troeltsch comes dangerously close
 to the pragmatism of James which he was contesting in his es-
 say on Platonism, for he now speaks of an intuitive feeling of

1. Cited in Rintelen, op. cit., 355 n.
 2. GE, III, 179.
 3. Ibid., 180.

appeal to the coherence of experience as our final test the necessity to which the will must bend; and the "Recht dieser Anerkennung (kann) nur durch die Fruchtbarkeit des Gedankens nachträglich bestätigt werden."¹ Thus the a priori turns out to be nothing more than an Evidenzgefühl, which had already influenced his interpretation in his essay "Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori."² This feeling is described as follows:

Das Evidenzgefühl ist nichts anders als das Gefühl, das eine solche gelungene Einstellung begleitet, muss aber sein wirkliches Recht erst durch die Leistung des gefundeten Gedankens zum Verständnis des wirklichen bestätigen.... Sein endgültiges Recht entscheidet erst die Leistung, die so zustande kommt.³

Here we have a logical circle. The a priori is not strictly rational and yet it is the norm of historical values and the epistemological foundation of the cultural syntheses. Its final justification, however, is to be found in the experience of which it is to be the basis. The a priori is hence not a self-evident principle, but rather a mere hypothesis, and the Evidenzgefühl, far from being the foundation of historical judgment, in any logical sense of that term, appears to be in the same predicament as any other datum of experience. Moreover, if the final arbiter is the fruitfulness of the decisions of the will, as Troeltsch says above, then, by applying Occam's razor, we may dismiss the a priori entirely. If we

1. GS, III, 180.

2. Ibid., 180-181; cf. 179, 182-183, II, 760.

3. Ibid., 180-181.

necessity to which the will must bend; and the "Recht dieser
Anerkennung (kann) nur durch die Trachtbarkeit des Gedankens
nachträglich bestätigt werden." Thus the a priori turns out
to be nothing more than an Evidenzgefühl, which had already in-
fluenced his interpretation in his essay "Zur Frage des religi-
ösen Axioms." This feeling is described as follows:

Das Evidenzgefühl ist nichts anderes als das
Gefühl, das eine solche gelungene Einstei-
lung begleitet, muss aber sein wirkliches
Recht erst durch die Leistung des gelungenden
Gedankens zum Verständnis des wirklichen be-
stehen... Sein endgültiges Recht ent-
scheidet erst die Leistung, die so zustande
kommt.

Here we have a logical circle. The a priori is not strict-
ly rational and yet it is the norm of historical values and
the epistemological foundation of the cultural syntheses. Its
final justification, however, is to be found in the experience
of which it is to be the basis. The a priori is hence not a
self-evident principle, but rather a mere hypothesis, and the
Evidenzgefühl, far from being the foundation of historical
judgment, in any logical sense of that term, appears to be in
the same predicament as any other datum of experience. More-
over, if the final arbiter is the fruitfulness of the deci-
sions of the will, as Troeltsch says above, then, by applying
Occam's razor, we may dismiss the a priori entirely. If we

1. 68, III, 180.
2. Ibid., 180-181; cf. IV, 182-183, II, 750.
3. Ibid., 180-181.

appeal to the coherence of experience as our final test the same conclusion follows. The a priori is either the validating ground of experience in itself or it is an unnecessary conception. We agree with Heinemann when he says:

Mit anderen Worten, das Apriori hat hier nicht nur seinen Vernunftcharakter sondern auch seine Ewigkeit und Allgemeingültigkeit aufgegeben, es ist verflüssigt und verlebendigt, verzeitlicht und reduziert sich auf das "Gefühl, sich in die eigentliche Hauptbewegung des Geistes, die intuitiv herausgeföhlt ist."¹

There are at least two other objections which may be made to the a priori. The first of these is that Troeltsch's a priori tries too exclusively to validate experience at its source. He tries to ground logical validity and historical norms by finding an ultimate unanalyzable element in human nature. But this method is too genetic and psychological. The origin or source of experience is not the locus of validity, for this is found only in the unity of all experience, that is, in reason.

An even more serious objection is that the a priori as explained by Troeltsch tends towards an atomistic view of experience and of the self. Instead of clinging tenaciously to the fact that the whole self is involved in religious and other valuational judgments, Troeltsch seems to hold that besides reason there are other centers of validity for our several experiences. Such a theory comes dangerously close to the old

1. NWP, 216; cf. GS, II, 819-821.

appeal to the coherence of experience as our final test the same conclusion follows. The a priori is either the validating ground of experience in itself or it is an unnecessary conception. We agree with Heineemann when he says:

Mit anderen Worten, das Apriori hat hier nicht nur seinen Verunftcharakter sondern auch seine Zweckmäßigkeit und Allgemeingültigkeit aufgegeben, es ist verliert und verfallen, verfallen ist, verfallen ist und verfallen ist, also auf das "Gefühl", also in die eigentliche Hauptbewegung des Geistes, die in- tuitiv herangezogen ist."

There are at least two other objections which may be made to the a priori. The first of these is that Troeltsch's a priori tries too exclusively to validate experience at its source. He tries to ground logical validity and historical norms by finding an ultimate unanalyzable element in human nature. But this method is too genetic and psychological. The origin or source of experience is not the focus of validity, for this is found only in the unity of all experience, that is, in reason.

An even more serious objection is that the a priori as explained by Troeltsch tends towards an atomistic view of experience and of the self. Instead of clinging tenaciously to the fact that the whole self is involved in religious and other valuational judgments, Troeltsch seems to hold that besides reason there are other centers of validity for our several experiences. Such a theory comes dangerously close to the old

faculty psychology with its compartmental theory of the mind. Besides, there is here a too rigidly formalistic and abstract conception of reason. In his reaction against what he feared was too monistic in Hegel, Troeltsch overemphasized the unique and individual aspects of consciousness. Form and content are too radically divorced from each other. The result is that instead of a unity of consciousness, the latter is split up into island universes of experience.

The difficulties of Troeltsch's a priori become clearer when we note the shift of ground which he makes in striving to give objectivity to historical norms. Were the a priori really adequate, any further grounding would be unnecessary. But the real foundations of objectivity are found in a metalogical monadology. He affirms that thought must stand in some secret unity with reality and be bound with it by some common ground. The unity and meaning of the whole, however, can only be surmised or guessed (geahnt); it cannot be scientifically constructed. Not out of the All can we secure the individual, but out of the security of the individual can we guess the All in its living and active totality of meaning.¹

Damit stehen wir dann allerdings beim Letzten, bei dem Gottesgedanken, der als irgendeine vorausgesetzte Grundvorstellung der Dinge hinter allem Denken liegt. Jedenfalls gibt es ohne ihn oder irgendein Analogon zu ihm keine Massstabildung.²

1. GS, III, 183.

2. Ibid., 183-184.

faculty psychology with its compartmental theory of the mind. Besides, there is here a too rigidly formalistic and abstract conception of reason. In his reaction against what he feared was too monistic in Hegel, Troeltsch overemphasized the unique and individual aspects of consciousness. Form and content are too radically divorced from each other. The result is that instead of a unity of consciousness, the latter is split up into island universes of experience.

The difficulties of Troeltsch's a priori become clearer when we note the shift of ground which he makes in striving to give objectivity to historical norms. Were the a priori really adequate, any further grounding would be unnecessary. But the real foundations of objectivity are found in a metaphysical monadology. He affirms that thought must stand in some secret unity with reality and be bound with it by some common ground. The unity and meaning of the whole, however, can only be surmised or guessed (errath); it cannot be scientifically constructed. Not out of the All can we secure the individual, but out of the security of the individual can we guess the All in its living and active totality of meaning.¹

Damit stehen wir denn allerdings beim
Tatsachen, bei dem Gottesgedanken, der als
irgendeine vorausgesetzte Grundvorstel-
lung der Dinge hinter allem Denken liegt.
Jedenfalls gibt es ohne ihn oder irgend-
ein Analogon zu ihm keine Massstabbil-
dung.²

1. GS, III, 183.

2. Ibid., 183-184.

Thus, for Troeltsch, the norms of history are ultimately grounded in the living depths, movement, and change of the divine will.¹ Though holding that we are in contact with the Absolute, he affirms that we can never grasp what the nature of the contact is. He does suggest, however, that God is immanent in our thoughts.

Das eigentliche Wagnis alles nicht bloss formalen Denkens besteht darin, dass wir einen aufblitzenden Vernunftgedanken als Ausfluss der göttlichen Lebendigkeit zu betrachten, zu erfassen und durchzuführen wagen.²

Accordingly, all genuine universality and objectivity is grounded ultimately in an intuitive grasp of the divine will.³ This intuition is inspired by our contact with history and is tested by our comparisons in practical experience, but the locus of certainty and objectivity is God.

Troeltsch confesses the thoroughgoing individualism of this view, for the truth which we have received in intuition is limited to the great Individual Totalities in which we live. Furthermore, each individual person is immediate to God and creates his ideal of himself and of the future out of his own history and out of his own inner relationship to the divine life.⁴ Here the values believed in seem to be so conditioned by the Individual Totality in which we exist, that we are shut

1. GS, III, 184. Troeltsch's temporalistic conception of God is well expressed on page 185.

2. Ibid., 185.

3. Ibid., 187.

4. Ibid., 188.

out from any universal values for mankind as a whole. The Individual Totality seems to be a monad without any windows. The function of the intuition is to give us a sense of assurance and reality in the midst of the unique and contingent stream of history of which we are a part. It is a pure act of faith when Troeltsch says that "trotzdem ist dieses jedesmalige, sich aus sich stets erneuernde Individuelle allerdings in ein universales eingebettet."¹ Far from giving a true objectivity to value by an appeal to the activity of God, the a priori of history presents but a fleeting standard of judgment in the universal flux and development of the historical whole. We are forced to conclude that as a principle of validation, the a priori fails completely, and the principle of Individual Totalities thus breaks down at a crucial point.

laid down the general principles of morality in Kant and towards one's neighbor. D. The Problems of Ethics

To a large extent we have already presented Troeltsch's fundamental principles of ethics in a general way. They invite further elucidation, however. The problems of ethics are of two general types and deal with the morality of conscience and with the ethics of the cultural values.

to be. The first 1. The Morality of Conscience

The morality of conscience has its roots in Kant.² But the ethical consciousness is more complex than Kant allowed.³

1. GS, III, 199.

2. CT, 45.

3. Ibid., 48-49.

out from any universal values for mankind as a whole. The individual Totality seems to be a monad without any windows. The function of the intuition is to give us a sense of assurance and reality in the midst of the unique and contingent stream of history of which we are a part. It is a pure act of faith when Troeltsch says that "Trotzdem ist dieses Jenseitige, sich aus sich selbst erheben der Individuelle allerdings in ein universales eingebettet." For from giving a true objectivity to value by an appeal to the activity of God, the a priori of history presents but a fleeting standard of judgment in the universal flux and development of the historical whole. We are forced to conclude that as a principle of validation, the a priori fails completely, and the principle of individual Totalities thus breaks down at a crucial point.

D. The Problems of Ethics

To a large extent we have already presented Troeltsch's fundamental principles of ethics in a general way. They invite further elucidation, however. The problems of ethics are of two general types and deal with the morality of conscience and with the ethics of the cultural values.

1. The Morality of Conscience

The morality of conscience has its roots in Kant.² But the ethical consciousness is more complex than Kant allowed.³

1.	98, 111, 199.
2.	97, 45.
3.	Ibid., 48-49.

Ethics is an action, says Troeltsch, and all actions are realizations of ends. Hence the unity of ethics can only be deduced from the end.¹ This end is the attainment of a free personality "which has its foundations in itself and possesses a certain unity of its own."² Hence personality is the decisive idea. ^{real summing of it. The whole, in order to achieve} this Personality, the author holds, must be acquired and achieved. Freedom and creation constitute the secret of personality. Creation takes place in obedience and in devotion to the imperative 'ought', but this is only its formal aspect of self-determination from within.³ In its entirety it also includes particular ends.⁴ Personality has thus to develop itself in a double direction, once towards itself and its ^{ideal} neighbor, and then in the form of corporate individuals. Kant laid down the general principles of morality to self and towards one's neighbor and crowned his conception with the principle of the dignity of human beings. However, in the second kind of personality, the Group, the "natural consciousness of the group is transfigured into an ethically founded devotion to ^{This morality, Troeltsch points out, begins with a detaching of mere nature from which it springs but with which it struggles.} a moral-super-individual whole."⁵

This whole must be considered as a community which ought to be. "The group starting from its natural basis, is thus to develop into a special moral community through the union and

1. CT, 50.

2. Ibid., 51.

3. Loc. cit.

4. Ibid., 52.

5. Ibid., 55.

6. Ibid., 62.

Which is an action, says Troeltsch, and all actions are real-
 izations of ends. Hence the unity of ethics can only be de-
 duced from the end. I. This end is the attainment of a free
 personality "which has its foundations in itself and possesses
 a certain unity of its own." 2. Hence personality is the de-
 sive idea. 3. The author holds, must be acquired and
 achieved. Freedom and creation constitute the heart of per-
 sonality. Creation takes place in obedience and in devotion
 to the imperative 'ought', but this is only its formal aspect
 of self-determination from within. 3. In its entirety it also
 includes particular ends. 4. Personality has thus to develop
 itself in a double direction, once towards itself and its
 neighbor, and then in the form of corporate individuals. Kant
 laid down the general principles of morality to self and to-
 wards one's neighbor and crowned his conception with the prin-
 ciple of the dignity of human beings. However, in the second
 kind of personality, the group, the "natural consciousness of
 the group is transfigured into an ethically founded devotion to
 a moral-super-individual whole." 5

This whole must be considered as a community which ought
 to be. "The group starting from its natural basis, is thus to
 develop into a special moral community through the union and

1.	CT. 80.
2.	Idid. 81.
3.	Loc. cit.
4.	Idid. 82.
5.	Idid. 83.

interconnection of its members."¹ Like the individual's, so must also the selfishness of the group be overcome. Other things to be overcome are the mere herd-instinct and the mere cooperation of interests. But such a transfiguration requires both continuous criticism of the unity of the group and a continuous moral ennobling of it. The whole, in order to achieve this goal, must be obligated to purity and dignity.²

Troeltsch contends that the same principles apply to the relations of the groups, or collective personalities, toward each other, as apply to the relations of single persons with one another.³ In principle we have to do with the "same demands of justice and of kindness, of recognition and of education, of respect and of support."³ Thus there arises the ideal of Humanity. But with the ideal there is also introduced the problem,

may we expect that the historical stream of life can be defined and shaped for us in the light of these ideas which follow from the formal nature of moral obligation.⁴

This morality, Troeltsch points out, begins with a controlling of mere nature from which it springs but with which it struggles.

In its essence it is a perpetual struggle and a perpetual creation. The very conception of this morality means that it can never be simply victorious. Victory would be the end of struggle and freedom.⁵

1. CT, 55-56.

2. Ibid., 56.

3. Ibid., 57.

4. Ibid., 58.

5. Ibid., 62.

interconnection of its members.¹ Like the individual's, so must also the selfishness of the group be overcome. Other things to be overcome are the mere hard-innate and the mere cooperation of interests. But such a transfiguration requires both continuous existence of the unity of the group and a continuous moral ennobling of it. The whole, in order to achieve this goal, must be obligated to purity and dignity.²

Troeltsch contends that the same principles apply to the relations of the groups, or collective personalities, toward each other, as apply to the relations of single persons with one another.³ In principle we have to do with the "same demands of justice and of kindness, of recognition and of education, of respect and of support."⁴ Thus there arises the ideal of Humanity. But with the ideal there is also introduced the problem, the question as to how it is to be realized.

may we expect that the historical stream of life can be defined and shaped for us in the light of these ideas which follow from the formal nature of moral obligation.⁵

This morality, Troeltsch points out, begins with a controlling of mere nature from which it springs but with which it struggles.

In its essence it is a perpetual struggle and a perpetual creation. The very conception of this morality means that it can never be simply victorious. Victory would be the end of struggle and freedom.⁶

1. Ibid., 55-56.
2. Ibid., 56.
3. Ibid., 57.
4. Ibid., 58.
5. Ibid., 62.

But, moreover, the instincts and needs have their own independent justification in the nature of man as it struggles for food, room, life, and more life.¹ Troeltsch believes that there is no hope at all for the complete realization of the moral ideal. We are always bound to history and foredoomed to compromise. Only at one point can history be transcended; and this point is not the Totality as a whole, but only the individual.

He alone transcends history.... The Kingdom of God, just because it transcends history, cannot limit or shape history.²

For concreteness of presentation the ethical problems within the historical flux find in Troeltsch a brilliant expression. But one feels that here, as on other occasions, too sharp a distinction is made between the rational formal aspects of ethics, with its ideals, and ^{the} material demands ^{of} social ethics. If the individual with his ideals can transcend history and thus change the course of his own conduct, there seems to be no reason for denying that the ideal and the imperative demands of the Kingdom of God might not direct the course of the development of the Totality as a whole. Certainly it has done so historically. When Troeltsch insists that formal ethics are outside of time or history,³ he is making the problem unnecessarily difficult and is creating an

1. CT, 63.

2. Ibid., 68.

3. Ibid., 79-80.

But, moreover, the instincts and needs have their own independent justification in the nature of man as it struggles for food, room, life, and more life. Troeltsch believes that there is no hope at all for the complete realization of the moral ideal. We are always bound to history and foredoomed to compromise. Only at one point can history be transcended; and this point is not the totality as a whole, but only the individual.

He alone transcends history... The Kingdom of God, just because it transcends history, cannot limit or shape history. For concreteness of presentation the ethical problems within the historical flux find in Troeltsch a brilliant expression. But one feels that here, as on other occasions, too sharp a distinction is made between the rational formal aspects of ethics, with its ideals, and ^{the} material demands of ethical ethics. If the individual with his ideals can transcend history and thus change the course of his own conduct, there seems to be no reason for denying that the ideal and the imperative demands of the Kingdom of God might not direct the course of the development of the totality as a whole. Certainly it has done so historically. When Troeltsch insists that formal ethics are outside of time or history, he is making the problem unnecessarily difficult and is creating an

1. OT, 83.
2. Ibid., 83.
3. Ibid., 79-80.

unnecessary hiatus between conscience and value. Here his conception of time is at fault, for he conceives of formal principles as timeless, i. e., as outside of all time, whereas they are more accurately described as valid for all time. Both conscience and value in ethics should be considered as parts of one total system of ethical principles.

2. The Ethics of Cultural Values

Besides the formal morals of conscience, the ethical consciousness presents man with value. The essence of these values, says Troeltsch, is "that they are obligatory values or objective ends - that is to say, actual values of a universal validity."¹ The chief question here is, what are the substantial ends which must be affirmed in order that such unity of personality and spiritualization of a community can be developed?²

Since these values are entirely historical creations, they divide themselves among the great cultural realms of the family, the state, law, economic control of nature, science, art, and religion.³ "Each of these different great realms has its own historical development, and each of its great historical manifestations is an individual creation, corresponding to the definite conditions of the period" in which it finds itself.⁴ Troeltsch holds that just as the morality of conscience leads

1. CT, 71-72.

2. Ibid., 78.

3. Ibid., 80.

4. Ibid., 80; cf. GS, III, 202-203.

unnecessarily distinct between conscience and value. Here his conception of time is at fault, for he conceives of formal principles as timeless, i. e., as outside of all time, whereas they are more accurately described as valid for all time. Both conscience and value in ethics should be considered as parts of one total system of ethical principles.

2. The Ethics of Cultural Values

Besides the formal morals of conscience, the ethical consciousness presents man with value. The essence of these values, says Troeltsch, is "that they are obligatory values or objective ends - that is to say, actual values of a universal validity."¹ The chief question here is, what are the substantial ends which must be affirmed in order that such unity of personality and spiritualization of a community can be developed?

Since these values are entirely historical creations, they divide themselves among the great cultural realms of the family, the state, law, economic control of nature, science, art, and religion.² Each of these different great realms has its own historical development, and each of its great historical manifestations is an individual creation, corresponding to the definite conditions of the period in which it finds itself.³ Troeltsch holds that just as the morality of conscience leads

1. *Op.*, 71-72.
2. *Ibid.*, 78.
3. *Ibid.*, 80.
4. *Ibid.*, 80; cf. *GS*, III, 202-203.

history into the sphere of the timelessly valid, so conversely the latter conducts us back into history and development, especially into the real of the Individual.¹ The cultural values are a full individual system of thought in harmony with the whole set of conditions of the epoch.² History reveals a number of attempts at a deduction of a system of values, but all of them are helpless "in the face of the fulness and vigor, and also of the tensions and cross-purposes, of cultural values in real life."³

In his article on "Historiography," where the author gives some consideration to the axiological problem, he says that we are confronted with a circle:

We must interpret history by the degree in which it approximates to ethical values, and at the same time we must derive these ethical values from history.⁴

Such a circle, if radically followed through, would lead to the worst kind of relativism, where it actually does drive Troeltsch eventually. However, this circle is not hopeless if, contrary to Troeltsch, we assign reason its proper concrete inner-historical function. To be sure, no set of material values is absolute, but, on the other hand, values can be formed in the light of a system of theoretical principles which lie behind all of our formulations. It is the conformity to formal law

1. CT, 82; cf. GS, III, 200.

2. Ibid., 83; cf. GS, III, 203.

3. Ibid., 92.

4. ERE, VI, 722; cf. CT, 94-96.

history into the sphere of the timeless valid, so conversely
the latter cannot be back into history and development,
especially into the realm of the individual.¹ The cultural
values are a full individual system of thought in harmony with
the whole set of conditions of the epoch.² History reveals a
number of attempts at a deduction of a system of values, but
all of them are hopeless "in the face of the fulness and vigor,
and also of the functions and cross-purposes, of cultural val-
ues in real life."³

In his article on "Historiography," where the author gives
some consideration to the axiological problem, he says that we
are confronted with a circle:

We must interpret history by the values in
which it approximates to ethical values,
and at the same time we must derive these
ethical values from history.⁴

Such a circle, if radically followed through, would lead to the
worst kind of relativism, where it actually does drive Troeltsch
eventually. However, this circle is not hopeless if, contrary
to Troeltsch, we assign reason its proper concrete inner-his-
torical function. To be sure, no set of material values is ab-
solute, but, on the other hand, values can be formed in the
light of a system of theoretical principles which lie behind
all of our formulations. It is the conformity to formal law

1. *Op. cit.*, III, 200.
2. *Ibid.*, III, 203.
3. *Ibid.*, 22.
4. *WJA*, VI, 722; cf. *CT*, 94-95.

which gives validity to the material values of ethics and unless the system of formal laws is regarded no cultural synthesis will even be possible. The material values of history viewed without any regard for formal backgrounds may seem exceedingly relative, but it is conceivable that two apparently contradictory material values may be expressions of a coherent underlying system of ethical principles. In fact, this is repeatedly the case. As conditions change, the same theoretical principles may require actions, which, if considered merely abstractly, seem irreconcilable.

In his Christian Thought, Troeltsch offers no rational solution of this problem, but falls back on religious faith.

Here too, it is faith that ultimately decides; and here, too, it is likewise faith that justifies. It is not by any peradventure that the religious idea of our Western sphere of culture culminates in this doctrine.¹

The only idea of which Troeltsch seems to be quite certain is the idea of personality. In the form of freedom it determines everything in the morality of conscience, and, in the form of object, everything in the ethic of values.² And yet, though this conception is important, the whole principle of personality is limited, says Troeltsch, to our Western world, and is, in our sense, unknown to the Far East. We can only believe that for us it is the truth.³

1. CT, 98.

2. Ibid., 99.

3. Loc. cit. 11.

which gives validity to the material values of ethics and un-
less the system of formal laws is regarded as cultural synthe-

sis will even be possible. The material values of history
viewed without any regard for formal backgrounds may seem ex-
ceedingly relative, but it is conceivable that two apparently
contradictory material values may be expressions of a coherent
underlying system of ethical principles. In fact, this is re-
peatedly the case. As conditions change, the same theoretical
principles may require actions, which, if considered merely

abstractly, seem irreconcilable.

In his Christian Thought, Troeltsch offers no rational so-

lution of this problem, but falls back on religious faith.

Here too, it is faith that ultimately decides;
and here, too, it is likewise faith that jus-
tifies. It is not by any pervasiveness that
the religious ideas of our Western sphere of
culture culminate in this doctrine.

The only idea of which Troeltsch seems to be quite certain is
the idea of personality. In the form of freedom it determines
everything in the morality of conscience, and, in the form of
object, everything in the ethic of values. And yet, though
this conception is important, the whole principle of personality
is limited, says Troeltsch, to our Western world, and is, in our
sense, unknown to the Far East. We can only believe that for
us it is the truth.

-
1. Cf. 98.
 2. Ibid., 99.
 3. Loc. cit.

The axiological circle, to which we referred above, is transcended by an appeal to metalogic.¹ Intuition is the final word.

In Wahrheit ist doch aber auch für uns ein solcher intuitiver Blick die Lösung des Zirkels und schon der Anfang der ganzen Problemstellung.²

The objectivity of ethics is thus "involved in a deep subjectivity and founded on personal resolve."³ A spiritual monadology solves the problem, says Troeltsch. Heinemann describes this monadology as follows:

Es ist eine geistige Monadenlehre, die sich nur dadurch von Leibniz unterscheidet, dass die Monaden aufeinander wirken und dass die selbständige Geisteswelt primär wie bei Eucken religiösen Bedürfnissen dienen soll.⁴

Troeltsch himself appeals directly to Leibniz. The monads participate in their common life-ground which works through them.⁶ The individual person is the locus of the activity of the divine monad and the locus of both the factual fullness of life and the commands of the 'ought'.⁷ What is relative has meaning only if through it there operates a living and creative Absolute.

Sie setzt voraus einen Lebensprozess des Absoluten, in welchem dieses selber von

1. GS, III, 203.

2. Ibid., 694; cf. ERE, VI, 720.

3. CT, 107.

4. NWP, 212.

5. GS, III, 209.

6. Ibid., 210.

7. Ibid., 211.

The axiological circle, to which we referred above, is

transcended by an appeal to metaphysics. Intuition is the

final word.

In Wahrheit ist doch aber auch für uns ein
solcher intuitiver Blick die Lösung der
Stärke und schon der Anfang der ganzen
Problematik.

The objectivity of ethics is thus "involved in a deep subject-
ivity and founded on personal resolve." A spiritual mens-

dology solves the problem, says Troeltsch. Heinemann describes
this methodology as follows:

Es ist eine geistige Monadenlehre, die
eben nur dadurch von Leibniz unterscheidet,
dass die Monaden aufeinander wirken und
dass die selbständige Geisteswelt primär
wie bei Spinoza religiösen Bedürfnissen
dienend ist.

Troeltsch himself appeals directly to Leibniz. The monads
participate in their common life-ground which works through

them. The individual person is the locus of the activity of
the divine monad and the locus of both the temporal finitude of
life and the commands of the 'ought'. What is relative has

meaning only in through it there operates a living and creative
Absolute.

Sie setzt voraus einen Lebensprozess des
Absoluten, in welchem dieses selber von

- | | |
|----|-----------------------------|
| 1. | GE, III, 203. |
| 2. | Ida, 624; cf. ERE, VI, 720. |
| 3. | CT, 107. |
| 4. | WEP, 212. |
| 5. | GE, III, 203. |
| 6. | Ida, 210. |
| 7. | Ida, 211. |

metaphysisch jedem Punkte aus in der diesem Punkte life is not
entsprechenden Weise ergriffen und ge-
clearly outstaltet werden kann.¹ a satisfactory explanation of

Thus, basic in Troeltsch's whole position is a religious con-
fidence in the unity and meaning of reality.¹ To achieve the in-
feeling of unity with God and the infinite power behind his-re-
tory is the highest goal of human wisdom, but this is more, he
admits, than philosophy of history.²

been pointed out, there is no clear criterion of truth for the
measurement of value. E. Religious Monadology

unstated. Troeltsch's religious monadology is fundamentally a per-
sonalistic world view.³ Ultimate reality is conceived to be a
personal pluralism with the finite monads metaphysically ap-
grounded in the Absolute Person. This monadology is, in the
second place, more than merely an intellectual construct. The
monads are empirically conceived as the concrete centers of
historical experience. Moreover, the monad is a concrete uni-
versal, a universalizing particular, preserving unity and iden-
tity in the midst of changing experiences. Finally, the intui-
tions which the monads experience are conceived synoptically.

11110 However, this view presents several obvious difficulties.
The participation of the finite in the infinite is only vague-
ly described. 11 fact universal, or at least implicit in all
Epistemologically viewed, the participation
truth, a truth which might easily depend
seems to be at once dualistic and monistic.⁵ Troeltsch's meta-
logic seems to be an unnecessary confusion of epistemology and

1. GS, III, 212.

2. Ibid., 113, 695.

Jedem Punkte aus in der diesen Punkte
entsprechenden Weise ergreifen und ge-
statet werden kann.¹

Thus, basic in Troeltsch's whole position is a religious con-
fidence in the unity and meaning of reality. To achieve the
feeling of unity with God and the infinite power behind his-
tory is the highest goal of human wisdom, but this is more, he
admits, than philosophy of history.²

E. Religious Monadology

Troeltsch's religious monadology is fundamentally a per-
sonalistic world view. Ultimate reality is conceived to be a
personal pluralism with the finite monads metaphysically
grounded in the Absolute Person. This monadology is, in the
second place, more than merely an intellectual construct. The
monads are empirically conceived as the concrete centers of
historical experience. Moreover, the monad is a concrete uni-
versal, a universalizing particular, preserving unity and iden-
tity in the midst of changing experiences. Finally, the insti-
tutions which the monads experience are conceived synoptically.
However, this view presents several obvious difficulties.
The participation of the finite in the infinite is only vaguely
described. Epistemologically viewed, the participation
seems to be at once dualistic and monistic. Troeltsch's meta-
logic seems to be an unnecessary confusion of epistemology and

1. GS, III, 212.
2. Ibid., III, 222.

metaphysics. Moreover, the nature of the divine life is not clearly outlined, nor do we have a satisfactory explanation of intuition and God's relation to that intuition. Though a universalizing particular, the monad's inner relationships within the finite monad of form and content, reason and the affective life, are not clearly explained. Indeed, the whole conception of reason is much too rigid and abstract. Finally, as has been pointed out, there is no clear criterion of truth for the measurement of values, while personality itself is left in the unstable position of being not universally valid as a basic concept, but only a product of Western thought. Such a view gives very little assistance as a way out of historical skepticism.

Troeltsch's thought moved constantly in the direction of individualistic relativism. This tendency can be illustrated conclusively in his treatment of the absoluteness of Christianity. The development of his thought on this question is clearly outlined in the last volume which came from his pen.¹ In his earlier book, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte,² he stated the problem as follows:

not whether Christianity was as a matter of fact universal, or at least implicit in all religion, but whether it possessed ultimate truth, a truth which might easily depend upon a single instance of itself.³

1. CT, 9-35.

2. Published 1902.

3. CT, 16.

103, 92, 106, 122, 127, 146.
For English translation see STCC, II, 1004-1005.

metaphysics. Moreover, the nature of the divine life is not clearly outlined, nor do we have a satisfactory explanation of intuition and God's relation to that intuition. Through a unitary, universal, the world's inner relationships within the finite world of form and content, reason and the affective life, are not clearly explained. Indeed, the whole conception of reason is much too rigid and abstract. Finally, as has been pointed out, there is no clear criterion of truth for the measurement of values, while personally itself is left in the unstable position of being not universally valid as a basic concept, but only a product of Western thought. Such a view gives very little assistance as a way out of historical skepticism.

Troeltsch's thought moves constantly in the direction of individualistic relativism. This tendency can be illustrated conclusively in his treatment of the epistemology of Christianity. The development of his thought on this question is clearly outlined in the last volume which came from his pen. In his earlier book, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Historizität, he stated the problem as follows:

Not whether Christianity was as a matter of fact universal, or at least implicit in all religion, but whether it possessed ultimate truth, a truth which might easily depend upon a single instance of itself.

1. CT, 9-38.
2. Published 1902.
3. CT, 10, 1-2.

So far as Christianity was concerned, its claim to universal validity could only be felt and believed, in the first instance, and must be confirmed retrospectively through its genuine ability to furnish a solution of the various problems of life.¹ Such a point of ultimate validity he believed himself to have found in Christianity's faith in revelation and in the kind of claim it makes to truth.² On this basis he compared it with other religions. What is peculiar about the former is the purely human character of its religious ideal, which appeals to the simplest, the most general, the most personal and spiritual needs of mankind. Moreover, it depends for its evidences upon an overwhelming manifestation of God in the persons and lives of the great prophets.

It was not a theory but a life - not a social order but a power. It owes its claim to universal validity not to the correctness of its reasoning nor to the conclusiveness of its proofs, but to God's revelation of Himself in human hearts and lives.³

In his Soziallehren (1912), he made a number of statements about the abiding characteristics of Christianity.⁴

1. Das christliche Ethos allein auf Grund seines personalistischen Theismus hat einen metaphysisch begründeten, durch keinen Naturalismus und keinen Pessimismus zerstörbaren Persönlichkeits- und Individualitätsgedanken.
2. Der christliche Ethos allein hat auf Grund seines

1. CT, 16-17.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., 20; cf. ACR, 103, 92, 106, 122, 127, 146.

4. GS, I, 978-979. For English translation see STCC, II, 1004-1005.

So far as Christianity was concerned, its claim to universal validity could only be felt and believed, in the first instance, and must be confirmed retrospectively through its general ability to furnish a solution of the various problems of life. 1. Such a point of ultimate validity he believed himself to have found in Christianity's faith in revelation and in the kind of claim it makes to truth. 2. On this basis he compared it with other religions. What is peculiar about the former is the purely human character of its religious ideal, which appeals to the simplest, the most general, the most personal and spiritual needs of mankind. Moreover, it depends for its evidences upon an overwhelming manifestation of God in the persons and lives of the great prophets.

It was not a theory but a life - not a social order but a power. It owes its claim to universal validity not to the correctness of its reasoning nor to the conclusiveness of its proofs, but to God's revelation of Himself in human hearts and lives. 3.

In his Soziallehren (1912), he made a number of statements

about the abiding characteristics of Christianity. 4.

1. Das christliche Ethos allein auf Grund seines personalistischen Theismus mit einem metaphysisch begründeten, durch keinen Naturalismus und keinen Positivismus zerstörbaren Persönlichkeits- und Individualitätsgehalt.
2. Der christliche Ethos allein hat auf Grund seines

1. CT, 16-17.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Ibid., 20; cf. AGR, 103, 92, 106, 123, 127, 146.
 4. GS, I, 278-279. For English translation see STCG, II, 1004-1005.

Gedankens von einer allen zugewandten und alle in sich vereinigenden göttlichen Liebe einen wirklich unerschütterlichen Sozialismus.

3. Nur das christliche Ethos ueberwindet das Gleichheits- und Ungleichheitsproblem, indem es weder im Sinne der Auslese die Gewalt und den Zufall verherrlicht, noch im Sinne der egalitären Doktrin die Wirklichkeit vergewaltigt. Es nimmt die Verschiedenheit der Lebenslagen, der Kräfte und der Fähigkeiten als einen von Gottes unerforschlichen Willen gestifteten Zusammenhang hin, den die innere Hebung der Persönlichkeit und die gegenseitigen Verbundenheitsgefühle in einen ethischen Kosmos verwandeln.
4. Das christliche Ethos leistet kraft der christlichen Persönlichkeitsschätzung und Liebe etwas, was keine noch so gerechte und rationelle Gesellschaftsordnung völlig entbehren kann, weil in ihr immer unberechenbare Leiden, Nöte, und Krankheiten uebrig bleiben, die Karität.
5. Das christliche Ethos stellt allem sozialen Leben und Streben ein Ziel vor Augen, das ueber allen Relativitäten des irdischen Lebens hinausliegt und im Verhältnis zu dem alles nur Annäherungswerte darstellt. Der Gedanke des Gottesreiches der Zukunft, der nichts anderes ist als der Gedanke der endgültigen Verwirklichung des Absoluten.

These conclusions are an acknowledgement of the validity of a personalistic metaphysics and an identification of it with Christianity. Even in his later discussions he did not withdraw from the practical standpoint here evolved. From a theoretical point of view, however, he made certain modifications:

My scruples arise from the fact that, whilst the significance for history of the concept of Individuality impresses me more forcibly every day, I no longer believe this to be so easily reconcilable with that of supreme validity.¹

Troeltsch was more and more impressed by the historical condi-

1. CT, 21-22.

... Gedanken von einer allen zugewandten und alle in sich vereinigen göttlichen Liebe einen wirklich ...

3. War das christliche Ethos notwendig das Gleich- heits- und Ungleichheitsproblem, indem es weder im Sinne der Analyse die Gewalt und den Kampf verheißt, noch im Sinne der egalitären Doktrin die Wirklichkeit vergewaltigt. Es nimmt die Verschie- denheit der Lebenslagen, der Kräfte und der Fähig- keiten als einen von Gottes unerschöpflichen Willen gestifteten Zusammenhang hin, den die innere Hebung der Persönlichkeit und die gegenseitigen Verbunden- heitsgefühle in einen ethischen Kosmos verwandeln.

4. Das christliche Ethos leistet Kraft der christlichen Persönlichkeitsethik und Liebe etwas, was keine noch so gerechte und rationale Gesellschaftsordnung völlig antworten kann, weil in ihm immer unersätt- liche Leiden, Mühe, und Krankheiten wehrig bleiben.

5. Das christliche Ethos stellt allem sozialen Leben und Streben ein Ziel vor Augen, das weder allein Relativitäten des irdischen Lebens hinanreißt und im Verhältnis zu dem alles nur Annäherungswerte dar- stellt. Der Gedanke des Gottesreiches der Zukunft, der nichts anderes ist als der Gedanke der endgi- ltigen Verwirklichung des Absoluten.

These conclusions are an acknowledgment of the validity of a personalistic metaphysics and an identification of it with Christianity. Even in his later discussions he did not with- draw from the practical standpoint here evolved. From a the- oretical point of view, however, he made certain modifications:

My scruples arise from the fact that, whilst the significance for history of the concept of individuality impresses me more forcibly every day, I no longer believe this to be so easily reconcilable with that of supreme validity.

These facts were more and more impressed by the historical condi-

The effect of these considerations upon his earlier views tionedness and individuality of Christianity, both in its several forms in church, sect, and mysticism, and as a whole.

Frederick summarizes as follows. The Christian religion stands or falls with European civilization. The individual character of it, always depends upon the intellectual, social, and national conditions among which it exists.¹

On the other hand, As for the conception of personality, it is part of a study of the non-Christian religions convinced me more and more that their naive claims to absolute validity are genuinely such. I found Buddhism and Brahmanism especially to be really humane and spiritual religions, capable of appealing in precisely the same way to the inner certitude and devotion of their followers as Christianity.²

The author then confesses that in his Der Historismus und seine Probleme he encountered the same difficulties in connection with the development of political, social, ethical, aesthetic, and scientific ideals, as he had in the field of religion.

Indeed, even the validity of science and logic seemed to exhibit, under different skies and upon different soil, strong individual differences present even in their deepest and innermost rudiments. What was really common to mankind, and universally valid for it, seemed, in spite of general kinship and capacity for mutual understanding, to be at bottom exceedingly little, and to belong more to the province of material goods than to the ideal values of civilization.³

1. CT, 24.

1. CT, 21-22.

2. Ibid., 22-23.

3. Ibid., 23-24.

5. Ibid., 26.

tionedness and individuality of Christianity, both in its sev-
eral forms in church, sect, and mysticism, and as a whole.

A religion, in the several forms assumed by
it, always depends upon the intellectual,
social, and national conditions among which
it exists.¹

On the other hand,

a study of the non-Christian religions con-
vinced me more and more that their naive
claims to absolute validity are genuinely
such. I found Buddhism and Brahmanism
especially to be really humane and spir-
itual religions, capable of appealing in
precisely the same way to the inner certifi-
cated and devotion of their followers as
Christianity.²

The author then confesses that in his Der Historismus und
seine Probleme he encountered the same difficulties in connec-
tion with the development of political, social, ethical, aes-
thetic, and scientific ideas, as he had in the field of re-

ligion.

Indeed, even the validity of science and
logic seemed to exhibit, under different
skies and upon different soil, strong
individual differences present even in
their deepest and innermost rudiments.
What was really common to mankind, and
universally valid for it, seemed, in spite
of general kinship and capacity for mutual
understanding, to be at bottom exceedingly
little, and to belong more to the province
of material goods than to the ideal values
of civilization.³

-
1. Cf. 21-22.
 2. Ibid., 22-23.
 3. Ibid., 23-24.

The effect of these considerations upon his earlier views Troeltsch summarizes as follows. The Christian religion stands or falls with European civilization. The individual character of the latter and also of the former comes more into the foreground, while the idea of supreme validity falls into the background.¹ As for the conception of personality, it is part of our de-orientalized Christianity.² What remains of Christianity's primary claim to validity is the fact that only through it have we become what we are and "that only in it can we preserve the religious forces that we need."³ Such a view, we may add, vitiates practically all of the demands of the religious a priori and the majestic conclusions of his Sozial-lehren. What is this, we may ask, but Troeltsch's Platonism surrendering to James' empiricism and then empiricism surrendering to the historical flux?⁴ Our life, says Troeltsch, is a compromise, a compromise every day to be renewed at every fresh turning of the road.

Even here, however, the author gathers together the scattered forces of belief and maintains that Christianity must, in some degree, be a manifestation of the Divine Life. The evidence for this is our own inner experience; this is the criterion of its validity. But then, it is only valid for us.⁵

1. CT, 24.

2. Ibid., 24-25.

3. Ibid., 25.

4. Ibid.; cf. 128, "History within itself cannot be transcended."

5. Ibid., 26.

The effect of these considerations upon his earlier views
 Troeltsch summarizes as follows. The Christian religion
 stands or falls with European civilization. The individual
 character of the latter and also of the former comes more into
 the foreground, while the idea of supreme validity falls into
 the background.¹ As for the conception of personality, it is
 part of our de-orientalized Christianity.² What remains of
 Christianity's primary claim to validity is the fact that only
 through it have we become what we are and "that only in it can
 we preserve the religious forces that we need."³ Such a view,
 we may add, violates practically all of the demands of the re-
 ligious a priori and the negative conclusions of his Social-
 ism. What is this, we may ask, but Troeltsch's historicism
 surrendering to James' empiricism and then empiricism surren-
 dering to the historical theory? Our life, says Troeltsch, is
 a compromise, a compromise every day to be renewed at every
 fresh turning of the road.
 Even here, however, the author gathers together the scat-
 tered forces of belief and maintains that Christianity must,
 in some degree, be a manifestation of the Divine life. The
 evidence for this is our own inner experience; this is the
 criterion of its validity. But then, it is only valid for us.⁴

1. *Ibid.*, 24-25.
 2. *Ibid.*, 24-25.
 3. *Ibid.*, 25.
 4. *Ibid.*, 27, 128, "History within itself cannot be
 transcended."
 5. *Ibid.*, 26.

It is final because we have nothing else.¹ Christianity is the truth, but a truth for us,² a truth which is final only within the Individual Totality in which we find ourselves. And so it is of all the other values.

III. Der Europäismus

Since Christianity is so closely related in Troeltsch's thought to the whole spiritual and cultural development of European civilization,³ it is well to close with a brief exposition of Europäismus. This concept is the constructive aspect of his thought which combines the Individual Totality of the past and present with the future development of the same. It is the cultural synthesis. In order to obtain a clear conception of it, we must differentiate it from the idea of Humanity. The latter may be an ethical ideal, but it is not a spiritual unity, and accordingly has no unified development.⁴ A real historical object is possible only in so far as it meets the requirements of the Individual Totality and of the principles of development which we have explained above.⁵

Es gibt für uns nur eine Weltgeschichte, des Europäertums. Der alte Gedanke der Weltgeschichte muss neue und bescheidenere Formen annehmen.⁶

1. CT, 26.

2. Ibid., 34.

3. Ibid., 30.

4. GS, III, 706.

5. Ibid., 707.

6. Ibid., 708.

It is final because we have nothing else.¹ Christianity is the truth, but a truth for us,² a truth which is final only within the Individual Totality in which we find ourselves. And so it is of all the other values.

III. Der Europäismus

Since Christianity is so closely related in Treitschke's thought to the whole spiritual and cultural development of European civilization,³ it is well to close with a brief exposition of Europäismus. This concept is the constructive aspect of his thought which combines the Individual Totality of the past and present with the future development of the same. It is the cultural synthesis. In order to obtain a clear conception of it, we must differentiate it from the idea of Humanity. The latter may be an ethical ideal, but it is not a spiritual unity, and accordingly has no unified development.⁴ A real historical object is possible only in so far as it meets the requirements of the Individual Totality and of the principles of development which we have explained above.⁵

Es gibt nur eine Weltgeschichte, die des Europäismus. Der alte Gedanke der Weltgeschichte muss neue und beachtendere Formen annehmen.⁶

- 1. Cf. 28.
- 2. Ibid., 34.
- 3. Ibid., 30.
- 4. Cf. III, 708.
- 5. Ibid., 707.
- 6. Ibid., 708.

The European world rests on the basis of the ancient world and cannot be separated from it,¹ Moreover, the criterion according to which history can be most successfully divided into periods will be the socio-economic-politico-juristic substructure.² This method concedes more to Marx's economic interpretation than any of Troeltsch's earlier writings,² and less to Hegel. According to this method, the beginnings of modern times are placed in the epoch of the amazing expansion of Europe, of the rise of modern national states, of capitalist economy, of colonial expansion, of spiritual autonomy, and of scientific thinking. It was the period of the practical application of the mind to material tasks.

Die eigentliche Neuzeit ist doch erst geboren aus dem Bruch mit dem Absolutismus und dem Konfessionalismus.³

In the Europäismus of the future, there will be, however, several lines of influence from the developing past which reach farther back than the period just alluded to. The first of these is the Jewish Prophets and the Bible.⁴ A second great element is classical Hellenism. A third significant influence is ancient imperialism; and the fourth is the Western Middle Ages. Prophetism contributed the transformation of national religious ideals into an ethic of humanity. Its com-

1. GS, III, 716.

2. Ibid., 756; cf. above, Ch. IV; cf. also GS, IV, 7.

3. Ibid., 762-763.

4. Ibid., 765-766.

The European world rests on the basis of the ancient world and cannot be separated from it.¹ Moreover, the criteria according to which history can be most successfully divided into periods will be the socio-economic-political-juridical structures.² This method concedes more to Marx's economic interpretation than any of Troeltsch's earlier writings,³ and less to Hegel. According to this method, the beginnings of modern times are placed in the epoch of the massive expansion of Europe, of the rise of modern national states, of capitalist economy, of colonial expansion, of spiritual autonomy, and of scientific thinking. It was the period of the practical application of the mind to material tasks.

Die eigentliche Neuzeit ist doch erst geboren aus dem Kampf mit dem Absolutismus und dem Konfessionalismus.³

In the Europäismus of the future, there will be, however, several lines of influence from the developing past which reach farther back than the period just alluded to. The first of these is the Jewish Prophets and the Bible.⁴ A second great element is classical Hellenism. A third significant influence is ancient imperialism; and the fourth is the Western Middle Ages. Prophetism contributed the transformation of national religious ideals into an ethic of humanity. Its com-

1. GS. III, 716.
2. Ioh. 1, 755; cf. above, Ch. IV; cf. also GS. IV, 7.
3. Ioh. 1, 753-754.
4. Ioh. 1, 753-754.

bination with Christianity gave to prophetism and the Bible an enormous influence in the western world. Classical Hellenism was the source for free artistic education and culture. Ancient imperialism formed the basis for civil government and contributed the idea of the closed military and bureaucratic empire-state, and also a world religion. That which the Middle Ages contributed is threefold; 1) its inwardness, 2) its striving for infinity (Unendlichkeitsdrang), and 3) its political and social institutions.¹

What the concrete cultural synthesis will be Troeltsch does not venture to outline. In the closing chapter of his Christian Thought he expresses the belief that the World War "has not proved a turning-point in history, but simply one episode among others."² There are four alternatives which present themselves for the future of Europe: 1) the renunciation of idealism, 2) an exclusively spiritual solution, 3) a single world-empire, and 4) a League of Nations.³

Der Historismus und seine Probleme was to have been the first volume of a two volume work. Of the second volume only that was published which constituted the five lectures which compose Christian Thought. If these lectures are a fair indication of the positive thought of the proposed second volume, then the conclusion seems evident that Troeltsch did not think

1. GS, III, 765-767.

2. CT, 150.

3. Ibid., 151-158.

mination with Christianity gave to prophetism and the Bible an enormous influence in the western world. Classical Hellenism was the source for free artistic education and culture. Aristocratic imperialism formed the basis for civil government and contributed the idea of the closed military and bureaucratic empire-state, and also a world religion. That which the Middle Ages contributed is threefold: 1) its inwardness, 2) its striving for infinity (Unendlichkeitstreben), and 3) its political and social institutions.¹

What the concrete cultural syntheses will be Troeltsch does not venture to outline. In the closing chapter of his Christian Thought he expresses the belief that the World War "has not proved a turning-point in history, but simply one episode among others."² There are four alternatives which present themselves for the future of Europe: 1) the renunciation of idealism, 2) an exclusively spiritual solution, 3) a single world-empire, and 4) a League of Nations.³

Der Historismus und seine Probleme was to have been the first volume of a two volume work. Of the second volume only that was published which constituted the five lectures which compose Christian Thought. If these lectures are a fair indication of the positive thought of the proposed second volume, then the conclusion seems evident that Troeltsch did not think

1. GS. III, 765-767.
 2. Cf. 150.
 3. Ibid., 151-152.

his way out of the inescapable skepticism and relativism which he was fighting so hard to avoid, and the principle of Individual Totalities has not completely vindicated itself.

Wir kennen in Wahrheit nur uns selbst und verstehen nur unser eigenes Sein und deshalb auch nur unsere eigene Entwicklung.... Eine Reise um die Welt mag der kürzeste Weg sein, zu sich selbst zu kommen. Wir kommen auf diesem Wege aber doch immer nur vor- gleichend und lernend eben zu uns selbst.¹

II. Troeltsch does not adequately relate cause and chance in the natural sciences to time and cause in historical sciences, leaving too sharp a cleavage between science with its conception of modernity and law and history with its idea of development.

III. In his interpretation of historical development as a creative, teleological, and temporal process within the limits of Individual Totalities, Troeltsch has produced a successful synthesis of Hegel, Bergson, Marx, and Dilthey.

IV. Troeltsch's attempt to solve the problem of the epistemological relationship between the individual person in the Individual Totality and the rest of reality by an appeal to intuition (epistemological teleology) is not successful because intuition is not a synthesizing principle.

V. Troeltsch fails to find an adequate foundation for norms in interpreting history and in constructing a cultural synthesis. This is due chiefly to four causes:

1. GS, III, 709.

and its relation to the materials of experience and to time.

B. An overemphasis on the unique significance and status of each cultural individuality.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions of the Dissertation

I. Troeltsch presents and successfully defends the principle of Individual Totalities in history as over against the atomistic principles of the natural sciences.

II. Troeltsch does not adequately relate time and cause in the natural sciences to time and cause in historical science, leaving too sharp a cleavage between science with its conception of mechanistic law and history with its idea of development.

III. In his interpretation of historical development as a creative, teleological, and temporal process within the limits of Individual Totalities, Troeltsch has effected a successful synthesis of Hegel, Bergson, Marx, and Rickert.

IV. Troeltsch's attempt to solve the problem of the epistemological relationship between the individual person in the Individual Totality and the rest of reality by an appeal to intuitionist monadology (metalogic) is not successful because intuition is not a self-validating principle.

V. Troeltsch fails to find an adequate foundation for norms in interpreting history and in constructing a cultural synthesis. This is due chiefly to four causes:

A. A too abstract conception of the nature of reason

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions of the Dissertation

- I. Troeltsch presents and successfully defends the principle of Individual Totalities in history as over against the atomistic principles of the natural sciences.
- II. Troeltsch does not adequately relate time and cause in the natural sciences to time and cause in historical science, leaving too sharp a cleavage between science with its conception of mechanistic law and history with its idea of development.
- III. In his interpretation of historical development as a creative, teleological, and temporal process within the limits of Individual Totalities, Troeltsch has effected a successful synthesis of Hegel, Bergson, Marx, and Rickert.
- IV. Troeltsch's attempt to solve the problem of the epistemological relationship between the individual person in the Individual Totality and the rest of reality by an appeal to institutional monadology (metaphysic) is not successful because institution is not a self-validating principle.
- V. Troeltsch fails to find an adequate foundation for norms in interpreting history and in constructing a cultural synthesis. This is due chiefly to four causes:
 - A. A too abstract conception of the nature of reason

and its relation to the materials of experience and to time.

B. An overemphasis on the unique significance and status of each cultural Individual Totality.

C. An appeal to intuition which is not an adequate principle for the validation of historical norms.

D. An appeal to the historical a priori which fails to ground the values of the cultural synthesis and eventuates in a mere Evidenzgefühl.

VI. The tendency of Troeltsch's thought is constantly in the direction of historical relativism.

VII. Troeltsch's religious personalism leads to skepticism in that the concept of personality is held to be not universally valid and basic but only true for Western thought.

These four questions constituted the general subject of our study.

We noted also in the Introductory Chapter that the problems of the Individual Totalities history developed gradually in Troeltsch's mind as a result of historical research and that his discussion of them represented his maturest thought. Then we noted the views of a number of critics whose discussions bear on this question. These critics were Hintze, Hübner, Tölgel, Heinemann, Hübner, von Hügel, and von Hentze.

In the Second Chapter we presented Troeltsch's principles of historiography. The former begins as an empirical science interested in the problem of causation. The latter, how-

and its relation to the materials of experience and to time.

B. An overemphasis on the unique significance and status of each cultural individual totality.

C. An appeal to intuition which is not an adequate principle for the validation of historical norms.

D. An appeal to the historical a priori which fails to ground the values of the cultural synthesis and events in a more fundamental.

VI. The tendency of Troeltsch's thought is consistently in the direction of historical relativism.

VII. Troeltsch's religious personalism leads to skepticism in that the concept of personality is held to be not universally valid and basic but only true for western thought.

ever, raises a number of epistemological and metaphysical questions which involve us in the whole discussion of the philosophy of history. We

SUMMARY

The problem to which this investigation has been devoted is the nature of Individual Totalities in Ernst Troeltsch's philosophy of history. In the introductory Chapter we indicated that such a study involved raising four questions: 1) What are Troeltsch's principles of historical research and his methods of historiography? 2) What are the structure and the function of the Individual Totality? 3) How are we to conceive of the process of development in the Individual Totality? 4) How are the norms of interpretation and the values of the cultural synthesis to be validated in the light of the principle of the Individual Totality? These four questions constituted the general outline of our study.

We noted also in the Introductory Chapter that the problems of the Individual Totality in history developed gradually in Troeltsch's mind after years of historical research and that his discussion of them represent his maturest thought. Then we noted the views of a number of critics whose discussions bear on this question. Chief among these were Hintze, Liebert, Tillich, Heinemann, Lyman, von Hügel, and von Rintelen.

In the Second Chapter we presented Troeltsch's principles of historiography. Historiography begins as an empirical science interested in the problem of causation. The latter, how-

SUMMARY

The problem to which this investigation has been devoted is the nature of Individual Totalities in Ernst Troeltsch's philosophy of history. In the introductory Chapter we indicated that such a study involved raising four questions: 1) What are Troeltsch's principles of historical research and his methods of historiography? 2) What are the structure and function of the Individual Totality? 3) How are we to conceive of the process of development in the Individual Totality? 4) How are the norms of interpretation and the values of the cultural synthesis to be validated in the light of the principle of the Individual Totality? These four questions constituted the general outline of our study.

We noted also in the introductory Chapter that the problem of the Individual Totality in history developed gradually in Troeltsch's mind after years of historical research and that his discussion of them represent his maturest thought. Then we noted the views of a number of critics whose discussions bear on this question. Chief among these were Hintze, Liebert, Tillych, Heinemann, Lyman, von Hugel, and von Rintelen.

In the second Chapter we presented Troeltsch's principles of historiography. Historiography begins as an empirical science interested in the problem of causation. The latter, however,

ever, raises a number of epistemological and metaphysical questions which involve us in the whole discussion of the philosophy of history. We then proceeded to show what sharp differences exist between the study of nature and the investigation of history indicating the fleeting character of historical processes over against the closed mathematical and causal system of nature. The case for naturalism we found transcended in three ways: 1) by a consideration of metalogic, 2) by a consideration of psychology, and 3) by a consideration of the philosophy of nature. One of the chief aids in Troeltsch's solution of the problem was the position of Rickert who propounded the principle of individual causation. We showed wherein Troeltsch accepted Rickert and wherein he went beyond him. In the investigation of history we showed how Troeltsch appealed to the principle of contingency and its basic significance in understanding the unique quality of historical events. At the end of the chapter we pointed out that Troeltsch's conception of physical cause was Kantian and that therefore he was not able to reconcile history with science under a common point of view. Like cause, so too time was left in a state of abstraction, for Troeltsch did not relate coherently the physical time of the sciences to the concrete duration of history. Then we showed how this difficulty has been overcome in some recent conceptions of modern science.

theories of the positivists, and the position of Rickert. We

ever, raises a number of epistemological and metaphysical questions which involve us in the whole discussion of the philosophy of history. We then proceeded to show what sharp differences exist between the study of nature and the investigation of history indicating the fleeting character of historical processes over against the closed mathematical and causal system of nature. The case for naturalism we found transcended in three ways: 1) by a consideration of metaphysics, 2) by a consideration of psychology, and 3) by a consideration of the philosophy of nature. One of the chief aids in Troeltsch's solution of the problem was the position of Rickert who propounded the principle of individual causation. We showed wherein Troeltsch accepted Rickert and wherein he went beyond him. In the investigation of history we showed how Troeltsch appealed to the principle of contingency and its basic significance in understanding the unique quality of historical events. At the end of the chapter we pointed out that Troeltsch's conception of physical cause was Kantian and that therefore he was not able to reconcile history with science under a common point of view. Like cause, so too time was left in a state of abstraction, for Troeltsch did not relate coherently the physical time of the sciences to the concrete duration of history. Then we showed how this difficulty has been overcome in some recent conceptions of modern science.

In Chapter Three we described some of the chief characteristics of the Individual Totalities. We dealt in turn with the following: Originality, Representation, Unity of Meaning and Value, Common-Spirit, the Unconscious, Creativity, and Indeterminism. We traced the relationship of the Individual Totality to Hegel's Objective Spirit and explained Troeltsch's treatment of the relationship between the individual person and the Common-Spirit by an appeal to Hartmann's outline of that problem. We agreed with Troeltsch that the Individual Totality has an objective status in reality and that history presents us with genuine Gestalten. Then we noted that the creative and spontaneous sources of history are found in individual personalities and that the latter are the bearers of the Common-Spirit and the basis for the unity of meaning and value which the Individual Totality exhibits.

Chapter Four was devoted to an investigation of the logic of historical development. Here we first traced the various and sundry meanings and applications of the term development, showing that the contrariety of usage necessitated a clarification of the concept if the term were to be applied to historical process. After showing the differences between historical development and evolution and progress, we presented four of Troeltsch's studies in the field of philosophical criticism, viz., Hegel's dialectic, Marx's dialectic, the theories of the Positivists, and the position of Rickert. We

quote epistemological principle.

In Chapter Three we described some of the chief characteristics of the Individual Totalities. We dealt in turn with the following: Originality, Representation, Unity of Meaning and Value, Common-Spirit, the Unconscious, Creativity, and Individualism. We traced the relationship of the Individual Totality to Hegel's Objective Spirit and explained Troeltsch's treatment of the relationship between the individual person and the Common-Spirit by an appeal to Hartmann's outline of that problem. We agreed with Troeltsch that the Individual Totality has an objective status in reality and that history presents us with genuine Gestalten. Then we noted that the creative and spontaneous sources of history are found in individual personalities and that the latter are the bearers of the Common-Spirit and the basis for the unity of meaning and value which the Individual Totality exhibits. In Chapter Four we devoted to an investigation of the logic of historical development. Here we first traced the various and sundry meanings and applications of the term development, showing that the contrary of usage necessitated a clarification of the concept if the term were to be applied to historical process. After showing the differences between historical development and evolution and progress, we presented some of Troeltsch's studies in the field of philosophical criticism, viz., Hegel's dialectic, Marx's dialectic, the theories of the Positivists, and the position of Rickert. We

noted that Troeltsch had a high admiration for Hegel because of his sense for the original, living, individual, and contradictory facts of history. What Troeltsch rejected in Hegel was his tendency toward the Spinozistic philosophy of identity. We noted further that Troeltsch found much in Marx with which he was in agreement, especially his realistic analysis of the capitalist system and his projection of development into the future. What vitiated Marx's position was his exclusively monistic economic interpretation of the dialectic. Turning from Hegel and Marx to the Positivists we showed how Troeltsch rejected almost completely the whole Positivistic historical dynamic because it violated the principle of Individual Totalities by its social atomism and by its inadequate conception of time. Then we took account of Troeltsch's criticism of Rickert, indicating how the conception of the Individual Totality is dependent on Rickert's work, but that the latter failed to account for the temporal and developmental dynamic of historical wholes. Rickert's Kantian conception of cause and time, when applied to history, Troeltsch rejected. Moreover, his system of values was too formal, contemplative, and subjective. Next we outlined Troeltsch's own creative, temporal, and teleological conception of development. At the close of the chapter we showed that the epistemology upon which Troeltsch built his views was closely related to Leibniz' monadology, but that the appeal to intuition was not an adequate epistemological principle.

noted that Troeltsch had a high admiration for Hegel because
 of his sense for the original, living, individual, and con-
 tradictory facts of history. What Troeltsch rejected in Hegel
 was his tendency toward the Epistemologic philosophy of identity.
 We noted further that Troeltsch found much in Marx with which
 he was in agreement, especially his realistic analysis of the
 capitalist system and his projection of development into the
 future. What vitiated Marx's position was his exclusively
 monistic economic interpretation of the dialectic. Turning
 from Hegel and Marx to the positivists we showed how Troeltsch
 rejected almost completely the whole positivistic historical
 dynamic because it violated the principle of individual to-
 talities by its social atomism and by its inadequate concep-
 tion of time. Then we took account of Troeltsch's criticism
 of Rickert, indicating how the conception of the individual
 totality is dependent on Rickert's work, but that the latter
 failed to account for the temporal and developmental dynamic
 of historical wholes. Rickert's Kantian conception of cause
 and time, when applied to history, Troeltsch rejected. More-
 over, his system of values was too formal, contemplative, and
 subjective. Next we outlined Troeltsch's own creative, tem-
 poral, and teleologic conception of development. At the
 close of the chapter we showed that the epistemology upon
 which Troeltsch built his views was closely related to Leibniz's
 monadology, but that the appeal to intuition was not an ade-
 quate epistemological principle.

The last chapter we devoted to the question of the cultural synthesis. We tried to show that Troeltsch failed to give an adequate foundation for an abiding system of values in history and that accordingly the principle of Individual Totalities breaks down at a crucial point. Our line of argument was first to show the practical nature of the philosophy of history and the problems which arise from a consideration of cultural syntheses. The crux of the matter lies in the relationship of philosophy to the norms of history. Here the unique status of the Individual Totality is significant. It is the locus for controlling and damming the stream of history. We then proceeded to show that Troeltsch's view regarding historical and cultural norms changed from an avowed Platonism of his earlier years to a more skeptical individualism. In trying to find inner-historical norms Troeltsch rejects all absolute universal material norms in history and appeals to intuition and the a priori. The principle of intuition, we tried to point out, leads to insuperable difficulties and must be supplemented by other principles. Likewise, the a priori fails to serve as an adequate principle of validation. We traced the evolution of its use and meaning in Troeltsch's religious and historical writings and found that it eventuates in mere subjectivism. Turning to the consideration of ethics in the Individual Totality we found that personality was the basic principle. We noted, however, that

The last chapter we devoted to the question of the cultural synthesis. We tried to show that Troschak failed to give an adequate foundation for an adding system of values in history and that accordingly the principle of individual Totalities breaks down at a crucial point. Our line of argument was first to show the practical nature of the philosophy of history and the problems which arise from a consideration of cultural synthesis. The crux of the matter lies in the relationship of philosophy to the norms of history. Here the unique status of the Individual Totality is significant. It is the locus for controlling and damping the stream of history. We then proceeded to show that Troschak's view regarding historical and ethical norms changed from an avowed historicism of his earlier years to a more epistemic individualism. In trying to find inner-historical norms Troschak rejects all absolute universal material norms in history and appeals to intuition and the a priori. The principle of intuition, we tried to point out, leads to insuperable difficulties and must be supplemented by other principles. Like-wise, the a priori fails to serve as an adequate principle of validation. We traced the evolution of its use and meaning in Troschak's religious and historical writings and found that it oscillates in mere subjectivism. Turning to the consideration of ethics in the Individual Totality we found that personality was the basic principle. We noted, however, that

personality was regarded not as a universally valid conception, but was true only for Western thought. Then we pointed out that Troeltsch ultimately falls back on a religious solution of the problem and appeals to faith. But his religious personalism tends toward skepticism in that personality is not a universally valid principle. In his later writings he held that the Christian religion stands or falls with European civilization. Accordingly, we outlined the structure of der Europäismus which constitutes his idea of the cultural synthesis, but found that Troeltsch avoided any concrete presentation of it. We finally drew our study to a close with the conclusion that on the crucial problem of validating thought and value the Individual Totality had not vindicated itself.

personality was regarded not as a universally valid conception, but was true only for Western thought. Then we pointed out that Troeltsch ultimately falls back on a religious solution of the problem and appeals to faith. But his religious personalism tends toward skepticism in that personality is not a universally valid principle. In his later writings he held that the Christian religion stands on a false with European civilization. Accordingly, we outlined the structure of *der Euro-päismus* which constitutes his idea of the cultural synthesis, but found that Troeltsch avoided any concrete presentation of it. We finally drew our study to a close with the conclusion that on the crucial problem of validating thought and value the Individual Totality had not vindicated itself.

All references in the dissertation are to the abbreviations cited along the right hand margin of the bibliography. Troeltsch's Gesammelte Schriften are listed first; the others are listed in chronological order.

Gesammelte Schriften 4 Bds.

65

- I. Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen. 1912, 1922.
- II. Der Protestantismus, Religion, Ethik und Politik. 1913, 1922.
- III. Der Historismus und seine Probleme. 1922.
- IV. Aufsätze zur Religionsgeschichte und Religionssoziologie.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Trübner, J. C. B. Mohr, 1912-1922

Vorwort und Off. I. Troeltsch's Works

Untersuchung der Elemente der altprotestantischen Theologie. Frankfurt, 1891; 2. Aufl. 1901 als theol. Dissert., 1901.

"Die christliche Sozialanschauung und ihre Entwicklung." Leitachr. f. Ethik und Politik, 2. Jahrg. (1891/92), später 65, 74.

"Religion und Kirche." Frankf. Jahrb., 81 (1895), später 65, 71.

"Anglikanische Ethik." Frankf. Jahrb., 82 (1896), später 65, 71.

"Die Selbstständigkeit der Religion." Leitachr. f. Theol. u. Politik, 5. d. 6 (1896).

"Christentum und Religionsgeschichte." Frankf. Jahrb., 87 (1897), später 65, 71.

"Auffklärung," art. in Handb. d. protest. Theol., 1. Aufl., 2. Kirche, 2. 3. 1897, später 65, IV.

"Theismus," art. in Handb. d. protest. Theol., 1. Kirche, 2. 4. 1898, später 65, IV.

"Geschichte und Metaphysik," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 3 (1898); Erwiderung auf Karlens Schrift gegen "Die Selbständigkeit der Religion."

All references in the dissertation are to the abbreviations cited along the right hand margin of the bibliography. Troeltsch's Gesammelte Schriften are noted first; the others are listed in chronological order.

"Deutscher Idealismus," art. in Realencyclop. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 8, 1904; später GS, IV.

Gesammelte Schriften. 4 Bd. GS

I. Die Soziallehren der christlichen und Gruppen. 1912, 1923.

II. Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik. 1913, 1922.

III. Der Historismus und seine Probleme. 1922.

IV. Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie. 1925.

Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1912-1925.

GS, II.

Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Absolute Vernunft und Offenbarung bei J. Gerhard und Melancthon. GS

Untersuchung zur Geschichte der altprotestantischen Theologie. Göttingen; 1891; S. 1-46 auch als Gött. theol. Dissert., 1891.

1912.

"Die christliche Weltanschauung und ihre Gegenströmungen," Zeitschr. f. Theol. und Kirche, 3 und 4 (1893/94); später GS, II.

"Religion und Kirche," Preuss. Jhbb., 81 (1895); später GS, II.

"Atheistische Ethik," Preuss. Jhbb., 82 (1895); später GS, II.

"Die Selbständigkeit der Religion," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 5 u. 6 (1895).

"Christentum und Religionsgeschichte," Preuss. Jhbb., 87 (1897); später GS, II.

"Aufklärung," art. in Realencyclop. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 2, 1897; später GS, IV.

"Deismus," art. in Realencyclop. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 4, 1898; später GS, IV.

"Die theologische und philosophische Entwicklung des Christentums," Deutsche Monatsschr. f. d. ev. Leben und Wissenschaft, 1903; später GS, II.

All references in the dissertation are to the abbreviations cited along the right hand margin of the bibliography. Trösch's Gesamte Schriften are noted first; the others are listed in chronological order.

- Gesamte Schriften. 4 Bd.
I. Die Soziallehren der christlichen und Gruppen.
1912, 1923.
II. Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik. 1912, 1922.
III. Der Historismus und seine Probleme. 1922.
IV. Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie. 1923.
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1912-1923.

Vernunft und Offenbarung bei J. G. Herder und Melancthon.
Untersuchung zur Geschichte der altprotestantischen Theologie. Göttingen, 1891; 2. 1-46 auch als Gött. theol. Dissert., 1891.

"Die christliche Weltanschauung und ihre Gegenströmungen."
Zeitschr. f. Theol. und Kirche, 3 und 4 (1892/94);
später GS, II.

"Religion und Kirche," Preuss. Jbb., 81 (1895); später GS, II.

"Atheistische Ethik," Preuss. Jbb., 82 (1895); später GS, II.

"Die Selbständigkeit der Religion," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 3 u. 6 (1895).

"Christentum und Religionsgeschichte," Preuss. Jbb., 87 (1897); später GS, II.

"Aufklärung," art. in Realencycl. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 2, 1897; später GS, IV.

"Deismus," art. in Realencycl. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 4, 1898; später GS, IV.

"Geschichte und Metaphysik," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 8 (1898); Erwiderung auf Kaftans Angriff gegen "Die Selbständigkeit der Religion."

Richard Rothe. Heidelberger Gedächtnisrede. Tübingen; 1899.

"Richard Rothe," Nachruf; Christliche Welt, 13 (1899).

"Deutscher Idealismus," art. in Realencycl. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche³, Bd. 8, 1900; später GS, IV.

Die wissenschaftliche Lage und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie. Samml. gemeinverständl. Vorträge und Schriften aus Theol. u. Relig.-Gesch. 20. Tübingen; 1900.

"Ueber historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie," Theologische Arbeiten aus dem rheinischen wissenschaftl. Predigerverein, N. F., 4 H. Tübingen; 1900; später GS, II.

Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte. Tübingen, 1902; Teilabdruck, S. 50 bis 66, unter d. Titel "Die Bedeutung der Geschichte," in "Moderne Philosophie," herausgeb. v. Frischeisen-Köhler, 1907; 2. Aufl., i. Einzelheiten verb., Tübingen, 1912.

"Leibniz und die Anfänge des Pietismus," in Der Protestantismus am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, herausg. von Pastor C. Werckshagen, 1. Bd. Berlin; 1902; später GS, IV.

"Theologie und Religionswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts," Jahrb. des Freien deutschen Hochstifts Frankfurt a. M., 1902.

"Grundprobleme der Ethik. Erörtert aus Anlass von Hermanns Ethik," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 12 (1902); später GS, II.

"Englische Moralisten," art. in Realencycl. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche³, Bd. 13, 1903; später GS, IV.

"Religionswissenschaft und Theologie des 18. Jahrhunderts," Preuss. Jhbb., 114 (1903); später Teilabdruck in GS, IV, unter "Zusätze und handschriftliche Erweiterungen."

"Die theologische und religiöse Lage der Gegenwart," Deutsche Monatsschr. f. d. ges. Leben der Gegenwart, 1903; später GS, II.

"Die theologische und religiöse Lage der Gegenwart", Deutsche Monatschr. f. d. Ges. Leben der Gegenwart, 1903; später 68, II.

"Religionswissenschaft und Theologie des 18. Jahrhunderts", Kress. Jb. 114 (1903); später Teilabdruck in 68, IV, unter "Klassische und handschriftliche Erweiterungen."

"Englische Moralisten", art. in Realencyclop. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 13, 1903; später 68, IV.

"Grundprobleme der Ethik. Erstes aus Anlass von Hermann Ethik", Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 18 (1902); später 68, II.

"Theologie und Religionswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts", Jb. d. des Reiches des Reiches Hochschullehrer a. M., 1908.

"Lehrbuch und die Anfänge des Protestantismus", in Den Protestantismus am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, herausg. von Pastor G. Wersbagen, I. Bd. Berlin; 1902; später 68, IV.

"Moderne Philosophie", herausgeg. v. Wissenschaftler, Köhler, 1907; 2. Aufl., I. Einzelheiten verb., Tübingen, 1912.

"Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte", Tübingen, 1902; Teilabdruck, 8. 60 die 68, unter d. Titel "Die Bedeutung der Geschichte", in "Theologische Arbeiten aus dem rheinischen Wissenschaftl. Predigerverein, N. F., 4. H., Tübingen; 1900; später 68, II.

"Die wissenschaftliche Lage und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie", Samml. Gemeinverstandl. Vorträge und Schriften aus Theol. u. Rel.-Gesch. 20. Tübingen; 1900.

"Deutscher Idealismus", art. in Realencyclop. f. protest. Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 8, 1900; später 68, IV.

"Richard Rothe", Nachr. u. Christliche Welt, 13 (1899).

Richard Rothe, Heidelberger Gedächtnisrede, Tübingen; 1899.

"Geschichte und Metaphysik", Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 8 (1898); Erweiterung auf Karlens Anglii gegen "Die Selbstständigkeit der Religion."

"Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums'?" Christliche Welt, 17 (1903); später GS, II.

"Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie," im Anschluzz an H. Rickerts "Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung"; Theol. Rundschau, 6 (1903); später GS, II.

Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie. HKR
Zugleich ein Beitrag zu den Untersuchungen über Kants Philosophie der Geschichte. Berlin; 1904; Sonderabdruck aus Kantstudien, 9.

Religionsphilosophie, in Die Philosophie i. Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Kuno Fischer, 1904; 2. Aufl., i. Einzelh. vielfach verändert und bibliographisch ergänzt, 1907.

Politische Ethik und Christentum. Göttingen; 1904.

Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft. PER
Tübingen; 1905; 2. unveränderte Aufl., 1922.

Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Teil I, Abt. IV, i, I. Hälfte, 1906; 2. Aufl., kaum verändert, bibliographisch ergänzt, 1909; letztere wieder abgedr. GS, II.

Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit, in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Teil I, Abt. IV, i, II. Hälfte, 1906; 2. stark veränderte und erweiterte Aufl., 1909; neuer, selbständiger Abdr., mit "Nachtrag" zur Literatur, 1922.

Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt, Vortrag auf dem Stuttgarter Historikertage, 1906. Hist. Zeitschr., 97, auch Sonderabdruck; 2. Aufl., selbständig und stark erweitert, als "Historische Bibliothek" Bd. 24, München; 1911; 3. unveränderte Aufl., als "Beiheft 2" der Hist. Zeitschr., München, 1924; veränderte englische Ausg., under d. Titel Protestantism and Progress, 1912.

Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche, der staatliche Religionsunterricht und die theologischen Fakultäten. Heidelberger Akademische Rede, 1906; dann auch Tübingen; 1907.

"Die Mission in der modernen Welt," Christliche Welt, 20 (1906); später GS, II.

"Die Mission in der modernen Welt," Christliche Welt, 20
(1906); später 62, 11.

Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche, der staatliche Religions-
unterricht und die theologischen Fakultäten. Heidel-
berger Akademische Rede, 1906; dann auch Tübingen, 1907.

Titel Protestantismus und Fortschritt, 1913.
Wien, 1924; veränderte englische Ausg., unter d.
unveränderte Aufl., als "Belief 2" der Hist. Zeitschr.,
als "Historische Bibliothek" Bd. 24, München, 1911; 2.
Ausg., 2. Aufl., selbständig und stark erweitert,
Historische Zeitschr., 1906. Hist. Zeitschr., 97, auch Sonder-
druck; 2. Aufl., Vortrag auf dem Stuttgarter
Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung

Literatur, 1922.
1909; neuer, selbständiger Abdr., mit "Nachtrag" zur
Hälfte, 1906; 2. stark veränderte und erweiterte Aufl.,
Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Teil I, Abt. IV, 1. Hälfte,
in der Kultur der Gegenwart, Teil I, Abt. IV, 1. Hälfte,
Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft, in Die

1922.
Wissenschaft. Tübingen, 1905; 2. unveränderte Aufl.,
Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religion
Politische Ethik und Christentum. Göttingen, 1904.

graphisch ergänzt, 1907.
Antl., 1. Minuskel. vielfach verändert und biblio-
graphisch. Festchrift für Bruno Willemer, 1904; 2.
Religionsphilosophie, in Die Philosophie i. Beginn des 20.
Jahrhunderts.

druck aus Kantstudien, 9.
Philosophie der Geschichte. Berlin, 1904; Sonderab-
druck ein Beitrag zu den Untersuchungen über Kants
Religionsphilosophie.
Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie.

Theol. Rundschau, 6 (1903); später 62, 11.
"Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung";
"Moderne Geschichtsphilosophie," im Anschluss an H. Rickert's
"Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums'?" Christliche Welt, 17
(1903); später 62, 11.

"Das Wesen des modernen Geistes," Preuss. Jhbb., 128 (1907);
später GS, IV.

"Autonomie und Rationalismus in der modernen Welt," Inter-
nationale Wochenschr., 1 (Mai 1907),

"Missionsmotiv, Missionsaufgabe und neuzeitliches Humanitäts-
Christentum," Zeitschr. f. Missionskunde u. Relig.-
Wissensch., 22 (1907).

"Theodicee. - Gnade. - Prädestination," drei Aufsätze in
Christliche Welt, 21 (1907); später, in Einzelheiten z.
T. stark verändert, aufgenommen in Die Religion in
Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. V, 1913, II, 1910, u. IV, 1913.

"Dogmatik. - Erlösung. - Offenbarung," drei Aufsätze in Die
Religion in Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Monatsblatt der
Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher, herausgeg. von
Schieler, I. einziger Jahrg., Tübingen, 1907; später un-
verändert aufgenommen in die Enzyklopädie Die Religion
in Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. II, 1910 u. IV, 1913.

"Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen," Archiv für So-
zialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Bd. 26-30, 1908-
1910, über: Alte Kirche, Katholizismus und Luthertum;
später aufgenommen in GS, I.

"Luther und die moderne Welt," in "Das Christentum," Samml.
Wissenschaft u. Bildung, Bd. 50, 1908; später z. T.
wieder abgedr., zus. mit "Luther und der Protestantis-
mus," 1917, als "Luther, der Protestantismus und die
moderne Welt," in GS, IV; einzelne Abschnitte auch auf-
genommen in die 2. Auflage von Protestantisches Christen-
tum und Kirche in der Neuzeit, 1909.

"Calvinismus und Luthertum," Christliche Welt, 23 (1909);
später GS, IV.

"Der Modernismus," Die Neue Rundschau, 20, 2 (1909); später
GS, II.

"Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori," Erwiderung an Paul Spiess
in Relig. u. Geisteskultur, Zeitschr. f. relig. Vertief-
ung des mod. Geisteslebens, 3 (1909); später GS, II.

"Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wis-
senschaft," Zeitschr. f. wissensch. Theol., 51 (1909);
später GS, II.

132
"Das Wesen des modernen Geistes", Preuss. Theol., 128 (1907);
später 68, IV.

"Autonomie und Rationalismus in der modernen Welt", Inter-
nationale Wochenschr., 1 (Mai 1907).

"Missionarismus, Missionarische Aufgabe und neuzeitliches Humanitäts-
Christentum", Zeitschr. f. Missionskunde u. Religions-
wissenschaft., 22 (1907).

"Theologie, - Gnade, - Prädestination", drei Aufsätze in
Christliche Welt, 21 (1907); später in Hefenheften z.
T. stark verändert, aufgenommen in Die Religion in
Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. V, 1913, II, 1910, u. IV, 1913.

"Dogmatik, - Erlösung, - Offenbarung", drei Aufsätze in Die
Religion in Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Monatshefte der
Religionsgeschichtlichen Volkskunde, herausgeg. von
Schleier, I. einziger Jahrg., Tübingen, 1907; später un-
verändert aufgenommen in die Enzyklopädie Die Religion
in Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. II, 1910 u. IV, 1913.

"Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen", Archiv für So-
zialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Bd. 28-30, 1908-
1910, über: Alte Kirche, Rationalismus und Lutherum;
später aufgenommen in 68, I.

"Luther und die moderne Welt", in "Das Christentum", Samml.
wissenschaft u. Bildung, Bd. 50, 1908; später z. T.
wieder abgedr., zus. mit "Luther und der Protestantis-
mus", 1917, als "Luther, der Protestantismus und die
moderne Welt", in 68, IV; einzelne Abschnitte auch auf-
genommen in die 2. Auflage von Protestantische Christen-
tum und Kirche in der Neuzeit, 1909.

"Calvinismus und Lutherum", Christliche Welt, 23 (1909);
später 68, IV.

"Der Modernismus", Die Neue Rundschau, 20, 2 (1909); später
68, II.

"Zur Frage des religiösen Apriori", Erwiderung an Paul Epies
in Relig. u. Geisteswiss., Zeitschr. f. relig. Vorst.-
lung des mod. Geisteslebens, 3 (1909); später 68, II.

"Rückblick auf ein halbes Jahrhundert der theologischen Wis-
senschaft", Zeitschr. f. wissenschaftl. Theol., 61 (1909);
später 68, II.

"Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums im Verhältnis zur modernen Philosophie," Logos, 1 (1910); später GS, II.

"Aus der religiösen Bewegung der Gegenwart," Die Neue Rundschau, 21, 3 (1910); später GS, II.

"Die Bedeutung des Begriffs der Kontingenz," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 20 (1910); später GS, II.

"Schleiermacher und die Kirche," in Schleiermacher, der Philosoph des Glaubens, herausg. v. Fr. Naumann. Berlin; 1910.

"On the Possibility of a Free Christianity," an Address at the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress; Berlin; 1910.

"Dogma. - Dogmatik. - Erlösung. - Eschatologie. - Gericht Gottes. - Gesetz. - Glaube. - Glaube und Geschichte. - Gnade. - Gnadenmittel. - Heilstatsachen," artt. in Die Religion i. Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. II, 1910.

"Die Kulturbedeutung des Calvinismus," Erwiderung auf F. Rachfahl; Internationale Wochenschr., 4 (1910); später GS, IV.

Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben. Tübingen; 1911.

"Das stoisch-christliche und das moderne profane Naturrecht," Hist. Zeitschr., 106 (1911); später GS, IV.

"Die Sozialphilosophie des Christentums," Jahrb. des Freien deutschen Hochstifts Frankfurt a. M., 1911; später, unter d. Titel "Epochen und Typen der Sozialphilosophie des Christentums," GS, IV.

"Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart," in Weltansch., Philosophie u. Religion, herausg. v. Dilthey, Frischeisen-Köhler u. a.; 1911; später GS, II.

"Religiöser Individualismus und Kirche," Vortrag im Badischen wissensch. Predigerverein 1910, Protestant. Monatshefte, 1911; auch als Manuskript gedruckt, Karlsruhe; 1911; später GS, II.

Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen. SCKG (GS, I). Tübingen; 1912; Unveränderte Neudrucke 1919, 1923.

- "Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums im Verhältnis zur modernen Philosophie," Logos, I (1910); später 98, II.
- "Aus der religiösen Bewegung der Gegenwart," Die Neue Rundschau, 21, 3 (1910); später 98, II.
- "Die Bedeutung des Begriffs der Kontingenz," Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche, 80 (1910); später 98, II.
- "Schleiermacher und die Kirche," in Schleiermacher, der Philo- soph des Glaubens, herausg. v. Fr. Mannmann, Berlin: 1910.
- "On the Possibility of a Free Christianity," an Address at the Fifth International Congress for Free Christianity and Religious Progress; Berlin: 1910.
- "Dogma - Dogmatik - Erweisung - Eschatologie - Gerichte Gottes - Gesetz - Glaube - Glaube und Geschichte - Gnade - Gnadenmittel - Heilstaten," Art. in Die Religion u. Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. II, 1910.
- "Die Kulturbedeutung des Calvinismus," Erwiderung auf F. Ruch- lahl, Internationale Vortragschr., 4 (1910); später 98, IV.
- Die Bedeutung der gesellschaftlichen Jesu für den Glauben. Tübingen: 1911.
- "Das ethisch-christliche und das moderne profane Naturrecht," Monat. Zeitschr., 108 (1911); später 98, IV.
- "Die Sozialphilosophie des Christentums," Lehrb. des freien christlichen Hochschullehrers Frankfurt a. M., 1911; später, unter A. Tiffert, Epochen und Typen der Sozialphilosophie des Christentums, 98, IV.
- "Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart," in Religion u. Philoso- phie u. Religion, herausg. v. Wilh. v. Schlegel, Berlin: 1911; später 98, II.
- "Religiöses Individualismus und Kirche," Vortrag im Badischen wissenschaftl. Predigerverein 1910, Protestant. Monatshefte, 1911; auch als Broschüre gedruckt, Karlsruhe: 1911; später 98, II.
- Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen. 2 Bände (92, I). Tübingen: 1912; unveränderte Neuauflage 1919, 1923.

- "Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion,"
to the memory of William James. Harvard Theological
Review, 5 (1912); später deutsch in GS, II.
- "Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik," GS, II.
Tübingen, 1913; 2. unveränderte Aufl., 1922.
- "Renaissance und Reformation," Hist. Zeitschr., 110 (1913);
später GS, IV.
- "Das Neunzehnte Jahrhundert," art. in Realencyclop. f. protest.
Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 24, 1913; später GS, IV.
- "Die Restaurationsepoche am Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts," in
Vorträge über wissenschaftliche und kulturelle Probleme
der Gegenwart. Riga; 1913; später GS, IV.
- "Religion und Wirtschaft," Vorträge der Gehe-Stiftung zu
Dresden, 5. Bd. I. Heft, 1913; wieder abgedr. in Deutsche
Akademiereden, herausg. v. Fr. Strich, 1924; z. T. auch
abgedr. unter d. Titel "Religion, Wirtschaft und Gesell-
schaft," GS, IV.
- "Logos und Mythos in Theologie und Religionsphilosophie,"
Logos, 4 (1913); GS, II.
- "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule'," The
American Journal of Theology, 17 (1913); auch deutsch in
GS, II.
- "Die Religion im deutschen Staate," Patria. Bücher f. Kultur
u. Freiheit, 1913; auch in GS, II.
- "Kirche (1912) - Christliches Naturrecht. - Offenbarung. -
Prädestination. - Religiöses Prinzip. - Protestantismus
im Verhältnis zur Kultur. - Theodicee. - Weiterentwick-
lung der christlichen Religion," artt. in Die Religion
i. Gesch. u. Gegenwart, Bd. III, 1912, Bd. IV und V,
1913; "Christliches Naturrecht" und "Verhältnis des
Protestantismus zur Kultur" auch in GS, IV.
- "Nach Erklärung der Mobilmachung," Heidelberger Rede am 2.
August; Heidelberg, 1914; z. T. auch, unter dem Titel
"In ernster Stunde," in Freie bayerische Schulzeitung
1914, Nr. 18.
- "Unser Volksheer," Mannheimer Rede am 3. November; Heidelberg;
1914.

"Unser Volkstanz", Mannheimer Rede am 2. November; Heidelberg: 1914.

"In erster Stunde", in Kreis bayerische Schmalzstunde August; Heidelberg, 1914; n. T. auch, unter dem Titel "Nach Erkennung der Mobilisation", Heidelberg: Rede am 2. Protestantisches Kultur" auch in GS, IV. 1913; "Christliches Naturrecht" und "Verhältnis des i. Gesch. d. Gegenwart, Bd. III, 1913, Bd. IV und V. lung der christlichen Religion", erst. in Die Religion im Verhältnis zur Kultur. - Theologie. - Weiterentwicklung Protestantismus. - Christliches Naturrecht. - Offenbarung. Kirche (1913) - Christliches Naturrecht. - Offenbarung. Die Religion im deutschen Erbe", Fritz. Bucher f. Kultur American Journal of Theology, 17 (1913); auch deutsch in "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule'", Theologie, 4 (1913); GS, II.

Logos und Mythos in Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Religion und Wirtschaft, "Vorträge der Gese-Stiftung zu Dresden, 6. Bd. I. Heft, 1913; wieder abgedr. in Deutsche Abhandlungen, herausg. v. W. Stöck, 1924; n. T. auch abgedr. unter d. Titel "Religion, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft", GS, IV.

Das neunzehnte Jahrhundert, "erst. in Religionsgeschichtliche Theol. u. Kirche, Bd. 24, 1913; später GS, IV.

"Renaissance und Restauration", Hist. Zeitschr., 110 (1913); später GS, IV.

"Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik", GS, II. Theol. 3 (1913); später deutsch in GS, II.

"Mysticism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion", to the memory of William James. Harvard Theological Review, 5 (1913);

"Das Wesen des Deutschen," Karlsruher Rede am 6. Dezember 1914; Heidelberg: 1915.

"Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte in unserem grossen Kriege," Kriegsschrift. des Kaiser-Wilhelm-Danks Heft 9; 1914.

Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter. AM
Hist. Bibliothek Bd. 36; München: 1915.

"Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, herausgegeben von Hintze, Meinecke, H. Oncken und H. Schumacher, Teubner 1915; spanische Uebers. unter dem Titel "El espíritu de la cultura alemana" i. d. Samml. "Lo que es Alemania," Buenos Aires, o. J.; 2 Aufl., in Einzelh. verändert u. bibliographische ergänzt, Teubner 1916; später z. T. aufgenommen in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa, unter dem Titel "Der metaphysische und religiöse Geist der deutschen Kultur."

"Ueber Massstäbe zur Beurteilung historischer Dinge," Kaisergeburtstagsrede, Berliner Universitätsschrift; wieder abgedr. in Hist. Zeitschr. 1916; später aufgenommen in GS, III.

"Das Ethos der hebräischen Propheten," Logos, 6 (1916); später unter d. Titel "Glaube u. Ethos der hebräischen Propheten" in GS, IV.

"Die alte Kirche," Logos, 6; (1916); später GS, IV.

"Deutsche Zukunft," in Samml. von Schriften zur Zeitgeschichte, S. Fischer-Berlin 1916. Enthaltend: "Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit" und "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral", beide zuerst erschien. in Die Neue Rundschau, 27, 1 (1916); beide später z. T. aufgenommen in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.

"Die Ideen von 1914," Die Neue Rundschau, 27, 1 (1916); später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.

"Luther und der Protestantismus," Die Neue Rundschau, 28, 2 (1917); später, erweitert durch Teile von "Luther und die moderne Welt" 1908, als "Luther, der Protestantismus und die moderne Welt" in GS, IV.

"Humanismus und Nationalismus in unserem Bildungswesen," Berlin, 1917; später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.

"Humanismus und Nationalismus in unserem Bildungswesen," Her-
lin, 1917; später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.

und die moderne Welt" in GS, IV.
die moderne Welt" 1908, als "Luther, der Protestantismus
(1917); später, erweitert durch Teile von "Luther und
Luther und der Protestantismus," Die Neue Rundschau, 28, 2

auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.
"Die Ideen von 1914," Die Neue Rundschau, 27, 1 (1916); später

und Westeuropa.
(1916); beide später z. T. aufgenommen in Deutscher Geist
von der Freiheit" und "Privatmoral und Staatsmoral",
S. Fischer-Berlin 1916. Kataland: "Die deutsche Idee
"Deutsche Zukunft," in Samml. von Schriften zur Zeitgeschichte.

"Die alte Kirche," Logos, 6; (1916); später GS, IV.

ten" in GS, IV.
unter d. Titel "Glaube u. Ethos der hebräischen Prophe-
"Das Ethos der hebräischen Propheten," Logos, 6 (1916); später

GS, III.
abgedr. in Hist. Zeitschr. 1916; später aufgenommen in
Geburtsstättende. Berliner Universitätsschrift; wieder
"Über Massstäbe zur Beurteilung historischer Dinge," Kaiser-

figürs Geist der deutschen Kultur."
Westeuropa, unter dem Titel "Der metaphysische und re-
1916; später z. T. aufgenommen in Deutscher Geist und
Mineral, verändert u. bibliographische ergänzt, Tenner
"Jo que es Alemanha," Buenos Aires, o. J.; 2 Aufl., in
Titel "El espíritu de la cultura alemana" i. d. Samml.
H. Schumacher, Tenner 1916; spanische Übers. unter dem
Luter, herausgegeben von Hinz, Meisner, H. Onken und
"Der Geist der deutschen Kultur," Deutsches Land und der Welt-

Hist. Bibliothek Bd. 36; München: 1915.
Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter.
AN

9; 1914.
Kriegs," Kriegsschrift. des Kaiser-Wilhelm-Danks Helf
"Deutscher Glaube und deutsche Sitte in unserem Grossen

1914, Heidelberg: 1915.
"Das Wesen des Deutschen," Karlsruher Rede am 6. Dezember

- "Ueber einige Eigentümlichkeiten der angelsächsischen Zivilisation," Die Neue Rundschau, 28, 1 (1917); später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.
- "Der Ansturm der westlichen Demokratie," in Die deutsche Freiheit, Vorträge von Harnack, Meinecke, Sering, Troeltsch, Hintze, Gotha 1917.
- "Die Bedeutung der Geschichte für die Weltanschauung," Geschichtl. Abende i. Zentralinstitut für Erziehung u. Unterr., 10. Heft (1918); später aufgenommen in GS, III.
- "Das Wesen des Weltkrieges," in Sammelwerk Der Weltkrieg und seine Einwirkung auf das deutsche Volk, herausgeg. von Schwarte, Leipzig 1918.
- "Die Dynamik der Geschichte nach der Geschichtsphilosophie des Positivismus," Philosophische Vorträge der Kantgesellschaft 23, Berlin 1919; später aufgenommen in GS, III.
- "Ueber den Begriff einer historischen Dialektik: I. Windelband, Rickert und Hegel. - II. Der Marxismus," Hist. Zeitschr., 119 u. 120 (1919); beide später aufgenommen in GS, III.
- "Deutsche Bildung," in Der Leuchter, Darmstadt 1919; auch selbständig in der Samml. Reichs deutsche Schriften, 1919; später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa; Teilabdruck der Seiten 19-22, 28-29, 30-36 in Die Hilfe, 29, 1923.
- "Der Aufbau der europäischen Kulturgeschichte," Schmollers Jahrbuch, 44, 3 (1920); später aufgenommen in GS, III.
- "Der Entwicklungsbegriff in der modernen Geistes- und Lebensphilosophie: I. Lotze, v. Hartmann, Eucken, Nietzsche, Balthus," Hist. Zeitschr., 122 (1920); später aufgenommen in GS, III.
- "Die Krisis in der Geschichtswissenschaft," Die Hochschule, Blätter f. Akadem. Leben und student. Arbeit, 3 (1920); GS, III.
- "Der Entwicklungsbegriff in der modernen Geistes- und Lebensphilosophie: II. Die Marburger Schule, die südwestdeutsche Schule, Simmel," Hist. Zeitschr., 124 (1921); später aufgenommen in GS, III.

196
197
"Über einige Eigentümlichkeiten der angelsächsischen Zivilisation", Die Neue Rundschau, 28, 1 (1917); später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropä.

"Der Aufbau der westlichen Demokratie", in Die deutsche Freiheit, Vorzüge von Harms, Heinicke, Seeling, Trostsch, Winter, Götts 1917.

"Die Bedeutung der Geschichte für die Weltanschauung", Gesellschaft, Abende 1. Zentralinstitut für Erziehung u. Unterricht, 10. Heft (1918); später aufgenommen in 28, III.

"Das Wesen des Weltkrieges", in Sammelwerk Der Weltkrieg und seine Wirkung auf das deutsche Volk, herausg. von Schwarte, Leipzig 1918.

"Die Dynamik der Geschichte nach der Geschichtsphilosophie des Positivismus", Philosophische Vorzüge der Kantgesellschaft, 23, Berlin 1919; später aufgenommen in 28, III.

"Über den Begriff einer historischen Dialektik: I. Wandel", Zeitschr., 118 u. 120 (1919); beide später aufgenommen in 28, III.

"Deutsche Bildung", in Der Leuchter, Darmstadt 1919; auch selbständig in der Samml. Kleinere deutsche Schriften, 1919; später auch in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropä. Teilbinder der Bände 19-22, 28-29, 30-36 in die Mitte, 29, 1923.

"Der Aufbau der europäischen Kulturgeschichte", Sammelwerk, Lehrbuch, 44, 3 (1920); später aufgenommen in 28, III.

"Der Entwicklungsbegriff in der modernen Geistes- und Lebensphilosophie: I. Lotze, v. Hartmann, Eucken, Nietzsche, Dilthey", Zeitschr., 122 (1920); später aufgenommen in 28, III.

"Die Krise in der Geschichtswissenschaft", Die Hochschule, Richter f. Akad., Leben und student. Arbeit, 3 (1920); 28, III.

"Der Entwicklungsbegriff in der modernen Geistes- und Lebensphilosophie: II. Die Kopenhagener Schule, die schwedische Schule, Simmel", Zeitschr., 124 (1921); später aufgenommen in 28, III.

"Der Berg der Läuterung," Berliner Rede zur Erinnerung an den 600-jährigen Todestag Dantes; Berlin 1921. Zusätze dazu in "Zum Dante-Jubiläum," Kunstwart 34, 2.

"Die Revolution in der Wissenschaft," Schmollers Jahrbuch, 45 (1921); später GS, IV.

"Adolf v. Harnack und Ferd. Christ. Baur," in Festgabe für A. v. Harnack z. 70. Geburtstage, Tübingen; 1921; auch selbständig als Sonderabdruck.

Der Historismus und seine Probleme. I: Das logische Problem der Geschichtsphilosophie. Tübingen; 1922. GS, III.

"Der Entwicklungsbegriff in der modernen Geistes- und Lebensphilosophie. III. Phänomenologische Schule, Scheler, Croce, Bergson," Hist. Zeitschr., 125 (1922); auch aufgenommen in GS, III.

"Zur Logik des historischen Entwicklungsbegriffs," Kantstudien, 27 (1922); auch aufgenommen in GS, III.

"Die Organologie der deutschen historischen Schule," Jahrbuch "Die Dioskuren" I, München; 1922; auch aufgenommen in GS, III.

"Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 18, I (1922); in Einzelh. erweitert wieder abgedr. im Tätigkeitsbericht der deutschen Hochschule für Politik, 1923; in letzterer Fassung aufgenommen in Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa.

"Die Sozialphilosophie des Christentums," Berner Vortrag; Zürich, 1922.

"Die Krisis des Historismus," Die Neue Rundschau, 33, I (1922).

"Meine Bücher," in Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Bd. 2, 1922; später auch in GS, IV.

"Die Zufälligkeit der Geschichtswahrheiten," in Der Leuchter, Darmstadt; 1923.

Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung. Fünf (für England bestimmte) Vorträge. Eingeleitet von Friedr. v. Hügel-Kensington. Berlin; 1924; englische Ausgabe unter d. Titel Christian Thought. Its History and Application. Lectures written for delivery in England during March 1923, edited by Baron F. v. Hügel. London; 1923.

1937

Der Historismus und seine Überwindung. Kant (für
England bestimmte) Vorlesung. Hingeleitet von Friedr. v.
Hegel-Knechtsteden. Berlin; 1934; englische Ausgabe unter
d. Titel Christian Thomasius: The History and Application
Lectures written for delivery in England during March
1933, edited by Baron W. v. Hegel. London; 1933.

"Die Zeitlichkeit der Geschichtswahrheiten," in Der Forscher,
Darmstadt; 1933.

"Meine Memoiren," in Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbst-
darstellungen, Bd. 2, 1933; später auch in GS, IV.

"Die Krise des Historismus," Die Neue Rundschau, 33, 1 (1933).

"Die Sozialphilosophie des Christismus," Berner Vortrag;
Zürich, 1933.

"Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik," Weltwirtschafts-
lichen Archiv 18, 1 (1933); in Einzelh. erweitert wieder-
abgedr. im Tätigkeitsbericht der deutschen Hochschule für
Politik, 1933; in letzter Fassung aufgenommen in
Deutscher Geist und Westeuropä.

"Die Organologie der deutschen historischen Schule," Jahrbuch
"Die Döckers" I, München 1933; auch aufgenommen in GS,
III.

"Zur Logik des historischen Entwicklungsbegriffs," Kantstudien,
37 (1932); auch aufgenommen in GS, III.

"Der Entwicklungsbegriff in der modernen Geistes- und Lebens-
philosophie. III. Phänomenologische Schule, Scheler,
Grosz, Bergson," Hist. Zeitschr., 123 (1932); auch auf-
genommen in GS, III.

Der Historismus und seine Probleme. I: Das historische Problem
der Geschichtsphilosophie. Tübingen; 1932. GS, III.

"Adolf v. Harnack und Ferd. Christ. Baer," in Festgabe für A.
v. Harnack z. 70. Geburtstag, Tübingen; 1931; auch
selbständig als Sonderdruck.

"Die Revolution in der Wissenschaft," Schmolliers Jahrbuch, 43
(1931); später GS, IV.

"Der Berg der Unterwelt," Berliner Rede zur Erinnerung an den
600-jährigen Todestag Dantes; Berlin 1931. Einzige dazu
in "Zum Dante-Jubiläum," Kunstwart 34, 2.

Spektator-Briefe. Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik 1918-1922. Mit einem Geleitwort von Friedrich Meinecke. Zusammengestellt und herausgeg. von H. Baron; Tübingen; 1924.

Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie. GS, IV. Herausgegeben von H. Baron: Tübingen, 1925.

Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa. Gesammelte kulturphilosophische Aufsätze und Reden. Tübingen; 1925.

Vorlesungen über "Glaubenslehre". München; 1925.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

II. Works on Troeltsch

Bornhausen, K., "Das religiöse Apriori bei Ernst Troeltsch und Rudolf Otto," Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 139 (1910).

Reinhold, M., "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem der wissenschaftlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1923.

Craig, C. E., "Ernst Troeltsch," Methodist Review, 105 (1923) 939-963.

Biehl, H., "Hermann und Troeltsch," Z. Th. K., 18 (1908).

Dietrich, A., "Ernst Troeltsch. Eine Gedächtnisrede," 1923.
Data on this article not clear.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hucken, R., Troeltsch, die deutsche Zeit des Christentums, Gött. Gel. Anz., 185 (1903). Data on this article not clear.

II. Works on Troeltsch

Palmer, Karl, Die innerweltlichen Güter: eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Troeltschs Theorie über das Verhältnis von Religion und Kultur. Diss., Kiel. Leipzig: J. C. Harnack, 1927. US10

Fraenkel, Erich, Politik und Moral, über die Grundlagen politischer Ethik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1917. PM

Grathoff, W., Die Grundlagen der Religionsphilosophie Ernst Troeltschs. 1914. GRI

Harnack, Adolf, "Rede an Folge Ernst Troeltschs," Christliche Welt, 37 (No. 7-8) 1925.

Heinemann, Fritz, Neue Wege der Philosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer, 1929.

Henderson, K. T., "Ethics and the Control of History: A Study of Troeltsch," Church Quarterly Review, 99 (1924) 113-144.

Herman, E., "Death of a Great German Thinker," Homiletical Review, 83 (1923) 283.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

II. Works on Tiselsach

- Hintze, O., "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus,"
Bornhausen, K., "Das religiöse Apriori bei Ernst Troeltsch
und Rudolf Otto," Zeitschrift für Philosophie
und philosophische Kritik, 139 (1910).
- "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem der wissen-
schaftlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für
Theologie und Kirche, 1923.
- Craig, C. E., "Ernst Troeltsch," Methodist Review, 106 (1923)
959-963.
- Diehl, H., "Hermann und Troeltsch," Z.Th.K., 18 (1908).
- Dietrich, A., "Ernst Troeltsch. Eine Gedächtnisrede," 1923.
Data on this article not clear.
- Eucken, R., Troeltsch, die Absolutheit des Christentums,
Gött. Gel. Anz., 165 (1903). Data on this article
not clear.
- Fellner, Karl, Das ueberweltliche Gut und die inner- UGIG
weltlichen Güter; eine Auseinandersetzung mit
Ernst Troeltschs Theorie ueber das Verhältnis
von Religion und Kultur. Diss., Kiel. Leip-
zig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1927.
- Franz, Erich, Politik und Moral, ueber die Grundlagen FM
politischer Ethik. Göttingen: Vanderbroeck u.
Ruprecht, 1917.
- Günther, W., Die Grundlagen der Religionsphilosophie GRT
Ernst Troeltsch. 1914.
- Harnack, Adolf, "Rede am Sarge Ernst Troeltschs," Christliche
Welt, 37 (No. 7-8) 1923.
- Heinemann, Fritz, Neue Wege der Philosophie. Leipzig: Verlag
von Quelle & Meyer, 1929.
- Henderson, K. T., "Ethics and the Control of History: A Study
of Troeltsch," Church Quarterly Review, 99
(1924) 116-144.
- Herman, E., "Death of a Great German Thinker," Homiletical
Review, 85 (1923) 283.

Herman, E., "Death of a Great German Thinker," Homiletical Review, 85 (1923) 283.

Henderson, K. T., "Ethics and the Control of History: A Study of Troeltsch," Church Quarterly Review, 99 (1924) 115-144.

Heinemann, Fritz, Neue Wege der Philosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer, 1929.

Harnack, Adolf, "Rede am Begräbnis Ernst Troeltschs," Christliche Welt, 27 (No. 7-8) 1923.

Günther, W., Die Grundlagen der Religionsphilosophie Ernst Troeltschs. 1914.

Kraus, Erich, Politik und Moral, nebst die Grundlagen politischen Ethik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1917.

Reinert, Karl, Das neuberweltliche Gut und die innerweltlichen Güter; eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Troeltschs Theorie nebst das Verhältnis von Religion und Kultur. Diss., Kiel. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1927.

Bucken, R., Troeltsch, die Absolutheit des Christentums. Gött. Gel. Anz., 188 (1903). Data on this article not clear.

Dietrich, A., "Ernst Troeltsch. Eine Gedächtnisrede," 1923. Data on this article not clear.

Diehl, H., "Hermann und Troeltsch," Z. Th. K., 18 (1908).

Craig, C. E., "Ernst Troeltsch," Methodist Review, 100 (1923) 959-983.

Theologie und Kirche, 1923. "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem der wissenschaftlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für

und philosophische Kritik, 139 (1910). "Das religiöse Apriori bei Ernst Troeltsch und Rudolf Otto," Zeitschrift für Philosophie

- Hintze, O., "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Hist. Ztsch., 135 No. 2 (1927) 138-239.
- Hoffmann, H., "Ernst Troeltsch zum Gedächtnis," Theologische Blätter, 1923.
- Jelke, R. J., Das religiöse Apriori und die Aufgaben der Religionsphilosophie. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der religionsphilosophischen Position Ernst Troeltschs. Diss., Giessen. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1917(?).
- Kaftan, Th., Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitstudie. ET Schleswig: Julius Vergas, 1912.
- Kessler, Kurt, Die wissenschaftliche Vertretung des Christentums in der Gegenwartstheologie. WVC Langensalza: Verlag der Studierstube, 1917.
- Knudson, A. C., Present Tendencies in Religious Thought. RPT New York, Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1924.
- Olegh, Robert, "Religious Apriorism," in E. C. Wilm (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and Theology. New York: Abingdon Press, 1922.
- Koepp, Wilhelm, Eine Metaphysik des Christentums. I Bd. MC Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1927.
- Köhler, Rudolf, "Troeltsch on the Religious Values of History," Der Begriff A priori in der modernen Religionsphilosophie. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1920.
- Leidretter, Erich, Troeltsch und die Absolutheit des Christentums. TAC Inaug.-diss., Königsberg. Mohrungen, Ostpr.: Rantenberg, 1927.
- Leighton, J. A., "Review of Troeltsch's Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft," Phil. Rev., 14 (1905) 362-364.
- Liebert, Arthur, "Ernst Troeltsch. 'Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung,'" Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 359-364.
- Lindau, E., "Review of Troeltsch's Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter," Kant Studien, 21 (1917) 333.

Hintze, O., "Troeltsch und die Probleme des Historismus," Hist. Zeitsch., 135 No. 2 (1927) 188-232.

Hoffmann, H., "Ernst Troeltsch zum Gedächtnis," Theologische Blätter, 1923.

Jeike, R. J., Das religiöse Axiom und die Aufgaben der Religionsphilosophie. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der religionsphilosophischen Position Ernst Troeltschs. Diss., Gießen. Göttingen: C. Bertelsmann, 1917(?)

Katten, Th., Ernst Troeltsch, eine kritische Zeitschau. Schleswig: Julius Verlag, 1912.

Kesseler, Kurt, Die wissenschaftliche Verkennung des Christentums in der Gegenwartstheologie. Jangenslad: Verlag der Studierube, 1917.

Kundson, A. C., Present Tendencies in Religious Thought. New York, Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1924.

"Religious Axiom," in E. C. Wilm (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and Theology. New York: Abingdon Press, 1922.

Koepf, Wilhelm, Eine Metaphysik des Christentums. I Bd. Göttingen: C. Bertelsmann, 1927.

Köhler, Rudolf, Der Begriff Axiom in der modernen Religionsphilosophie. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1920.

Leibert, Erich, Troeltsch und die Absolutheit des Christentums. Inaug.-diss., Königsberg. Kohneneyer, Göttingen: Kohneneyer, 1927.

Leighton, J. A., "Review of Troeltsch's 'Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft,'" Phil. Rev., 14 (1905) 382-384.

Liebert, Arthur, "Ernst Troeltsch. Der Historismus und seine Überwindung," Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 329-384.

Lindau, E., "Review of Troeltsch's 'Axiom, die ethische Antike und das Mittelalter,'" Kant Studien, 21 (1917) 228.

- Lyman, Eugene W., "Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of History," Philosophical Review, 41 (1932) 443-465.
- Macintosh, D. C., "Troeltsch's Theory of Religious Knowledge," American Journal of Theology, 23 (1919) 274-289.
- Meinecke, Friederich, "Ernst Troeltsch und das Problem des Historismus," (Berlin) Deutsche Nation, (Mar., 1923).
- Mezger, Paul, Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. ACR
- Parpert, F., Die Aufgabe der geschichtlichen Abstraktion, eine Auseinandersetzung mit E. Troeltschs Geschichtsmythodologie. Dissertation. Göttingen, 1919.
- Ritzert, G., Die Religionsphilosophie Ernst Troeltschs. RET 1924. Data not complete.
- Sleigh, Robert Skillen, The Sufficiency of Christianity. SC London: J. Clark & Co., Ltd., 1923.
- Spiess, Emil, Die Religionstheorie von Ernst Troeltsch. RTT Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1927.
- Tasker, J. C., "Troeltsch on the Religious Values of History," London Quarterly Review, 142 (1924) 51-61.
- Tillich, Paul, "Ernst Troeltsch. Versuch einer geistesgeschichtlichen Würdigung," Kant Studien, 29 (1924) 351-358.
- Ueberweg, F., Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. GGP 5. Bd., Die Deutsche Philosophie des XIX. Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1923.
- Vermeil, Edmond, La pensée religieuse de Troeltsch. PLT Strasbourg: Librairie Istra, 1922.
- von Hügel, F., "Introduction" to Troeltsch's Christian Thought. CT
- "Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity studied in connection with the Works of Ernst Troeltsch," Constructive Quarterly, 2 (1914) 69-98, 673-701. Published later in

Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. Series I. London: J. M. Dent, 1921. EA

von Rintelen, Fritz-Joachim, "Der Versuch einer Ueberwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 8 (1930) 324-372.

Wiencke, Fr., Die Entwicklung des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs bei Ernst Troeltsch. Inaug.-diss., Berlin: 1929. EPG

Wobbermin, W., "Religionsphilosophie als theologische Aufgabe," Kant Studien, 33 (1928) 200-218.

Wolfe, G. E., "Troeltsch's Conception of the Significance of Jesus," American Journal of Theology, 20 (1916) 179-204.

Wundt, Wilhelm, Problem der Völkerpsychologie. Leipzig: Ernst Wiegandt, 1911. PV

Wünsch, G., "Ernst Troeltsch zum Gedächtnis," Christliche Welt, 37 (1923).

Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. Series I. London: J. M. Dent, 1931.

von Rintelen, Fritz-Joachim, "Der Versuch einer Überwindung des Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 8 (1930) 324-372.

Wiener, H., Die Entwicklung des philosophischen Gottesbeweises bei Ernst Troeltsch. Inaug.-diss., Berlin: 1929.

Wobbermin, W., "Religionsphilosophie als theologische Aufgabe," Kant Studien, 33 (1928) 200-218.

Wolfe, G. E., "Troeltsch's Conception of the Significance of Jesus," American Journal of Theology, 30 (1916) 178-204.

Wundt, Wilhelm, Problem der Völkerpsychologie. Leipzig: IV. Ernst Wiegandt, 1911.

Wunsch, G., "Ernst Troeltsch zum Gedächtnis," Christliche Welt, 37 (1923).

Baldwin, J. M., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. DPF
2 vol. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1923.

Brightman, E. S., "A Temporalist View of God," SRM, Rel., 12
(1932) 544-555.

Edgington, A. S., The Nature of the Physical World. MPW
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1923.

Harkness, Georgia, John Calvin the Man and his Mission. CMS
N. Y.: Henry Holt, 1931.

Lalande, André, Vocabulaire de la Philosophie. V vol. VI
Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933.

Leibniz, G. W., Discourse of Metaphysics. CMS
Chicago: Open Court, 1933.

Martmann, Nicolai, Das Problem des geistigen Gottes. PMS
Leipzig: Felix Alcan, 1933.

III. Other Works Consulted

Hegel, G. W. F., Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. Hrg. v. Lasson, Leipzig:
Felix Alcan, 1933.

Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Hrg. v. Lasson, Leipzig: Felix
Alcan, 1933.

Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix
Alcan, n. d.

Horkheimer, Max, Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933.

Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft. KrV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. KrV
Metaphysik der Sitten. In der Philo-
sophischen Bibliothek, Leipzig: Felix Alcan, 1933.

Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysik, tr. by E. Bouanquet, MS
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884.

Microcosmus. Tr. by Elizabeth
Hamilton and E. S. Constance Jones, N. Y.:
Scribners and Welford, 1887.

- Baldwin, J. M., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. DPP
2 vol. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1928.
- Brightman, E. S., "A Temporalist View of God," Jour. Rel., 12
(1932) 544-555.
- Eddington, A. S., The Nature of the Physical World. NPW
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1928.
- Harkness, Georgia, John Calvin the Man and his Ethics. CME
N. Y.: Henry Holt, 1931.
- Lalande, André, Vocabulaire de la Philosophie. 2 vol. VP
Paris: Felix Alcan, 1928.
- Leibniz, G. W., Discourse of Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, Monadology. MET
Tr. by G. P. Montgomery, Chicago: Open Court, 1924.
- Hartmann, Nicolai, Das Problem des geistigen Seins. PGS
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1932.
- Hegel, G. W. F., Encyclopaedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. EPW
Hrsg. v. Lasson, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923.
- Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. GPR
Hrsg. v. Lasson, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1930.
- Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte. VPG
Leipzig: Verlag von Phillipp Reclam, n. d.
- Horkheimer, Max, Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie. ABG
Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1930.
- Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft. KrV
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. KpV
Metaphysik der Sitten. MS
In der Philosophischen Bibliothek, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1919.
- Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysic, tr. by B. Bosanquet, MET
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884.
- Microcosmus. MIC
Tr. by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones, N. Y.:
Scribners and Welford, 1887.

SCOTT
MIC
Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones, N. Y.:
Scriveners and Welford, 1887.

LOTZE, Hermann, Metaphysik, tr. by H. Benardet,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884.

ME
Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,
Metaphysik der Sitten. In der Philo-
sophischen Bibliothek, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1919.

ABG
Horkheimer, Max, Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichts-
philosophie. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1930.

VPO
Neelam, N. S., Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der
Geschichte. Leipzig: Verlag von Philipp
Reclam, n. d.

GPR
Meiner, Felix, 1930.
Rechte. Hrg. v. Lassen, Leipzig: Felix
Meiner, 1930.

ME
Nagel, G. W. V., Encyclopaedia der philosophischen
Wissenschaften. Hrg. v. Lassen, Leipzig:
Felix Meiner, 1932.

PGS
Hartmann, Nicolai, Das Problem des reinen Seins.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1932.

MT
Montgomery, Chicago: Open Court, 1934.
once with Arnold, Montology. Tr. by G. P.
Leibniz, G. W., Discourse of Metaphysics, Correspond-

VP
Lafande, Andre, Voynichiste de la Philosophie. 2 vol.
Paris: Felix Alcan, 1938.

CMS
Harnass, Georgia, John Calvin the Man and his Ethics.
N. Y.: Henry Holt, 1931.

EDDINGTON, A. S., The Nature of the Physical World.
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1928.

BRIGHAM, E. S., "A Temperamental View of God", Jour. Rel., 13
(1932) 244-252.

BEIDWIN, J. H., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 2 vol.
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1928.

Marx-Engels, Ueber historischen Materialismus. Berlin:
Internationaler Arbeiterverlag, 1930.

Perry, R. B., Philosophy of the Recent Past. PRP
London: Scribner's Sons, 1927.

"Is Society a Person," Jour. Phil., 21 (1924)
87-91.

Rickert, Heinrich, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. GE
3. Aufl., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915.

Die Philosophie des Lebens. PL
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920.

Rothacker, Erich, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften.
Tübingen: Mohr, 1920.

Stace, W. T., The Philosophy of Hegel. POH
London: Macmillan and Co., 1924.

Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of PESC
Capitalism. Tr. by Talcott Parsons, N. Y.:
Scribners, 1930.

Whitehead, A. N., Science and the Modern World. SMW
N. Y.: Macmillan, 1925.

Marr-Saunders, Über historische Materialismus. Berlin: Internationaler Arbeiterverlag, 1930.

Ferry, M. B., Philosophy of the Recent Past. London: Gollancz's Sons, 1937.

"Is Society a Person," Ann. Phil., 31 (1934) 87-91.

Rickert, Heinrich, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. 3. Aufl., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1918.

Die Philosophie des Lebens. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1930.

Reichardt, Erich, Mineralismus in die Geisteswissenschaften. Tübingen: Mohr, 1930.

Stace, W. T., The Philosophy of Hegel. London: Macmillan and Co., 1934.

Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Tr. by F. Parson, N. Y.: Scribners, 1930.

Whitehead, A. N., Science and the Modern World. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1935.


Brief Autobiography



Walter George Muelder was born in Boody, Illinois, March 1, 1907, the second child of Reverend Epke Hermann Muelder and Minnie Horlitz Muelder. The parents were both born in Germany but came to America while still in their childhood. Walter received his elementary education in Peoria and in San Jose, Illinois, and his secondary education in San Jose, Illinois, and in Burlington, Iowa. Then followed (1923-1925) two years study in the Burlington Junior College. From 1925 to 1927 he attended Knox College, where he received the B. S. degree in 1927. The next three years were spent in Boston University School of Theology (1927-1930), at the end of which he was granted the S. T. B. degree. At this time he was also awarded the Frank D. Howard Fellowship from the School of Theology and an American German Exchange Fellowship from the Institute of International Education in New York City. The next year (1930-1931) was spent primarily at the University of Frankfurt am Main, Germany. From 1931 to 1933 he has been enrolled in the Boston University Graduate School. During the academic year 1931-1932 he was the Fellow in Systematic Theology and in 1932-1933 the Borden Parker Bowne Fellow in Philosophy.



6



BOSTON UNIVERSITY



1 1719 02459 8908

Date: 05/03/2005
Box Type: 1 2
File Seq: 00004
B1351
-C2-0029-2-08-02


PUTAWAY - FILE



6903791 *

DO NOT REMOVE

CHARGE SLIP FROM THIS POCKET
IF SLIP IS LOST PLEASE RETURN BOOK
DIRECTLY TO A CIRCULATION STAFF MEMBER.



Boston University Libraries
771 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02215

